Omniscience + Creator = No Free Will

[Copernicus]

Right, well as I've been trying to say, apparently in a more clumsy fashion than Aristotle (who knew?) THIS is the actual problem, not omniscience, and not creation or the conjunction of those. God's happening to know the truth value of propositions doesn't make them true. God can't know them unless they're true. Their truth is primary, and God's knowledge hangs on their truth. So once again, it is not God who determines our actions by knowing what they'll be, but it is we who determine God's knowledge by doing what we do.

Again, you completely miss the point made in the OP. God is an agent in this scenario. He knowingly brings about a state of affairs that he could have chosen not to bring about or (according to most Christians) has the power to have prevented from occurring. Hence, God has, in effect, created automatons. And he lets them run into the walls, thinking that he is not responsible for their actions when he knew full well that they would run into the walls.

The entire discussion about future propositions lacking truth values has been a red herring. Omniscience has always been taken to include knowledge of future events. While knowledge alone does not cause those events, the act of a being that knowingly sets up the conditions for the events does.

 

[themadhair]

The idea that they might not have truth values grew out of the idea that truth was determined by verifiability, which was a popular idea in the first half of the last century. The relationships between logical determinism and "truth values" of future sentences is a 20th century interpretation of Aristotle's conundrum as a problem rooted in language.

More on this please.

 

[Dunemeister]

Again, you completely miss the point made in the OP. God is an agent in this scenario. He knowingly brings about a state of affairs that he could have chosen not to bring about or (according to most Christians) has the power to have prevented from occurring. Hence, God has, in effect, created automatons. And he lets them run into the walls, thinking that he is not responsible for their actions when he knew full well that they would run into the walls.

I don't see the "hence".

The entire discussion about future propositions lacking truth values has been a red herring. Omniscience has always been taken to include knowledge of future events. While knowledge alone does not cause those events, the act of a being that knowingly sets up the conditions for the events does.

It's not a red herring. If those propositions have no truth value, God doesn't know what will happen, so his creating the initial conditions PLUS his knowledge can't entail what you say it does. You can't shunt this aside by saying "omnisicence has always meant this or that." What I'm trying to do is show you that you are (perhaps) making a mistake about what omnisicence means. I take it to mean knowing everything it's possible to know. Or perhaps more modestly, knowing everything about the world. It's an open question whether future events constitutes something possible to know or something about the world. I'm still waiting for your analysis of truth such that future events are possible to know (i.e., such propositions have truth conditions) or that future events are relevantly "part of the world". Apparently I'll wait in vain. Fair enough, I suppose, if you choose not to deal with the issue.

Chalk it up to stupidity, but I'm underwhelmed by the force of this argument. God creates condition set A. Exactly nothing follows from that even if God knows what the future will be (on the assumption that my argument about future-oriented propositions is wrong). For God's knowledge is based on what we do, not the other way around. How many times do I have to say this? You have to show the "hence", and so far, you haven't done so.

 

[themadhair]

I take it to mean knowing everything it's possible to know.

This involves verifiability, and thus a reduced version of omniscience.

I'm still waiting for your analysis of truth such that future events are possible to know (i.e., such propositions have truth conditions) or that future events are relevantly "part of the world".

Stop trying to ask others to reach a burden of proof regarding verifiability when such verifiability is ASSUMED in the definition of omniscience.

Fair enough, I suppose, if you choose not to deal with the issue.

The argument you proposed has, I think, been debunked. You are making a claim that fails because it is founded on verifiability – and verifiability is assumed in omniscience.

For God's knowledge is based on what we do, not the other way around. How many times do I have to say this?

As many times until you realise that you have got things backwards.

 

[Dunemeister]

This involves verifiability, and thus a reduced version of omniscience.

How does it do so?

Stop trying to ask others to reach a burden of proof regarding verifiability when such verifiability is ASSUMED in the definition of omniscience.

Again, you keep saying that I'm talking about verifiability, and I keep telling you that I"m not talking about verifiability. Don't tell me I'm doing something that I'm not. I'm talking about

TRUTH CONDITIONS


If you are unsure what I mean by that, perhaps we should have a sidebar discussion to make that clear. As I've said repeatedly, the truth conditions are a separate issue from the means of verifying that they've been met.

The argument you proposed has, I think, been debunked. You are making a claim that fails because it is founded on verifiability – and verifiability is assumed in omniscience.

Round round we go.

As many times until you realise that you have got things backwards.

Why me?

 

[Copernicus]

More on this please.

I personally find that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Knowledge is one of the best sources for learning about, or refreshing one's memory of, topics in philosophy. If you are interested in verificationism, a good place to start is Alfred J. Ayer. But I heartily recommend that you review their page on Truth first, since it lays out a good overview of the subject.

 

[logician]

Interesting but not relevant to the thread (as usual).

Total BS as usual, the aspect of prayer is very relevant to the thread topic as it affects whether a supposed god can affect outcomes, or is merely a disinterested bystander. In a chaotic or random universe (supposedly created by said god), it does not know the outcome of its own decisions, and answers prayers according to its own priority scheme. In a predestined universe, however, prayers may be made, but the outcomes are already predetermined by said god, esssentially eliminating any real free will. Of course, keeping up with all these prayers seems quite a monumental task in any case.

 

[Copernicus]

I don't see the "hence".

It is quite simple really. If an intelligent agent is convinced that X will inexorably lead to Y, and that agent causes X, then that agent also causes Y. Causation is a transitive operator. (BTW, I have just showed the "hence" that you keep claiming that I have yet to show.)

It's not a red herring. If those propositions have no truth value, God doesn't know what will happen, so his creating the initial conditions PLUS his knowledge can't entail what you say it does...

You are wrong to merely assume that claims about the future have no truth value, especially since people generally assign truth values to claims about the future. You are confusing the property of having a truth value with one's ability to establish precisely what the truth value is.

You can't shunt this aside by saying "omnisicence has always meant this or that." What I'm trying to do is show you that you are (perhaps) making a mistake about what omnisicence means...

Word meanings do not exist independently of conventional usage. There is a long history of discussion about predestination in Abrahamic cultures precisely because God, as an "omniscient" being, cannot be ignorant of future events. You want to change the meaning of "omniscient" by claiming that the conventional idea of God is wrong--that omniscience is impossible as defined by most people in this ancient debate. I am not mistaken about what omniscience means, and I am quite happy to agree with you that there are no omniscient beings in that sense. But that wasn't the sense that the OP was addressing. You have turned the argument into a dispute about word meaning rather than about the substantive issue.

I take it to mean knowing everything it's possible to know. Or perhaps more modestly, knowing everything about the world. It's an open question whether future events constitutes something possible to know or something about the world. I'm still waiting for your analysis of truth such that future events are possible to know (i.e., such propositions have truth conditions) or that future events are relevantly "part of the world". Apparently I'll wait in vain. Fair enough, I suppose, if you choose not to deal with the issue.

You do understand that our perception of time is relative to our senses, don't you? Time does not progress at the same pace for all observers, and it is theoretically possible to engage in time travel. From the viewpoint of physics, time is not unidirectional. I see no reason why the Christian God would need to be limited to perceiving time at the same pace and in the same way that we are. After all, he is supposed to have supernatural powers, isn't he? It is not beyond the imagination of humans that even limited human beings can have precognitive powers. I'm quite willing to agree with you that the Christian God is extremely implausible, if not impossible. You are looking for some way to make some version of God more plausible by limiting what we conventionally understand omniscience to entail. Have at it. Just don't go trying to sell us the idea that this is the God that Christians believe in and pray to.

Chalk it up to stupidity, but I'm underwhelmed by the force of this argument. God creates condition set A. Exactly nothing follows from that even if God knows what the future will be (on the assumption that my argument about future-oriented propositions is wrong). For God's knowledge is based on what we do, not the other way around.

God creates the universe, but he has no idea how it will turn out until it does. God is immanent in a universe where the perception of time is relative to observers, and he is limited to the perspective of human observers. That seems to be the position you are trying to defend when you claim to believe the "argument about future propositions", which you explicitly denied believing in in an earlier post. So maybe God is really good at guessing? On what basis would he make such guesses? Knowledge of deterministic causality? Magical powers? Still, he conveys accurate, confident information about future events to assorted prophets. Is this making any sense to you? Not to me.

How many times do I have to say this? You have to show the "hence", and so far, you haven't done so.

You never had to repeat it in the first place, since I have showed the "hence". Causation is a transitive operation. A creator being who knows the consequences of his actions determines the events that are consequences of its actions. But keep on repeating the question, even after it has been answered. That rhetorical technique is called argumentum ad nauseam.

 

[Dunemeister]

Total BS as usual, the aspect of prayer is very relevant to the thread topic as it affects whether a supposed god can affect outcomes, or is merely a disinterested bystander. In a chaotic or random universe (supposedly created by said god), it does not know the outcome of its own decisions, and answers prayers according to its own priority scheme. In a predestined universe, however, prayers may be made, but the outcomes are already predetermined by said god, esssentially eliminating any real free will. Of course, keeping up with all these prayers seems quite a monumental task in any case.

It's not relevant because, on the argument of this thread, whether God affects outcomes is irrelevant. What's relevant is that God creates the initial conditions under which the universe comes into being. This, combined with God's omniscience, in particular his knowledge of all the future actions of his creatures, somehow entails theological determinism.

 

[CarlinKnew]

A universe made by an omniscient creator must be predetermined. Every effect must have a cause known by the creator, and this chain of cause and effect must lead back to the original conditions set by god. Thus, no free will.

 

[Dunemeister]

It is quite simple really. If an intelligent agent is convinced that X will inexorably lead to Y, and that agent causes X, then that agent also causes Y. Causation is a transitive operator. (BTW, I have just showed the "hence" that you keep claiming that I have yet to show.)

Why "inexorably"? Here I think is the actual problem with your argument. You are assuming determinism.

[quote[You are wrong to merely assume that claims about the future have no truth value, especially since people generally assign truth values to claims about the future. You are confusing the property of having a truth value with one's ability to establish precisely what the truth value is.[/quote]

It's not me who is confusing those.

Word meanings do not exist independently of conventional usage.

Conventions can be incorrect. Word meaning is relevant.

Still, he conveys accurate, confident information about future events to assorted prophets. Is this making any sense to you? Not to me.

With respect to prophecy: If God tells people what is going to happen, he doesn't do so on the basis of his knowing what will happen. In such cases, his omnipotence is in view, and he makes such a thing happen.

You never had to repeat it in the first place, since I have showed the "hence". Causation is a transitive operation. A creator being who knows the consequences of his actions determines the events that are consequences of its actions. But keep on repeating the question, even after it has been answered. That rhetorical technique is called argumentum ad nauseam.

Sure, but again, his creatures' actions are the "consequence" of God's creative act if and only if God in fact causes his creatures so to act. And so far you've given no reason to think so.

 

[logician]

Again, omniscience is impossible in a chaotic mutliverse, since if a supposed god existed, it by choice made it chaotic.

 

[themadhair]

You are assuming determinism.

facepalm.jpg
What do think the argument in the OP is trying to show????

It's not me who is confusing those.

You really are. The only reasoning you have presented against truth values has involved an inability to assign/verify such truth values. No logical contradictions, no argument that didn’t seem to come from a non-omniscient perspective, no argumentation that didn’t involve limiting omniscience, etc.

Sure, but again, his creatures' actions are the "consequence" of God's creative act if and only if God in fact causes his creatures so to act. And so far you've given no reason to think so.

facepalm.jpg
What do think the argument in the OP is trying to show????

 

[Dunemeister]

facepalm.jpg
What do think the argument in the OP is trying to show????

If determinism is the conclusion, it can't be a premise.

You really are. The only reasoning you have presented against truth values has involved an inability to assign/verify such truth values. No logical contradictions, no argument that didn’t seem to come from a non-omniscient perspective, no argumentation that didn’t involve limiting omniscience, etc.

Assign and verify are not the same. By "assign" a truth value, I mean to say how a proposition can be true. I have repeatedly argued that it's NOT OUR ABILITY TO DETERMINE THE TRUTH of future propositons that's at issue. I've repeatedly argued that it's THE INAPPROPRIACY OF USING TRUTH LANGUAGE with respect to those propositions that's at issue.

Perhaps I should back up a bit and say that I take truth to be a matter of correspondence. That is, a proposition is true if and only if states of affairs correspond to that proposition. As such, truth can come in degrees, ranging from 0 (no correspondence at all) to .5 (some correspondence) to 1 (complete correspondence.). Regarded that way, it's a straightforward matter to seeing how propositions about regularities (statements expressed in the simple present tense), things alleged to be happening now (statements expressed in the continuous present tense) or about the past can have truth values. They are true (value 1) if and only if the world is (or was) completely as described. This is entirely independent of whether anyone can determine (know) the truth values.

It's a lot less straightforward with future propositions. How can a future propostion be said to "correspond" with the way the world is? (This is not the same question as "How can we know the truth value of future propositions.) Since the events described in the proposition haven't happened yet, the proposition cannot correspond to anything yet. THEREFORE, the proposition has no truth value yet. When the events (at the future time specified) take place, the truth value of the event gets assigned. Again, this is independent of whether anybody does or even can know (determine) what the truth value is.

So this line does not conflate knowledge with truth. Truth is a matter of correspondence. Knowledge is a matter of detecting that correspondence.

 

[themadhair]

If determinism is the conclusion, it can't be a premise.

facepalm.jpg

Truth is a matter of correspondence.

And if a proposition regarding the past corresponded with the past it is true. If a proposition corresponds to the present it is true. If a proposition will correspond to the future it is true.

Incidentally – does it not appear that the argumentation you are trying to use here also applies to propositions regarding the past?

 

[Dunemeister]

And if a proposition regarding the past corresponded with the past it is true. If a proposition corresponds to the present it is true. If a proposition will correspond to the future it is true.

I actually think that something like this is right. However, the skeptic can (and does) argue that even if the proposition turns out to correspond with the way things turn out in the future, the question is whether the proposition has a truth value at the the time of its utterance before said event. Before the event takes place, the proposition doesn't have a truth value because the universe hasn't "caught up" with the proposition (as it were). When the universe "catches up" with it, it's not the future-oriented proposition, but an analogous one about the past that becomes true.

All this involves some murky metaphysics, which is one of the practical reasons I gave up on this line at university. I don't do abstract logic real well, so....

Incidentally – does it not appear that the argumentation you are trying to use here also applies to propositions regarding the past?

If it does, you'll have to spell it out for me because I don't quite see it.

In any case, I'm happy to drop this line. I brought it up as an alternative to Mr Emu's tack. And getting back to the original argument, and assuming that truth values make sense for future-oriented propositions, I am still underwhelmed by the force of the argument. Perhaps you might take a look at my exchange with Copernicus and add your two bits?

 

[Copernicus]

Why "inexorably"? Here I think is the actual problem with your argument. You are assuming determinism.

Actually, I have observed causality in action, as has every other living being. All I said was that causation is a transitive relationship. If God is omniscient (and I assume that that means he understands causal relationships in our reality), then he had a basis for predicting the future, even if he could not, despite is alleged omniscience, have direct knowledge of it. After all, human beings understand enough about causality to be able to predict each other's behavior even with a limited range of knowledge. God, with his alleged unlimited knowledge, ought to be a great deal better at it.

You are wrong to merely assume that claims about the future have no truth value, especially since people generally assign truth values to claims about the future. You are confusing the property of having a truth value with one's ability to establish precisely what the truth value is.

It's not me who is confusing those.

Then let me just say that it strongly appears to several people who have read your posts that you are confusing those. So far, your statements have been entirely consistent with that perception, except for your demurrals.

Conventions can be incorrect. Word meaning is relevant.

And just where do you think word meanings come from? Divine revelation? Dictionaries hire usage panels for a reason--to determine how words are conventionally used.

With respect to prophecy: If God tells people what is going to happen, he doesn't do so on the basis of his knowing what will happen. In such cases, his omnipotence is in view, and he makes such a thing happen.

I see. So, in your view, God is generally ignorant of the future, but he is knowledgeable of it when "his omnipotence is in view". So matters regarding prophecies actually compromise our free will, since those are predetermined. Hence, we become automatons lacking in free will whenever we fulfill a biblical prophecy. Hence, no one who commits a sinful act that God revealed in prophecy (or that led up to the conditions triggering the prophesied event) can actually be blamed by God for violating his will, since they would actually be carrying out his will. This is getting more and more interesting as you try to imagine a way out of your logical corner. It is interesting that God's omnipotence was not "in view" when he created the universe, but he decided to make it come "into view" at choice places as events unfolded. I suppose that he couldn't predict when or even if he would bring his omnipotence into view, since he had no knowledge of what would happen after the universe was created. :areyoucra

Sure, but again, his creatures' actions are the "consequence" of God's creative act if and only if God in fact causes his creatures so to act. And so far you've given no reason to think so.

Except when people are caught up in a chain of events leading up to a prophecy. Then, and only then, they are automatons. And you really don't believe any of this anyway, do you? You did say that you didn't yourself believe that God was ignorant of the future. He would have to have some ideas of the future in order to make prophecies at all, wouldn't he? Or have we been manipulated all along to bring about his prophetic visions? :sarcastic

 

[Dunemeister]

Actually, I have observed causality in action, as has every other living being. All I said was that causation is a transitive relationship. If God is omniscient (and I assume that that means he understands causal relationships in our reality), then he had a basis for predicting the future, even if he could not, despite is alleged omniscience, have direct knowledge of it. After all, human beings understand enough about causality to be able to predict each other's behavior even with a limited range of knowledge. God, with his alleged unlimited knowledge, ought to be a great deal better at it.

So the word "inexorably" was a mistake?

Then let me just say that it strongly appears to several people who have read your posts that you are confusing those. So far, your statements have been entirely consistent with that perception, except for your demurrals.

Bull****. That perception is consistent with the fact that my opposition is intent on begging the question.

And just where do you think word meanings come from? Divine revelation? Dictionaries hire usage panels for a reason--to determine how words are conventionally used.

Dictionaries tell us how words are used, not how they ought to be used.

I see. So, in your view, God is generally ignorant of the future, but he is knowledgeable of it when "his omnipotence is in view". So matters regarding prophecies actually compromise our free will, since those are predetermined. Hence, we become automatons lacking in free will whenever we fulfill a biblical prophecy.

No. We don't become automatons. The rest of your paragraph starting from "hence" continues the nonsequitur. If God's will and our will collide, God's wins. That's all.

 

[Copernicus]

So the word "inexorably" was a mistake?

Not in the slightest. Causation is a relationship between an antecedent and a consequent event wherein the consequent would not occur unless the antecedent had. The word "inexorably" stands.

Bull****. That perception is consistent with the fact that my opposition is intent on begging the question.

You've been accused of verificationism, but you deny it. Nevertheless, you have never proposed any alternative explanation for why you think propositions about the future cannot have truth values.

Dictionaries tell us how words are used, not how they ought to be used.

Precisely. They describe conventional usage. As far as I can tell (and I'm just an ignorant linguist), we ought to use words in such a way that others will understand their meanings. If you choose not to, don't be surprised if others refuse to play along.

No. We don't become automatons. The rest of your paragraph starting from "hence" continues the nonsequitur. If God's will and our will collide, God's wins. That's all.

I would expect nothing less from an omnipotent being. It just seems that your god's omniscience turns on and off like a water faucet, as it suits your conclusions.

 

[Mister Emu]

Causation is a relationship between an antecedent and a consequent event wherein the consequent would not occur unless the antecedent had.

That seems a fairly broad understanding of causation...

For instance... if Jack the Ripper had never been born, then he couldn't have murdered the people he did... therefore Jack the Ripper's great-great-great-great-great-great-grandparents caused the murders of Jack the Ripper?