What qualifies as an "absolute moral fact"?
What is an objective fact?
Tis not I that am arguing for such things. Just using your rhetoric to say if you put those words before anything, they become equally objective facts as assertions you have made.
That it is immoral to vote for a Democrat? What's immoral about it?
(A little dose of what you've done in this thread....)
I repeat, it is objective moral fact that voting Democrat is wrong.
Here's the argument:
The moral realist may argue for the view that there are moral facts as follows:
(1) Moral sentences are sometimes true.
(2) A sentence is true only if the truth-making relation holds between it and the thing that makes it true.
(3) Thus, true moral sentences are true only because there holds the truth-making relation between them and the things that make them true.
Therefore,
(4) The things that make some moral sentences true must exist.
It is a short inference from the existence of the things that make some moral sentences true to the existence of moral facts.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/moralrea/
And here is the rebuttal for that within the article.
If moral judgments are expressed by commands or prescriptions, then there cannot be literal moral truths. (Cf. Wright 1993. He argues that the focal discussion in the realist/antirealist debate should be about the acceptable theories of truth.) If there are no literal moral truths, then no moral judgments may be cited as evidence for knowing how the world is. Moral knowledge can no longer be considered as descriptive or propositional; or, no one is justified in believing certain things about the world in making moral judgments. This illustrates how the noncognitivist analysis of moral judgments can be escalated into the antirealist rejection of (those good names that we take for granted when we participate in moral practices such as) “moral truths” and “moral knowledge.” The antirealist’s noncognitivism threatens moral objectivity as well. Objectivity is to be found within the world. If moral judgments are not about accurately describing the world —for example, if moral judgments are about us —then moral objectivity will not be found within the world. If moral objectivity is to be found within us, then it is not the same objectivity with which we began, or, so had been the old antirealist’s way.
*Bold emphasis mine.
There are other rebuttals to this point (in the article).
I think my rebuttal, based on this thread, would say that if the moral sentence is: Raping a child is inherently wrong - then I would like to understand the truth-making relation that makes this true. For currently, I actually do believe by this logic that the moral sentence: Raping a child is inherently right, could be rationalized by similar logic. Though, obviously this will depend on what is provided as the truth-making relation.
I do prefer to change the example of what is currently being employed as the moral assertion, but will do my best to adapt to those who insist it is just as fair game as say why it is inherently wrong to vote for Democrats. As if those are on par with each other.