Non-physical entities with causal powers: computer programs

[psychoslice]

Thankyou so much. Much of the argument and tension I find seem to be drawn from something as insignificant as a misconception about how we are using words. What we are trying to communicate is what counts, words apparently can mean just about anything.

yes that so true, I don't know the answer but I do know what your saying, hate to you is want its all about, its all nothing but a imagination, nothing but imagination.

 

[Bunyip]

"Suppose McX maintains there is something which I maintain there is not. McX can, quite consistently with his own point of view, describe our difference of opinion by saying that I refuse to recognize certain entities. I should protest, of course, that he is wrong in his formulation of our disagreement, for I maintain that there are no entities, of the kind which he alleges, for me to recognize; but my finding him wrong in his formulation of our disagreement is unimportant, for I am committed to considering him wrong in his ontology anyway.
When I try to formulate our difference of opinion, on the other hand, I seem to be in a predicament. I cannot admit that there are some things which McX countenances and I do not, for in admitting that there are such things I should be contradicting my own rejection of them.

It would appear, if this reasoning were sound, that in any ontological dispute the proponent of the negative side suffers the disadvantage of not being able to admit that his opponent disagrees with him.
This is the old Platonic riddle of nonbeing. Nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not?"
(source and complete text)

No worries. Do you have those examples? Or an example of a non-physical entity please.

 

[idav]

1) What is "it"?
2) Functional processes of physical systems need not be (and cannot be) physical.


Quantum computing is an over-hyped field that is completely irrelevant here. The author doesn't even allude to quantum computing, but is quite clearly concerned with the kind of programs you use all the time on the kind of computer you do.

The whole foundation is based on that physical basis.

The paper stating programs and data is non-physical is not a valid premise, or you would need to prove to be data is non-physical. I just stated why it is not, data is an physical on off switch.

 

[idav]

Even the monitor you see on the screen is physical and the pixels can be replaced with spools of thread.

Not exactly what your getting at legion but it illustrates my point and it's pretty cool.
http://www.wired.com/2015/07/forget-4k-low-res-screen-creates-images-thread/

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

The whole foundation is based on that physical basis.

What "whole foundation" and what is this postulate "physical basis" that it is based on?

The paper stating programs and data is non-physical is not a valid premise

Thankfully, the paper doesn't contain, state, implicitly or explicitly entail, or otherwise rely on anything remotely resembling such a premise. The premises are given in the definitions, and these are quite standard and universally accepted among scientists and in the scientific, physics, and metaphysical literature.

or you would need to prove to be data is non-physical.

This would be like proving the number 3 is non-physical. It's obviously true.

I just stated why it is not, data is an physical on off switch.

You asserted this. You didn't give any reason for it to be so, and even hardcore reductionist computer scientists would find fault with this claim.

 

[idav]

What "whole foundation" and what is this postulate "physical basis" that it is based on?


Thankfully, the paper doesn't contain, state, implicitly or explicitly entail, or otherwise rely on anything remotely resembling such a premise. The premises are given in the definitions, and these are quite standard and universally accepted among scientists and in the scientific, physics, and metaphysical literature.


This would be like proving the number 3 is non-physical. It's obviously true.


You asserted this. You didn't give any reason for it to be so, and even hardcore reductionist computer scientists would find fault with this claim.

Fine here is a reference, this is basic stuff.

The pertinent part.

The computer has switches to represent data and switches have only two states: ON and OFF.

http://homepage.cs.uri.edu/book/binary_data/binary_data.htm

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Fine here is a reference, this is basic stuff.

You're missing the point. That binary representation in a physical system entails some method of instantiation is trivial and obvious (although with computers these binary instantiations are not binary but rather involve something akin to fuzzy alpha levels, as whether or not one builds a computer using Turing's original description or uses cutting-edge CMOS chips, physical systems aren't discrete, let alone binary). The point is we cannot explain the physical configurations of a computer carrying out the instructions of a program without referring to the causal power of a non-physical algorithm. The top-down structure/logic requires an explanation of the system's dynamics that renders as not only "real" but as interacting with the "physical" world an abstract, logical/mathematical and non-physical "entity". Programs don't exercise causal powers independently of the physical systems upon which they are implemented, but neither can they be reduced to the physics governing the constituent parts of the systems alongside those parts. The program is not the same thing as the physical operations of the physical system that implements it, because among other things there are multiple possible, distinct realizations of any given program and often actual distinct realizations. It is the logical structure and nature of the program which structures the physical system itself, and does so in different ways even given the same program (also, it does so continuously as even though algorithms consist of discrete "steps", the are implemented on systems that aren't discrete which cause them to change/order the structure of the system continuously).

Put overly simplistically, computers don't run programs, programs run computers (or, similarly, computers don't create programs, programs create the configuration space for the physical systems that implement them).

 

[Runewolf1973]

It seems like these non-physical entities...mathematical equations, word structures and computer programs only exist because humans create them. Do any non-physical entities exist in nature?

 

[Bunyip]

It seems like these non-physical entities...mathematical equations, word structures and computer programs only exist because humans create them. Do any non-physical entities exist in nature?

From what I can understand, I think that if they did it would be very different definitions of non-physical entity than one finds in the context of metaphysics or religion.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

It seems like these non-physical entities...mathematical equations, word structures and computer programs only exist because humans create them.

Mathematical equations and word structures are human representations. This is easily demonstrated with a simple example: 2. The number 2 is represented by the word "two", by "2". by "II", by deux, Zwei, etc. These representations don't matter from an ontological perspective because (or at least in part because) they don't even represent an entity which interacts with "physical" reality.

This is not true of e.g., representations of functional processes like metabolic-repair. Here, whether one uses notations like [M,R], f , or "metabolic-repair" is irrelevant. The actual "thing" itself is unchanged by our representation of it in linguistic or mathematical symbols. That we can say of this question regarding it affirmatively

Do any non-physical entities exist in nature?

...means that we assert such non-physical "things" exist precisely because our representations here don't matter, as well as because the "thing itself" is a measurable phenomenon that dictates the configurations/ordering of physical systems despite being inherently and essentially non-physical.

 

[Ouroboros]

Perhaps this is of interest (unless it's already been posted)

 

[idav]

Mathematical equations and word structures are human representations. This is easily demonstrated with a simple example: 2. The number 2 is represented by the word "two", by "2". by "II", by deux, Zwei, etc. These representations don't matter from an ontological perspective because (or at least in part because) they don't even represent an entity which interacts with "physical" reality.

This is not true of e.g., representations of functional processes like metabolic-repair. Here, whether one uses notations like [M,R], f , or "metabolic-repair" is irrelevant. The actual "thing" itself is unchanged by our representation of it in linguistic or mathematical symbols. That we can say of this question regarding it affirmatively


...means that we assert such non-physical "things" exist precisely because our representations here don't matter, as well as because the "thing itself" is a measurable phenomenon that dictates the configurations/ordering of physical systems despite being inherently and essentially non-physical.

Math represents something real. You take the number two and it represents something like two apples or two atoms. Math isn't some arbitrary explanation of reality. The reality would physically be here with no need for our immaterial thoughts on the matter.

 

[Ouroboros]

Math represents something real. You take the number two and it represents something like two apples or two atoms. Math isn't some arbitrary explanation of reality. The reality would physically be here with no need for our immaterial thoughts on the matter.

I'm not sure I can agree on this. For instance, how is the imaginary number represented in reality?

 

[idav]

I'm not sure I can agree on this. For instance, how is the imaginary number represented in reality?

You can say he physics needs all this complex math using calculus and imaginary numbers. However nothing about calculating physics is imaginary. Every measurement would come from something that creates an affect. The op would have us believe something can have an affect on a physical system and not be physical.

 

[Ouroboros]

You can say he physics needs all this complex math using calculus and imaginary numbers. However nothing about calculating physics is imaginary.

Imaginary numbers don't really exist as a physical representation. i = √-1. Which is technically impossible, but it solves the math.

Every measurement would come from something that creates an affect. The op would have us believe something can have an affect on a physical system and not be physical.

How do you define physical? Something that's just natural in general or something that is actually tangible? I think some of the problem might come from different views on what constitutes "physical", perhaps.

 

[idav]

Imaginary numbers don't really exist as a physical representation. i = √-1. Which is technically impossible, but it solves the math.


How do you define physical? Something that's just natural in general or something that is actually tangible? I think some of the problem might come from different views on what constitutes "physical", perhaps.

Yeah thats solving the math with a place holder when we dont know what it reeally is. Dark energy solves the math and we have no idea what it is butbmy point would be it is real and physical.

There is an issue with rhe concept of physical. Someone can say gravity is immaterial and does stuff, well it is still physical and the basis for gravity is mass exists. The debate is something similar to that. Now it isnt that materialism or physicalism ignore immaterial aspects like consciousness but that it can be explained via natural physical processes. So i have a hard time saying things like gravity and thoughts are not physical cause it seems impossible to me.

It is a fact that data are on and off switches so nothing about the processes in a regular computer get away from cause and effect which the op admits. I have a hard time believing something having a physical affect is not physical.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Math represents something real. You take the number two and it represents something like two apples or two atoms.

Or four unicorns. Or 17 elves. Or googol gods. The point is that
1) To "represent something real" is to say that the representation itself isn't real and 2) that it is quite possible for numbers or other mathematical "objects" to represent things that don't exist (for an example of a mathematical "object" that isn't a number to represent something that doesn't exist, there is a very hand "object" called the "expected probability" or "expectation" which represents, in elementary (and finite) probability theory e.g., the fact that a flip of a fair coin yield heads with probability 1/2, although I am playing fast and loose with concepts and terms here for the sake of simplicity).

Math isn't some arbitrary explanation of reality.

That's because it isn't an explanation of reality. Hence "all [mathematical] models are wrong", the impossibility for most mathematical models to actually be real, and the differing mathematical models for the exact same "real" phenomena or system. Also, massive swathes of mathematical theory were deliberately constructed not to explain real systems in any sense that would make the mathematical representations correspond directly to something real. Probability theory, statistics, cardinal numbers, abstract spaces (Hilbert spaces, Banach spaces, etc.), and so on.

The reality would physically be here with no need for our immaterial thoughts on the matter.

Are you saying our thoughts are literally immaterial, or was this a figure of speech?

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

I'm not sure I can agree on this. For instance, how is the imaginary number represented in reality?

Rather, it represents an unbelievably large number of physical phenomena (or at least is required for the mathematical representation of these). It is no more or less real than pi, 2, or the square root of 2.

 

[Ouroboros]

Rather, it represents an unbelievably large number of physical phenomena (or at least is required for the mathematical representation of these). It is no more or less real than pi, 2, or the square root of 2.

Or perhaps even infinity? Is it real, or perhaps it's not? (The integer sum of -1/12 just popped into my head )

I'm not sure where I'm going with this part, but I was just thinking about how this discussion relates to some modern thoughts about consciousness only being an illusion, and the same for time or even the physical itself. If something is an illusion, is it still physical?

 

[idav]

Or perhaps even infinity? Is it real, or perhaps it's not? (The integer sum of -1/12 just popped into my head )

I'm not sure where I'm going with this part, but I was just thinking about how this discussion relates to some modern thoughts about consciousness only being an illusion, and the same for time or even the physical itself. If something is an illusion, is it still physical?

Entropy is real, its the seperation which is illusion which has consequences for consciousness which feels as something seperate. Even just looking at our biology we can see the illusion, the cells are many aware, not just one aware being.