O
ne of the premises is that God is omniscient (all-knowing). Are you or anyone else who takes the same position as you on this particular argument
claiming to know more than a being who is premised to be all knowing? If there is a being who is all knowing then it
seems pretty arrogant to argue that there is no good purpose in suffering. In other words,
if omniscience is indeed one of the definitions for the god you are arguing against then how can you logically argue for suffering as a proof that such a god is not loving? Perhaps such a god
knows more (actually would know more) about the full nature and purposes of suffering
better than you.
It would seem to me that you would first have to somehow disprove the premise that such a god is all knowing before showing that such a god is not loving. I am not sure how you could do that without running into any number of potential contraditions yourself. But hey, it may be possible.
You are misunderstanding the problem with why special pleading is fallacious.
There are (in general) two types of objections to arguments from epistemology:
1)
De facto objections, which assert that the argument is false in reality
2)
De jure objections, which assert that the argument can't be rationally made because the arguer has no justification or reason to believe it
Special pleading is a
de jure fallacy, and pointing out that special pleading doesn't work is a
de jure objection. It is completely within the realm of possibility that God has some inexplicable reason for suffering that causes it to be ultimately good: no one is disputing that.
What is disputed is asserting that such is the case without evidence. "Possible" doesn't mean "plausible," nor does it even defeat the logical contradiction entailed in the Problem of Evil.
Let me illustrate this with an example:
Bill: Boy, those clouds make it look like it's going to rain.
Ted: Nah, clouds have nothing to do with whether it will rain; it's actually magical leprechauns that cause it to rain.
Bill: What? Do you have any evidence for that assertion?
Ted: Nah, I'm just pointing out that it's possible.
Bill: But then you haven't really made an argument at all, since there are many things that are technically "possible."
Bill's objection at the end isn't a
de facto objection to the existence of leprechauns, it's a
de jure objection -- which is equally as valid. One is ontological, one is epistemic. You can point out possibilities all you like but if you haven't a shred of evidence for how they can even be conceived you don't have a position to argue from.