Doppleganger was getting at something different
I suspected that might be the case, hence this:
I see the above in terms of theories about language, grammar, syntax, lexemes, etc. So I apologize for what follows, as it is not only lengthy, but is perhaps totally missing the point.
He was talking about an unconscious process by which we take a conscious chunk of the world and make it a referent. If there's no rules by which we do that we could not learn to do it, but we do learn to do it from our early childhood, so there are rules, and there is a structure by which we are programmed to learn langauges by our social contacts, and in turn program others. That is what is "essential" and "inherent," a structure ordered in thought.
I would not use the word "rules", but I would use structure.
Perhaps what I wrote was not
entirely unrelated then, merely largely unrelated. What you refer to as taking "a conscious chunk of the world" I think I would call categorization. An example (to see if I'm understanding you correctly) is learning the word/concept "tree". Another is "I". My sister has twin girls who turned 2 a week or so ago. One of them often uses her name rather than "I". She does use "I", and even in mental state predicates ("I think x"), but hasn't fully understood that her name is something that others use to refer to her, but that this is because they are external.
We all (some sooner, some later) learn to do this and beyond. What Plato meant by Form or Idea (mostly using the term εἰδός/
eidos, although sometimes ἰδέαι
/ideai) is today "category" or "concept" for some modern philosophers and those in cognitive science whose work is related to language (e.g., guys like Pinker or cognitive linguists).
And you probably know (perhaps much better than I) how Aristotle, Kant, Saussure, Husserl, Wittgenstein, and others have dealt with the barriers set between thought/internal representation, language, and things language is meant to refer to.
doppelgänger;1520584 said:
Let's say we take as our starting point the pantheistic approach and determine "nature" or "God" is "the totality of all reality, unfragmented by discrete knowledge" (for shorthand, I'll be referring to this as "all that is").
doppelgänger;1520584 said:
If "nature" or "God" is "all that is," then of logical necessity, doesn't there have to be an underlying aspect of reality that places me in relationship to "all that is"?
So what is the device underlying all reality as I can experience it that is not itself words and that has the power to bring form to formlessness?
I propose, as I've hinted at a few times recently, that "God" is the rules and structures of grammar itself - the essential structure of language by which all things are categorized, given meaning and related to, including my own sense of self identity (the "I am" at the center of the universe of my experiences, relating to it all).
If someone were to threaten death upon a person in the cognitive sciences unless that individual summed up with one word what the cognitive sciences "are", despite their being so broad almost any field (from biblical studies to mathematics) can be a part, that word would be categorization.
At the heart of cognition is the giving of "form" to that which is an abstraction. Even Plato recognized that something like a "chair" describes many things which are not the same yet the same word is used for these. His answer was the Platonic "Ideal Form". The answer above is the numinsous/"Nature"/"God"/cosmic structure, if I understand correctly.
I freely admit I am more than a little biased here, but although I do see nature playing a role, it is neither the same nature nor the same role. The neuroimaging studies that are seldom reported in any article but which are the ones most likely to be important tend to relate to this question, and before cognitive psychology had things like fMRI or EEG, behavioral experiments related to it (and do still). One of the first lessons learned in early cog. sci. research (when the field was mainly computer scientists/mathematicians, psychologists, and philosophers) was how much we took for granted our perceptual faculties.
Trying to get a computer to recognize things as members of a category when these members look very different, such as a leapord, a house cat, and a lion, turned out to be extremely difficult. Yet my niece can do it (actually, both can, but one is more advanced with motor skills and is pretty much where she should be with verbal skill). Once again, that figure/ground discussion in this thread many posts back rears its head. Those were early ideas on the nature of visual input and categorization, both perceptual and conceptual. I "see" a picture of a landscape as a "whole" in that it is distinct from the wall or desk upon which it is mounted, but I also see the trees, rocks, mountains, and clouds in the picture as different parts of the picture rather than just a smear of colors.
I did notice your book suggestion from a few pages back, and have added it to my list. I would offer my own if I may. It is Lakoff's
Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. It was published in 1987, and the author was one of several independent researchers who became the founders of cognitive linguistics. The book, however, is hardly a mere study of interest only to linguists or psychologists, as I bought my edition in Barnes & Noble a few years ago. It is extremely rare to find in a bookstore a book that is cited (especially cited numerous times) in technical literature, and rarer still to find one that is not old enough to be a classic (e.g., something by Freud). The title (which, the author remarks, is either loved or hated by feminist scholars but for the same reason) comes from the word
balan. It is a word in a language indigenous to Australia which refers to a category, and more specifically one which includes women, fire, and dangerous things.
The point of the book is not that these things are similar (which is why the title is either loved or hated but always for the wrong reason). It is that we tend to believe we group similar things together because they are similar more than we actually do. What is similar between a wedding ring, a ring of smugglers, Saturn's rings, ring theory (in mathematics) and a ring leader? Conceptual prototypes and metaphor. Prototypically, a ring is basically a circle. That easily explains Saturn and jewelry, but a ring of smugglers? That is a metaphorical extension; we have abstracted from from a more central concept and applied some part of the concept "ring" to the the "circular" relationship network of smugglers (often words have more than one central concepts or prototypes). We can conceive as circular a group of people connected by goal, occupation, and behavior (to smuggle contraband, a person who smuggles contraband, and the smuggling itself, respectively). They are connected in a singular way that e.g,. a baseball team is not.
One reason, then, to understand that what gives form to the formless is something other than "Nature"/Cosmic structure itself is they different ways in which different languages do this. We have no word
balan that includes women, fire, and dangerous things in the way that native speakers of Dyirbal do. For us, there is a big difference between drawing and writing, yet in ancient Greece the same word was used for both. If I am talking to someone and mention Dr. Langacker, I will usually either not use the word "doctor" or at least specify that he is a linguist. People associate "doctor" with medicine far more readily than with doctorates.
I can say "I like this house" and "I like this home", but somehow they mean very different things. I can be in any house and like it, but usually I have only one home.
I could quite literally go on until I died of starvation listing examples, so I will stop here, hoping to have shown what I meant to. The formless smears of matter that make up everything from light and air to rocks and steel are given form by thought and by language, but if it was the cosmic structure, divine mind, or nature which did so, why is it that not just concepts/words, but thought itself is differs depending on culture and langauge?
We have, I believe, an inherent ability to categorize wholes and parts, likes and unlikes, figure and ground, and other distinctions. It is partly based on the perceptual faculties that humans have as well as how different faculties are accorded different levels of importance in this process (sight, for example, is key). That much is common to humanity. It is, however, very broad and very flexible. A central reason this is so has to do with the centrality of metaphor for thought. Culture, intersubjectivity, and language use all interact such that different cultures can end up categorizing the same perceptual input quite differently. What creates structure and destroyes structure is this thing...
...all things devours
birds, beasts, trees, flowers,
gnaws iron, bites steel,
and grinds hard stones to meal
Slays kinds and ruins town
And beats high mountains down.
Time doesn't merely change the physical, or the physical forms (the perceived), but also the internal forms
Imperious Casear, dead and turned to clay
Might stop a hole to keep the wind away.
Oh that the earth which held the world in awe,
Should patch a wall, to expel the winter's flaw.
Thank you for the detailed response.
Thank you for using so kind a descriptor, as "detailed" sounds so much better than what is really ramblings only a little related to the topic and of even less import.