Omniscience + Creator = No Free Will

[MoonWater]

Well, it's not just a matter of opinion. It is stated very clearly in the definition that freewill is the ability to make choices free from external cause. You may disagree with the definition, but that is the definition.

if there is a cause behind the decision that we make then it is not free will as we really did not have a choice in the matter. If however something initiates a set of choices that we can make, or one way or another there are multiple decisions for us to make and we choose which one we follow then that is free will. I took the "external causes" part as saying that nothing is forcing you to choose one thing. It seems as though your trying to argue that if there is any outside influence on one's decision then it isn't free will. If that is the case then free will would be an impossibility as there is always outside influence.

 

[CarlinKnew]

The past actually holds more significance to our present day and to our future than our future does to our future.

If the future exists then everything in the present (including our individual choices) must happen according to the future. For example, if the future exists, and in the future I have no limbs, I'm known as The Dumpling Master, and I own a small island in the South Pacific, then all actions in the present must lead toward that unfortunate end.

 

[CarlinKnew]

if there is a cause behind the decision that we make then it is not free will as we really did not have a choice in the matter.

You're still equating free will with choice. There is a difference. The above example is not an act of freewill, but it is an act of choice.

Free will is hard to explain. Wikipedia probably does a much better job at explaining than I could do.

 

[Mister Emu]

I merely rejected your ascribing of a claim to me that I never made.

My apologies, when you objected to the ascribing of the claim, I assume you rejected the claim as well...

Secondly, god still created. Whether or not that was a ‘choice’ in some way or not doesn’t change that it was an act of creation to set the ball rolling.

Indeed... getting the ball rolling does not mean determining every bounce though, metaphorically...

So far you have done this only be redefining omniscience to be something other than all-knowing.

How is that? I agree that omniscience includes knowledge of the future... I have otherwise argued that it need not do... a difference

You only did it once.

When?

I have already pointed out the important difference here.

And I have shown you how it isn't. Future change means nothing if the future does not yet exist. If neither exist now, they are both in the same category...

As pointed out previously, foreknowledge is very different from unicorns because one can have an actual truth value (to use your phrase)

Not my phrase...

 

[themadhair]

Indeed... getting the ball rolling does not mean determining every bounce though, metaphorically...

True. This is why I emphasise both premises in the OP are necessary.

How is that? I agree that omniscience includes knowledge of the future... I have otherwise argued that it need not do... a difference

I think you answered your own question here.

When?

I believe when you said this – “ If, as I content, God's knowledge of our actions is a product of our having acted, then for God to have determined our actions to suit His will, He would have had to produce other scenarios wherein we acted differently to determine which one He would create. ”

And I have shown you how it isn't. Future change means nothing if the future does not yet exist. If neither exist now, they are both in the same category...

Doesn’t your argument also hold for past knowledge?

 

[spacejanitor]

If the future exists then everything in the present (including our individual choices) must happen according to the future. For example, if the future exists, and in the future I have no limbs, I'm known as The Dumpling Master, and I own a small island in the South Pacific, then all actions in the present must lead toward that unfortunate end.

Without the past there is NO future.

 

[McBell]

Two things:

Firstly, you are assuming that those ‘other possible results’ are possibilities. I do think that, assuming the premises of omniscience and creator, there is only one possible course of results. And that is the course that the omniscient creator knows.

No.
You are the one making the assumption that they do not.
I suspect that the reason you are making said assumption is so that your argument seems more sound.

Now if you want to get into specifics on a particular deity, or more to the point, the claimed charactoristics of a specific deity, then by all means do so.

However your attempt to argue this as generally as you are simply does not work.

Secondly, I don’t see the contradiction in your idea. Assuming those possible choices were possible - why wouldn’t an omniscient being know all those choices AND the choices that will be chosen? The set of possible choices plus the set of choices that will be made would seem to be compatible with knowing everything. I don’t see the reason you think the OP placed limits on omniscience.

Because it has to in order to come to the conclusion it has.

 

[themadhair]

You are the one making the assumption that they do not.

The OP is arguing for this so I don’t understand the accusation of it being an assumption….

However your attempt to argue this as generally as you are simply does not work.

Care to address the OP if you think so?

Because it has to in order to come to the conclusion it has.

I repeat again:
” Secondly, I don’t see the contradiction in your idea. Assuming those possible choices were possible - why wouldn’t an omniscient being know all those choices AND the choices that will be chosen? The set of possible choices plus the set of choices that will be made would seem to be compatible with knowing everything. I don’t see the reason you think the OP placed limits on omniscience.”

 

[Dunemeister]

Just because we, as non-omniscient beings, cannot determine the truth value of a given proposition on the future doesn’t make it impossible for that proposition to have a truth value. What you seem to be doing is arguing against a concept of omniscience from a non-omniscient perspective.

It's not about whether we can determine a proposition's truth value. It's whether the proposition even has a truth value; whether it's appropriate to even speak of truth when dealing with such propositions. Many, many philosophers hold that there can be no truth where the future is concerned because it hasn't happened yet.

Furthermore, for God to act in this world (a key element of Judeo-Christian theology), he must be immanent, or "within time." Thus God's knowledge of the future is much like ours - nonexistent - because he too must await history's unfolding before he can know the truth of a future-oriented proposition, which becomes true not as a future-oriented proposition but as a present or past-oriented proposition.

This doesn’t follow. The inability to verify a truth value doesn’t render existence of that truth value illogical.

I hope my further explanation shows where you've made a mistake here.

The analogy is flawed because foreknowledge isn’t a logical contradiction.

It is if future-oriented propositions don't have a truth value.

You are claiming the non-existence of a truth value based upon an inability of a non-omniscient being to verify it. Also – in your flawed analogy you are using definitionally contradictory concepts, which are in no way analogous to foreknowledge.

Again, no. It's not the ability to determine the truth value that's at issue. The issue is whether the proposition even HAS a truth value. If foreknowledge involves knowing the truth about propositions that have no truth value, then foreknowledge is incoherent.

The argument on the OP rests entirely upon its premises (like any other argument). What you are doing is creating a reduced version of omniscience in order to argue against its conclusions. If omniscience is a false concept then the argument doesn’t hold. I understand that. But I don’t get why you are reducing omniscience from its definition of ‘all-knowing’ while trying to pretend you are not doing so.

I'm not reducing anything to anything. I'm doing good old-fashioned conceptual analysis just as the English tradition has been doing for a couple or three centuries now. I'm suggesting that your analysis of omnisicence is flawed given that it rests on a mistake about whether propositions about the future have a truth value. This doesn't change what omnisicence means because to be omniscient, one would have to know everything it's possible to know. If it's impossible to know something (because it doesn't have a truth value), then a being can lack knowledge of it (indeed, must lack it) and still be omniscient.

As pointed out, although never explicitly stated, my assumptions are based upon the definition of omniscience to be “all-knowing”. By arguing against future-orientated propositions you are arguing for a piece of knowledge to be beyond the grasp of an “all-knowing” being.

They can't be "pieces of knowledge" if they don't have a truth value. So my proposition D (Dunemeister will have granola and yoghurt for breakfast tomorrow at 8 A.M.) isn't "beyond God's grasp" as such. It's just that there's simply no truth of the matter about D. Since there's no truth of the matter, there's no knowledge of it either.

Redefining omniscience to be anything other than all-knowing is changing its meaning.

I hope you can see that I'm not changing its meaning. I'm analyzing its meaning. I say that omniscience is the ability to know all propositions that have a truth value of "true." Thus omniscient beings don't know that 3+2=6 because it's false. Similarly, an omnisicent being doesn't know that Caesar was defeated in Gaul because Ceasar was victorious in Gaul. And, since propositions about the future have no truth value, it is impossible for God (or anyone) to know them. For a necessary condition for knowledge is that the proposition to be known has a truth value of "true." Since no future-oriented propositions are true, God doesn't know them, just as he doesn't know any other proposition that doesn't have the truth value "true."

I am not the one using and/or arguing for a scenario in which all-knowing does not mean all-knowing.

Niether am I.

Not if the concept follows directly from the definition of omniscience and there is no logical contradiction involved.

To say S knows X where X is a proposition that has no truth value is logically contradictory.

I’ll bite on this and take the following tack. I’ll define omniscience a bit more rigorously for you, and in so doing will leave you to define knowledge:

Absolute knowledge set – the set of knowledge that cannot be added, a set such that every set of knowledge is a subset.
Omniscience – to possess the absolute knowledge set.

I prefer to define omniscience as the ability to know or the actual knowing all and only true propositions, but I'll go with yours for sake of argument. And it is YOU who must provide an analysis of knowledge such that your argument makes sense. I'm not going to do your homework for you.

 

[Copernicus]

Sorry for barging in here, but I think I have some relevant comments to make on this discussion. I am a professional linguist, and I have studied linguistic philosophy quite in depth as part of my graduate training for my PhD. This is a subject that I am quite familiar with. Dunemeister ignored my previous post, but I'll carry on anyway. :drool:

It's not about whether we can determine a proposition's truth value. It's whether the proposition even has a truth value; whether it's appropriate to even speak of truth when dealing with such propositions. Many, many philosophers hold that there can be no truth where the future is concerned because it hasn't happened yet.

Who? Can you name them? That would give us a clue as to which schools of philosophy you are talking about. If statements about the future lacked truth values, then you wouldn't be able to say things like: "Will you tell me which philosophers you are talking about? Yes or no?" But this is silly, because you yourself rejected the philosophical position that you are touting.

Furthermore, for God to act in this world (a key element of Judeo-Christian theology), he must be immanent, or "within time." Thus God's knowledge of the future is much like ours - nonexistent - because he too must await history's unfolding before he can know the truth of a future-oriented proposition, which becomes true not as a future-oriented proposition but as a present or past-oriented proposition.

Nonsense. Judeo-christian prophets have not made claims that lacked truth value. They were passing on foreknowledge that they believed their deity had revealed to them. BTW, your claim about immanence is highly misleading if not totally wrong, since that property does not limit God to just present time. All it means is that his presence pervades everything, not that it pervades everything only at a given moment in time. You have misrepresented the concept.

It is if future-oriented propositions don't have a truth value.

Rubbish. God has always been represented as knowing the future. You are denying an essential ingredient of Judeo-Christian faith.

Again, no. It's not the ability to determine the truth value that's at issue. The issue is whether the proposition even HAS a truth value. If foreknowledge involves knowing the truth about propositions that have no truth value, then foreknowledge is incoherent.

Again, you have said that you did not accept the very philosophical position that you are basing this argument on!

I'm not reducing anything to anything. I'm doing good old-fashioned conceptual analysis just as the English tradition has been doing for a couple or three centuries now. I'm suggesting that your analysis of omnisicence is flawed given that it rests on a mistake about whether propositions about the future have a truth value. This doesn't change what omnisicence means because to be omniscient, one would have to know everything it's possible to know. If it's impossible to know something (because it doesn't have a truth value), then a being can lack knowledge of it (indeed, must lack it) and still be omniscient.

Actually, the linguistic philosophical tradition goes back only to the early 20th century. It was founded by such greats as Wittgenstein and Russell. You really ought to know this if you have studied the field, as I have. That is why I keep asking you (and I suppose you'll keep ignoring it) just which philosophers back your claim that statements about the future lack truth values. Are we talking about logical positivists here?

I hope you can see that I'm not changing its meaning. I'm analyzing its meaning. I say that omniscience is the ability to know all propositions that have a truth value of "true." Thus omniscient beings don't know that 3+2=6 because it's false.

No, no, no! Everyone who has learned addition knows that 3+2=6 is false, because it is false by definition. Analytic truth is fundamentally different from synthetic truth. It has nothing to do with omniscience. Come on, Dunemeister! You said that you had studied this subject.

Similarly, an omnisicent being doesn't know that Caesar was defeated in Gaul because Ceasar was victorious in Gaul. And, since propositions about the future have no truth value, it is impossible for God (or anyone) to know them. For a necessary condition for knowledge is that the proposition to be known has a truth value of "true." Since no future-oriented propositions are true, God doesn't know them, just as he doesn't know any other proposition that doesn't have the truth value "true."

I'm guessing that you are going with a positivist concept of truth values. That is, truth is essentially identified with the ability to verify a claim. Am I wrong? That approach to truth was abandoned by most philosophers decades ago.

I prefer to define omniscience as the ability to know or the actual knowing all and only true propositions, but I'll go with yours for sake of argument. And it is YOU who must provide an analysis of knowledge such that your argument makes sense. I'm not going to do your homework for you.

It appears to me that it is you who has not done the homework. Omniscience has been discussed at length in the philosophical literature, and it is almost never defined in the way you have characterized it. It is knowledge of the truth of all events--past, present, and future. God is almost never conceived of as a being who is limited to knowledge of just the present and the past. And I must say that you have seriously misrepresented the field of philosophy in general. Not only have you admitted that you do not believe the nonsensical claim that claims about the future lack truth value (unless you have now gone back on your previous statement), but you have implied that large numbers of philosophers believe the same thing! Preposterous.

 

[Mister Emu]

True. This is why I emphasise both premises in the OP are necessary.

Even knowing what all the bounces will be before you roll the ball down the hill does not necessitate the roller causing all of the bounces...

I think you answered your own question here.

No, I did not... I argue from a position I do not hold, I never argued that omniscience does not include future knowledge... only that if one does not believe the future to exist yet, expecting an omniscient being to know it would be illogical...

I believe when you said this – “ If, as I content, God's knowledge of our actions is a product of our having acted, then for God to have determined our actions to suit His will, He would have had to produce other scenarios wherein we acted differently to determine which one He would create. ”

How is this rejecting omniscience?

 

[Copernicus]

No, I did not... I argue from a position I do not hold, I never argued that omniscience does not include future knowledge... only that if one does not believe the future to exist yet, expecting an omniscient being to know it would be illogical...

I find this fascinating--Christians arguing from positions that they do not hold in order to maintain the faith. Just astounding. What is wrong with arguing from a position that you do hold? :thud:

 

[Mister Emu]

I find this fascinating--Christians arguing from positions that they do not hold in order to maintain the faith. Just astounding. What is wrong with arguing from a position that you do hold?

Perhaps you are finding it fascinating because you are not understanding what is going on...

The arguement over whether omniscience must include future knowledge is tangential to the debate of whether an omniscient creator can coexist with free will. It is a seperate matter as far as I am concerned because both the person I am arguing with and I agree that omniscience does include future knowledge...

 

[themadhair]

Many, many philosophers hold that there can be no truth where the future is concerned because it hasn't happened yet.

AFAIK these philosophers are more concerned with verifiability when it comes to this. This doesn’t arise if omniscience is assumed.

Furthermore, for God to act in this world (a key element of Judeo-Christian theology), he must be immanent, or "within time."

I do not believe being in time or outside as altering the argument. This is one of the reasons why I’ve tried to avoid the issue.

Thus God's knowledge of the future is much like ours - nonexistent - because he too must await history's unfolding before he can know the truth of a future-oriented proposition, which becomes true not as a future-oriented proposition but as a present or past-oriented proposition.

See the highlighted. This is a verifiability argument again which is already assumed in the concept of omniscience.

I hope my further explanation shows where you've made a mistake here.

I do not believe so. My concern that your point was connected to verifiability seems to have been well placed.

It is if future-oriented propositions don't have a truth value.

Any proposition I make regarding the future is either true or false. That I have to wait for the event to occur in order to verify it doesn’t change that.

The issue is whether the proposition even HAS a truth value.

But so far you objections have encompassed aspects of verifiability. Any claim made regarding the future is either true of false. That such propositions are either true or false means that them possessing a truth value is logically consistent.

They can't be "pieces of knowledge" if they don't have a truth value.

And such hasn’t been sufficiently argued for IMO.

To say S knows X where X is a proposition that has no truth value is logically contradictory.

How does the following statement lack a truth value?:
It will rain on the 1st January 2010 outside my house.
It is either true or false. Just because we cannot determine which doesn’t alter the fact that such a statement is either true or false. I really do not see how you can argue that a statement like this cannot have a truth value.

And it is YOU who must provide an analysis of knowledge such that your argument makes sense. I'm not going to do your homework for you.

I believe I have already done so. Essentially you have argued that foreknowledge is exempt from knowledge and I do not believe your argument holds. Taking your definition “ I prefer to define omniscience as the ability to know or the actual knowing all and only true propositions”, and discarding the ability portion since I think it has verifiability problems, I believe foreknowledge immediately follows. Out of the two statements “It will rain tomorrow” & “It will not rain tomorrow” one of those is true. Your definition would mean that whichever of those statements are true are known to your concept of omniscience.

Even knowing what all the bounces will be before you roll the ball down the hill does not necessitate the roller causing all of the bounces...

It does if the roller created the ball, the hill and the forces involved…..

I never argued that omniscience does not include future knowledge...

Arguing that future propositions have no truth value, and defining omniscience in terms of truth values, is doing just that surely?

only that if one does not believe the future to exist yet, expecting an omniscient being to know it would be illogical...

I disagree. If there is a body of knowledge not available to a being then that being is not omniscient. The current non-existence of the future doesn’t have any bearing on whether knowledge of that future can exist. It does have a bearing on ability to obtain and verify said knowledge – but omniscience doesn’t require that.

How is this rejecting omniscience?

I never claimed this.

The arguement over whether omniscience must include future knowledge is tangential to the debate of whether an omniscient creator can coexist with free will. It is a seperate matter as far as I am concerned because both the person I am arguing with and I agree that omniscience does include future knowledge...

One does not have to hold a position in order to debate a proposition or argument. I hold that NONE of the three premises in the OP are true and yet I’m debating it….

 

[Copernicus]

The arguement over whether omniscience must include future knowledge is tangential to the debate of whether an omniscient creator can coexist with free will. It is a seperate matter as far as I am concerned because both the person I am arguing with and I agree that omniscience does include future knowledge...

Terminological debates are good as distractions. I'll give you that. The real issue here is whether the Christian concept of God makes any sense at all. Some, of course, will maintain the illusion that we aren't really discussing that concept, although that is exactly what we are discussing. What I have always found fascinating is the very human capacity for self-deception.

 

[Falvlun]

This actually gave me an idea for an actual logical solution:

Before we're all born, we sit down with god and go through our whole upcoming life, pre-determining all our decisions. Once they're all scripted, our memories are erased, we're born, and we follow through on our pre-determined course - yet, we actually exercised free-will in making the decisions initially.

Finally, a logical solution.

I guess if you want something done right, you do have to do it for yourself.

Unfortunately, this just pushes the problem further back. It follows that God would know what choices you would choose to pre-determine your life even before you sat down with him.

 

[Mister Emu]

It does if the roller created the ball, the hill and the forces involved…..

But not if the creator created the ball with the ability to choose how to bounce without said creator's intervention...

Arguing that future propositions have no truth value, and defining omniscience in terms of truth values, is doing just that surely?

You are confusing me with Dunemeister again...

I disagree. If there is a body of knowledge not available to a being then that being is not omniscient. The current non-existence of the future doesn’t have any bearing on whether knowledge of that future can exist. It does have a bearing on ability to obtain and verify said knowledge – but omniscience doesn’t require that.

And I disagree with you... Verification has nothing to do with it, if the future doesn't exist, there is no information to obtain and verify...

I never claimed this.

Well, I assumed you meant omniscience, considering I wrote the word create in there, as in creator God...

Which premise did I reject? I have stated multiple times that God is omniscient, and that God is the creator...

You only did it once.

When?

I believe when you said this – “ If, as I content, God's knowledge of our actions is a product of our having acted, then for God to have determined our actions to suit His will, He would have had to produce other scenarios wherein we acted differently to determine which one He would create. ”

The real issue here is whether the Christian concept of God makes any sense at all. Some, of course, will maintain the illusion that we aren't really discussing that concept, although that is exactly what we are discussing.

Oh, I know...

 

[Falvlun]

If god existed and were an omniscient creator then I contend we have no free will. God would know the future course of any creation by its omniscience. Thus, in the act of creation god determined the future course of that creation. Because god created, and knew the future course of that creation from ‘before’ (doesn’t make much sense but you get the idea) it created, we cannot have free will.

Discuss.

Your basic equation is "Omniscience + Creator = No Free Will." I am unclear, however, why you need both premises for your conclusion.

Omniscience (where it includes knowledge of the future) implies that the future already exists, thus it can be known, and therefore, free-will is not possible. No Creator premise necessary.

A Creator that creates a deterministic universe eliminates the possibility of free-will, no omniscience premise necessary.

You have argued that your hypothetical Creator did not necessarily create a deterministic universe, but it is the Creator's omniscience that makes the universe deterministic. If this is so, we have again come full circle: It is omniscience that creates determinism that eliminates free-will. Again, no Creator premise necessary.

Why do you require both premises?

 

[Mr Cheese]

Of course God lies outside of logic. Thus this whole conversation is silly.

Limiting the limitless to human understanding is like teachinga dog claculus and expecting it to partake in advanced mathematics. In the end, the dog will still be a dog.

 

[Falvlun]

Of course God lies outside of logic. Thus this whole conversation is silly.

Limiting the limitless to human understanding is like teachinga dog claculus and expecting it to partake in advanced mathematics. In the end, the dog will still be a dog.

If it helps you, consider this: When people make claims about God, and they defend that claim by invoking logic or reason, then the validity of these reasons may be debated using logic and reason. Essentially, they have brought their concept of God into an arena (logic) that can be debated.

This, of course, does not define the true nature of God (or even whether God exists). It merely explores the reasons given for believing that God possesses particular attributes, and whether these reasons are logically sound.