So, hopefully you agree that the definition of "structure" does not create a tautology of this sentence: "All structures discovered by physicists using the scientific method are objectively existing." Right?It is not merely about quoting definitions, it is about whether or not you have said something that is not so obvious that it could not possibly - even conceivably - been any other way.
But for clarity here are the briefest Oxford Dictionary definitions of the key words:
Entity: A thing with distinct and independent existence.
Structure: The arrangement of and relations between the parts or elements of something complex.
In any case, again, you are welcomed to supply any term that you wish to indicate what it is that physicists discover about empirical reality by using the scientific method. You can even make it a nonsense placeholder term or symbol.
How many times I have asked you to define "real"?-or (if we use the definition of "structure") -
All arrangements of and relations between the parts or elements of something complex discovered by physicists using the scientific method are having objective reality in a way that is not dependent on the mind for existence. (Well no, we certainly do not know that this is necessarily true absent the assumption that such structures - mathematical ones for example - are real
That premise that you just stated here is going to be used to deduce that the mathematical structures that physicists discover using the scientific method are real. Right?
Why ask such a vacuous question? If you can show that there is another universe where E=mc3 is genuinely referential, then do so. You will be demonstrating that the thesis of mathematical realism is true in that universe too.You quoted this clause from Routledge: "a mathematical statement is true just in case it accurately describes the mathematical facts" as an explanation of what mathematical realism means. Is E=mc2 a mathematical statement? Of course it is. So if that explanatory clause from Routledge is correct, what it is claiming is that E=mc2 is true even if there is not a (particular) universe for it to true about - it is true just in case such a universe exists? Of course there may be universes for which E=mc2 is not true, but can I then not also make the claim that E=mc3 is also true just in case there is a universe in which the empirically observed facts would bear this out?
If these sentences are supposed to be an argument, then state it:And more than that it means that there must actually (but not necessarily physically) exist an E, an m and a c that fulfills any and all of the possible relations among them for any conceivable actually existing physical entities whether or not any of these entities actually exist, just in case they do? So mathematical realism is really just like any other form of idealism - it makes entirely unfalsifiable claims about things which may or may not exist in such superlative abundance that it tells us precisely nothing at all. Its Plato's "beard" gone wild again.
P1: [. . . ]
P2: [. . . ]
C: Therefore [. . . ]