Non-physical entities with causal powers: computer programs

[Yerda]

I believe information is very physical, independently from where and how it is stored. In the same way energy is very physical too, independently from its instantiation as electrical, gavitational, etc. i even think the two things are actually the same.

Ciao

- viole

In what sense would the information contained in a sentence be physical?

 

[idav]

I decided to put this post here as this is where such posts normally go (rather than e.g., the "Science & Technology" section, which isn't a debate forum, or the "General Debates" section). I have, more than once, taken issue with comparisons between the mind or brain and computers. Also, computers are about as close as we can get to a wholly reducible system as
1) We build them, from the theoretical designs of Church and Turing to the actual implementations from the ENIAC to the computer/smartphone/tablet/etc. you are using to access this post.
2) They are quite literally physical instantiations of formal logic.
3) They are modularly and hierarchically organized (unlike most natural systems and in particular all living systems), especially with respect to function (unlike the brain, where memory systems are not only--at least somewhat--indistinct from one another, but are also indistinct from any would-be processor). So RAM, for example, is a particular type of memory located in a specific place that interacts with other likewise functionally organized components of the system in deliberate, pre-defined ways.
4) Everything about computers is rule-based, finite, discrete, and just generally the seeming epitome of a reducible system in basically all senses of the term.

So I found it interesting when, in the volume
Aguirre, A., Foster, B., & Merali, Z. (Eds.). (2015). Questioning the Foundations of Physics: Which of Our Fundamental Assumptions are Wrong? (The Frontiers Collection). Springer.

I found computers used as an example not only of non-physical entities but anti-reductionism in the contributing paper "Recognizing Top-Down Causation" by Ellis. I've included a summary of his use of this example, and for those who wish for an even more minimal amount of information part A is the most relevant:
"Definition 1 (Causal Effect) If making a change in a quantity X results in a reliable demonstrable change in a quantity Y in a given context, then X has a causal effect on Y...
Definition 2 (Existence) If Y is a physical entity made up of ordinary matter, and X is some kind of entity that has a demonstrable causal effect on Y as per Definition 1, then we must acknowledge that X also exists (even if it is not made up of such matter)...
A: Causal Efficacy of Non Physical entities: Both the program and the data are non-physical entities, indeed so is all software. A program is not a physical thing you can point to, but by Definition 2 it certainly exists. You can point to a CD or flashdrive where it is stored, but that is not the thing in itself: it is a medium in which it is stored. The program itself is an abstract entity, shaped by abstract logic. Is the software nothing but its realisation through a specific set of stored electronic states in the computer memory banks? No it is not because it is the precise pattern in those states that matters: a higher level relation that is not apparent at the scale of the electrons themselves. Its a relational thing (and if you get the relations between the symbols wrong, so you have a syntax error, it will all come to a grinding halt). This abstract nature of software is realised in the concept of virtual machines, which occur at every level in the computer hierarchy except the bottom one. But this tower of virtual machines causes physical effects in the real world, for example when a computer controls a robot in an assembly line to create physical artefacts.
B: Logical relations rule at the higher levels: The dynamics at all levels is driven by the logic of the algorithms employed in the high level programs. They decide what computations take place, and they have the power to change the world. This abstract logic cannot be deduced from the laws of physics: they operate in a completely different realm. Furthermore the relevant higher level variables in those algorithms cannot be obtained by coarse graining any lower level physical states. They are not coarse-grained or emergent variables: they are assigned variables, with specific abstract properties that then mediate their behaviour.
C: Underlying physics allows arbitrary programs and data: Digital computers are universal computers. The underlying physics does not constrain the logic or type of computation possible, which Turing has shown is universal. Physics does not constrain the data used, nor what can be computed (although it does constrain the speed at which this can be done). It enables the higher level actions rather than constraining them. The program logic dictates the course of things.
D: Multiple realisability at lower levels. The same high level logic can be implemented in many different ways: electronic (transistors), electrical (relays), hydraulic (valves), biological (interacting molecules) for example. The logic of the program can be realised by any of these underlying physical entities, which clearly demonstrates that it is not the lower level physics that is driving the causation. This multiple realisability is a key feature characterising top-down action: when some high level logic is driving causation at lower levels, it does not matter how that logic is physically instantiated: it can be realised in many different ways."

It uses on off switches that are encoded running in a physical system. It is not immaterial nor is quantum computing which use physical atoms to do the on off switches.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

It uses on off switches that are encoded running in a physical system.

1) What is "it"?
2) Functional processes of physical systems need not be (and cannot be) physical.

It is not immaterial nor is quantum computing which use physical atoms to do the on off switches.

Quantum computing is an over-hyped field that is completely irrelevant here. The author doesn't even allude to quantum computing, but is quite clearly concerned with the kind of programs you use all the time on the kind of computer you do.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

In what sense would the information contained in a sentence be physical?

In an information-theoretic sense (or a quantum information-theoretic sense) there are multiple realizations for the physical information of a given utterance, sentence, etc. None of them are capable of describing or even addressing the semantic content of a sentence, phrase, or even a word. After all, information theory is formal, which means it is syntactical rather than conceptual.

That said, it has become increasingly common in modern physics to adopt an information-theoretic view of the whole of reality/the cosmos. This is, IMO, because modern physics has increasingly relied on mathematics abstracted from the one-to-one correspondence we find of observables in classical physics as well as fundamentally probabilistic. Information theory, which was derived by Shannon using physics to begin with (entropy) has returned to physics because it is particularly well suited to describing probabilistic systems and uncertainty.

 

[Bunyip]

1) What is "it"?
2) Functional processes of physical systems need not be (and cannot be) physical.

Of course. But the point is that they are functional processes of PHYSICAL SYSTEMS, and thus not non-physical.

Quantum computing is an over-hyped field that is completely irrelevant here. The author doesn't even allude to quantum computing, but is quite clearly concerned with the kind of programs you use all the time on the kind of computer you do.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Of course. But the point is that they are functional processes of PHYSICAL SYSTEMS, and thus not non-physical.

Language is a product of physical systems. It isn't physical (same with concepts).

 

[Bunyip]

Language is a product of physical systems. It isn't physical (same with concepts).

Of course, but it is a product of the physical. It is not an entity either is it? Nor are concepts or computer programs.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Surely computers are physical?

"Hence although they are the ultimate in algorithmic causation as characterized so precisely by Turing, digital computers embody and demonstrate the causal efficacy of non-physical entities. The physics allows this; it does not control what takes place, rather it enables the higher level logic to be physically implemented. Computers exemplify the emergence of new kinds of causation out of the underlying physics, not implied by physics but rather by the logic of higher level possibilities as encoded in data structures and algorithms. This leads to a different phenomenology at each of the levels of Table 3.2 [see below], described by effective laws for that level, and an appropriate language. A combination of bottom up causation and contextual affects (top-down influences) enables their complex functioning."
Ellis, G. (2015).Recognizing Top-down Causation. In A. Aguirre, B. Foster, & Z. Merali (Eds.). Questioning the Foundations of Physics: Which of Our Fundamental Assumptions are Wrong? (The Frontiers Collection) (pp. 17-44). Springer.
Table 3.2:

 

[Bunyip]

"Hence although they are the ultimate in algorithmic causation as characterized so precisely by Turing, digital computers embody and demonstrate the causal efficacy of non-physical entities.

What is a non-physical entity? As far as I know, we have no examples of such things.

The physics allows this; it does not control what takes place, rather it enables the higher level logic to be physically implemented. Computers exemplify the emergence of new kinds of causation out of the underlying physics, not implied by physics but rather by the logic of higher level possibilities as encoded in data structures and algorithms. This leads to a different phenomenology at each of the levels of Table 3.2 [see below], described by effective laws for that level, and an appropriate language. A combination of bottom up causation and contextual affects (top-down influences) enables their complex functioning."
Ellis, G. (2015).Recognizing Top-down Causation. In A. Aguirre, B. Foster, & Z. Merali (Eds.). Questioning the Foundations of Physics: Which of Our Fundamental Assumptions are Wrong? (The Frontiers Collection) (pp. 17-44). Springer.
Table 3.2:

Yes thankyou. Got all that . Thanks for elaborating. Could you please give me the defninitions of 'entity' and 'non-physical' that you are applying please?

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

What is a non-physical entity? As far as I know, we have no examples of such things.

In my opening post, I quoted two definitions the author gives that the author's argument depend upon. Do you grant these to be true or not (and if not, why not)? Otherwise, I can't address your question as I am not the author and cannot assert what the basis for his definition of a non-physical entity is apart from these two definitions. However, I can elaborate on these definitions as the other does with two scans:

 

[Bunyip]

In my opening post, I quoted two definitions the author gives that the author's argument depend upon. Do you grant these to be true or not (and if not, why not)? Otherwise, I can't address your question as I am not the author and cannot assert what the basis for his definition of a non-physical entity is apart from these two definitions. However, I can elaborate on these definitions as the other does with two scans:

Sorry, but you have misread. It is your definitions of 'entity' and ' non-physical' please.

 

[Bunyip]

From what you"ve posted above, I can see that we are applying very different meanings to physical, non-physical and entity than are common to the context of religious discussion. I just wanted to clarify so that I was not equating one meaning with another.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Sorry, but you have misread. It is your definitions of 'entity' and ' non-physical' please.

This isn't my argument. So my definitions aren't relevant here, excepting insofar as they consist solely of an ability to communicate the author's. I wouldn't use computers here as an example, I don't find the author's account of causation sufficiently detailed or substantiated to warrant the claims made, but I do think it is obvious that there are "non-physical entities". For one thing, I think it obviously true that a kind of Platonism such as Penrose defends to be true, or more simply that "entities" can be abstractions such as an irrational number or a perfect circle. I would not equate the ontological status of all (or most) non-physical entities with that of physical entities. Rather, I would assert that at best a precious few examples of non-physical entities warrant such a treatment. The best example I can think of offhand is that of metabolic-repair, mostly because it is the backbone to the non-reductionist, non-materialist position found in theoretical, systems, and especially relational biology (not to mention logical proofs that living systems aren't computable).

 

[Bunyip]

This isn't my argument. So my definitions aren't relevant here, excepting insofar as they consist solely of an ability to communicate the author's. I wouldn't use computers here as an example, I don't find the author's account of causation sufficiently detailed or substantiated to warrant the claims made, but I do think it is obvious that there are "non-physical entities".

An example or two, would help here please.

For one thing, I think it obviously true that a kind of Platonism such as Penrose defends to be true, or more simply that "entities" can be abstractions such as an irrational number or a perfect circle. I would not conflate the existence of all (or most) non-physical entities with the ontological status of physical entities. Rather, I would assert that at best a precious few examples of non-physical entities warrant such a treatment. The best example I can think of offhand is that of metabolic-repair, mostly because it is the backbone to the non-reductionist, non-materialist position found in theoretical, systems, and especially relational biology (not to mention logical proofs that living systems aren't computable).

I asked for your definitions by the way only so I could get a grip on your interpretation of the argument.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

An example or two, would help here please.

Luckily, I just gave two elsewhere (actually two of the same, and only one of them constitutes as specific example but it is the one I gave in my reply)

Consider a model, simulation, or similar "realization" of a cell and the process of metabolic-repair, and let f: A→B be a function
"where f is the process that takes input A and output B...The system Rosen uses for an example is the Metabolism-Repair or [M,R] system. The process, f, in this case stands for the entire metabolism going on in an organism...The transition, f, which is being called metabolism, is a mapping taking some set of metabolites, A, into some set of products, B. What are the members of A? Really everything in the organism has to be included in A, and there has to be an implicit agreement that at least some of the members of A can enter the organism from its environment. What are the members of B? Many, if not all, of the members of A since the transitions in the reduced system are all strung together in the many intricate patterns or networks that make up the organism's metabolism. It also must be true that some members of B leave the organism as products of metabolism...In the context developed so far, the mapping, f, has a very special nature. A functional component has many interesting attributes. First of all, it exists independent of the material parts that make it possible. Reductionism has taught us that every thing in a real system can be expressed as a collection of material parts. This is not so in the case of functional components...Fragmentability is the aspect of systems that can be reduced to their material parts leaving recognizable material entities as the result. A system is not fragmentable is reducing it to its parts destroys something essential about that system. Since the crux of understanding a complex system had to do with identifying the context dependent functional components, they are by definition, not fragmentable". (emphasis added; italics in original)
Mikulecky, D. C. (2005). The Circle That Never Ends: Can Complexity be Made Simple? In D. Bonchev & D. H. Rouvray (Eds.). Complexity in Chemistry, Biology, and Ecology (Mathematical and Computational Chemistry). Springer.

"systems biology is concerned with the relationship between molecules and cells; it treats cells as organized, or organizing, molecular systems having both molecular and cellular properties. It is concerned with how life or the functional properties thereof that are not yet in the molecules, emerge from the particular organization of and interactions between its molecular processes. It uses models to describe particular cells and generalizes over various cell types and organisms to arrive at new theories of cells as molecular systems. It is concerned with explaining and predicting cellular behaviour on the basis of molecular behaviour. It refers to function in ways that would not be permitted in physics. It addresses an essential minimum complexity exceeding that of any physical chemical system understood until now. It shies away from reduction of the system under study to a collection of elementary particles. Indeed, it seems to violate many of the philosophical foundations of physics, often in ways unprecedented even by modern physics." (emphases added)
Boogerd, F., Bruggeman, F. J., Hofmeyr, J. H. S., & Westerhoff, H. V. (Eds.). (2007). Systems biology: philosophical foundations. Elsevier.

I asked for your definitions by the way only so I could get a grip on your interpretation of the argument.

And I asked whether or not you granted the definitions given in order to do the same as well as to explain my interpretation.

 

[Bunyip]

Luckily, I just gave two elsewhere (actually two of the same, and only one of them constitutes as specific example but it is the one I gave in my reply)

Consider a model, simulation, or similar "realization" of a cell and the process of metabolic-repair, and let f: A→B be a function
"where f is the process that takes input A and output B...The system Rosen uses for an example is the Metabolism-Repair or [M,R] system. The process, f, in this case stands for the entire metabolism goin on in an organism...The transition, f, which is being called metabolism, is a mapping taking some set of metabolites, A, into some set of products, B. What are the members of A? Really everything in the organism has to be included in A, and there has to be an implicit agreement that at least some of the members of A can enter the organism from its environment. What are the members of B? Many, if not all, of the members of A since the transitions in the reduced system are all strung together in the many intricate patterns or networks that make up the organism's metabolism. It also must be true that some members of B leave the organism as products of metabolism...In the context developed so far, the mapping, f, has a very special nature. A functional component has many interesting attributes. First of all, it exists independent of the material parts that make it possible. Reductionism has taught us that every thing in a real system can be expressed as a collection of material parts. This is not so in the case of functional components...Fragmentability is the aspect of systems that can be reduced to their material parts leaving recognizable material entities as the result. A system is not fragmentable is reducing it to its parts destroys something essential about that system. Since the crux of understanding a complex system had to do with identifying the context dependent functional components, they are by definition, not fragmentable". (emphasis added; italics in original)
Mikulecky, D. C. (2005). The Circle That Never Ends: Can Complexity be Made Simple? In D. Bonchev & D. H. Rouvray (Eds.). Complexity in Chemistry, Biology, and Ecology (Mathematical and Computational Chemistry). Springer.

"systems biology is concerned with the relationship between molecules and cells; it treats cells as organized, or organizing, molecular systems having both molecular and cellular properties. It is concerned with how life or the functional properties thereof that are not yet in the molecules, emerge from the particular organization of and interactions between its molecular processes. It uses models to describe particular cells and generalizes over various cell types and organisms to arrive at new theories of cells as molecular systems. It is concerned with explaining and predicting cellular behaviour on the basis of molecular behaviour. It refers to function in ways that would not be permitted in physics. It addresses an essential minimum complexity exceeding that of any physical chemical system understood until now. It shies away from reduction of the system under study to a collection of elementary particles. Indeed, it seems to violate many of the philosophical foundations of physics, often in ways unprecedented even by modern physics." (emphases added)
Boogerd, F., Bruggeman, F. J., Hofmeyr, J. H. S., & Westerhoff, H. V. (Eds.). (2007). Systems biology: philosophical foundations. Elsevier.


And I asked whether or not you granted the definitions given in order to do the same as well as to explain my interpretation.

Sorry, should have said. Yes.

This is a very different usage of terms than we find on the religious context, so I just want to clarify.

 

[Bunyip]

Luckily, I just gave two elsewhere (actually two of the same, and only one of them constitutes as specific example but it is the one I gave in my reply)

Consider a model, simulation, or similar "realization" of a cell and the process of metabolic-repair, and let f: A→B be a function
"where f is the process that takes input A and output B...The system Rosen uses for an example is the Metabolism-Repair or [M,R] system. The process, f, in this case stands for the entire metabolism going on in an organism...The transition, f, which is being called metabolism, is a mapping taking some set of metabolites, A, into some set of products, B. What are the members of A? Really everything in the organism has to be included in A, and there has to be an implicit agreement that at least some of the members of A can enter the organism from its environment. What are the members of B? Many, if not all, of the members of A since the transitions in the reduced system are all strung together in the many intricate patterns or networks that make up the organism's metabolism. It also must be true that some members of B leave the organism as products of metabolism...In the context developed so far, the mapping, f, has a very special nature. A functional component has many interesting attributes. First of all, it exists independent of the material parts that make it possible..

I don't agree that is the case.

Reductionism has taught us that every thing in a real system can be expressed as a collection of material parts. This is not so in the case of functional components.

Reductionism? Sorry, but where did that come into it?

..Fragmentability is the aspect of systems that can be reduced to their material parts leaving recognizable material entities as the result. A system is not fragmentable is reducing it to its parts destroys something essential about that system. Since the crux of understanding a complex system had to do with identifying the context dependent functional components, they are by definition, not fragmentable". (emphasis added; italics in original)
Mikulecky, D. C. (2005). The Circle That Never Ends: Can Complexity be Made Simple? In D. Bonchev & D. H. Rouvray (Eds.). Complexity in Chemistry, Biology, and Ecology (Mathematical and Computational Chemistry). Springer.

"systems biology is concerned with the relationship between molecules and cells; it treats cells as organized, or organizing, molecular systems having both molecular and cellular properties. It is concerned with how life or the functional properties thereof that are not yet in the molecules, emerge from the particular organization of and interactions between its molecular processes. It uses models to describe particular cells and generalizes over various cell types and organisms to arrive at new theories of cells as molecular systems. It is concerned with explaining and predicting cellular behaviour on the basis of molecular behaviour. It refers to function in ways that would not be permitted in physics.

How so? Not explained by physics sure, but not permitted? I disagree.

It addresses an essential minimum complexity exceeding that of any physical chemical system understood until now. It shies away from reduction of the system under study to a collection of elementary particles. Indeed, it seems to violate many of the philosophical foundations of physics, often in ways unprecedented even by modern physics." (emphases added)
Boogerd, F., Bruggeman, F. J., Hofmeyr, J. H. S., & Westerhoff, H. V. (Eds.). (2007). Systems biology: philosophical foundations. Elsevier.


And I asked whether or not you granted the definitions given in order to do the same as well as to explain my interpretation.

Sure, violate away. (The laws of physics that is) why not? Quantum physics did.

 

[psychoslice]

From what you"ve posted above, I can see that we are applying very different meanings to physical, non-physical and entity than are common to the context of religious discussion. I just wanted to clarify so that I was not equating one meaning with another.

Some how what you say seems to resinate with me, I cannot put words to it, but I feel what your saying is beautiful, and l is full of truth, thank you.

 

[Bunyip]

Some how what you say seems to resinate with me, I cannot put words to it, but I feel what your saying is beautiful, and l is full of truth, thank you.

Thankyou so much. Much of the argument and tension I find seem to be drawn from something as insignificant as a misconception about how we are using words. What we are trying to communicate is what counts, words apparently can mean just about anything.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

From what you"ve posted above, I can see that we are applying very different meanings to physical, non-physical and entity than are common to the context of religious discussion.

"Suppose McX maintains there is something which I maintain there is not. McX can, quite consistently with his own point of view, describe our difference of opinion by saying that I refuse to recognize certain entities. I should protest, of course, that he is wrong in his formulation of our disagreement, for I maintain that there are no entities, of the kind which he alleges, for me to recognize; but my finding him wrong in his formulation of our disagreement is unimportant, for I am committed to considering him wrong in his ontology anyway.
When I try to formulate our difference of opinion, on the other hand, I seem to be in a predicament. I cannot admit that there are some things which McX countenances and I do not, for in admitting that there are such things I should be contradicting my own rejection of them.

It would appear, if this reasoning were sound, that in any ontological dispute the proponent of the negative side suffers the disadvantage of not being able to admit that his opponent disagrees with him.
This is the old Platonic riddle of nonbeing. Nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not?"
(source and complete text)