God as a Mental concept

[dogsgod]

Knowledge is very distinct from belief. Using knowledge, for example, one can calculate the orbit of a distant planet so as to have a rocket reach its target. Beliefs don't necessarily contain knowledge because it's possible to believe a falsehood or to deny a truth.

 

[Dunemeister]

Knowledge is very distinct from belief. Using knowledge, for example, one can calculate the orbit of a distant planet so as to have a rocket reach its target. Beliefs don't necessarily contain knowledge because it's possible to believe a falsehood or to deny a truth.

Beliefs don't "contain" knowledge. "Knowledge" is what we call beliefs that have a privileged status. Thus our knowledge is a subset of our beliefs, not something distinct from them. That is we have a set of beliefs S; our knowledge includes some but not all of our beliefs in S.

 

[Dunemeister]

Invisible God/s exist or they don't.

Well, we'd have to get more precise on the content of "God", but whatever definition you apply, you're right. That god exists or doesn't. Something can't exist AND not exist at the same time and in the same manner.

 

[Guitar's Cry]

Philosophically, that's at best imprecise. Belief is an attitude we take toward a proposition. When we believe it, we take an attitude of "I am confident this is true" toward it. So if I (fully) believe 3 + 2 = 5, it means I'm confident that 3 + 2 = 5 is true.

Knowlege is a normative notion. It is a status we baptize a subset of our beliefs with. I believe lots of things, but not all my beliefs constitute knowledge. I believe my grandmother lives in Town A. But I haven't seen her in 20 years, and it could well be that she's moved. I just haven't heard one way or the other. Even if by some fluke she still lives in Town A, I don't know that. Why? Well, for one thing my belief is outdated. Given the myriad circumstances that could have happened in the last couple of decades, I can't well claim to know that she lives in Town A (unless I know something else about her that would make me think she couldn't have moved).

Philosophically, I think it is okay to be imprecise in this case.

I keep trying in some way to distinguish how knowledge can be characterized away from a belief, but I can seem to shake the fact that knowledge here appears to be associated with a belief that lines up with a reality outside the individual, and I just can't do that.

For one thing, if belief is an attitude, then it represents our notion of knowledge from an ignorant viewpoint: we don't necessarily need to know that our belief aligns with a circumstance outside our individual situation.

But can we ever really know that. Knowledge also appears to be an attitude--or perhaps a viewpoint (the same?)--about a given circumstance.

I could wrong, of course, and am just stuck in a mental rut.

Prephilosophically, there's no problem with that, but when you try to get more philosophically precise, you need to be clearer about the distinctions. Ever since Plato, there has been a remarkable consensus in the western philosophical tradition that knowledge is related to belief, but not in the way you suggest. As I said earlier, knowledge is a sort of privileged belief. Intuitively, it's one thing to say I believe Bismark is the capital of North Dakota. It's true. But if I believe it because I have a brain lesion that compels me to believe that, or if I believe it out of an acid trip hallucination, I don't know it. On the other hand, if I learn it in school from a competent authority backed up by current political maps, or if I grow up there and visit the state legislative buildings, then I can be said to know it. The belief is no longer "mere" belief, it's knowledge.

But you do know it! It's just the rest of the world that doesn't agree with you.

If all you need for a belief to be knowledge is a shared social reality, then belief simply becomes a personal, private knowledge.

Just a slight correction. In the case, the issue isn't the belief that there are wind chimes but the status of the belief that the wind is blowing.

Then the difference between belief and knowledge in this case is the time between the event and recognition?

Again, the issue isn't whether they get "conceptions" or "conceptualize" things.

Well, it is in this thread.

Of course they do. The question is which person's belief has a privileged status we call "knowledge". Knowledge is not just having conceptions.

But it is the only way we can have knowledge. Without conceptions, there is nothing.

In other words, I'm beginning to have a concept that knowledge is primarily a social thing: that it exists as something in the shared reality rather than in a general reality.

I might conceptualize a whole raft of things, but if those things are not true, or if those things happen to be true but my belief in them is the result of capricious Alpha Centaurian cognitive scientists, a Cartesian evil demon, dumb luck or brain lesion, I can't be said to know them. Back to our case. Intuitively, the man subject to hallucinations forms the belief The wind is blowing, but there is something amiss with his so believing. It's true the wind is blowing, and he believes the wind is blowing, but the connection between the way the world is and his belief is skewed. He doesn't believe the wind is blowing because of the way the world is but because he suffers from hallucinations. His friend, on the other hand, comes by his belief through the proper functioning of his sensory organs and his cognitive faculties. Thus his belief is (or at least can be) knowledge.

Our reality is, in a way, built off of Descartes' Evil Demon: we are thrown into a timeline that we are trained to understand, being given limited sensory information and a brain that can formulate our world only through scaffolding frameworks.

Any objective notion is thus similar to a Hegelian Absolute; it is a fine perspective, but it is only a perspective. Thus, while things may seem all bright and sunny from on high, Dostoevsky is still suffering from his toothache down below while Kierkegaard is shouting "I'm an individual, goshdarnit! And my limited perspective is truth! So there!"

So my hallucinations are, to me, real. If I wish to justify them in a neurological way, I can say that my hallucination of the unicorn represents a synaptic connection that your brain doesn't have. A synaptic connection that is as real as your belief that 2+3=5.

The concept may originate where you please. But the man's belief in the concept arises out of a psychological need unrelated to truth. That's why, even if it's true that God exists, if you come by your belief in this way, your belief isn't knowledge.

I'm tellin' ya, that unicorn is there!

My main point is that every concept is mental, but not every concept is knowledge. Knowledge a belief that is formed by truth-conducive methods. The world and the belief are appropriately related by sensory and cognitive processes that are aimed at providing true beliefs. To the extent that our beliefs are not so formed, they don't constitute knowledge.

And I'll end with conceding that this is a useful distinction, but in the end, from the perspective of the individual believing in God because he desires it, and, from forming that concept through knowledge attained from Sunday School or Bible Study or just plain living in a culture that has this knowledge of God, his concept is no different from the man who does not wish God, but must admit his belief from his own personal study of the matter.

 

[Guitar's Cry]

Beliefs don't "contain" knowledge. "Knowledge" is what we call beliefs that have a privileged status. Thus our knowledge is a subset of our beliefs, not something distinct from them. That is we have a set of beliefs S; our knowledge includes some but not all of our beliefs in S.

I can agree with this, actually, despite some of my other posts.

I've never actually thought about the finer points of distinguishing "knowledge" and "belief," so this is actually giving something new to think about.

 

[Dunemeister]

Philosophically, I think it is okay to be imprecise in this case.

Well, as Aristotle enjoins, let us not seek more precision than the case permits.

I keep trying in some way to distinguish how knowledge can be characterized away from a belief, but I can seem to shake the fact that knowledge here appears to be associated with a belief that lines up with a reality outside the individual, and I just can't do that.

Well, knowledge does hinge on truth. You can't know something that isn't true. Now, for most of us, a belief is true if and only if it represents the way the world really is. If you've given up on the notion that there's a way the world is independently of anyone having beliefs about it, then of course you'll have issues with my account of knowledge. But it just seems to me that if you think that there's no world out there beyond your mental one, you've slipped into solipsism. I can't PROVE that there's a world external to what my mind perceives, but to get by in the world, I simply have to assume it. As even Hume admitted, the global skeptic (one who denies the existence of objects separate from the perceiver) also assumes, to get on with life, that the external world exists. Even the global skeptic leaves the room by the door, not the window.

For one thing, if belief is an attitude, then it represents our notion of knowledge from an ignorant viewpoint: we don't necessarily need to know that our belief aligns with a circumstance outside our individual situation.

I'm not sure what you mean here. When I say that a belief matches the world, I mean that my belief RB: "I had Raisin Bran for breakfast this morning" faithfully represents the way the world was this morning. If RB is false (I actually had Corn Flakes), the belief isn't true. In order for me to know RB, RB must be true AND I must believe RB by the right means. Namely, my memory must not be playing me tricks, my sensory and cognitive faculties must be operating as they should, and those faculties must be successfully designed to produce true beliefs.

But can we ever really know that. Knowledge also appears to be an attitude--or perhaps a viewpoint (the same?)--about a given circumstance.

Your question devolves to "Can I know that my sensory and cognitive faculties are successfully designed to obtain true beliefs about the world, and in the case of any particular belief formation, can I know that my faculties are so working?" I think that we can presume proper function unless and until it can be shown that they are malfunctioning. That's what pyschiatrists and doctors are for.

As for knowledge being an attitude, again I'd say that's a bit misleading. Let's say that "warrant" is that quantity enough of which transforms a true belief into knowledge. What we've been talking about then amounts to "What confers warrant on a belief?" I've tried to argue that warrant comes via the proper functioning of sensory and cognitive machinery. And now it's important to observe that warrant comes in degrees. I believe 3 + 2 = 5. In fact, I believe it quite firmly. It seems obviously true. We could say that this belief has maximal warrant, so I believe it quite firmly. On the other hand, I also believe that mathematics is incomplete. But I don't believe this as firmly as 3 + 2 = 5. I'm not expert enough in mathematical reasoning to work it out for myself, but guys with PhDs in mathematics have told me so, and I take their word for it. So my belief that mathematics is incomplete has warrant, but less so than that 3 + 2 = 5. And so I believe it less firmly.

So there's a sense in which you're right. I believe things with varying degrees of firmness. The firmness with which I believe them is a measure of how much warrant they have. And warrant is that quantity enough of which transforms a belief into knowledge. However, to be clear, the belief is the attitude that something is true. Warrant is what provides extra force or weight (the word is hard to choose) to the belief.

I could wrong, of course, and am just stuck in a mental rut.

Couldn't we and aren't we all?

But you do know it! It's just the rest of the world that doesn't agree with you.

Well, if I had a belief that is universally rejected, I'd say the belief has very little warrant for me, and so does not constitute knowledge. My insistence that it IS knowledge merely shows the depth of my self deception.

If all you need for a belief to be knowledge is a shared social reality, then belief simply becomes a personal, private knowledge.

I hope I've shown that I don't believe that this is "all" you need.

And I'll end with conceding that this is a useful distinction, but in the end, from the perspective of the individual believing in God because he desires it, and, from forming that concept through knowledge attained from Sunday School or Bible Study or just plain living in a culture that has this knowledge of God, his concept is no different from the man who does not wish God, but must admit his belief from his own personal study of the matter.

The concept is the same, but as I've said having a conception is not the same as knowing it. Knowing implies that the belief is acquired the right way. Wish fulfillment is not aimed at truth, so beliefs formed by that mechanism don't count as knowledge. Beliefs formed as a result of insanity or brain lesions, even if they happen to be true, aren't knowledge. And this is so even if the insane person and the soberly rational person arrive at the same conception of God.

Anyway, you said "I'll end", so I suppose I'll end to. Thanks for a stimulating discussion.

 

[Willamena]

the idea is probably that contradictory propositions can't both be true at the same time and in the same way. You believe that Bismark is the capital of North Dakota. I believe that Bismark is not the capital of North Dakota. These beliefs cannot both be true. Either Bismark is the capital or it's not. Period. I think it's this idea that underlies what atotalstranger is on about.

And that's fine. I simply proposed that the condition doesn't apply for mental concepts. If "God" (like "objective truth") is a mental concept, per the OP, then one person can hold that the mental concept exists and another hold that it does not, and both can be true because each is the one holding the mental concept. In that instance, "god exist for one and not for the other."

Edit: More precisely, the condition still applies - the statements are both true at the same time in the same way.

 

[Dunemeister]

And that's fine. I simply proposed that the condition doesn't apply for mental concepts. If "God" (like "objective truth") is a mental concept, per the OP, then one person can hold that the mental concept exists and another hold that it does not, and both can be true because each is the one holding the mental concept. In that instance, "god exist for one and not for the other."

A and B are discussing/holding the concept "God." Check. On your analysis, A says the concept of God exists and B says it doesn't. But what does that even mean? Surely the concept exists whether God exists or not. But in that case, what you've said is trivially (in the sense of being a matter of definition) true.

I don't think the people are debating whether the concept of God exists but whether God exists. That is, they are debating whether the proposition God exists is true. And if that's the case, even though both parties to the dispute are holding the same view of God (that is, they are discussing the existence of the same God), only one of the disputants can be right.

 

[Willamena]

A and B are discussing/holding the concept "God." Check. On your analysis, A says the concept of God exists and B says it doesn't. But what does that even mean? Surely the concept exists whether God exists or not. But in that case, what you've said is trivially (in the sense of being a matter of definition) true.

I don't think the people are debating whether the concept of God exists but whether God exists. That is, they are debating whether the proposition God exists is true. And if that's the case, even though both parties to the dispute are holding the same view of God (that is, they are discussing the existence of the same God), only one of the disputants can be right.

What does it mean for a mental concept to exist? Atotalstranger suggested earlier that, to him, a mental concept does exist, but is not an entity. To someone else it may not "exist" because it is not an entity; and to still another, it may qualify as an entity. We each formulate the world (even with identical defintion) in different ways unique to each of us: our "world views".

I happen to think it's not trivial, but essential.

I understand that people are debating whether "God" exists. I'm simply trying to contribute to the thread per the topic of the OP. Sorry if I interrupted something else.

 

[Dunemeister]

What does it mean for a mental concept to exist? Atotalstranger suggested earlier that, to him, a mental concept does exist, but is not an entity. To someone else it may not "exist" because it is not an entity; and to still another, it may qualify as an entity. We each formulate the world (even with identical defintion) in different ways unique to each of us: our "world views".

I happen to think it's not trivial, but essential.

I understand that people are debating whether "God" exists. I'm simply trying to contribute to the thread per the topic of the OP. Sorry if I interrupted something else.

No, I don't think you're interrupting anything. We're probably talking about the same thing but using such widely various categories that at best we talk past each other.

But trying to talk with you rather than past you, I'm unclear how different people can affirm both that a concept exists and not exists in the same way without falling into contradiction, which is what I assume was at issue in the first instance. If the people in dispute are talking about different things, such as the manner in which a thing can exist, they are not contradicting each other; they are talking past each other.

 

[dogsgod]

Sure, the concept of a God exists for the believer, but if there is no God the concept represents a falsehood. If there is a God, the concept could still represent a falsehood if the concept does not in any way describe God.

 

[Willamena]

But trying to talk with you rather than past you, I'm unclear how different people can affirm both that a concept exists and not exists in the same way without falling into contradiction, which is what I assume was at issue in the first instance.

Because it can exist for one and not for another; but the manner in which it would exist is the same for both.

 

[Mr Cheese]

Sure, the concept of a God exists for the believer, but if there is no God the concept represents a falsehood. If there is a God, the concept could still represent a falsehood if the concept does not in any way describe God.

depends on how you define God
I would assert that God is everything, and beyond concept

Thus your assertion is left in the creek without a paddle

 

[Mr Cheese]

I don't think the people are debating whether the concept of God exists but whether God exists.

What IS God?

Before you can truly debate whther God exists, you must first define what God is

I can discuss the non existence of chinese male nipples. As I have never seen any. I can do this because both parties in a discussion know what male nipples are.

It is really impossible to discuss whther God exists until you what God is.
Or you can just compramise and discuss scritpure adn Dogma, which is just a compramise..and not really discussing God

 

[Willamena]

depends on how you define God
I would assert that God is everything, and beyond concept

Thus your assertion is left in the creek without a paddle

What does it mean to be "beyond concept"? That is not a concept I can grasp.

 

[Mr Cheese]

What does it mean to be "beyond concept"? That is not a concept I can grasp.

heh, you're pokign fun but...


:flirt: It is something you can experience but not express.

to put it simply without flowerly language:

like having great sex, and having a great orgasm....
and simply not being able to express what you experienced.

That is what I mean...
...........

The purpose of a fishtrap is to catch fish, and when the fish are caught, the trap is forgotten.
The purpose of a rabbit snare is to catch rabbits. When the rabbits are caught, the snare is forgotten.
The purpose of words is to convey ideas. When the ideas are grasped, the words are forgotten.
Where can I find a man who has forgotten words? He is the one I would like to talk to.


–Chuang Tsu

 

[nonbeliever_92]

I think people cannot distinguish between a supernatural being and an experience.

 

[Willamena]

I think people cannot distinguish between a supernatural being and an experience.

Perhaps they shouldn't.

 

[nonbeliever_92]

Perhaps they shouldn't.

why????

 

[Willamena]

why????

Because there is no right and wrong when it comes to what "a supernatural being", or even "an experience", is. They can be different, and they can be the same thing.