Is There a Cure for Metaphysical Dogma?

[siti]

And now to your second argument:

(2)

P1: All entities (/structures) discovered by physicists using the scientific method are objectively existing.
P2: Some mathematical relations are entities (/structures) discovered by physicists using the scientific method.
C: Therefore, some mathematical relations are objectively existing.
And I noted that it's form is AII-1--which states:

All M are P.
Some S are M.
Therefore, some S are P.

A valid syllogism (as, again, I have never denied). But this is definitely either deliberate obfuscation or circular depending on what you mean (or refuse to define) by the word "entities".

First of all, can we get rid of "(/structures)" - I can see why you want it, but it doesn't help your cause - for example, languages have structures, perhaps even thoughts do - but can we really argue that those structures are "objectively existing"? I know these are not the kind of structures that that physicists discover using the scientific method - but I am actually doing your argument a favour by clearing out a potentially objectionable bit.

Now we are left with the same issue in regard to the use of the word "entities" - which means "having independent existence". Is that OK?

So eliminating the "(/structures)" and substituting the phrase 'things having independent existence' in your argument and we now have:

P1: All things having independent existence discovered by physicists using the scientific method are objectively existing.
P2: Some mathematical relations are things having independent existence discovered by physicists using the scientific method.
C: Therefore, some mathematical relations are objectively existing.

Now P2 is very suspect because we have no reason to assume this to be true unless we are already assuming mathematical realism. If we don't make that assumption then we presumably have to get rid of the "having independent existence" (i.e. the "entities") part altogether but that completely undermines your major premise - which, in any case, even in its original form, is probably a tautology. But anyway, if we do strip that bit out we are then left with:

P1: All 'things' discovered by physicists using the scientific method are objectively existing.
P2: Some mathematical relations are 'things' discovered by physicists using the scientific method.
C: Therefore, some mathematical relations are objectively existing.

What we have now is the equivalent of an argument that goes:

All red things are red
Some roses are red things
Therefore, some roses are red

Now P1 is definitely a tautology (so no problem about that being true) and P2 is more or less OK as long as we allow sufficient latitude in the definition of 'things'. But the conclusion, (besides being another statement of the perfectly obvious and nothing more than a slightly reworded version of the minor premise by virtue of the tautological nature of the major premise), still only establishes (if it establishes anything at all) that mathematical relations exist independently of individual minds. We can no more use this argument to establish mathematical realism than we can use the red roses argument to establish the reality of qualia (such as 'redness').

Still nowhere near a convincing argument for mathematical realism.

 

[Nous]

OK - first of all, my sincere apologies for adding unnecessary confusion by unclear presentation and sloppy terminology.

Thank you. No apologies necessary.

Now, here's Colyvan's argument as you stated it:

(P1) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only the entities that are indispensable to our best scientific theories.
(P2) Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories.
(C) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities

We have both stuffed up our interpretations of it several times so I think "we ought" to tidy that up first...

What he literally states is this:

S are P.
M are P.
Therefore S are M.

That is not valid, besides lacking critical quantification. That form concludes this:

Rabbits are mammals.
Dogs are mammals.
Therefore, rabbits are dogs.

No - that's still wrong - what he has is this:

P are all M (I'm not sure that's the same as all P are M but because he also says "only" that implies that all M are P - he's just written it the wrong way round)
S are M (He doesn't state whether this is all or some but we can assume some I think - see below)
Therefore S are P (since we are assuming P2 means "some S are M" then the conclusion can only be "some S are P"

That isn't the form that he literally states. The form he literally states is, as I noted, invalid. You have reformulated it as a valid syllogism, as I noted could be done. (You've done it better than I had done it.)

It is jumbled up but it is valid...to make it clearer I propose that we can rearrange P1 to say "all and only the entities that are indispensable to our best scientific theories are 'things' that we ought to have ontological commitment to" - that is really what Colyvan wants to say (yes?)

Then P2 is more or less OK if we put "some" at the beginning (because, presumably we agree that not all mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories), and omitting the "and only" bit from P1 (because it doesn't help the argument at all) so we now have a valid AII-1 syllogism (which is what you said you were aiming for? We could equally switch S and M in P2 and get a valid AII-3 form):

P1: All M [entities that are indispensable to our best scientific theories] are P ['things' we ought to have ontological commitment to]
P2: Some S [mathematical entities] are M [entities that are indispensable to our best scientific theories]
C: Therefore some S [mathematical entities] are P ['things' we ought to have ontological commitment to]

So Colyvan's IS a valid syllogism - just a bit jumbled in the form that you (he?) presented.

Your reformulation of what he states in the SEP article, which I quoted, is indeed valid. And I don't like the "we ought" phrasing, just like you don't. As I noted, it's ultimately an argument about metaphysical theses, not about metaphysicians.

And I still have a problem with the use of 'entities'. My understanding and explanation of that is fine in my previous post(s) as far as I can see (he said, marking his own work). There is absolutely no sound reason to assume that mathematical statements/relations...etc. exist as 'entities' at this point in the argument because we have not yet established that "we ought to have ontological commitment" to them and to say they are 'entities' is to have an ontological commitment to them. Of course it might be true that they are, but again, this is not sound argumentation (IMO) because it appears (to me at least) to assume the conclusion.

Well - it does, in fact, assume the conclusion and that can clearly be seen by attempting to substitute the word "entities" with another word like, say, "statement" or "relation". Presumably you have no issue with that because presumably you accept that some mathematical "entities" are "statements" or "relations"? But if one makes that substitution then it is very obvious that mathematical realism is assumed in the premises...this is not (as you suspected) a straw man fallacy, it is, I suppose, a kind of reductio ad absurdum:

P1: All M [statements/relations that are indispensable to our best scientific theories] are P ['things' we ought to have ontological commitment to]
P2: Some S [mathematical statements/relations] are M [statements/relations that are indispensable to our best scientific theories]
C: Therefore some S [mathematical statements/relations] are P ['things' we ought to have ontological commitment to]

On the plus side, we now have a much more precise and defensible P2, but P1 is even weaker than the original form and very obviously assumes the conclusion that some statements/relations are real. It becomes an absurdly circular argument - but all I have done is make what we mean by "mathematical entities" a little less obfuscated - n'est-ce pas?

Are you with me so far? If so - we can unwrap the other arguments more carefully one by one.

What you have stated here is another valid syllogism. It is no more an example of petitio principii
than any other valid syllogism. The conclusion of a valid syllogism does not repeat or contain either of the premises.

 

[Nous]

P1: All central terms of fundamental scientific laws are genuinely referential.
P2: All central terms of fundamental scientific laws are quantities (/mathematical relations).
C: Therefore, some quantities (/mathematical relations) are genuinely referential.

In this you refer to the fact that your two arguments do not use the term "mathematical entities" so I should have no objection on the grounds I have now clearly explained in my previous two posts. That is correct. But you have completely overlooked my objection to what you (may/may not) mean by "genuinely referential" in your first argument.

By "genuinely referential," I mean the same as Professor Little meant in the article I quoted: the statement refers to something that exists objectively, i.e.,the statement is not just a façon de parler. It's exactly as you said earlier about two particles in which one is twice the size of the other. If true--if those two types of particles exist, and if one is indeed twice the size of the other--then that is a genuinely referential statement.

And E=mc2 refers to an objectively existing relation between the quantity E and the product of the quantities m and c times itself. That relation between these quantities objectively exists, as can be discovered by anyone using the correct methodology.

If we substitute that phrase for "genuinely referential" then we get:

P1: All central terms of fundamental scientific laws are true statements about things that really exist
P2: All central terms of fundamental scientific laws are quantities (/mathematical relations).
C: Therefore, some quantities (/mathematical relations) are true statements about things that really exist

So when the obfuscation clears, we find that the argument really doesn't prove anything but what was already obvious. We are still no nearer a convincing (let alone compelling) argument for mathematical realism.

The argument deduces that some quantities/mathematical relations objectively exist (i.e., can be discovered by anyone using the correct methodology). Do you deny that the quantity E exists? Do you deny that the relation between E, m and c times itself exists (at least as our currently best approximation)? If so, you can only be called a scientific anti-realist.

 

[Nous]

So eliminating the "(/structures)" and substituting the phrase 'things having independent existence' in your argument and we now have:

P1: All things having independent existence discovered by physicists using the scientific method are objectively existing.
P2: Some mathematical relations are things having independent existence discovered by physicists using the scientific method.
C: Therefore, some mathematical relations are objectively existing.

No, you have falsely made the argument circular or vacuous. Not every mathematical relation or structure (set of equations) exist objectively. You won't find the word "structure" defined as "having independent existence" in any dictionary. The term "mathematical structure" in the argument does not smuggle in the term "objectively existing."

 

[siti]

No, you have falsely made the argument circular or vacuous. Not every mathematical relation or structure (set of equations) exist objectively. You won't find the word "structure" defined as "having independent existence" in any dictionary. The term "mathematical structure" in the argument does not smuggle in the term "objectively existing."

Well that's precisely my point - "structure" does not imply "objectively existing", "entities" does. If we reformulate the argument with the "structures" but without the "entities" then we have:

P1: All structures discovered by physicists using the scientific method are objectively existing.
P2: Some mathematical relations are structures discovered by physicists using the scientific method.
C: Therefore, some mathematical relations are objectively existing.

But is P1 true? If, as you seem to agree, the term "structures" can include things which have neither "independent existence" nor "objective existence" then P1 is false and the argument is unsound.

If we wish to say that "structures" only includes things that have either/both "independent existence" and/or "objective existence" then they are included in the term "entities" and there is no reason to add "(/structures)" anyway.

That's why I suggested that we remove "(/structures)" - it doesn't help your argument at all whatever we think about the reality or otherwise of "structures".

But if we remove "structures" and leave "entities" in we have a tautology (as I explained) that merely states the obvious (but vacuous) fact that anything that has "independent existence" and is "discovered by physicists using the scientific method" is "objectively existing" in P1 which, whilst not in itself making the argument either invalid or unsound, does indeed render it both vacuous and circular - as I have already demonstrated.

 

[siti]

By "genuinely referential," I mean the same as Professor Little meant in the article I quoted: the statement refers to something that exists objectively, i.e.,the statement is not just a façon de parler. It's exactly as you said earlier about two particles in which one is twice the size of the other. If true--if those two types of particles exist, and if one is indeed twice the size of the other--then that is a genuinely referential statement.

And E=mc2 refers to an objectively existing relation between the quantity E and the product of the quantities m and c times itself. That relation between these quantities objectively exists, as can be discovered by anyone using the correct methodology.

We have to be careful and precise here.

In my example of the two particles, what exists are two particles..."their relative sizes" is a relation that refers to two objectively existing entities...not necessarily either the quantities or the relation...so I might be overstepping the boundary of what is usually called scientific realism here, but it doesn't make me an anti-realist - if anything I would say it makes me an ultra-realist...but let me press on...

In your phrase here: "E=mc2 refers to an objectively existing relation between the quantity E and the product of the quantities m and c times itself" we have probably reified abstractions on two levels...the quantities themselves and the relation that pertains between the quantities...I do not believe we have sufficient grounds to make the claim that either/both the quantities or/and the relation are real. Rather, what we ought to say is something like:

"E=mc2 refers to a relation (that pertains) between the quantity E and the product of the quantities m and c times itself of objectively existing entities to which the quantities E and m refer in a system of objectively existing entities to which the quantity c refers".

Its unwieldy, but it is about as uncomplicated as we have grounds to claim. All the mathematical elements are still genuinely referential but we have avoided unwarranted reification.

The argument deduces that some quantities/mathematical relations objectively exist (i.e., can be discovered by anyone using the correct methodology). Do you deny that the quantity E exists? Do you deny that the relation between E, m and c times itself exists (at least as our currently best approximation)? If so, you can only be called a scientific anti-realist.

No, I can be a scientific ultra-realist that thinks that we might be able to make objective discoveries about things that objectively exist.

 

[Nous]

Well that's precisely my point - "structure" does not imply "objectively existing", "entities" does. If we reformulate the argument with the "structures" but without the "entities" then we have:

P1: All structures discovered by physicists using the scientific method are objectively existing.
P2: Some mathematical relations are structures discovered by physicists using the scientific method.
C: Therefore, some mathematical relations are objectively existing.

But is P1 true? If, as you seem to agree, the term "structures" can include things which have neither "independent existence" nor "objective existence" then P1 is false and the argument is unsound.

If we wish to say that "structures" only includes things that have either/both "independent existence" and/or "objective existence" then they are included in the term "entities" and there is no reason to add "(/structures)" anyway.

That's why I suggested that we remove "(/structures)" - it doesn't help your argument at all whatever we think about the reality or otherwise of "structures".

But if we remove "structures" and leave "entities" in we have a tautology (as I explained) that merely states the obvious (but vacuous) fact that anything that has "independent existence" and is "discovered by physicists using the scientific method" is "objectively existing" in P1 which, whilst not in itself making the argument either invalid or unsound, does indeed render it both vacuous and circular - as I have already demonstrated.

So you cannot point out anything "circular," tantological or erroneous in my argument:

P1: All entities (/structures) discovered by physicists using the scientific method are objectively existing.
P2: Some mathematical relations are entities (/structures) discovered by physicists using the scientific method.
C: Therefore, some mathematical relations are objectively existing.

And, in answer to your question: Yes, my P1 is true according to the Wikipedia article from which the premise was taken (my bolding):

Within philosophy of science, [the thesis of scientific realism] is often an answer to the question "how is the success of science to be explained?" The discussion on the success of science in this context centers primarily on the status of unobservable entities apparently talked about by scientific theories. Generally, those who are scientific realists assert that one can make valid claims about unobservables (viz., that they have the same ontological status) as observables, as opposed to instrumentalism.​

Scientific realism - Wikipedia

 

[Nous]

Rather, what we ought to say is something like:

"E=mc2 refers to a relation (that pertains) between the quantity E and the product of the quantities m and c times itself of objectively existing entities to which the quantities E and m refer in a system of objectively existing entities to which the quantity c refers".

That sounds kind of clumsy to me. Nevertheless, it apparently asserts that the the mathematical relation E=mc2 is genuinely referential. E=mc2 is obviously a relation between quantities. Objects that are not quantities do not have "=" signs between them, and cannot be multiplied times another object or times themselves.

And to claim that the mathematical relations discovered by the use of the scientific method are not genuinely referential is not what a scientific realist claims.

 

[siti]

So you cannot point out anything "circular," tantological or erroneous in my argument:

P1: All entities (/structures) discovered by physicists using the scientific method are objectively existing.
P2: Some mathematical relations are entities (/structures) discovered by physicists using the scientific method.
C: Therefore, some mathematical relations are objectively existing.

Yes I can and I did. If you claim that "all entities (/structures) are..., then you are claiming both that "all entities are..." AND "all sructures are..."

How can the statement "all entities discovered by physicists using the scientific method are objectively existing" be anything other than a tautology?

And "mathematical relations" are only actually entities if the thesis of mathematical realism is true, so P2 definitely assumes the conclusion and the argument is therefore circular.

And, in answer to your question: Yes, my P1 is true according to the Wikipedia article from which the premise was taken (my bolding):

Within philosophy of science, [the thesis of scientific realism] is often an answer to the question "how is the success of science to be explained?" The discussion on the success of science in this context centers primarily on the status of unobservable entities apparently talked about by scientific theories. Generally, those who are scientific realists assert that one can make valid claims about unobservables (viz., that they have the same ontological status) as observables, as opposed to instrumentalism.​

Scientific realism - Wikipedia

So your entire argument depends entirely on assuming the conclusion based on what (according to that infallible arbiter of truth, Wikipedia) "those who are scientific realists" generally assert. I'm afraid you've just killed your own argument stone dead.

 

[siti]

That sounds kind of clumsy to me. Nevertheless, it apparently asserts that the the mathematical relation E=mc2 is genuinely referential. E=mc2 is obviously a relation between quantities. Objects that are not quantities do not have "=" signs between them, and cannot be multiplied times another object or times themselves.

And to claim that the mathematical relations discovered by the use of the scientific method are not genuinely referential is not what a scientific realist claims.

Genuinely referential is not the same as genuinely real. The claim of mathematical realism is that E, m and c2 as well as the relation E=mc2 all have the same ontological status as the physical realities that they refer to. You have signally failed to prove that with any of your arguments so far. These "quantities" and "relations" may or may not have the same ontological status as "particles" and "waves" - it is a matter of metaphysical belief and if you are insisting that the belief that mathematical "objects" do indeed have the same ontological status as physical objects on the grounds that this is what Wikipedia says scientific realists assert, then you are holding to a metaphysical dogma for which you have neither empirical nor logical proof. And that is just about where we came in as far as this topic is concerned.

 

[Nous]

Yes I can and I did. If you claim that "all entities (/structures) are..., then you are claiming both that "all entities are..." AND "all sructures are..."

How can the statement "all entities discovered by physicists using the scientific method are objectively existing" be anything other than a tautology?

the definition of tautology

1. needless repetition of an idea, especially in words other than those of the immediate context, without imparting additional force or clearness, as in “widow woman.”.
2. an instance of such repetition.
3. Logic.

1. a compound propositional form all of whose instances are true, as “A or not A.”.
2. an instance of such a form, as “This candidate will win or will not win.”.

So where is the tautology in the sentence: "All entities (/structures) discovered by physicists using the scientific method are objectively existing"? It obviously doesn't contain any phrase such as "widow woman" or an assertion such as that something is either "A or not A".

And if that sentence were a tautology, that obviously doens't make it a false statement. That saves the argument from being unsound. So what is your problem with it, if that premise were a tautology?

I'm thinking you haven't actually understood that a valid syllogism cannot be an example of petitio principii. It seems like you're still trying to make that claim. In a valid syllogism, the conclusion never repeats a premise.

And "mathematical relations" are only actually entities if the thesis of mathematical realism is true, so P2 definitely assumes the conclusion and the argument is therefore circular.

Ah, I wrote that last paragraph above before even reading this sentence of yours.

Apparently you are referring to some argument that you have made up yourself, not either of the ones that I have stated.

This is one of my arguments:

P1: All entities (/structures) discovered by physicists using the scientific method are objectively existing.
P2: Some mathematical relations are entities (/structures) discovered by physicists using the scientific method.
C: Therefore, some mathematical relations are objectively existing.

Notice that the conclusion is deduced from the three terms in the two premises. Neither of the premises are statements contained in the conclusion. Therefore, that valid syllogism is not "circular".

You need to study logic. You are unable to distinguish between a valid argument--a deduction--and a circular statement.

 

[Nous]

Genuinely referential is not the same as genuinely real.

The quantity E, the quantity m, and the quantity c times itself, as well as the relation E=mc2 are genuinely referential in the same way as the word "particle" is genuinely referential. That's what mathematical realism is:

Mathematical realism is the view that the truths of mathematics are objective, which is to say that they are true independently of any human activities, beliefs or capacities. As the realist sees it, mathematics is the study of a body of necessary and unchanging facts, which it is the mathematician’s task to discover, not to create. These form the subject matter of mathematical discourse: a mathematical statement is true just in case it accurately describes the mathematical facts.​

Realism in the philosophy of mathematics - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

 

[Thief]

Define what you mean by "physical".

Are not these ideas about "physical" or "our physical existence" just a tenent of a metaphysical thesis? "Physical" is not an adjective that any scientific discipline defines or tests.

so...you want to discuss ...metaphysics....
but you have no means to define what is physical

have you not undone yourself?

 

[siti]

the definition of tautology

1. needless repetition of an idea, especially in words other than those of the immediate context, without imparting additional force or clearness, as in “widow woman.”.
2. an instance of such repetition.
3. Logic.

1. a compound propositional form all of whose instances are true, as “A or not A.”.
2. an instance of such a form, as “This candidate will win or will not win.”.

So where is the tautology in the sentence: "All entities (/structures) discovered by physicists using the scientific method are objectively existing"? It obviously doesn't contain any phrase such as "widow woman" or an assertion such as that something is either "A or not A".

And if that sentence were a tautology, that obviously doens't make it a false statement. That saves the argument from being unsound. So what is your problem with it, if that premise were a tautology?

I'm thinking you haven't actually understood that a valid syllogism cannot be an example of petitio principii. It seems like you're still trying to make that claim. In a valid syllogism, the conclusion never repeats a premise.

Ah, I wrote that last paragraph above before even reading this sentence of yours.

Apparently you are referring to some argument that you have made up yourself, not either of the ones that I have stated.

This is one of my arguments:

P1: All entities (/structures) discovered by physicists using the scientific method are objectively existing.
P2: Some mathematical relations are entities (/structures) discovered by physicists using the scientific method.
C: Therefore, some mathematical relations are objectively existing.

Notice that the conclusion is deduced from the three terms in the two premises. Neither of the premises are statements contained in the conclusion. Therefore, that valid syllogism is not "circular".

You need to study logic. You are unable to distinguish between a valid argument--a deduction--and a circular statement.

Your first premise checks all the boxes of your definition of a tautology...

That in itself does not render the argument unsound - all red things are indeed red is a perfectly logical statement - it just fails to provide any useful information.

Your second premise depends on what you mean by "entity" (which you have failed to specify despite several requests). As far as I know, an "entity" can be an "objectively existing thing" or "conceptually existing thing" and (in terms of your argument) unless we assume mathematical realism we have no reason to assume that the former applies. Your P2 is either an unprovable hunch, an assertion of mathematical realism or false. I'm taking it that your mathematical realist metaphysical dogma makes the "assertion of mathematical realism" option the most likely - and that - regardless of how proud you are of your logical reasoning abilities - makes your argument circular (like this discussion) and vacuous (as any further needless repetition of this discussion would be).

The quantity E, the quantity m, and the quantity c times itself, as well as the relation E=mc2 are genuinely referential in the same way as the word "particle" is genuinely referential.

The word "particle" is genuinely referential only because the particle itself (whatever a particle actually is) is real. The word is a concept that describes an actual reality, not an instance of the actual reality - it can have no independent reality in the absence of the reality that it is used to describe.

That's what mathematical realism is:

Mathematical realism is the view that the truths of mathematics are objective, which is to say that they are true independently of any human activities, beliefs or capacities. As the realist sees it, mathematics is the study of a body of necessary and unchanging facts, which it is the mathematician’s task to discover, not to create. These form the subject matter of mathematical discourse: a mathematical statement is true just in case it accurately describes the mathematical facts.

Again, you are confusing objectivity with reality - they are just not the same thing. And if we apply that last sentence of the Routledge definition to E=mc2 then you seem to be saying that there is an E, an m and a c even in the absence of a universe, let alone waves and particles. So that might be true - I personally doubt it - but how the F does your argument prove it without assuming it?

​

 

[Nous]

Your first premise checks all the boxes of your definition of a tautology...

Prove it. Quote the definitions showing that I have used words that mean the same:

P1: All entities (/structures) discovered by physicists using the scientific method are objectively existing.​

Your second premise depends on what you mean by "entity" (which you have failed to specify despite several requests).

You are welcomed to use any definition of "entity" that you find in a dictionary that is consistent with what physicists discover using the scientific method. What other term would you like to use to identify what it is the physicists discover using the scientific method?

You are also welcomed to use "structure" as a substitute for "entity," where "structure" means a series of relationships (such as your relation where one particle is twice the volume of another).

​

The word "particle" is genuinely referential only because the particle itself (whatever a particle actually is) is real. The word is a concept that describes an actual reality, not an instance of the actual reality - it can have no independent reality in the absence of the reality that it is used to describe.

Your paragraph here is an excellent example of a tautology. Right?

​

Again, you are confusing objectivity with reality - they are just not the same thing.

Prove it. Be sure to cite your sources.

And if we apply that last sentence of the Routledge definition to E=mc2 then you seem to be saying that there is an E, an m and a c even in the absence of a universe, let alone waves and particles.

I didn't say any such thing. Nevertheless, E is a quantity; it is a conserved quantity in an isolated system, i.e., it remains constant, and is not created or destroyed by changes occurring in a closed system. It is not a spatially extended universe, a wave or a particle.

 

[Nous]

so...you want to discuss ...metaphysics....

Evidently you either didn't read or didn't understand the OP. Go back and read it. Try answering the questions asked in it.

 

[Thief]

My impression is that most philosophically conversant adults hold some belief that a thesis of metaphysics states a truth about the nature of reality. If you do not hold any such belief, you are welcomed to declare your metaphysical neutrality.

Further, my impression is that it isn't uncommon people to hold their metaphysical beliefs tenaciously, even when presented evidence contrary to the thesis, or on the basis of clearly invalid reasoning. In other words, the belief takes on the characteristics of a dogma, in which there is an intellectual or emotional allegiance to it, possibly motivated by identification with a group.

Definition of DOGMA

1 a : something held as an established opinion; especially : a definite authoritative tenet

b : a code of such tenets pedagogical dogma

c : a point of view or tenet put forth as authoritative without adequate grounds​

Indeed, any sort of overt affirmation of a single metaphysical thesis might be considered suspect, given that metaphysical theses are not scientifically tested or shown to be true to the exclusion of all others. Some metaphysical theses or certain tenets of some theses might be (and seemingly have been) empirically ruled out. But that doesn't leave us with which, if any, thesis is true.

So, do you “have” a metaphysical thesis, one that you assert to be true? If so, on what grounds have you concluded its truth? Is this thesis falsifiable? If so, what fact or evidence would falsify it?

yep....

and without a reference to the physical.....metaphysical is a topic beyond you

 

[Nous]

yep....

and without a reference to the physical.....metaphysical is a topic beyond you

Wow, what lunacy.

What books on metaphysics have you read?

Why don't you define the adjective "physical"?

 

[siti]

Prove it. Quote the definitions showing that I have used words that mean the same:

P1: All entities (/structures) discovered by physicists using the scientific method are objectively existing.

It is not merely about quoting definitions, it is about whether or not you have said something that is not so obvious that it could not possibly - even conceivably - been any other way.

But for clarity here are the briefest Oxford Dictionary definitions of the key words:

Entity: A thing with distinct and independent existence.
Structure: The arrangement of and relations between the parts or elements of something complex.

Objectively: In a way that is not dependent on the mind for existence
Exist: Have objective reality or being

​

I am pretty sure I already did this earlier but if you substitute the definitions in your P1 what you end up with is something like this - either (if we use the definition of "entity"):

All independently existing things discovered by physicists using the scientific method are having objective reality in a way that is not dependent on the mind for existence. (Well yes - if it is independently existing, its existence obviously cannot be dependent on mind - this is very definitely a tautology)

-or (if we use the definition of "structure") -

All arrangements of and relations between the parts or elements of something complex discovered by physicists using the scientific method are having objective reality in a way that is not dependent on the mind for existence. (Well no, we certainly do not know that this is necessarily true absent the assumption that such structures - mathematical ones for example - are real - i.e. relating to something as it is, not merely as it may be described or distinguished).

So your P1 is either a tautology (which means it is logically coherent but essentially vacuous), or possibly false.

But the real test is to ask the question: is there any conceivable manner or circumstances in which physicists (correctly) using the scientific method could have (correctly and unmistakenly) discovered entities that were not "objectively existing"?

I didn't say any such thing.

You quoted this clause from Routledge: "a mathematical statement is true just in case it accurately describes the mathematical facts" as an explanation of what mathematical realism means. Is E=mc2 a mathematical statement? Of course it is. So if that explanatory clause from Routledge is correct, what it is claiming is that E=mc2 is true even if there is not a (particular) universe for it to true about - it is true just in case such a universe exists? Of course there may be universes for which E=mc2 is not true, but can I then not also make the claim that E=mc3 is also true just in case there is a universe in which the empirically observed facts would bear this out? And more than that it means that there must actually (but not necessarily physically) exist an E, an m and a c that fulfills any and all of the possible relations among them for any conceivable actually existing physical entities whether or not any of these entities actually exist, just in case they do? So mathematical realism is really just like any other form of idealism - it makes entirely unfalsifiable claims about things which may or may not exist in such superlative abundance that it tells us precisely nothing at all. Its Plato's "beard" gone wild again.

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[Thief]

Wow, what lunacy.

What books on metaphysics have you read?

Why don't you define the adjective "physical"?

look in a mirror and make your denial to THAT guy