Is consciousness physical or nonphysical?

[Gambit]

Is consciousness physical or nonphysical?

 

[Bunyip]

Is consciousness physical or nonphysical?

An emergent property of the physical, as distinct from the physical, just as the abstract is distinct from the real.

 

[George-ananda]

I voted 'nonphysical'

Here is the great divide that is the true separating issue in so many of our debates.

Physicalists: Matter is primary and consciousness is a product of matter

Non-Physicalists: Consciousness is primary and matter is a product of consciousness.

 

[Bunyip]

I voted 'nonphysical'

Here is the great divide that is the true separating issue in so many of our debates.

Physicalists: Matter is primary and consciousness is a product of matter

Non-Physicalists: Consciousness is primary and matter is a product of consciousness.

So you would see both physicalism and non-physicalism as monist?

 

[Rick O'Shez]

An emergent property of the physical, as distinct from the physical

I'd broadly agree. Consciousness arising in dependence on the brain, but not the same, so non-physical.

 

[Laika]

physical: Consciousness is a property of matter and the product of the Brain.

 

[Gambit]

An emergent property of the physical, as distinct from the physical, just as the abstract is distinct from the real.

Abstractions are clearly nonphysical. So, are you arguing that consciousness is nonphysical?

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Non-physical functional process/property of the brain that is entirely a product of the brain the way that cellular metabolic-repair is non-physical as it describes an a process that is entirely produced by the dynamics of the cell yet also is producing those dynamics, and thus is really the non-physical process that emerges from and determines physical processes (I feel like sometimes RF gets set to repeat). Or alternatively, as the physical/non-physical dichotomy is questionable at best and almost a century outdated at worst, the answer is neither.

 

[NulliuSINverba]

Is consciousness physical or nonphysical?

Consciousness doesn't appear to be possible without a physical framework to house it.

 

[Gambit]

Here is the great divide that is the true separating issue in so many of our debates.

Physicalists: Matter is primary and consciousness is a product of matter

Non-Physicalists: Consciousness is primary and matter is a product of consciousness.

Those are definitely two options (materialism and idealism): But I think there is at least one other option - namely, that both consciousness and matter are equally fundamental (dualism).

 

[Gambit]

I'd broadly agree. Consciousness arising in dependence on the brain, but not the same, so non-physical.

I like the fact you characterized an emergent property here as a nonphysical one.

 

[Looncall]

I like the fact you characterized an emergent property here as a nonphysical one.

Consciousness is clearly a process, not a substance. It makes no sense to speak of it as physical or non-physical. It occurs as events happening in physical substances. That is not to say it is in any way supernatural.

Fire is a good analog. It too is a process that occurs in matter.

 

[Willamena]

Both and neither: the physical and non-physical are some of what reside in consciousnes.

Physical and non-physical are categorizations of reality, nothing more.

 

[Gambit]

physical: Consciousness is a property of matter and the product of the Brain.

So, is consciousness a physical property? Also, what kind of brain (human, animal)?

 

[Gambit]

Non-physical functional process/property of the brain that is entirely a product of the brain the way that cellular metabolic-repair is non-physical as it describes an a process that is entirely produced by the dynamics of the cell yet also is producing those dynamics, and thus is really the non-physical process that emerges from and determines physical processes (I feel like sometimes RF gets set to repeat). Or alternatively, as the physical/non-physical dichotomy is questionable at best and almost a century outdated at worst, the answer is neither.

How exactly is "awareness" a function? (I can see where you might argue it is an epiphenomenal by-product of some functional process.) Also, you appear to be contradicting yourself On the one hand you are arguing that consciousness is a "nonphysical functional process/property," while, on the other hand, you are arguing that it is neither physical nor nonphysical.

 

[Gambit]

Consciousness doesn't appear to be possible without a physical framework to house it.

But that doesn't address the question as to whether consciousness is physical or nonphysical. IOW, you're evading the question.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

How exactly is "awareness" a function?

In a model of the brain, it can and should be represented by a mathematical entity capable of being fed input and producing output, otherwise known as a "function".

 

[Gambit]

Consciousness is clearly a process, not a substance. It makes no sense to speak of it as physical or non-physical. It occurs as events happening in physical substances. That is not to say it is in any way supernatural.

Well, is it a physical process or a nonphysical process?

 

[Gambit]

In a model of the brain, it can and should be represented by a mathematical entity capable of being fed input and producing output, otherwise known as a "function".

Are you characterizing consciousness as information processing?

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Are you characterizing consciousness as information processing?

I wasn't. I was trying to avoid getting into concepts from systems biology and relational biology that are based upon Robert Rosen's work on what he called [M,R]-systems and closure to efficient causation. However:
"A simple representation of components to a system is the input/output block diagram. In this representation, each block represents an agent that effects a change on something, namely its input. The result of this interaction is some output. The abstract way of representing this is

where f is the process that takes input A into output B. Clearly B can now become the input for some other process so that we can visualize a system as anetwork of these interactions. The relational system represents a very special kind of transition this way. Rather than break everything down in the usual reductionist manner, these transitions are selected for an important distinguishing property, namely their expression of process rather than material thingsdirectly. This is best explained with an example. The system Rosen uses for an example is the Metabolism-Repair or [M,R] system. The process, f, in this case stands for the entire metabolism going on in an organism. This is, indeed, quite an abstraction. Clearly, the use of such a representation is meant to suppress the myriad of detail that would only serve to distract us from the more simple argument put this way. It does more because it allows processes we know are going on to be divorced from the requirement that they be fragmentable or reducible to material parts alone...
The transition, f, which is being called metabolism, is a mapping taking some set of metabolites, A, into some set of products, B. What are the members of A? Really everything in the organism has to be included in A, and there has to be an implicit agreement that at least some of the members of A can enter the organism from its environment. What are the members of B? Many, if not all, of the members of A since the transitions in the reduced system are all strung together in the many intricate patterns or networks that make up the organism’s metabolism. It also must be true that some members of B leave the organism as products of metabolism. The usefulness of this abstract representation becomes clearer if the causal nature of the events is made clear...
the mapping, f...is a functional component of the system we are developing. A functional component has many interesting attributes. First of all, it exists independent of the material parts that make it possible. This idea has been so frequently misunderstood that it requires a careful discussion. Reductionism has taught us that every thing in a real system can be expressed as a collection of material parts. This is not so in the case of functional components. We only know about them because they do something. Looking at the parts involved does not lead us to knowing about them if they are not doing that something. Furthermore, they only exist in a given context. “Metabolism” as discussed here has no meaning in a machine. It also would have no meaning if we had all the chemical components of the organism in jars on a lab bench. Now we have a way of dealing with context dependence in a system theoretical manner. Not only are they only defined in their context, they also are constantly contributing to that context. This is as self- referential a situation as there is. What it means is that if the context, the particular system, is destroyed or even severely altered, the context defining the functional component will no longer exist and the functional component will also disappear...
The semantic parallel with language is in the concept of functional component. Pull things apart as reductionism asks us to do and something essential about the system is lost. Philosophically this has revolutionary consequences. The acceptance of this idea means that one recognizes ontological status for something other than mere atoms and molecules. It says that material reality is only a part of that real world we are so anxious to understand. In addition to material reality there are functional components that are also essential to our understanding of any complex reality.

Mikulecky, D. C. (2005). The Circle That Never Ends: Can Complexity be Made Simple?. In Complexity in Chemistry, Biology, and Ecology (pp. 97-153). Springer