Maybe we should eliminate all 'hate crimes' and instead charge people who commit crimes based on race, sexual identity, etc as terrorists.
Because that is *exactly* what they are: domestic terrorists. The goal of their action is to intimidate the *group* of people they hate.
So, how's that for a solution? Instead of charging those who shoot up churches, or who select and beat up gays with hate crimes, why not *really* charge them with the crime they committed: terrorism?
I am pleased to see at least one person who understands the reason for the enhanced penalties for hate crimes. As Justice Rehnquist wrote in the unanimous
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, in upholding Wisconsin's race-motivated hate crime enhancement:
Traditionally, sentencing judges have considered a wide variety of factors in addition to evidence bearing on guilt in determining what sentence to impose on a convicted defendant. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. ----, ---- (1991) (slip op., at 10); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949). The defendant's motive for committing the offense is one important factor. See 1 W. LeFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 3.6(b), p. 324 (1986) ("Motives are most relevant when the trial judge sets the defendant's sentence, and it is not uncommon for a defendant to receive a minimum sentence because he was acting with good motives, or a rather high sentence because of his bad motives"); cf. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) ("Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished"). Thus, in many States the commission of a murder, or other capital offense, for pecuniary gain is a separate aggravating circumstance under the capital sentencing statute. See, e. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(F)(5) (1989); Fla. Stat. § 921.1415(f) (Supp. 1992); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(f) (Supp. 1992); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(e)(6) (1992); Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-102(h)(vi) (Supp. 1992).
[. . .]
Moreover, the Wisconsin statute singles out for enhancement bias inspired conduct because this conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm. For example, according to the State and its amici, bias motivated crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite community unrest. See, e. g., Brief for Petitioner 24-27; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13-15;Brief for Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae 18-22; Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae 17-19; Brief for the Anti Defamation League et al. as Amici Curiae 9-10; Brief for Congressman Charles E. Schumer et al. as Amici Curiae 8-9. The State's desire to redress these perceived harms provides an adequate explanation for its penalty enhancement provision over and above mere disagreement with offenders' beliefs or biases. As Blackstone said long ago, "it is but reasonable that among crimes of different natures those should be most severely punished, which are the most destructive of the public safety and happiness." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *16.
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 47 (1993).
Actually, hate crime laws generally only increase the seriousness of the crime by one notch, whereas the penalties for terroristic acts are quite harsher.
