Place of Rational Inquiry in Dharmic Worldviews

[Aupmanyav]

He did not. I feel wierd having to tell you what your guru teaches.

Hey, Osal, we are talking of a different Gautama in this thread at the moment. Not the Gautama the Buddha but Gautama (Akshapada, as 3D2e1f said) of the 'Nyaya' philosophy. That is why I did not write it as Buddha. But sorry for the confusion.

 

[Rick O'Shez]

But the physical air is there. I do not think Buddha denied that. I have no problem with 'Sunyata', no essence. Hindus term it 'maya'. So, Indra's net is based on something more than just dependent origination. That Hindus term as Brahman. Not Guatama the Buddha (he was not into speculation), but later Buddhists talk about Bodhikaya, Buddhadhatu, Tathagatagarbha and Dhammakaya.

Yes, sunyata represents flux with no essence, and is certainly more like maya than Brahman. This is a fundamental difference between Buddhist and Hindu teaching, which is why I get frustrated with those who attempt to conflate them.

 

[Rick O'Shez]

No. I am asking about why the dharmas appear cojointly in a regular manner in a way to make object talk intelligible. Why doesn't a free shape dharma or a free color dharma or a free solidity dharma or a pure number or a pure motion appear disconnected with all other dharmas? Why are all the phenomenal particulars appear tightly bound to each other "as if" they joined at the hip via a substance?

We recognise and label things based on a particular set of characteristics. So in practice we use the characteristics of a visual object to define it, we then add the assumption of a substance or essence "behind" those characteristics. So for example if a piece of "fruit" is longer and softer than an apple and coloured yellow, we might label it "banana". So in other words it us who does the binding.

In the Buddhist teaching of anatta this approach is applied to "person" or "being" as well as "apple".

As the Vajira Sutta says:

"Why now do you assume 'a being'?
Mara, have you grasped a view?
This is a heap of sheer constructions:
Here no being is found."

 

[Aupmanyav]

No being, but some entity, nevertheless (or you could explain to me. No smoke without a fire, as they say).
It is the same problem. Something or nothing. This exists even when people say consciousness is Brahman. Existence vs. non-existence.

 

[Rick O'Shez]

Existence vs. non-existence.

In Buddhist teaching the answer would be dependent origination, the middle way between the extremes of existence and non-existence.
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.015.than.html

 

[Aupmanyav]

If everything is dependent origination, then it is nihilism and Buddha was against it.

 

[Rick O'Shez]

If everything is dependent origination, then it is nihilism and Buddha was against it.

I'm not even sure what you mean by "nihilism" in this context. In any case it is clear that the Buddha taught dependent origination, it is a central theme in the suttas.

Buddhist teaching is based on conditionality and relativity, not on essences and absolutes. Anatta, sunyata, pratītyasamutpāda, the principle is crystal clear.
This is the essential difference between Buddhist and Hindu teaching.

 

[Aupmanyav]

Yeah, because Buddha advised against speculations and Hindus were sort of addicted to them.

 

[sayak83]

We recognise and label things based on a particular set of characteristics. So in practice we use the characteristics of a visual object to define it, we then add the assumption of a substance or essence "behind" those characteristics. So for example if a piece of "fruit" is longer and softer than an apple and coloured yellow, we might label it "banana". So in other words it us who does the binding.

In the Buddhist teaching of anatta this approach is applied to "person" or "being" as well as "apple".

As the Vajira Sutta says:

"Why now do you assume 'a being'?
Mara, have you grasped a view?
This is a heap of sheer constructions:
Here no being is found."

You are not answering my question.

 

[Rick O'Shez]

You are not answering my question.

Then I don't understand the question you are asking. Or possibly you have not understood the answer I have given.

 

[Rick O'Shez]

Yeah, because Buddha advised against speculations and Hindus were sort of addicted to them.

Buddhism and Hinduism clearly teach different things. But yes, the Buddha discouraged fruitless speculation, it's really a type of papanca ( mental proliferation ).

 

[Aupmanyav]

Is every speculation fruitless? In that case Einstein would not have come up with relativity.

 

[LuisDantas]

Speculation is fine, necessary even. But we should be wary of mistaking it for reality.

 

[atanu]

Atanu, are you even reading my posts?

I rephrased "did not accept Ishwara" to "Ishwara plays no role in Nyaya'.

I am reading posts carefully and thus came to know of your unfounded assertion, which you modified later. If I had not pointed it out, your statement 'Gautama did not accept Ishwara" would have gone on record as given and many would have accepted it on face value.

Your second view is "Ishwara plays no role in Nyaya", is even more absurd. When Nyaya says "Ishwara has role in dispensing karma phala", how can it have no role?

Furthermore, I do not agree to this for reasons explained above. For benefit of readers, if any, I will explain it again.

Nyaya enumerates the objects of knowledge as below:

“9. Soul, body, senses, objects of sense, intellect, mind, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit, pain and release-— are the objects of right knowledge.”

Regarding knowledge of objects, it holds:

“114. For that purpose there should be a purifying of our soul by abstinence from evil and observance of certain duties as well as by following the spiritual injunctions gleaned from the Yoga institute.—46.”
115. To secure release, it is necessary to study and follow this treatise on knowledge as well as to hold discussions”. -- 47
....

If you took a holistic view of six Hindu Darshana-s as six faces of the one, you would realise that 'Ishwara Pranidhana' is a key teaching of Yoga, which Nyaya exhorts us to follow (see above).

Please do not imagine that Veda is only about karma kanda. The Veda is our known histories first document that has a full verse about meditation. And the whole of Vedanta is Veda. All six darsana-s are also linked to each other intimately.

I will not relish argumentation on this. To me it is clear that Nyaya takes sruti regarding Ishwara and atman as shabda pramana and provides logical support to these. Further, Nyaya, stating that the knowledge of atman is an essential knowledge for moksha, also exhort us to follow the guidance of Yoga school, which lists Ishwara Pranidhana as a requirement towards moksha.

I will request readers to read the sutras themselves fully and not rely on academic-intellectual essays.

 

[sayak83]

Then I don't understand the question you are asking.

If properties like shape, color, hardness etc. are bare particulars, then there would be cases where they are manifest in pure form. Thus the world could have a "bare empty sphere" without particulars like hardness, color etc. co-located with that sphere. Similarly the world could have something that is merely hard but without being co-located with any shape or extent or dimension. If the particulars are truly independent and merely happen to be co-located in some situations, then we would expect to see pure properties floating independently of others quite often. We would see empty shapes, pure numbers, free floating colors etc. everywhere. But we don't see it. Instead these properties (shape-size-dimension-color-hardness-taste etc.) appear together consistently in the same space so that the inference of enduring objects becomes possible and intelligible. This is not something one expects in a Buddhist worldview. So what is the explanation?

 

[Rick O'Shez]

If properties like shape, color, hardness etc. are bare particulars, then there would be cases where they are manifest in pure form.

No, the distinction here is between noumena and phenomena. Objects don't "have" characteristics, objects ARE characteristics. The characteristics are what "make" the object, and objects don't have independent existence apart from those characteristics. I'm not sure I can explain it more clearly than that.

 

[Aupmanyav]

Tell us how it all begins just with characteristics. This is one thing where I differ from Buddha. Otherwise except that existence is no different from non-existence, 'creatio ex-nihilo'. Science is mulling over it, 'many-worlds'.

 

[sayak83]

No, the distinction here is between noumena and phenomena. Objects don't "have" characteristics, objects ARE characteristics. The characteristics are what "make" the object, and objects don't have independent existence apart from those characteristics. I'm not sure I can explain it more clearly than that.

Then why do we not see pure characteristics (a pure shape without associated hardness, color etc; a pure number unassociated with shapes and forms; a pure color without extensions or dimensions; etc.)? Instead they always come in "object-like" bundles? That is the question I want you to answer.

 

[Rick O'Shez]

Then why do we not see pure characteristics (a pure shape without associated hardness, color etc; a pure number unassociated with shapes and forms; a pure color without extensions or dimensions; etc.)? Instead they always come in "object-like" bundles? That is the question I want you to answer.

It's clear you still haven't understood the important distinction between phenomena and noumena. It's silly to suggest there are "pure" characteristics floating around out there, that would be making characteristics into noumena, whereas of course they are phenomena.

Characteristics are phenomena which arise in dependence on conditions, so for example the colour of the "sea" will depend on prevailing light conditions, the size of the waves will depend on prevailing wind and tide conditions, and the temperature will depend on location and season. The "sea" is defined by these characteristics, or to put it more accurately the "sea" IS these characteristics.

 

[sayak83]

It's clear you still haven't understood the important distinction between phenomena and noumena. It's silly to suggest there are "pure" characteristics floating around out there, that would be making characteristics into noumena, whereas of course they are phenomena.

Characteristics arise in dependence on conditions, so for example the colour of the "sea" will depend on prevailing light conditions, the size of the waves will depend on prevailing wind and tide conditions, and the temperature will depend on location and season. The "sea" is defined by these characteristics, or to put it more accurately the "sea" IS these characteristics.

No, you are mixing object talk with property talk. There is no sea. There are only properties like colors, shapes, smells, heat/cold etc which arise and vanish dependently on other properties. There is no reason then why such properties cannot arise dependently on other properties in unbundled forms (as just a shape arising dependently from other pure shapes) rather than always arising in "bundled" state with other properties (co-arising shapes/forms/colors/smells) in a way that makes object talk intelligible.

Remember the famous Cheshire cat of Alice in Wonderland that vanishes entirely except the smile. That kind of single property phenomena should be observed far more frequently.