Why?
Not exactly what I asked.
Her lately you been asking tings I could not understand the context for. Your questioned assumed something I never claimed nor believe is true. I can't answer a question with an incorrect assumption. I never said freewill or intent rules out determinism as a general principle so I can answer a question that assumes I did.
How could total mysteries be an impediment to anything? Either they are an impediment for any worldview or for none of them.
They are usually impediments to certainty, and do not make good grounds for argumentation. For example I rarely debate the Trinity because if true it is a compete mystery.
BTW by mystery I meant having no way to link X to Y, but to claim X is the result of Y anyway.
Again, this is not what I asked.
What I asked is a question about a phylophical position: compatibilism.
Does compatibilism entail a violation of determinism in the case of intentional agents or an ultimate non physicalism for things like minds and how they instantiate intent?
Your as bad a speller as me. I assume you meant philosophical, and yes it does represent a break with strict determinism. I had already amnswered your question with the actual definition. Here it is again:
Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent.
Compatibilists believe freedom can be present or absent in situations for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics.
The way I read it, does not seem to indicate that. They seem to be fully determinists. Which could explain why some pure naturalists are compatibilists (e.g. Sean Carroll). He actually compares free will to things like temperature and pressure: it does not make sense to say that they do not exists even thought they are macroscopic properties reducible to components which do not possess the same property. This is what I gathered from his article about the subject. Dan Dennett seems to go in the same direction with its intentional stance.
Compatibilist is a break with pure determinism but that does not mean every compatibilists would hold that view. I don't know the personal interpretations of all compatibilists, just what compatibilist means.
The evidence (about compatibism) I ask from you is required only if you believe that compatibilists hold the position that human minds, or anything else connected to intent, trascend or violate the laws of determinism. In that case, I would like to read the evidence (about compatibilism) you might want to provide.
The only evidence necessary is to show determinism does not explain all reality. I have given the best possible examples of that, anything additional would be a more complex and less obvious example. The ability of us to actualize desires billions of times a day is the best possible evidence and more than sufficient to show determinism does not govern all reality. I don't think I can provide stronger evidence against anything than that or evidence of any greater amount against a thing. It does not even seem to allow for debate of any kind.
I think it a horrible explanation to suggest that determinism resulted in anyone having a coherent plan to do something like build a house, but it is no explanation at all to suggest determinism was so obliging as to perform the trillions of necessary functions to produce that house, which it never cared about in the first place. A thing cannot have any better or more contradictory evidence than pure determinism. What more can you possibly ask for?