God existance paradox?

[Enai de a lukal]

It's hardly a surprise that they would discuss the logical problem of evil, not only because it was very popular and in the interest of thoroughness, but because it has been veritably refuted!

You're either being naive or partisan. Plantinga's free will defense is hardly a conclusive refutation.

I think I'd agree. I don't think the problem of evil (either the evidential or the logical) has any intellectual force. Yet it does have quite a strong emotional force.

Just exaggerating again. It most certainly has intellectual force, and I don't think Plantinga's argument, or any theodicy I've seen, adequately answers it. I just think its small potatoes compared to the other problems facing theism.

Mackie, Enai? Mackie is of a bygone generation.

So are many writers who are nevertheless part of the contemporary discussion. A generation is a blink of the eye in academic philosophy. It's also ironic that you should say this here, since Plantinga and Mackie belong to the same generation.

 

[Sovereign Dream]

You're either being naive or partisan. Plantinga's free will defense is hardly a conclusive refutation.
Just exaggerating again. It most certainly has intellectual force, and I don't think Plantinga's argument, or any theodicy I've seen, adequately answers it. I just think its small potatoes compared to the other problems facing theism.
So are many writers who are nevertheless part of the contemporary discussion. A generation is a blink of the eye in academic philosophy. It's also ironic that you should say this here, since Plantinga and Mackie belong to the same generation.

Would you care to defend the logical problem of evil, then?

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Sure.

 

[George-ananda]

People have been reporting these sorts of incidents for millenia. And they are always of dubious credibility, and admit of more plausible explanations. More tellingly, the best we get are second-hand reports; none of these sorts of events have ever been documented by a credible impartial source.

Who determines the credibility ratings where every report, witness and investigator supporting a miracle claim is always of dubious credibility? My point is credibility may be subjective here.

When atheist/skeptics are converted, the 'true' skeptics claim the converted were naive, duped or gullible. With those techniques, the hard-core skeptic can make the debate go on forever. The debate can go on forever but I will form my own objective judgement.

 

[Sovereign Dream]

Sure.

Ok, let me know where you post your defense.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Ok, I'm hoping we can just skip to Plantinga- not much point in rehashing the problem of evil, since its formulation hasn't changed much over the centuries. In short, his entire solution presupposes libertarian free will- a concept which is incomplete at best, incoherent at worst. It also revolves around two similarly dubious claims; that the existence of libertarian free will both accounts for and justifies/outweighs the existence of evil- that evil exists as a necessary condition for this sort of free will, and that the good of this free will outweighs any evils which accompany it. A. I don't see how a concept of libertarian free will can be formulated that can adequately justify the claim that libertarian free will is good, so much so as to outweigh evil, B. I don't see that an omnipotent being would have to even make a choice here in the first place, and C. I find the notion of moral goodness at play here extremely naive and problematic; it presupposes a very black-and-white moral realism which I don't think is tenable.

I can elaborate on any of these items at need, but what should be clear is that several of the assumptions or claims which Plantinga's defense requires are not obviously true.

 

[Skwim]

Ok, I'm hoping we can just skip to Plantinga- not much point in rehashing the problem of evil, since its formulation hasn't changed much over the centuries. In short, his entire solution presupposes libertarian free will- a concept which is incomplete at best, incoherent at worst. It also revolves around two similarly dubious claims; that the existence of libertarian free will both accounts for and justifies/outweighs the existence of evil- that evil exists as a necessary condition for this sort of free will, and that the good of this free will outweighs any evils which accompany it. A. I don't see how a concept of libertarian free will can be formulated that can adequately justify the claim that libertarian free will is good, so much so as to outweigh evil, B. I don't see that an omnipotent being would have to even make a choice here in the first place, and C. I find the notion of moral goodness at play here extremely naive and problematic; it presupposes a very black-and-white moral realism which I don't think is tenable.

I can elaborate on any of these items at need, but what should be clear is that several of the assumptions or claims which Plantinga's defense requires are not obviously true.

​

 

[ruffen]

Also, there is no conceptual or logical reason why free will must necessarily lead to people choosing evil. It is easy to imagine a world where everyone can choose evil but have no interest or inclination towards it, just like everyone can freely choose to put their hand in boiling water, but still (almost) everyone freely chooses not to.

 

[Akivah]

Evil can be stated as excessive self-interest.

 

[Sovereign Dream]

Ok, I'm hoping we can just skip to Plantinga- not much point in rehashing the problem of evil, since its formulation hasn't changed much over the centuries. In short, his entire solution presupposes libertarian free will- a concept which is incomplete at best, incoherent at worst. It also revolves around two similarly dubious claims; that the existence of libertarian free will both accounts for and justifies/outweighs the existence of evil- that evil exists as a necessary condition for this sort of free will, and that the good of this free will outweighs any evils which accompany it. A. I don't see how a concept of libertarian free will can be formulated that can adequately justify the claim that libertarian free will is good, so much so as to outweigh evil, B. I don't see that an omnipotent being would have to even make a choice here in the first place, and C. I find the notion of moral goodness at play here extremely naive and problematic; it presupposes a very black-and-white moral realism which I don't think is tenable.

I can elaborate on any of these items at need, but what should be clear is that several of the assumptions or claims which Plantinga's defense requires are not obviously true.

You'll notice that I asked you to defend the logical problem of evil, not present a critique of Plantinga's Free Will Defense. Anyone -- an atheist, a theist, one who finds the logical problem of evil compelling, one who finds the logical problem of evil not compelling, etc. -- can present a critique of Plantinga's FW Defense. What I'm interested in is your defense of the logical problem of evil.

Responding anyway to the criticism, I don't know what you mean when you say that free will is "incomplete or incoherent." That's something you should elaborate on lest it be mistaken as a mere unintelligible bare assertion. But that the free will defends "hinges" on the supposition that we do have free will is a mere triviality. Moreover, that we have free will seems to be patently obvious (indeed, Plantinga no doubt thinks that belief that we have free will is properly basic). In fact, as Craig and others have pointed out, one cannot even rationally affirm that determinism is true for, if determinism is true, then a person's "deciding" that determinism is true was itself determined such that the person never really weighed the alternatives and came to a free decision on the matter. Furthermore, denying that we do have free will, if that is what Plantinga's Free Will Defense commits you to, forces you to embrace the absurd by embracing determinism and with it a sort of moral nihilism, for an agent cannot be held responsible for an act that he never freely willed to do in the first place. In so doing, you'd have to do away with any sort of belief in moral responsibility, which is patently absurd.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

You'll notice that I asked you to defend the logical problem of evil, not present a critique of Plantinga's Free Will Defense.

That would sort of be beating a dead horse; the logical problem of evil is done to death, on boards like these especially, and to be honest I'm basically bored silly with them. But you've claimed that Plantinga's argument in particular refutes the logical problem of evil, so it seemed most pertinent to focus on that specifically.

Responding anyway to the criticism, I don't know what you mean when you say that free will is "incomplete or incoherent."

Not free will, libertarian free will: the view that free will consists in an agent being the sole cause of an action, and not anything external to that agent (such as God). And there are several problems here: that libertarianism provides, at best, a necessary but not sufficient condition of free will, since an action may be caused by an event internal to an agent, and still not be freely willed- do I freely will an involuntary action that is caused by physiological process in my body? Clearly not. Worse, that libertarian free will is valuable (a presupposition of Plantinga's) needn't entail that agents have the capacity to inflict harm upon others- one could have free will, but not the power to cause suffering in others (and as this is not a contradiction, it would fall within the scope of an omnipotent's being's power). And lastly, free will provides no response to the problem of natural evil.

But that the free will defends "hinges" on the supposition that we do have free will is a mere triviality.

Libertarian free will.

Moreover, that we have free will seems to be patently obvious

I shouldn't have to tell you what's wrong with this.

In fact, as Craig and others have pointed out, one cannot even rationally affirm that determinism is true for, if determinism is true, then a person's "deciding" that determinism is true was itself determined such that the person never really weighed the alternatives and came to a free decision on the matter.

This is essentially a strawman.

Furthermore, denying that we do have free will, if that is what Plantinga's Free Will Defense commits you to, forces you to embrace the absurd by embracing determinism and with it a sort of moral nihilism, for an agent cannot be held responsible for an act that he never freely willed to do in the first place. In so doing, you'd have to do away with any sort of belief in moral responsibility, which is patently absurd.

Not only is moral nihilism/anti-realism not absurd, it is eminently tenable. As is determinism. Come on now, claiming this or that position you disagree with is "absurd" isn't going to hold any water here.

 

[Sovereign Dream]

That would sort of be beating a dead horse; the logical problem of evil is done to death, on boards like these especially, and to be honest I'm basically bored silly with them. But you've claimed that Plantinga's argument in particular refutes the logical problem of evil, so it seemed most pertinent to focus on that specifically.

I didn't ask you whether the LPoE was "done to death," I asked you to defend it. If you're not willing to, then perhaps you shouldn't have said that you were earlier. And I can't very well know whether Platinga's free will defense will apply to the sort of LPoE you're be ostensibly defending for you may after all have a nuanced view on the matter.

Not free will, libertarian free will

That's right, that's what I meant.

the view that free will consists in an agent being the sole cause of an action, and not anything external to that agent (such as God). And there are several problems here: that libertarianism provides, at best, a necessary but not sufficient condition of free will, since an action may be caused by an event internal to an agent, and still not be freely willed- do I freely will an involuntary action that is caused by physiological process in my body? Clearly not.

What's the problem here? The libertarian could happily concede that we aren't responsible for all our actions -- only those that are freely willed and that we do freely will at least some actions. Obviously one wouldn't be responsible for, say, your knee jerking when struck by a doctor, or your heart beating at such-and-such times per minute, etc.

Worse, that libertarian free will is valuable (a presupposition of Plantinga's) needn't entail that agents have the capacity to inflict harm upon others- one could have free will, but not the power to cause suffering in others (and as this is not a contradiction, it would fall within the scope of an omnipotent's being's power).

What do mean here when you speak of the "capacity to inflict harm upon others." Are talking about a modal capacity (viz. necessarily, one cannot harm another) or else what? Furthermore, God may have a perfectly good reason for allowing suffering to take place. We are not in a position to know on the matter, given our markedly absent omniscience.

And lastly, free will provides no response to the problem of natural evil.

That's a bit like complaining that calculus doesn't tell us anything about Shakespeare. The so-called Problem of Suffering has its own theodicy.

Libertarian free will.

Right.

I shouldn't have to tell you what's wrong with this.

I don't see what's wrong with it. The belief that we will at least some of our actions seems to me to be as properly basic as our belief in the external world. Absent no defeater for this belief (namely, that we will at least some of our actions), there is no reasons to abandon it.

This is essentially a strawman.

What? How? Did you just pick a random fallacy to fling?

Not only is moral nihilism/anti-realism not absurd, it is eminently tenable. As is determinism. Come on now, claiming this or that position you disagree with is "absurd" isn't going to hold any water here.

No moral nihilist is consistent about his moral nihilism. Indeed, if we were true nihilists (let alone determinsts), it wouldn't make much sense to speak of anyone being "responsible" for any act or other, certainly not criminals and murderers, etc.

Moreover, one here's one convincing and simple argument against both moral nihilism and determinism:

P1.) If moral nihilism is true, then nothing is ever right or wrong.

P2.) Some things are right or wrong.

C: Therefore, moral nihilism is false.


P1.) If determinism is true, we never freely will any action.

P2.) I am freely writing this comment in the Religious Forum.

C: Therefore, determinism is false.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

I didn't ask you whether the LPoE was "done to death," I asked you to defend it. If you're not willing to, then perhaps you shouldn't have said that you were earlier. And I can't very well know whether Platinga's free will defense will apply to the sort of LPoE you're be ostensibly defending for you may after all have a nuanced view on the matter.

If Plantinga's argument is considered to be a refutation of the problem of evil, then criticizing that argument is defending the problem of evil.

That's right, that's what I meant.

Then your comment that it is trivial is clearly mistaken.

What's the problem here? The libertarian could happily concede that we aren't responsible for all our actions -- only those that are freely willed and that we do freely will at least some actions. Obviously one wouldn't be responsible for, say, your knee jerking when struck by a doctor, or your heart beating at such-and-such times per minute, etc.

The problem is, according to libertarian free will, such actions are as freely willed as any other. Don't you see a problem with a theory of free will that renders your knee jerking when struck by at doctors office, and choosing what tie to wear, equally freely willed?

What do mean here when you speak of the "capacity to inflict harm upon others." Are talking about a modal capacity (viz. necessarily, one cannot harm another) or else what?

No, physical possibility. Its unclear what exactly is intrinsically valuable about having both the capacity to inflict harm, as well as the ability to freely will it, above and beyond the value of merely being able to will it (and choosing not to)- and more generally, it is not clear what is valuable, in itself, about libertarian free will in the first place, construed along the lines already mentioned.

Furthermore, God may have a perfectly good reason for allowing suffering to take place.

That's not relevant, unless it is the case that it was logically impossible to have both; as I mentioned, there is no apparent contradiction between allowing free will (if it can be shown to be a good in itself at all), and nevertheless having created a world in which agents causing harm or suffering to one other is not physically feasible.

That's a bit like complaining that calculus doesn't tell us anything about Shakespeare.

:sarcastic

I don't see what's wrong with it. The belief that we will at least some of our actions seems to me to be as properly basic as our belief in the external world.

Let's focus on one piece of Plantinga at a time- discussions of his epistemology probably should be dealt with elsewhere; and in any case, I don't see why our belief that our actions are freely willed, in the relevant sense, is epistemically foundational in the sense that, e.g. belief in an external world is.

What? How? Did you just pick a random fallacy to fling?

You honestly don't see any problem with that portrayal of determinism?

No moral nihilist is consistent about his moral nihilism.

Even if that were true, it would not be relevant to whether moral nihilism is true.

Indeed, if we were true nihilists (let alone determinsts), it wouldn't make much sense to speak of anyone being "responsible" for any act or other, certainly not criminals and murderers, etc.

No, that doesn't follow. Moral anti-realism/nihilism does not entail anarchy. I mean, isn't it obvious that there are at least practical reasons for enforcing moral and societal norms?

Moreover, one here's one convincing and simple argument against both moral nihilism and determinism:

P1.) If moral nihilism is true, then nothing is ever right or wrong.

P2.) Some things are right or wrong.

C: Therefore, moral nihilism is false.


P1.) If determinism is true, we never freely will any action.

P2.) I am freely writing this comment in the Religious Forum.

C: Therefore, determinism is false.

Convincing? I mean, they are valid, but then so is-

If atheism is true, God does not exist.
God exists.
Atheism is not true.

Convincing? Um, not exactly.

 

[Skwim]

Moreover, one here's one convincing and simple argument against both moral nihilism and determinism:

I won't pretend to understand what you've just tried to say here, but if the following two arguments are meant to prove some point, they don't.

P1.) If moral nihilism is true, then nothing is ever right or wrong.

P2.) Some things are right or wrong.

C: Therefore, moral nihilism is false.

Unless you're equating moral nihilism (nothing is intrinsically moral or immoral) with no right and wrong, which amounts to saying X = X, you have to prove your first premise, which you haven't done.

Of course, if you are equating moral nihilism with no right and wrong (if X = X) then you end up with the following conditional argument.

1. If X then X (or simply, 1. X)
2. non-X
C. ∴ X is false.
​

In which case you're obligated to prove non-X, an entity which you have already conditionally asserted to be true in 1.. It amounts to saying "If there are red elephants, but there are no red elephants, then there are no red elephants. It's nonsensical. A non-argument: X is, and is not. May just as well have saved yourself all the premis work you've gone to and simply assert that moral nihilism is false.


And your second argument is no better.

P1.) If determinism is true, we never freely will any action.

P2.) I am freely writing this comment in the Religious Forum.

C: Therefore, determinism is false.

Keeping the same form, but changing the words we can also say

P1. If freewill is true, some things we do are undetermined.
P2. Everything we do is determined
C. ∴ freewill is false.
:slap:



​

 

[Sovereign Dream]

If Plantinga's argument is considered to be a refutation of the problem of evil, then criticizing that argument is defending the problem of evil.


Then your comment that it is trivial is clearly mistaken.


The problem is, according to libertarian free will, such actions are as freely willed as any other. Don't you see a problem with a theory of free will that renders your knee jerking when struck by at doctors office, and choosing what tie to wear, equally freely willed?

Libertarian free will does not entail that every action is willed. The libertarian is only committed to the supposition that at least some actions are freely willed, not that they are all freely willed. What makes you say that of libertarian free will? That is, what have you been reading that makes you think that the libertarian is committed to the supposition that all actions are freely willed? No defender of free will that I know of defends such absurd a supposition.

No, physical possibility. Its unclear what exactly is intrinsically valuable about having both the capacity to inflict harm, as well as the ability to freely will it, above and beyond the value of merely being able to will it (and choosing not to)- and more generally, it is not clear what is valuable, in itself, about libertarian free will in the first place, construed along the lines already mentioned.

Well, think of what such a world would be like: it might be a world in which no physical beings exist. Or a world in which every time someone tried to inflict harm on someone else, a sort of protective bubble might form whenever someone attempted to cause harm. But God has quite plausible good reasons for allowing individuals to inflict bodily harm upon one another. In any case, we aren't in an epistemic position to know. Now, you mention that it's not clear what is valuable about libertarian free will in the first place. The answer seems quite forthcoming to me: any possible world that has libertarian free will is greater than every world in which there isn't free will for in the absence of free will, there is no such thing as "good" in such a world. All it would take for a world with free will to be greater than a world without free will would be the doing of just one good action.

That's not relevant, unless it is the case that it was logically impossible to have both; as I mentioned, there is no apparent contradiction between allowing free will (if it can be shown to be a good in itself at all), and nevertheless having created a world in which agents causing harm or suffering to one other is not physically feasible.

But such a world might not be feasible or at the very least would be, on the whole, less perfect a world than this one in which, though there is suffering and harm, there are nevertheless incommensurable goods that result form them. For, after all, it is better an act to refrain from hurting someone when you physically can harm them than freely refraining from harming someone when you cannot physically harm them in the first place.

:sarcastic


Let's focus on one piece of Plantinga at a time- discussions of his epistemology probably should be dealt with elsewhere; and in any case, I don't see why our belief that our actions are freely willed, in the relevant sense, is epistemically foundational in the sense that, e.g. belief in an external world is.

It might be even more foundational than the belief in the external world, for, after all, one must first make use of his capacities to freely reason that there is an external world in the first place.

You honestly don't see any problem with that portrayal of determinism?

Do you?

Even if that were true, it would not be relevant to whether moral nihilism is true.

Right, but the very fact that one cannot live consistently without living as if some actions were truly wrong or truly right lends great support to the supposition that there really are such things as good and bad.

No, that doesn't follow. Moral anti-realism/nihilism does not entail anarchy. I mean, isn't it obvious that there are at least practical reasons for enforcing moral and societal norms?

Sure, again the nihilist could live as if some actions were truly wrong or right, or he could simply construct a fictitious moral "code" in the interest of his own self-preservation, but moral nihilism, let alone determinism, does entail the doing away with any concepts of moral responsibility out the window.

Convincing? I mean, they are valid, but then so is-

If atheism is true, God does not exist.
God exists.
Atheism is not true.

Convincing? Um, not exactly.

Well, just ask yourself: are some actions truly right or wrong? It just seems obvious that they are. Are some actions freely willed? Again, it seems obvious that at least some are. For example, I am currently freely writing this response to you. If I wanted to, I could stop writing it at any moment. Or I could delete it and never post it, etc. Any premise that seeks to demonstrate that we do not ever freely will any action is less obvious than the fact that we do freely will some actions. Ditto with morality.

 

[gzusfrk]

I use this whenever someone tries to talk me into an abrahamic relegion.
Sure it can use more organization, but what about the core concept.

A- God by definetion is neither an idiot, sadist, nor is he a masochist. God is also omniscient.
B- God is the most merciful being in the universe, loves all his creatures, wants for them to enter heaven, and gets angry when he is disobeyd.
C- God created everyone, including Satan , sinners, and nonbelievers.
D- Since god is omniscient he knew their nature and their end.
E- Based on C and D, God is either:
1) An idiot who doesn't know what he is doing.
2) A sadist that likes torturing humans in hell.
3) A masochist who despite being hurt that his loved creatures chose to doom themselves -which is what he is supposed to feel, refer to B-, enjoys his own pain.
4) Lastly he has no idea what was going to happen in the future.
F- E contradicts A and B. Hence God is non existant.
So what do you think?

I'm thinking how many scenario's could GOD could run through in 5 or 10 minutes.

 

[Me Myself]

I use this whenever someone tries to talk me into an abrahamic relegion.
Sure it can use more organization, but what about the core concept.

A- God by definetion is neither an idiot, sadist, nor is he a masochist. God is also omniscient.
B- God is the most merciful being in the universe, loves all his creatures, wants for them to enter heaven, and gets angry when he is disobeyd.
C- God created everyone, including Satan , sinners, and nonbelievers.
D- Since god is omniscient he knew their nature and their end.
E- Based on C and D, God is either:
1) An idiot who doesn't know what he is doing.
2) A sadist that likes torturing humans in hell.
3) A masochist who despite being hurt that his loved creatures chose to doom themselves -which is what he is supposed to feel, refer to B-, enjoys his own pain.
4) Lastly he has no idea what was going to happen in the future.
F- E contradicts A and B. Hence God is non existant.
So what do you think?

It does destroy that concept of God, yes.

Then again, my God is both a sadist and a masochist. (And a sinner and a mother and a saint ... )

 

[ruffen]

P1.) If determinism is true, we never freely will any action.

P2.) I am freely writing this comment in the Religious Forum.

C: Therefore, determinism is false.

How can you know that P2 is true? In retrospect, just before writing the comment, you chose to do so, but did you really? If you turned back time to just before writing the comment, and all other conditions were exactly the same and your brain was in the same state, would you have chose not to write the comment?

 

[Me Myself]

P1.) If determinism is true, we never freely will any action.

P2.) I am freely writing this comment in the Religious Forum.

C: Therefore, determinism is false.

You were determined to write that and to believe you have free will

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Libertarian free will does not entail that every action is willed. The libertarian is only committed to the supposition that at least some actions are freely willed, not that they are all freely willed. What makes you say that of libertarian free will? That is, what have you been reading that makes you think that the libertarian is committed to the supposition that all actions are freely willed? No defender of free will that I know of defends such absurd a supposition.

I didn't say that every action is willed; but according to libertarianism, any action that is not caused by anything external to the agent is freely willed- so your knee jerking when the doctor whacks it is just as freely willed as choosing what tie to wear. I say again- libertarianism does not provide a sufficient condition for free will.

Well, think of what such a world would be like: it might be a world in which no physical beings exist. Or a world in which every time someone tried to inflict harm on someone else, a sort of protective bubble might form whenever someone attempted to cause harm.

Sure. And likely other possibilities we can't even imagine, but God could- and could enact, provided they are merely logically possible.

But God has quite plausible good reasons for allowing individuals to inflict bodily harm upon one another.

Plausible good reasons don't really cut the mustard for God; the goods achieved by the existence of suffering must not only logically entail the existence of suffering, they must somehow be of such worth as to be in some sense better than a world in which this good was not achieved, but suffering did not exist (which strikes me as, at the very least, not an altogether terrible sort of world)- and that's provided we're assuming something like consquentialism in the first place.

In any case, we aren't in an epistemic position to know.

That may not be the route you want to take, as you may be pulling the rug out from underneath your own feet; if you're saying we're not in a position to evaluate the morality of God's actions or plan, then by the same token we're not really in a position to ascribe to God the property of omnibenevolence.

Now, you mention that it's not clear what is valuable about libertarian free will in the first place. The answer seems quite forthcoming to me: any possible world that has libertarian free will is greater than every world in which there isn't free will for in the absence of free will, there is no such thing as "good" in such a world.

Its not clear to my why that should follow.

For, after all, it is better an act to refrain from hurting someone when you physically can harm them than freely refraining from harming someone when you cannot physically harm them in the first place.

Why?

It might be even more foundational than the belief in the external world, for, after all, one must first make use of his capacities to freely reason that there is an external world in the first place.

Again, you state this without argument- I don't see why this should be so. Belief in an external world plays a crucial role in pretty much all of our epistemic projects, and would fit in the sequence of justifications for any given claim at some point. But not so with free will- the existence of free will isn't a presupposition for the majority of our truth-claims about the world, as is belief in an external world, or other minds. And as I said, we're not just assuming the truth of Plantinga's epistemology here- so whether belief in the external world is a properly basic belief in the first place isn't just a given.

Do you?

Yes. Of course, leave it to Craig to faithfully and charitable relate his opponents positions.

Right, but the very fact that one cannot live consistently without living as if some actions were truly wrong or truly right lends great support to the supposition that there really are such things as good and bad.

Well no- or rather, "good" and "bad" could just be far different than normally conceived. If they are, as they likely are, adaptive behavioral patterns encouraging cooperative social strategies, then they are real, in a sense- these particular ways of interacting with others have proved to be more successful in the past than others. And that a given society has the norms and values that it does is certainly a matter of fact. But there is nothing more to moral norms and values than this- rules we've made up that encourage certain types of behavior, which have proven successful and mutually beneficial in the past.

Sure, again the nihilist could live as if some actions were truly wrong or right, or he could simply construct a fictitious moral "code" in the interest of his own self-preservation, but moral nihilism, let alone determinism, does entail the doing away with any concepts of moral responsibility out the window.

Well, no, it doesn't, and for the same reason that nihilism doesn't entail any such thing.

Well, just ask yourself: are some actions truly right or wrong? It just seems obvious that they are. Are some actions freely willed? Again, it seems obvious that at least some are.

Um, ok.