Objective Morality Without God

[dybmh]

Morality is about optimization of the group

Not true. Morality defines proper vs. improper behavior. You are choosing group optimization as proper, but that doesn't have to proper.

while your scenario is not optimized by any rational criteria.

Bliss is the rational criteria. And even though I didn't state it explicitly, maintaining / sustaining existence is a rational criteria. Keeping this diety happy is rational.

It implies God uses relative morality based on whims instead of rational morality based on common sense.

I agree it's a whim. But that doesn't make it subjective. It's something I mentioned earlier.

If this diety shares that whim universally; if each and every living thing has the same whim, then it is no longer subjective. That is why it is absolutley required that the deity in my example reveals itself undeniably, and without fail, brings each and every living being to bliss.

Regarding common sense, yes, if the conditions I described are met, then it IS common sense to do something that seems unpleasant in the moment in order to accomplish bliss and sustain existence for everyone. It's nothing more than taking a bitter pill which will save your life and the life of others. Taking medicine is common sense.

 

[Bird123]

I think there is a lot of merit to seeing things that way. Especially as it pertains to judging others. I don't think one person has the right to stand in moral judgment of another. But that STILL doesn't mean morality is subjective. Nor is it dependent on God.

As humans, we sometimes want to ask ourselves what is good and bad (ethically speaking). But not always to control others. Sometimes, for whatever reason, we wish to "do the right thing" in our lives morally speaking. Then the question remains, "How do we figure that out? What is objectively the "right thing" morally speaking?" It's a very good and very important question.

Are we ever going to arrive at a perfect answer to that question? No. But we can come up with a pretty good answer, I bet. And we don't need commandments from God to do so. We can use our brains to figure a lot of it out.

I'd never advocate drawing some specific line between good and evil. That's nonsense. Both are a matter of degrees. It would be like insisting that "hot" and "cold" be drawn at a specific temperature. And everyone had to agree on that. That's absurd. Celsius isn't more accurate than Fahrenheit. It's just easier to do math with.

It's like you said. Each will use their brains and best judgment. If the results of our choices end up good, we will hold onto that. If the results are not so good, we will say those words: I'll never do that again!!!

Indeed, life is a learning experience.
As one looks at this world and back though history, it's clear to see, God created this world so that Brains wins. It is the direction forward.

Just like all the physics add up perfectly, so does the people factor. The people factor is much more complicated because it carries many more variables. Further, God gave everyone a different view to guaranty mankind a larger view than any one person could have. Perhaps, it's a mistake to create labels and boxes to place everything in.

Get close to a painting and it looks a mess. Take a few steps back and view the Masterpiece!! Perhaps, it's time to widen the view to see what one is missing.

One's actions and choices define one. Maybe defining morality is no more than an excuse to judge and hate regardless of the reasons one uses to justify it.

In a multilevel classroom, one will see others learning lessons one has already learned. Is this the time to define morality, judge and condemn? After all, each at some point has learned the very same lesson.

I say it's time to teach, and point others in the right direction all within the realm of Unconditional Love. Of course, you can't learn their lesson for them so it should not be about control. Each must walk their own journey for themselves. Each will choose the best choices for themselves. Each will define morality for themselves.

That's what I see. It's very clear!!

 

[joelr]

Just to get it out of the way, what is moral has changed over time. People used to think that sacrificing children to the gods was a moral act. We of course are horrified at that idea.

In the OT Jephthah's daughter was a burnt offering to teach him a lesson. Some people still are ok with that.

 

[wellwisher]

Objective morality is an oxymoron. The reason this is the case, is moral codes try to control irrational impulses, for the good of the team. However, irrational impulses are not always easily reached or controlled with reason.

For example, we have laws against drugs. Since these drug taboos are more contemporary; 1920's, the laws were instituted by secular, instead of religious means. How is that working out? The drug problem has expanded since the first secular taboo. The logic behind not doing drugs, may be sound, but it does not reach the irrational impulses of the people who routinely ignore the law.

Truth is better than lying, in any rational system, since truth allows for clarity and good data is best for drawing the best curve. So why do politicians lie to the masses? We have separation church and state, so this objective morality is based on secular rules, that claim to be rational, yet they are ignored.

When you deal with the irrational side of humans, sometimes an irrational system works better. If we had God having a tempter tantrum if you do X, this irrationality can reach the irrational side of the violators. It may not be as effective for the rational person, who does not see the logic. However, law was not made for the righteous, but for the irrationally impulsive; sinners.

Say I do something that is irrationally impulsive, thereby harming the team; immoral behavior. If I can rationalize it, after the fact, and make myself appear to the victim, is that objective morality?

Defense lawyers do this in court. Defense lawyers will try to appeal to not only logic but also to the emotions of the jury, to help justify the irrational behavior of their client. They need some irrationality within the jury to help some members of the jury, justify the bad behavior, or in some cases, reward stupid behavior.

There was a case in the USA where a woman was rewarded $millions for burning herself with hot coffee, she had just bought from a fast food restaurant. She put aside her reason and got a reward for a blond moment, from an irrationally induced jury. We need another way that can deal with all the irrationality, both within criminals and juries.

Does anyone remember the Russian Collusion Coup where the Democrats led Swamp tried to railroad an innocent man? How many in this forum, who call themselves rational, fell for the coup? The reason you bore false witness, was you were manipulated into irrationality, and allowed yourself to put aside your reason. There was too much fun, beating on an innocent man, who was framed. Your rational code was place on the back burner. Objective morality is not always good enough for the irrational side of humans, which is the main source of all types of violations.

The religious Right, who uses the morality of God, as the litmus test, were able to suspend their irrationality easier, so they got this right. Thou shall not bear false witness, requires you have all the facts before jumping on the band wagon of herd irrationality. Secular morality pushed by the Left does not require that; an immoral code.

 

[vulcanlogician]

I don't think I've ever spoken to a modern theologian that discounts immanence, come to think of it. Immanence seems to be the more important aspect of God to most of them, since it's through immanence that God is omnipresent. It's immanence that allows the individual Christian to feel the presence of God and be filled with the Holy Spirit, to have their prayers heard and answered, and in monasticism to recognize that we are all unified by the substance of God.

Immanence is core to understanding the divinity of Jesus Christ. The whole religion of Christianity revolves around a personal Christ, whose spirit remains immanent in our world so that we might turn to it in faith.

I don't know much about Muslim theology either, so I'm going to confine my discussion to Christianity.

I think the idea of immanence is there, especially in monasticism. (I actually wasn't even thinking about monasticism when I made my earlier remarks, but citing monasticism is a good counterpoint to what I said.) But mere mention of the idea of immanence doesn't make it a core idea of faith as you are want to portray it.

There is so much thinking that God is "up there"... that we "beckon him to us"... that certain turns of good fortune are God's doing... that he interrupts the usual happenings in the world to do his will.

Immanence would suggest a being who is the doer of every activity and is equally alive in miracles as he is in the mundane.

I was raised in Catholicism. And apart from the strong monastic element which you mentioned earlier, Catholicism is a religion of "intermediaries." It is common to ask priests to pray on your behalf. Priests are sought for absolution of sins. Saints are prayed to and asked to speak to God on one's behalf.

Protestants often do the same thing with the Bible. THROUGH THE BIBLE, one understands, connects with, and properly serves God. One Protestant told me that her church was "filled to the brim with the Holy Spirit." There is a locality associated with God. God is THERE in my church, but somewhere else, God is not so much there. It's inferred. Nobody says it outright, but they believe that God is at certain places at certain times.

So while, yes, the idea of immanence, or Christ being everywhere, is often spoken of (and I was raised with the idea as a young Catholic) there are plenty of attitudes, ideas, and practices embedded within the Christian religion that seem to assume God is not very immanent in certain ways.

 

[vulcanlogician]

The problem that I see is that "best" in "best outcome" is an evaluative claim and it presupposes consequentialism, so it can't really be objective.

Hmmmm. I think I disagree with that. I think "best outcome" most surely implies consequentialism. But some actions can be better than others to a non-consequentialist, right? Or (to a Kantian) some intentions can be better than others, right?

So (even though I might not have given it enough thought) my knee-jerk response is that "better" and "best" aren't necessarily consequentialist.

 

[Ella S.]

I don't know much about Muslim theology either, so I'm going to confine my discussion to Christianity.

I think the idea of immanence is there, especially in monasticism. (I actually wasn't even thinking about monasticism when I made my earlier remarks, but citing monasticism is a good counterpoint to what I said.) But mere mention of the idea of immanence doesn't make it a core idea of faith as you are want to portray it.

There is so much thinking that God is "up there"... that we "beckon him to us"... that certain turns of good fortune are God's doing... that he interrupts the usual happenings in the world to do his will.

Immanence would suggest a being who is the doer of every activity and is equally alive in miracles as he is in the mundane.

I was raised in Catholicism. And apart from the strong monastic element which you mentioned earlier, Catholicism is a religion of "intermediaries." It is common to ask priests to pray on your behalf. Priests are sought for absolution of sins. Saints are prayed to and asked to speak to God on one's behalf.

Protestants often do the same thing with the Bible. THROUGH THE BIBLE, one understands, connects with, and properly serves God. One Protestant told me that her church was "filled to the brim with the Holy Spirit." There is a locality associated with God. God is THERE in my church, but somewhere else, God is not so much there. It's inferred. Nobody says it outright, but they believe that God is at certain places at certain times.

So while, yes, the idea of immanence, or Christ being everywhere, is often spoken of (and I was raised with the idea as a young Catholic) there are plenty of attitudes, ideas, and practices embedded within the Christian religion that seem to assume God is not very immanent in certain ways.

I see where you're coming from, but I think the approach to God you're ascribing is separate from the theological God that is considered the supreme authority on objective morality, since the latter is a concept developed in theology based on Platonic influence.

Before God was connected to objective morality, Yhwh Elohim was merely the patron deity of the Hebrews. His laws were similar to those of a king or a lordship or a tribal leader and, in a similar fashion, he enforced them through punishments and rewards such as annihilating Sodom & Gomorrah.

The concept that God's law is objective has its historical roots in that mental monism, which is still put forward by influential Christian thinkers like CS Lewis, Immanuel Kant, George Berkley, and Soren Kierkegaard. These are names that any erudite modern Christian has at least heard of. Kant's radical idealism is particularly relevant to our discussion on objective morality.

Hmmmm. I think I disagree with that. I think "best outcome" most surely implies consequentialism. But some actions can be better than others to a non-consequentialist, right? Or (to a Kantian) some intentions can be better than others, right?

So (even though I might not have given it enough thought) my knee-jerk response is that "better" and "best" aren't necessarily consequentialist.

I didn't mean to imply that "best" is necessarily consequentialist, just "best outcome." "Best" is an evaluative claim, though, so I'm skeptical that it could ever be factual rather than relative to certain criteria, such as preference.

That could get into axiology, since mathematical "truth" is relative to mathematical axioms, and obviously that's a pretty natural direction to take in ethics and aesthetics. However, I don't deny that certain actions might objectively violate Deontology or Utilitarianism or virtue ethics or God's commandments, so I'm not sure that axiology actually helps us get closer to an objective morality in the sense that you mean.

 

[vulcanlogician]

I see where you're coming from, but I think the approach to God you're ascribing is separate from the theological God that is considered the supreme authority on objective morality, since the latter is a concept developed in theology based on Platonic influence.

Before God was connected to objective morality, Yhwh Elohim was merely the patron deity of the Hebrews. His laws were similar to those of a king or a lordship or a tribal leader and, in a similar fashion, he enforced them through punishments and rewards such as annihilating Sodom & Gomorrah.

The concept that God's law is objective has its historical roots in that mental monism, which is still put forward by influential Christian thinkers like CS Lewis, Immanuel Kant, George Berkley, and Soren Kierkegaard. These are names that any erudite modern Christian has at least heard of. Kant's radical idealism is particularly relevant to our discussion on objective morality.

Very well put.

I mean, that's the situation we're looking at. There are a bunch of thinkers who've supposed various things about God's nature over the century. (Plato among others.) We certainly don't find much talk of immanence in the OT. Contemporary Christians are influenced by Augustine and others, and it becomes rather difficult to separate the base religion (if there is such a thing) from the myriad ideas that it has come to associate itself with. Immanence is one such idea.

You're well aware of my sympathies toward atheistic pantheism and my fondness for the idea that you and I (and everything else) are an inseparable part of a unified whole. In my view, an intelligent creator that can exist independently from creation does kind of mess with the idea of a unified whole... but I also think its possible for traditional theistic immamance to be the case (if we want to get technical about it).

Atheistic pantheism makes far fewer assumptions about immanence. It's just that, to fully describe reality, we must account for all those things that really exist. You can't explain the solar system without including Mars in the description. Likewise, we cannot fully describe Mars (why it moves at the rate it does for instance) without referring to the solar system as a whole. Then, to fully explain the solar system, we have to describe the galaxy, and so on and so forth... until we at last describe the entire universe.

That's a kind of "basic immanence" that makes perfect sense to me.

On the other hand, it's not very clear whether Jesus or Yahweh are assumed to take part in that kind of immanence. There seems to be this idea that Jesus is "moved by compassion" to be with us always. That it's part of his divine gift to us... that he'd never abandon us... THOSE ideas stand in contrast to the abstractions made by Plato, Kant, and others.

I didn't mean to imply that "best" is necessarily consequentialist, just "best outcome."

Okay. I misunderstood you then. We are in complete agreement on that.

"Best" is an evaluative claim, though, so I'm skeptical that it could ever be factual rather than relative to certain criteria, such as preference.

That could get into axiology, since mathematical "truth" is relative to mathematical axioms, and obviously that's a pretty natural direction to take in ethics and aesthetics. However, I don't deny that certain actions might objectively violate Deontology or Utilitarianism or virtue ethics or God's commandments, so I'm not sure that axiology actually helps us get closer to an objective morality in the sense that you mean.

Well, that's why objective ethics is the can of worm that it is, right?

ANY truth claim about ANYTHING, even normative claims, often needs a referent. All truth is relative.

Morality, as I see it (if it IS objective) must be objective in reference to the axioms upon which the ethical system as a whole stands. Axioms are the only thing we should assume are true "all by themselves." I agree that ethical determinations are relative. ALL determinations (aside from axioms) are relative to something. I accept that.

But just because there is THAT sort of relativism going on with ethics doesn't mean that personal preference or cultural opinion has anything to do with ethical truth. I reject that latter kind of relativism for reasons I've already mentioned. Different people and different cultures form beliefs about all kinds of things. That doesn't mean we can't ignore those opinions and try to find out what really is the case.

 

[vulcanlogician]

They seem to do a good job of summing up my position but when I got to "Morality involves laws" I was a bit hesitant. Laws are things which need to change over time to suite a specific environment. I would say that laws should have a basic ethic that they are based on and in my case that is the unchanging love of God.
I suppose having such a thing in argument B would change it completely.

Argument B (repeated for reference)

1. If there is a law, there is an author.
2. Morality involves laws.
Therefore: Morality needs to have an author.

3. There are only two possible authors of morality: humans or God.
Therefore: If humans didn't create morality, then God did.

I share your reservations about the word "law." And it isn't the word I would have chosen. The lecturer does mention possible controversy in regards to him using the word and says that we can substitute "rules" in there if we'd like. What exactly we mean when we make reference to "rules" or "laws" (or "ought") is a whole 'nother big complicated problem in ethics.

But I think we can use "rules" as a shorthand to make the argument work.

The fact about morality that is important in this argument is that "rules" or "laws" or any normative statement DOES seem to require an author. I pretty much agree with that statement. What's your take so far? Does the argument make sense to you if we substitute "rules" in instead of "laws"? It does for me, but we should probably work out any kinks before proceeding....

 

[Ella S.]

Very well put.

I mean, that's the situation we're looking at. There are a bunch of thinkers who've supposed various things about God's nature over the century. (Plato among others.) We certainly don't find much talk of immanence in the OT. Contemporary Christians are influenced by Augustine and others, and it becomes rather difficult to separate the base religion (if there is such a thing) from the myriad ideas that it has come to associate itself with. Immanence is one such idea.

You're well aware of my sympathies toward atheistic pantheism and my fondness for the idea that you and I (and everything else) are an inseparable part of a unified whole. In my view, an intelligent creator that can exist independently from creation does kind of mess with the idea of a unified whole... but I also think its possible for traditional theistic immamance to be the case (if we want to get technical about it).

Atheistic pantheism makes far fewer assumptions about immanence. It's just that, to fully describe reality, we must account for all those things that really exist. You can't explain the solar system without including Mars in the description. Likewise, we cannot fully describe Mars (why it moves at the rate it does for instance) without referring to the solar system as a whole. Then, to fully explain the solar system, we have to describe the galaxy, and so on and so forth... until we at last describe the entire universe.

That's a kind of "basic immanence" that makes perfect sense to me.

On the other hand, it's not very clear whether Jesus or Yahweh are assumed to take part in that kind of immanence. There seems to be this idea that Jesus is "moved by compassion" to be with us always. That it's part of his divine gift to us... that he'd never abandon us... THOSE ideas stand in contrast to the abstractions made by Plato, Kant, and others.

I agree that these ideas in folk religion seem to contradict the ideas in Christian philosophy. I always thought this was because the folk concepts of Christianity remain quite close to the henotheism of the ancient Hebrews.

I've noticed that a lot of Christians describe God in a way that makes him sound a lot more like a pagan "King of the Gods" figure than the omnimax, immanent substance of all described in classical theology. When I was a kid, my Catholic priest told me that this is because people have a habit of personifying God so that they could better relate to him and that these approaches to God should be understood more poetically.

Certainly, as I grew up, I began to realize that many people were not being poetic. They meant these sorts of descriptions quite literally. Still, perhaps it was merely their theological ignorance causing that, I'd think.

Now that I'm an atheist, I can't just reject a whole portion of theistic beliefs like that, because theistic beliefs are equal to me in the sense that I think they're all wrong. So I can't as easily dismiss these beliefs about God as I could when I believed, as ironic as that is.

I do think one could argue that this approach to God as a powerful deity could still ground objective morality. After all, the word "good" comes from "Godly." So what is good is what is in line with the divine commands of the supreme authority, because that's Godly obedience.

That's an authoritarian/dogmatic approach to morality, though, and does not treat objective morality in the same way we would regard gravity as objectively real. It would be more like how we treat the laws of governments as objective.

Well, that's why objective ethics is the can of worm that it is, right?

ANY truth claim about ANYTHING, even normative claims, often needs a referent. All truth is relative.

Morality, as I see it (if it IS objective) must be objective in reference to the axioms upon which the ethical system as a whole stands. Axioms are the only thing we should assume are true "all by themselves." I agree that ethical determinations are relative. ALL determinations (aside from axioms) are relative to something. I accept that.

But just because there is THAT sort of relativism going on with ethics doesn't mean that personal preference or cultural opinion has anything to do with ethical truth. I reject that latter kind of relativism for reasons I've already mentioned. Different people and different cultures form beliefs about all kinds of things. That doesn't mean we can't ignore those opinions and try to find out what really is the case.

To me, this is where arguments about ethics fall apart and become arguments about semantics. The axioms we need to derive ethical systems from are merely definitions of what we mean by words like "right," "just," "ethical," "good," "moral," etc.

The problem with that is that it would only be one of several definitions. According to the way we use language today, your axiomatic definitions of goodness would never be "more correct" than any other definition, since the words are being defined in a wide variety of mutually exclusive ways.

The diversity of ethical philosophies kills the notion that "goodness" refers to any single concept, in my opinion. It's not the fact that people differ in what they believe is true, but they differ in how they're using the word "good."

 

[vulcanlogician]

I agree that these ideas in folk religion seem to contradict the ideas in Christian philosophy. I always thought this was because the folk concepts of Christianity remain quite close to the henotheism of the ancient Hebrews.

Very accurate assessment.

Sometimes I don't like how the word "folk" is used in academic discourse. Kind of as a synonym for "lay" or "untrained." Are theologians and priests really "expert Christians"? In a way, perhaps. They have made certain intellectual and/or liturgical efforts. But they may also (hypothetically) lack some crucial truths about what it means to be Christian... things that a (hypothetical) untrained, uneducated person may come to know with little effort.

But I get your meaning. The "pagan king of the gods" analogy well describes most of colloquial Christianity.

Now that I'm an atheist, I can't just reject a whole portion of theistic beliefs like that, because theistic beliefs are equal to me in the sense that I think they're all wrong. So I can't as easily dismiss these beliefs about God as I could when I believed, as ironic as that is.

Meh. You can always be "more wrong."

To me, this is where arguments about ethics fall apart and become arguments about semantics. The axioms we need to derive ethical systems from are merely definitions of what we mean by words like "right," "just," "ethical," "good," "moral," etc.

I disagree. I think we are talking about a real mode of evaluation when we are talking about ethics. As long as we are being clear about what we mean when we say good and bad, we can use genuine, actual, physical criteria (like amount of suffering) to determine objectively true things. This isn't angels on the head of a pin. Suffering is a quantifiable reality. If you can stretch your imagination around the idea that suffering or sadness might be bad, then -- boom. You can make objectively true ethical statements about certain actions, in regards to the amount of pain or suffering they create.

I forget who refuted Berkeley by kicking a stone. But it's much the same situation with ethics. If you for even an instant entertain the idea that the stone is really there, then Berkeley's theories evaporate and you have this whole chunk of reality (the material world) to start making determinations about.

Same with ethics. Once you begin to even entertain an axiom that deals with good/bad as true, you are presented with an entire universe of ethical importance. I mean, economists do the same thing with money. Just because some people don't care about money, or different people have different attitudes about money, that doesn't mean economics isn't an objective enterprise. If you CARE about money and wealth, then economics will tell you objectively true things about the thing you care about. Same goes for ethics. If you care about x or y good, then you can learn things about reality by referring to ethical theories.

For me, its not an ontological question. Morality is not an obelisk that towers over mankind, telling mankind what to do. All I posit is that morality is (perhaps) an important feature of reality that we might benefit from paying attention to. Like say, weather patterns or economic laws.

 

[Brian2]

That's alright. Entertain the thought. If God said all rape is moral, would it be objectively moral?

No.
So I am judging your hypothetical God on my current morals.

 

[Brian2]

Argument B (repeated for reference)

1. If there is a law, there is an author.
2. Morality involves laws.
Therefore: Morality needs to have an author.

3. There are only two possible authors of morality: humans or God.
Therefore: If humans didn't create morality, then God did.

I share your reservations about the word "law." And it isn't the word I would have chosen. The lecturer does mention possible controversy in regards to him using the word and says that we can substitute "rules" in there if we'd like. What exactly we mean when we make reference to "rules" or "laws" (or "ought") is a whole 'nother big complicated problem in ethics.

But I think we can use "rules" as a shorthand to make the argument work.

The fact about morality that is important in this argument is that "rules" or "laws" or any normative statement DOES seem to require an author. I pretty much agree with that statement. What's your take so far? Does the argument make sense to you if we substitute "rules" in instead of "laws"? It does for me, but we should probably work out any kinks before proceeding....

Yes OK it makes sense.

 

[Ella S.]

I disagree. I think we are talking about a real mode of evaluation when we are talking about ethics. As long as we are being clear about what we mean when we say good and bad, we can use genuine, actual, physical criteria (like amount of suffering) to determine objectively true things. This isn't angels on the head of a pin. Suffering is a quantifiable reality. If you can stretch your imagination around the idea that suffering or sadness might be bad, then -- boom. You can make objectively true ethical statements about certain actions, in regards to the amount of pain or suffering they create.

I can understand that some people define "bad" in reference to suffering or sadness. I also understand that not everyone who defines "bad" does that.

The problem is that both definitions are "true" to me, because they're an accurate use of language. You seem to imply that only one definition can be "really true." That either consequentialism or deontology has "true" ethical statements, but not both because they contradict one another. That only one of them has the "true" definition of good.

That doesn't make any sense to me at all.

I forget who refuted Berkeley by kicking a stone. But it's much the same situation with ethics. If you for even an instant entertain the idea that the stone is really there, then Berkeley's theories evaporate and you have this whole chunk of reality (the material world) to start making determinations about.

I agree that suffering and sadness exist and that some people call them "bad." I don't agree that "badness" is the same as suffering or sadness, or even that it's a genuine property of these things. It's a word we created to refer to a wide variety of mutually exclusive concepts.

To me, it seems like you're being overly reductive about what "bad" can mean, or maybe mistaking the map for the territory by confusing "badness" for something that actually, objectively exists.

Same with ethics. Once you begin to even entertain an axiom that deals with good/bad as true, you are presented with an entire universe of ethical importance. I mean, economists do the same thing with money. Just because some people don't care about money, or different people have different attitudes about money, that doesn't mean economics isn't an objective enterprise. If you CARE about money and wealth, then economics will tell you objectively true things about the thing you care about. Same goes for ethics. If you care about x or y good, then you can learn things about reality by referring to ethical theories.

For me, its not an ontological question. Morality is not an obelisk that towers over mankind, telling mankind what to do. All I posit is that morality is (perhaps) an important feature of reality that we might benefit from paying attention to. Like say, weather patterns or economic laws.

I think you confuse the issue by calling it morality. If you're concerned with merely reducing suffering, then there's no need to call the choices that do that "good." That just creates confusion for people who don't share the same definition of "good" that you use.

 

[wellwisher]

Human language is subjective. There is no cause and affect between the sound/noises of any language, and the reality actions and objects that the sounds claim to represent. Have you even heard a cat say cat? If you heard this sound for the first time; cat, you would not know this meant since cats do not make this noise. There are 7100 languages in the modem world. Why so many if this is objective? Shouldn't it default to just one, naturally?

The sound connections of language are arbitrary and therefore subjective. This subjectivity is the foundation of spoken and written language; open ended system. If the base is fuzzy then the meaning can be made fuzzy; new meaning or slang. Language can be useful for transferring information, but it gets subjective when we say things like, suffering, since there is no objective scale that applies to all for this word; noise/sound.

The Left is much more whiny; can be induced to subjectively suffer easier, since they are more subjective and less objective. They will censor free speech due to their subjective inductions. Objectivity will attempt to find an objective litmus test, that is not too dependent on the soft foundation of spoken and written language.

I like to compare moral systems by their output affects, which can be quantified as social costs. A $billion may mean different things to different people; rich or poor, but this will still weight the same in $100 bills. We can go by weight and use calibrated scales.

There is a natural visual language. Unlike the arbitrary noise and sounds of spoken language, which has resulted in 7100 languages; subjective, the visual language uses wavelengths of light, which can be objectified by science. Nearly all people can contrast light from dark; shades of gray, as well as shapes with the natural language of the eyes. Most people can even separate all the colors. Seeing is universal and is believing, with costs something we can see on paper or in a pile no matter which of the 7100 languages you prefer to use.

 

[vulcanlogician]

Yes OK it makes sense.

(repeated for reference)
Argument A:

1. If morality is objective, humans didn't create it.
2. If humans didn't create morality, then God did.
Therefore: If morality is objective, then God created it.

Argument B:

1. If there is a law, there is an author.
2. Morality involves laws.
Therefore: Morality needs to have an author.

3. There are only two possible authors of morality: humans or God.
Therefore: If humans didn't create morality, then God did.

Great.

Do you think argument A does a good job of demonstrating that objective morality needs God in order to exist?

Argument B is there to provide justification for premise 2 in Argument A. Do you think it accomplishes that?

 

[vulcanlogician]

I can understand that some people define "bad" in reference to suffering or sadness. I also understand that not everyone who defines "bad" does that.

Yes. Exactly. The nature of my claim isn't: "Everyone ought to view pain as bad and happiness as good in order to be objectively correct about reality."

My claim is: "If you believe that suffering is axiomatically good and suffering is axiomatically bad," that can serve as a foundation for objective ethics.

"Pain is bad." Is NOT some "out there" claim. To me, "this is bad" is a perception that is always there right along with the pain you feel, every time you feel pain. The inverse is true for pleasure/happiness. If someone disagrees then the debate continues. But I don't think the matter is as controversial as some would like to portray it.

The funny thing about skepticism is that it is hard to know where to put the cork in it. There is no actual proof that solipsism isn't true. If someone where to claim that solipsism IS true, I wouldn't be able to point to some error they've made in their premises or logic. I would have to say that they are using "runaway skepticism" and that has led them to deny the existence of things that are obviously real. That's (imo) what is going on with solipsism. It ignores things that are axiomatically true.

I could posit the same about the experience of pain being bad. How can one deny that pain is bad? It's badness is self-evident upon experiencing it. In fact, if you DON'T experience something that is bad, we can hardly call it pain.

That's what I mean by it being axiomatic.

To me, it seems like you're being overly reductive about what "bad" can mean, or maybe mistaking the map for the territory by confusing "badness" for something that actually, objectively exists.

I agree. I like to use hedonism as an example because of its simplicity. I do think there are things that qualify as bad but aren't pain... same with good and pleasure.

But that's a whole 'nother incredibly complex topic. (G.E. Moore has a nice conception, but his theories have logical errors that people are trying to address/fix.)

Long story short, no moral theory is without serious problems. And that includes moral nihilism AND moral relativism. I think relativism is the worst of the bunch. as far as moral realism and nihilism, I'm about 50/50 on those. I like to argue in favor of realism more because people dismiss it too easily. It's not nearly as bad as people take it to be.

Even if you accept moral realism, the problems with ethical theories don't stop. No moral theory is perfect, and many philosophers would really prefer if there weren't so many problems. But there are. I tend to try to isolate things that I think we have figured out: ie. God's law cannot be what makes morality objective, or moral relativism is false. I'm pretty confident about those two claims.

But when you get to the heart of the issue... as you are... things get very difficult very fast.

 

[Brian2]

(repeated for reference)
Argument A:

1. If morality is objective, humans didn't create it.
2. If humans didn't create morality, then God did.
Therefore: If morality is objective, then God created it.

Argument B:

1. If there is a law, there is an author.
2. Morality involves laws.
Therefore: Morality needs to have an author.

3. There are only two possible authors of morality: humans or God.
Therefore: If humans didn't create morality, then God did.

Do you think argument A does a good job of demonstrating that objective morality needs God in order to exist?

Some people might say that morality could be objective but not created, just discovered.

Argument B is there to provide justification for premise 2 in Argument A. Do you think it accomplishes that?

If the laws of physics do not need a creator, but just are, and possibly can be different in different places, then it could be the same with laws of morality.
So I don't see the argument and justification as conclusive.

As people say, if you first show there is a God who does not change, that would be helpful.

 

[vulcanlogician]

Some people might say that morality could be objective but not created, just discovered.

Exactly. You are anticipating my responses. I disagree with premise 2 of argument A and premise 1 of argument B. The rest of the premises are true, and (imo) neither argument commits a logical fallacy.

I think theists have some room to push back against my disagreement with premise 1 of argument B. They might say that the laws of nature ARE authored by God, just like the laws of mathematics and logic. (But a few problems arise if they try to go that route.)

I think if they fail in the effort to support premise 1 of argument B, or concede the point that not all laws need an author, then I am justified in rejecting premise 2 of argument A. (And if premise 2 is false, then the conclusion of argument A is unsupported.)

Would you agree with that?

Like I said before, I'm not trying to "win" our debate. I'm trying to test my own assumptions (and yours) and see where the debate ends up.

 

[Ella S.]

Yes. Exactly. The nature of my claim isn't: "Everyone ought to view pain as bad and happiness as good in order to be objectively correct about reality."

My claim is: "If you believe that suffering is axiomatically good and suffering is axiomatically bad," that can serve as a foundation for objective ethics.

In other words, if you assume that ethics is objective, and that suffering is objectively bad, then you can make an objective ethical philosophy based off of that. I agree, but I think there's an issue with that assumption.

"Pain is bad." Is NOT some "out there" claim. To me, "this is bad" is a perception that is always there right along with the pain you feel, every time you feel pain. The inverse is true for pleasure/happiness. If someone disagrees then the debate continues. But I don't think the matter is as controversial as some would like to portray it.

Well, I don't feel that way when I feel pain. Sometimes I like a bit of pain because it reminds me that I'm alive or it tells me that I've pushed myself to grow beyond my limits. I don't see that pain as bad at all. I don't even see it as a necessary sacrifice to some greater good. Pain is an indifferent to the Stoics.

It's also lauded for its ability to help the Overman in his will to self-creation, since it gives him a struggle to overcome under Existentialist humanism.

So "Pain is bad" kind of is an "out there" claim. It's directly opposed by quite a lot of philosophy. I don't think it's an assumption that we can merely take for granted.

The funny thing about skepticism is that it is hard to know where to put the cork in it. There is no actual proof that solipsism isn't true. If someone where to claim that solipsism IS true, I wouldn't be able to point to some error they've made in their premises or logic. I would have to say that they are using "runaway skepticism" and that has led them to deny the existence of things that are obviously real. That's (imo) what is going on with solipsism. It ignores things that are axiomatically true.

I do think we have stronger arguments for naturalism than we do for solipsism, but that's probably a discussion for another thread. I don't think solipsism has been falsified, but I do think it can be demonstrated to be less likely than alternative models.

I could posit the same about the experience of pain being bad. How can one deny that pain is bad? It's badness is self-evident upon experiencing it. In fact, if you DON'T experience something that is bad, we can hardly call it pain.

I honestly don't know what you mean by this. I don't think I've ever experienced self-evident badness. That's not me being a runaway skeptic. I genuinely have no frame of reference for what you're talking about here.

Do you mean aversion? I'm not averse to pain. I used to be, but through discipline I've mostly overcome that.

Long story short, no moral theory is without serious problems. And that includes moral nihilism AND moral relativism. I think relativism is the worst of the bunch. as far as moral realism and nihilism, I'm about 50/50 on those. I like to argue in favor of realism more because people dismiss it too easily. It's not nearly as bad as people take it to be.

I actually think that most moral theories are perfectly adequate, so long as you grant their definitions of good and bad. The problem is that "good" and "bad" aren't real. The only thing that I would consider "real" is the external, physical world observable by the senses. There are no real values; just objects and processes.

Even if you accept moral realism, the problems with ethical theories don't stop. No moral theory is perfect, and many philosophers would really prefer if there weren't so many problems. But there are. I tend to try to isolate things that I think we have figured out: ie. God's law cannot be what makes morality objective, or moral relativism is false. I'm pretty confident about those two claims.

But when you get to the heart of the issue... as you are... things get very difficult very fast.

I think most of the problems with ethical systems come from post hoc stirrings of moral intuitions which grow uncomfortable with simple ethical axioms being taken to their logical conclusions. I don't think this is really an issue with the ethical systems themselves, though, so much as it demonstrates that they aren't subjectively acceptable to whoever takes issue with them.