Knowledge and Belief

[Willamena]

It allows us to say that is logically possible that God could exist without anyone recognizing that God exists- which is hardly controversial.

It is controversial--that possibility, that God (or Russell's teapot, or the white-tail deer that we know nothing of) exists, is the scientifically unfalsifiable claim that can bear no burden of proof.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

It is controversial--that possibility, that God (or Russell's teapot, or the white-tail deer that we know nothing of) exists, is the scientifically unfalsifiable claim that can bear no burden of proof.

You're so missing the point. We aren't talking about epistemology, and falsification pertains to epistemic criteria. You're trying to lead us off on a tangent, and trying to do so by disputing an obvious logical distinction. That a god, or flying teapot, or white-tail deer, that no one recognizes or identifies as existing exists is unfalsifiable and, from an epistemic point of view, a difference which makes no difference, is certainly true- but irrelevant here. It is an uncontroversial, trivial point that logically, "X does not exist" does not follow necessarily from "X is not recognized as existing". So not only is your claim completely off-topic here, its simply mistaken as well.

The Amazonian fish example illustrates this basic distinction adequately, and I'm not interested in pursuing an irrelevant tangent over an obvious and trivially true logical point much further. Its logically possible that there exists some things which we don't know or recognize exist (because it is not self-contradictory, which is what logical possibility consists in). Its just not really something which can reasonably be disputed. There are more productive lines of discussion here, especially regarding justification, something nobody's been willing to touch on yet. (or, you could go back and tell us what you meant by this "propositions are true worlds" gibberish)

 

[Falvlun]

Must we need to be able to identify, say, a white-tail deer in order for white-tail deer to exist? Suppose humans died off and there was nobody around to say "Yep, that's a white-tail deer"- would there not be any white-tail deer any more? Of course there would! Similarly, even if we couldn't identify knowledge as such at all (and we haven't even established that, because identifying knowledge and identifying knowledge with certainty or infallibility are NOT the same thing), it wouldn't follow that there was no knowledge.

Actually, it would follow that there could be no knowledge.

Unlike deer, knowledge only exists in our mind. It is not an actual thing. Without humans (or other sentient beings), there would be no knowledge.

We decide what is knowledge and what is not knowledge. We must define something as knowledge in order for it to be knowledge.

Now, if we stipulate that something is knowledge if and only if it is true, then we must know whether something is true in order to define something as knowledge.

Since, as you concede above, we are unable to determine truth with certainty or infallibility, then we are also unable to define anything as knowledge.

If there is nobody to define anything as knowledge, then knowledge does not exist.

 

[Willamena]

You're so missing the point. We aren't talking about epistemology, and falsification pertains to epistemic criteria. You're trying to lead us off on a tangent, and trying to do so by disputing an obvious logical distinction. That a god, or flying teapot, or white-tail deer, that no one recognizes or identifies as existing exists is unfalsifiable and, from an epistemic point of view, a difference which makes no difference, is certainly true- but irrelevant here. It is an uncontroversial, trivial point that logically, "X does not exist" does not follow necessarily from "X is not recognized as existing". So not only is your claim completely off-topic here, its simply mistaken as well.

The Amazonian fish example illustrates this basic distinction adequately, and I'm not interested in pursuing an irrelevant tangent over an obvious and trivially true logical point much further. Its logically possible that there exists some things which we don't know or recognize exist (because it is not self-contradictory, which is what logical possibility consists in). Its just not really something which can reasonably be disputed. There are more productive lines of discussion here, especially regarding justification, something nobody's been willing to touch on yet. (or, you could go back and tell us what you meant by this "propositions are true worlds" gibberish)

We can't avoid talking about epistemology if we're discussing knowledge and belief.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

We can't avoid talking about epistemology if we're discussing knowledge and belief.

Now you're just trying to cloud the water on purpose. Yes, the topic of the thread concerns epistemology. But the point at issue does not.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Actually, it would follow that there could be no knowledge.

Unlike deer, knowledge only exists in our mind. It is not an actual thing. Without humans (or other sentient beings), there would be no knowledge.

Right. But that's not the question. Ex hypothesi, for there to be a case of knowledge, there must be at least one knower. But as per the last man example, for him to know, neither him nor anyone else (since there is no one else) needs to identify or judge his knowledge as knowledge. Thus, an inability to identify or judge knowledge as such does not entail the non-existence of knowledge. It could be that it exists, but we can never recognize it as such. Of course, ala Willemena's point, its existence would be a difference which makes no difference, from an epistemic point of view. But the point I'm making is just the trivial one that logically, the one doesn't follow from the other.

As it happens, I think we can identify knowledge as knowledge, and so the point turns out to be moot- the whole argument against identifying knowledge as knowledge is that we can never be certain, the possibility for error is always present. But if we recognize that certainty is a false criteria, for the reason's already mentioned (that it pertains to deductive knowledge in particular, and is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for knowledge in general), this argument loses its force.

We decide what is knowledge and what is not knowledge. We must define something as knowledge in order for it to be knowledge.

We decide how to use the word "knowledge", and so we must define the word before we can say this or that is an instance of knowledge. But that doesn't mean that, given a definition or usage for this word, certain things won't satisfy this definition irrespective of whether anyone is there to say, "hey, that's a case of knowledge!" To claim this, one has to commit to a bizarre metaphysic indeed.

Now, if we stipulate that something is knowledge if and only if it is true, then we must know whether something is true in order to define something as knowledge.

Since, as you concede above, we are unable to determine truth with certainty or infallibility, then we are also unable to define anything as knowledge.

We aren't stipulating that, that seems to be how the word is used. But yes, in order to consider or identify (not define) something as knowledge, to identify knowledge as knowledge in a particular instance, we have to see whether it is true. But your conclusion only follows if we agree that certainty or infallibility is part of our criteria for "is true".

If there is nobody to define anything as knowledge, then knowledge does not exist.

This is ambiguous. If nobody is there to define the word "knowledge", then the term is meaningless, and doesn't denote anything- so in a sense, knowledge would not exist. And as above, if there is nobody to know in the first place, then knowledge doesn't exist; knowledge is contingent upon a subject, a knower.

 

[Willamena]

Now you're just trying to cloud the water on purpose. Yes, the topic of the thread concerns epistemology. But the point at issue does not.

The point (that a thing's existence and our acknowledgement or identification thereof are logically distinct) fails because it's not epistemologically responsible to hold up existence distinct from what we know. We cannot claim truth for things we do not know about--to allow that is to allow a teapot in orbit around Mars.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

... it's not epistemologically responsible to hold up existence distinct from what we know.

That's irrelevant, and I'm not claiming otherwise. As I've pointed out several times times now, I'm not asserting the existence of things we don't know exist. I'm merely noting that an argument against identifying knowledge is not logically equivalent to an argument against the existence of knowledge. I'm not sure what sort of mental block is preventing you from understanding the import of this distinction in this context. This was simply a trivial point in passing (and its discouraging that posters are getting hung up on it), and is ultimately moot since, as I said in my last post, I think its a false premise that we can never identify knowledge as such anyways.

 

[Falvlun]

Right. But that's not the question. Ex hypothesi, for there to be a case of knowledge, there must be at least one knower. But as per the last man example, for him to know, neither him nor anyone else (since there is no one else) needs to identify or judge his knowledge as knowledge. Thus, an inability to identify or judge knowledge as such does not entail the non-existence of knowledge. It could be that it exists, but we can never recognize it as such.

How could knowledge exist if nobody could recognize it? Knowledge must exist, as you have said, in the mind of a person. If a person can't recognize knowledge, then ergo, knowledge doesn't exist.

Also note: each of those paragraphs was a premise. I was merely stating that premise, not claiming that this was the question.

As it happens, I think we can identify knowledge as knowledge, and so the point turns out to be moot- the whole argument against identifying knowledge as knowledge is that we can never be certain, the possibility for error is always present. But if we recognize that certainty is a false criteria, for the reason's already mentioned (that it pertains to deductive knowledge in particular, and is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for knowledge in general), this argument loses its force.

Will address this below.

We decide how to use the word "knowledge", and so we must define the word before we can say this or that is an instance of knowledge. But that doesn't mean that, given a definition or usage for this word, certain things won't satisfy this definition irrespective of whether anyone is there to say, "hey, that's a case of knowledge!" To claim this, one has to commit to a bizarre metaphysic indeed.

This would merely relegate knowledge to the realm of the unicorn. It hypothetically could exist, but it doesn't (if no one can say "hey, that's a case of knowledge!"). And again, this is because knowledge only exists in our minds. If our minds cannot determine if something is knowledge, then knowledge fails to manifest.

We aren't stipulating that, that seems to be how the word is used. But yes, in order to consider or identify (not define) something as knowledge, to identify knowledge as knowledge in a particular instance, we have to see whether it is true. But your conclusion only follows if we agree that certainty or infallibility is part of our criteria for "is true".

If knowledge can only be knowledge if it is true, then I fail to see how there is any room for fallibility.

It must be true to be knowledge. There's no wiggle room.

Likewise, if we can't or don't know for certain whether it is true, then we can't determine that it is knowledge.

This is ambiguous. If nobody is there to define the word "knowledge", then the term is meaningless, and doesn't denote anything- so in a sense, knowledge would not exist. And as above, if there is nobody to know in the first place, then knowledge doesn't exist; knowledge is contingent upon a subject, a knower.

I didn't say "define knowledge". I said "define something as knowledge".

If we cannot point to a statement and say "This is knowledge", then knowledge cannot exist.

 

[AmbiguousGuy]

If knowledge can only be knowledge if it is true, then I fail to see how there is any room for fallibility.

It must be true to be knowledge. There's no wiggle room.

Likewise, if we can't or don't know for certain whether it is true, then we can't determine that it is knowledge.

It seems so simple, doesn't it?

 

[Enai de a lukal]

How could knowledge exist if nobody could recognize it?

Um, because nothing about the definition of knowledge under discussion entails that it be recognized as knowledge?

Knowledge must exist, as you have said, in the mind of a person.

This is a highly problematic way of putting it, and that's "a whole nother story" so let's bracket this.

If a person can't recognize knowledge, then ergo, knowledge doesn't exist.

It still doesn't follow, regardless of how many times we repeat it.

This would merely relegate knowledge to the realm of the unicorn.

That's fine. Everyone is forgetting the context of the distinction- as above, the point is simply that "Knowledge can never be identified" does not logically entail "knowledge does not exist". As it happens, I'm certainly not granting that knowledge can never be identified- as I've pointed out twice now, all this is ultimately moot since I think the premise is mistaken.

If knowledge can only be knowledge if it is true, then I fail to see how there is any room for fallibility.

Because infallibility only seems to be a feature of a very particular type of knowledge or truth (and even there, its questionable)- logical/mathematical/analytic/a priori truth.

Likewise, if we can't or don't know for certain whether it is true, then we can't determine that it is knowledge.

Once again, only if we've accepted infallibility or certainty as our criteria here, which is a mistake for numerous reasons. Most obviously, because it simply isn't a necessary feature of the cases in which we use the word "knowledge" in actual linguistic practice.

I didn't say "define knowledge". I said "define something as knowledge".

It wasn't the "something as" part that was problematic, it was using the word "define", when it seems we're talking about a judgment or classification rather than a definition.

If we cannot point to a statement and say "This is knowledge", then knowledge cannot exist.

I get it that some posters feel this way, but we've merely had it repeated as a refrain, rather than seen any good reason for thinking it is so.

 

[Willamena]

Rather, if it's not true, it's not useful.

...and so we discard it.

 

[AlisonRose222]

The New Message from God states:
"The mind can believe, but belief is weak and vulnerable to influence and persuasion. But Knowledge, the deeper intelligence that the Creator has provided you, is beyond manipulation and deception. It cannot be corrupted by any power, be it human or extraterrestrial."
and...
"This Knowledge is a greater intelligence within each person waiting to be discovered, but its whole existence is in relationship to the Creator of all life. It is not a resource that you can use to enrich yourself or to gain advantage over others, for Knowledge will not do these things. Its purpose and its reality is to respond to the Creator of all life and to respond to the great calling that is going out as humanity continues to approach this great threshold in its existence."

 

[Monk Of Reason]

But a rational process of deduction (even if deduction, as opposed to inductive/defeasible reasoning, WERE our primary mode of reasoning- it probably isn't all considered) is not really a "guess", in any sense of the word. I suppose one could loosely characterize inductive knowledge as a "guess", in contrast to deductive knowledge, but now you've got a problem- deductive knowledge certainly appears to be certain, and not a guess at all. Thus, these do not appear to be features of knowledge as such, seeing as both inductive and deductive knowledge are, after all, knowledge.

Educated guess and guess are not the same thing. Your comming close to strawman with this comment.

We can attempt to obtain information and deductive knowledge is only considered to be knowledge. Or we "believe" we have the knowledge after deductive reasoning.

So we have been reduced to two choices. Either knowledge is a term we use to apply to things we think we have assurity to or we don't actually "know" anything but have a belief that we know things.

But that doesn't follow- knowledge has to be correct, by definition; a falsehood cannot be knowledge, OK. And we have no absolute, infallible way to identify what is or isn't correct- all that follows from this is that we cannot diagnose knowledge as knowledge with 100% certainty; not that knowledge doesn't exist at all.

I agree. But not with the way you have been utilizing the term knowledge. No one actually "knows" anything by this definition. The closest thing we have is math and other such functions that are free from experience.

Must we need to be able to identify, say, a white-tail deer in order for white-tail deer to exist? Suppose humans died off and there was nobody around to say "Yep, that's a white-tail deer"- would there not be any white-tail deer any more? Of course there would! Similarly, even if we couldn't identify knowledge as such at all (and we haven't even established that, because identifying knowledge and identifying knowledge with certainty or infallibility are NOT the same thing), it wouldn't follow that there was no knowledge.

I also agree.

And in order to see that being knowledge, and being considered knowledge, are not identical, consider the last man on Earth- everyone else has died. This man is like you and I in most every respect except, he never reflects on what he believes or knows. He just goes about his business. Now, suppose he believes that he left his water jug by the pond because that's what he remembers doing, and that he DID leave it there- in other words, he has a justified true belief, but one that is NOT considered knowledge, simply because there's nobody around to consider it knowledge and, as I said, he never reflects upon his own beliefs. Now, intuitively, we would have no problem calling this an instance of knowledge, and one where the knowledge is not "considered knowledge" by ANYONE.

Perhaps this illustrates the difference more clearly.

In any case, to take a step back- one of the purposes of a theory of knowledge is to give an account of what these cases which people tend to refer to as "knowledge" have in common (if anything). In a sense, philosophers are like linguists- we need to see what all the cases in which people use this word "know" consist in, and compare them. And for virtually every case we can come up with, the JTB definition can account for and classify it as knowledge. That's a good sign.

But another requirement we should have- one NOT satisfied by many theories of truth or knowledge- is that it cohere with the rest of our best and most tenable pictures of the world, in particular that of the sciences, but also importantly, that of our day-to-day lives. Given this, any theory of knowledge which comes back with the verdict that there is no such thing as knowledge is basically worthless- even if it adduces compeling arguments for this claim, there isn't much we can do with it. It doesn't help explain our scientific picture of the world, or what it is we are doing when in our day-to-day lives we know who is calling on the phone, or know the color of the drapes in our living room. Skepticism about truth in these sorts of contexts makes no sense whatsoever- it has no part in the language-game. Is there any sense in doubting whether I know I'm using a computer right now? Or that I'm wearing a shirt? (and there is a deeper issue here- Wittgenstein's private language argument, in which doubt presupposes something being the case, and something being true- but thats "a whole nother story", as they say)

I don't recall saying that there is no such thing as objective knowledge. Just that its unobtainable and the way we use the word "knowledge" is different than what you have proposed. For example when I say "I know that evolution happened." I mean that I have a firm conviction that the theory of evolution is true based on the evidence. Not that there is some infallable truth to it all. Weather or not evolution is true as an objective matter of the universe devoid of all evidence based reasoning is another matter and one quite useless. One even more useless than saying that knowledge doesn't exist.

 

[Falvlun]

Um, because nothing about the definition of knowledge under discussion entails that it be recognized as knowledge?

Where does knowledge exist when it's not recognized?

That's fine. Everyone is forgetting the context of the distinction- as above, the point is simply that "Knowledge can never be identified" does not logically entail "knowledge does not exist". As it happens, I'm certainly not granting that knowledge can never be identified- as I've pointed out twice now, all this is ultimately moot since I think the premise is mistaken.

The crux of my problem with your definition is that knowledge cannot be identified as such, using your definition. Hence, all this is exceedingly relevant to our discussion.

Because infallibility only seems to be a feature of a very particular type of knowledge or truth (and even there, its questionable)- logical/mathematical/analytic/a priori truth.


Once again, only if we've accepted infallibility or certainty as our criteria here, which is a mistake for numerous reasons. Most obviously, because it simply isn't a necessary feature of the cases in which we use the word "knowledge" in actual linguistic practice.

I am confused. You are the one arguing that it MUST BE true in order for it to be considered knowledge. Where is the wiggle room? If something must be true in order for us to consider it knowledge, then we would have to know that this something is true before we can call it knowledge.

The very fact that we do not require this certainty-- as you say, actual linguistic practice-- is the shining chunk of evidence against your very definition!

It wasn't the "something as" part that was problematic, it was using the word "define", when it seems we're talking about a judgment or classification rather than a definition.

Seriously. You don't understand what it means to "define something as X"? It means "something has the properties of X".

Can you explain how we can claim that "something has the properties of knowledge"-- one of which, according to you, is truth-- if we are unable to ascertain whether it actually has that property?

I get it that some posters feel this way, but we've merely had it repeated as a refrain, rather than seen any good reason for thinking it is so.

All you've done is merely repeat that it is wrong, rather than offering any reason to accept your proclamation.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Where does knowledge exist when it's not recognized?

Depending on how one feels about mental states, its either a mental state or a behavioral disposition. In neither case does it require someone to say "hey, that is knowledge" for it to satisfy the definition of knowledge. Where does my knowledge of how to tie my shoes exist when nobody notes that I know how to tie my shoes? (in my brain somewhere?)

The crux of my problem with your definition is that knowledge cannot be identified as such, using your definition.

No, that doesn't follow, as we've noted several times now. Identifying knowledge as such =/= certainty =/= knowing that we know. Not sure why people are so intent on building strawmen here.

I am confused. You are the one arguing that it MUST BE true in order for it to be considered knowledge. Where is the wiggle room? If something must be true in order for us to consider it knowledge, then we would have to know that this something is true before we can call it knowledge.

Why?

The very fact that we do not require this certainty-- as you say, actual linguistic practice-- is the shining chunk of evidence against your very definition!

Since I've not only not offered certainty as part of my definition at any point, but explicitly pointed out that it's neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for knowledge, this could hardly be the case. When do we hold beliefs? When a sufficient/compelling degree of evidence supports the belief in question. Beliefs concerning knowledge are no different.

Seriously. You don't understand what it means to "define something as X"? It means "something has the properties of X".

Right, I gotcha. Which is, as I pointed out, a slightly weird way to use the word "define", but OK (you define a concept, you judge whether something satisfies it on a given instance)

Can you explain how we can claim that "something has the properties of knowledge"-- one of which, according to you, is truth-- if we are unable to ascertain whether it actually has that property?

Who said we're "unable to ascertain whether it actually has" truth? If we want to know whether your keys are in your pocket, we look in your pocket. If you claim that the square root of 145896328406712234 is an even number, we can perform a calculation. No problem here... Unless, of course, you're trying to sneak in that unwelcome guest, infallibility, through the back door- he's not allowed!

All you've done is merely repeat that it is wrong, rather than offering any reason to accept your proclamation.

Well, if being an obvious non-sequitur is not reason enough for you, then I'm not sure how I can help. And if you want to ignore pages of the thread and say "all you've offered are proclamations", then we aren't haven't a discussion anymore, we're playing make-believe.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Educated guess and guess are not the same thing.

Sure, but an "educated guess" is still a guess, and so it seems like a misleading term to use at best; and when it comes to deductive/analytic/a priori knowledge, its not applicable at all. That 2+2=4, or that A->A is no guess, educated or otherwise.

We can attempt to obtain information and deductive knowledge is only considered to be knowledge.

I'm not sure what you mean by this statement, could you restate/elaborate?

So we have been reduced to two choices. Either knowledge is a term we use to apply to things we think we have assurity to or we don't actually "know" anything but have a belief that we know things.

"Knowledge" is a term we apply to beliefs which are justified and true. Granted, we have no infallible access to the truth of facts, but the application is more or less appropriate in proportion to several factors, including and especially evidence.

I agree. But not with the way you have been utilizing the term knowledge. No one actually "knows" anything by this definition. The closest thing we have is math and other such functions that are free from experience.

Not close, all the way there- math and logic satisfy not only my definition of knowledge, but the additional criteria of logical certainty others have wished to tack on as well. And the only reason we would say "no one actually knows anything by this definition" is if we are going to say either that there are no determinate states of affairs in the world, that language cannot adequately describe them, or that no adequate warrant is ever obtainable. I see no reason to accept any of these claims. My definition of knowledge only requires a few things, and they are, I think, pretty uncontroversial (or rather, any model or view which does NOT have them would be bizarre and practically unworkable)-

1. There are states of affairs in the world, or facts (things are a certain way)
2. Language can/does describe states of affairs in the world
3. Its possible to obtain evidence sufficient to warrant belief

... the way we use the word "knowledge" is different than what you have proposed. For example when I say "I know that evolution happened." I mean that I have a firm conviction that the theory of evolution is true based on the evidence.

Maybe, but not necessarily. As we've noted already, one can know and needn't have "a firm conviction". So when people say "I know..." they are not necessarily telling us they have a firm conviction. They are telling us 3 things- that they believe X, that X is true, and that their belief is warranted.

Not that there is some infallable truth to it all. Weather or not evolution is true as an objective matter of the universe devoid of all evidence based reasoning is another matter and one quite useless. One even more useless than saying that knowledge doesn't exist.

Its a good thing I'm not arguing that "evolution is true as an objective matter of the universe devoid of all evidence based reasoning" then (whatever that may mean- I'm not sure, but it doesn't sound good)...

 

[Falvlun]

Well, if being an obvious non-sequitur is not reason enough for you, then I'm not sure how I can help. And if you want to ignore pages of the thread and say "all you've offered are proclamations", then we aren't haven't a discussion anymore, we're playing make-believe.

Dude, you were the one who started it, with your claims that I've merely just been repeating myself. If you think it's make-believe, then you better take a cold-hard look into the mirror, buddy.

 

[Falvlun]

When do we hold beliefs? When a sufficient/compelling degree of evidence supports the belief in question.Beliefs concerning knowledge are no different.

I had to highlight this, since this hearkens back to what I've been saying this whole time!

From my very first post in this thread:

I think the distinction between knowledge and belief-- at least practically speaking-- is level of certainty the person places upon it. If they are certain that a thing is true, then this is considered knowledge. If they are not completely certain, but still hold the thing to be true, then it is just considered a belief.

Knowledge is a belief based upon the certainty of truth (and justification for that truth).

Knowledge is defined by belief of truth and not actual truth.

 

[AmbiguousGuy]

Knowledge is defined by belief of truth and not actual truth.

Just so, although I'd like to suggest:

Knowledge is defined by an individual's personal, fallible belief of truth.

And:

There is no truth except and unless one is ready to embrace AmbigGuy's (God given) opinions as truth.