Simplified argument vs free will

[idav]

Say your boss asks you to choose a consultant to work on a particular project. He gives you a scope of work, a list of consultant qualifications, and enlists you to get proposals from each of them. You read through the proposals and select the one with the best combination of meeting the scope, having qualifications, and lowest price.

To suggest that this decision is based on something "wanted" is a complete rationalization, making "want" fit into the picture where it's not needed, and doesn't have to factor in at all.

Because there is a difference between want and need. I would be able to use logic and reason to prevent myself from recommending my cousin. Besides that it is ultimately my bosses decision, I'm only giving input.

 

[Willamena]

Philosophy lists a number of theories about what constitutes desire. There's Action-based desire (to work to get something is to desire it), Good-based desire (to consider something good, or to have it have the appearance of good, is to desire it), Pleasure-based desire (what gives us pleasure is desirable), and even one called Attention-based desire (what gives us a reward for learning it is what we desire). And more. With all these notions about what "want" is, I suspect it can end up being "self-evident" in anything in any number of ways.

 

[Nakosis]

I am still unclear as to the implications of your meaning. Are you claiming that while external factors don't have direct control, they still have indirect control?

And furthermore, I'm still perplexed by why the anti-freewill crowd feels that if our actions are ultimately controlled by us, how that does not constitute freewill.

Actually you do have freewill in any practical sense. You are free to act according to your desires. However your actions are determine to where you couldn't have acted or chosen any different then you did.

So we can choose between our wants, and decide which one we want on top. That is how I interpret that premise, which doesn't negate freewill in the least.

Unless, as I suspect, there is the hidden premise (not stated, but necessary to your argument) that we are innately imbued with wants over which we have no control.

You have control over your desires. However whatever control you implement is the result of a desire you place higher value on.

And this is the fatal assumption of the deterministic argument. How do you know that we have a suite of original wants from which spring every single other want? I find it far more probable that these are developed over time, due to our self-awareness of various wants, instincts, needs, etc (nor do I deny that these would be shaped by environmental or genetic factors--- shaped, but not determined.)

Caused/determined, the same thing. You have instincts which cause a baby's initial actions. The baby's actions cause the environment to change. Some changes are desirable, cause pleasure. Some are not. A child's behavior gets programmed to act in a manner that is most likely to cause pleasure. However because of external circumstances this does not always occur. This modifies the programming which causes the child to behave differently in order to achieve the desired pleasure.

So we do assume an initial set of instinctual responses to stimuli and a initial desire for pleasure. One's environment would seem to account for the rest of the behavior that becomes part of one's programming.

Surely we are born with certain instincts, such as the instinct to suckle, etc. But that is a relatively small pool of "original wants". Do you really think my decision to become a lab rat is predicated upon my original instinct to suckle, or to perform reciprocal altruism? We are not governed by instincts. Certainly, too, we are born with predispositions, based upon our genetic make-up, but these are only predispositions-- no matter what popularization of science tells you, there is no "murderer" gene, etc.

This assumption is the ultimate flaw in this whole argument, nor can it follow from the previous premises since they require this premise in order to be true themselves.

Your original instincts and desire for pleasure developed the programming which led to the behavior of choosing to become a lab rat.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Irrelevant and completely unrelated. Your example sentence requires imediate action from reader, whereas mine doesn't.

Which is what I said. It just reminded me of that experiment. It's unrelated.

Did you use small letters to make me have a harder time reading?

No, I copied and pasted but had problems changing the font when posting. Every time I highlighted the portion and tried to change it nothing happened.

For starters, I can't make sense of the bolded parts. How can one choose contrary to an action that one performs?

Yaffe (in the article I quoted) argues that lumping all decisions together under the lable "choice" is misleading at best and just wrong at worst. By using the term "choice" for every decision the causation argument is in effect performing a slight of hand trick. The bolded parts are the beginning of an explanation which show the inadequacy of using want ->choice-> event as an argument against free will, because it involves subsuming divergent notions under the singular concept "choice." Hence the reference to the tertium non datur principle. Although one can not "will" A and ~A, one can choose A and not desire ~A.

The 'want' to choose to make the choice. :sarcastic

Then you get into infinite loops. I make a choice. That choice is an action, and I'm conscious of making that choice. I choose to do so. So I choose to make that choice. But then there is that choice (the choice to choose) to consider. Once again, I'm aware of the fact that I'm choosing a choice, and that I'm choosing to choose to make that choice. And so on, ad infinitum. It's an infitinite loop, involving simultaneous "choices" resulting from choices. Which contradicts the OP.

The bolded part of the text, which is the most important part of the quote, is merely an interpretation of an event. In other words, it is a weak argument. My interpretation of the event is that he decided to go because ultimately that is what he wanted to do. He felt more inclined to go, and that is why he did.

Which, as I noted earlier, others have designated as an inadequate notion of choice designed to reach the conclusion of the OP. Lumping desires, coerced decisions, and more simple choices into one category leads to a false conclusion because it undermines agency through semantics. Simply connecting every choice to the most valued want hides the complexity of agency. Again, one cannot choose A and ~A, but one can choose A and want ~A. Or, one can not determine between A v B, but be coerced by circumstances to make a determination contrary to one's "want." In essence, by reducing all decisions to the label choice, the degree of agency or free will is likewise reduced, but only due to the conflation of disparate terms. The OPs argument rests on defining every choice as the result of a want, which is simply a vast oversimplification of the nature of choice.

It is a considerable mistake to think of every 'want' possessing the same degree of strenght. Not every want equals to an urge. Not every want equals to a craving.

Not every choice equals a "want." Again, the OPs argument is one of semantic restriction: define every choice in terms of want, ignoring coercision, desires, urges, etc., which under different conditions (some outside of the agents control) under the singular concept of want. By simply defining every choice as the outcome of a want, despite the fact that most individuals would argue they made choices they didn't want to make, the OP neatly side-steps an otherwise more complicated issue.

More important, however, is the "looping" of choices. If the choice is a conscious one, then the choice to choose that choice is also a choice (and again, this loop may go on ad infinitum). Where is the "want" in an infinite loop?

 

[Nakosis]

Because there is a difference between want and need. I would be able to use logic and reason to prevent myself from recommending my cousin. Besides that it is ultimately my bosses decision, I'm only giving input.

I'd suggest the difference between want and need is the value assigned to the desire.

There is a threshold that if the assigned value of a desire surpasses it becomes a need.
Below that threshold a desire is merely a want.

You've a desire to be ethical which has a greater value to you then your desire to do a favor for your cousin. If that is true then you had no choice except to not recommend your cousin. Your actions were determined by the values of your desires.

 

[Nakosis]

Yaffe (in the article I quoted) argues that lumping all decisions together under the lable "choice" is misleading at best and just wrong at worst. By using the term "choice" for every decision the causation argument is in effect performing a slight of hand trick. The bolded parts are the beginning of an explanation which show the inadequacy of using want ->choice-> event as an argument against free will, because it involves subsuming divergent notions under the singular concept "choice." Hence the reference to the tertium non datur principle. Although one can not "will" A and ~A, one can choose A and not desire ~A.

Why would one choose A over -A if they did not have a greater desire for A then -A?

Unless you're saying one can imagine choosing A but choose -A instead. Which is fine. We can imagine having made different choices then the one's we did make. Doesn't mean we would have actually made them. So you imagine having made a choice which never really existed as a choice.

This is will? The ability to imagine having made choices that never really existed?

 

[Willamena]

I'd suggest the difference between want and need is the value assigned to the desire.

There is a threshold that if the assigned value of a desire surpasses it becomes a need.
Below that threshold a desire is merely a want.

You've a desire to be ethical which has a greater value to you then your desire to do a favor for your cousin. If that is true then you had no choice except to not recommend your cousin. Your actions were determined by the values of your desires.

This suggests that neither our "wants" nor "needs" determine an outcome, but our capacity to assign value.

No matter how you cut it, it's still the same cake.

 

[idav]

I'd suggest the difference between want and need is the value assigned to the desire.

There is a threshold that if the assigned value of a desire surpasses it becomes a need.
Below that threshold a desire is merely a want.

You've a desire to be ethical which has a greater value to you then your desire to do a favor for your cousin. If that is true then you had no choice except to not recommend your cousin. Your actions were determined by the values of your desires.

Wanting to do something and actually doing it are two different things. The premise says that if I want it most I will do it but this can't be the case otherwise people couldn't get out of addictions. Logic is not a greater 'want' than the brain getting that dopamine or whatever other chemical the brain wants everyday. In fact the brain struggles with this very thing with the left hemisphere competing against the right hemisphere on every thought we have.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Why would one choose A over -A if they did not have a greater desire for A then -A?

Unless you're saying one can imagine choosing A but choose -A instead. Which is fine. We can imagine having made different choices then the one's we did make. Doesn't mean we would have actually made them. So you imagine having made a choice which never really existed as a choice.

This is will? The ability to imagine having made choices that never really existed?

We can desire A and ~A by differentiating the notion of "want," which is over simplified to the point that it may negate the OPs argument. To use Yaffe's terminology, we can define "want" (he uses "will" or "willings" and other terms) to describe choices which we would rather not like. Take the example of the killer who asks a mother to choose which of her children the killer should execute, understanding that if the does not choose the killer will execute them all. The mother then chooses, and so in some sense "wants" the killer to execute child X, but certainly does not desire it. In other words, she desires this execution in the sense that, given her options, it is preferable, but she also desires that the execution not happen. Hence, she desires A and ~A.

 

[Koldo]

I am still unclear as to the implications of your meaning. Are you claiming that while external factors don't have direct control, they still have indirect control?

Yes.

If you turn a steering wheel to the right, you are indirectly controlling the wires to turn to the right.

And furthermore, I'm still perplexed by why the anti-freewill crowd feels that if our actions are ultimately controlled by us, how that does not constitute freewill.

It is due to the inability to have done otherwise.
Also, the word 'ultimately' can be misleading in this context.
So i do rather not say that our actions are 'ultimately' controlled by us to avoid confusion.

So we can choose between our wants, and decide which one we want on top. That is how I interpret that premise, which doesn't negate freewill in the least.

Unless, as I suspect, there is the hidden premise (not stated, but necessary to your argument) that we are innately imbued with wants over which we have no control.

We don't necessarily need to have 'wants' over which we have no control.
Suffices to say our 'wants' can only be controlled by other 'wants'.

To clear any misunderstanding, the control we refer to is not done by any agency that is not ruled by determinism nor indeterminism.

And this is the fatal assumption of the deterministic argument. How do you know that we have a suite of original wants from which spring every single other want? I find it far more probable that these are developed over time, due to our self-awareness of various wants, instincts, needs, etc (nor do I deny that these would be shaped by environmental or genetic factors--- shaped, but not determined.)

What do you mean by 'these'?
The 'original wants' or 'every single other want'?

Surely we are born with certain instincts, such as the instinct to suckle, etc. But that is a relatively small pool of "original wants". Do you really think my decision to become a lab rat is predicated upon my original instinct to suckle, or to perform reciprocal altruism? We are not governed by instincts. Certainly, too, we are born with predispositions, based upon our genetic make-up, but these are only predispositions-- no matter what popularization of science tells you, there is no "murderer" gene, etc.

I don't find it fitting to use the word 'instinct' as equal to the word 'wants'. This is simply because in common usage the word 'instinct' is used in opposition to the word 'reasoning', and thus it is unfit for this debate.

 

[Nakosis]

This suggests that neither our "wants" nor "needs" determine an outcome, but our capacity to assign value.

No matter how you cut it, it's still the same cake.

However our ability to assign values is determined by other needs and wants.

The idea is there are other needs and wants who's value are externally set by our environment. While you can set the value on some needs or wants, there are some you can't. These were values set by external circumstances which you may not even be conscious of. They would cause you to assign a certain value to a conscious desire.

However since you are not likely conscious of having had these values set it seems to be an arbitrary want or need which is initiated internally.

 

[Koldo]

The argument (that "want" is self-evident) ignores that decisions get made for other reasons.

It doesn't ignore.
It affirms decisions can NOT get made for other reasons.
Or better said, the ultimate reason for any and every choice to be made is a 'want' ( or multiple ).

Say your boss asks you to choose a consultant to work on a particular project. He gives you a scope of work, a list of consultant qualifications, and enlists you to get proposals from each of them. You read through the proposals and select the one with the best combination of meeting the scope, having qualifications, and lowest price.

To suggest that this decision is based on something "wanted" is a complete rationalization, making "want" fit into the picture where it's not needed, and doesn't have to factor in at all (is superfluous).

This is clearly a misunderstanding on the position that arises from your example.
Why would an individual select the one with the best combination of meeting the scope, having qualifications and lowest price?

If these weren't wanted attributes there wouldn't be a reason to select someone who possesses them. It is exactly because these attributes are wanted that the choice is made possible.

 

[Skwim]

My post #36 doesn't argue for fate any more than for a destiny determined by our own free decisions. I've still yet to see an argument.

I didn't single out your post #36 to be critical of it, but simply to establish your contribution to the thread. Your first contribution.

Edit: Fate is not determinism. Fate involves a free agent being condemned to know a path they cannot deviate from.

I have to disagree. My understanding of fate is in line with the following from thefreedictionary.com

"fate (f

t)n.

1. a. The supposed force, principle, or power that predetermines events.
b. The inevitable events predestined by this force.

2. A final result or consequence; an outcome.
3. Unfavorable destiny; doom."
(emphasis mine)
​

I'm just saying that no such argument has reached my eyes or ears to justify that there is only one path, there are free agents, and they are condemned to travel this one path.

If a free agent is condemned to travel any one path, then in what sense are they free?

 

[Koldo]

Yaffe (in the article I quoted) argues that lumping all decisions together under the lable "choice" is misleading at best and just wrong at worst. By using the term "choice" for every decision the causation argument is in effect performing a slight of hand trick. The bolded parts are the beginning of an explanation which show the inadequacy of using want ->choice-> event as an argument against free will, because it involves subsuming divergent notions under the singular concept "choice." Hence the reference to the tertium non datur principle. Although one can not "will" A and ~A, one can choose A and not desire ~A.

Even though you did expand on your previous post, this quote did not answer my question.

Then you get into infinite loops. I make a choice. That choice is an action, and I'm conscious of making that choice. I choose to do so. So I choose to make that choice. But then there is that choice (the choice to choose) to consider. Once again, I'm aware of the fact that I'm choosing a choice, and that I'm choosing to choose to make that choice. And so on, ad infinitum. It's an infitinite loop, involving simultaneous "choices" resulting from choices. Which contradicts the OP.

I don't have to go a step further.
I don't have to choose to choose to make a choice, and so on.
The 'want' to make choices , in general, is always active because either by action or inaction we are always making choices. So we always want to make choices.
This want is connected to the original wants. There isn't an infinite loop.

Which, as I noted earlier, others have designated as an inadequate notion of choice designed to reach the conclusion of the OP. Lumping desires, coerced decisions, and more simple choices into one category leads to a false conclusion because it undermines agency through semantics. Simply connecting every choice to the most valued want hides the complexity of agency. Again, one cannot choose A and ~A, but one can choose A and want ~A. Or, one can not determine between A v B, but be coerced by circumstances to make a determination contrary to one's "want." In essence, by reducing all decisions to the label choice, the degree of agency or free will is likewise reduced, but only due to the conflation of disparate terms. The OPs argument rests on defining every choice as the result of a want, which is simply a vast oversimplification of the nature of choice.

First, it is inadequate in your opinion.
Second, one cannot choose A and ~A, but one can choose A and want both A and ~A in different degrees, which is what makes the choice for A possible.
Third, coercion restricts possible actions to the point that the action performed wouldn't be wanted in itself outside of the coercion. However, the action becomes wanted due to the coercion.
Fourth, once again , in your opinion, it is an oversimplification of the nature of choice.

It is important to make clear what are strictly opinions. Otherwise i will fighting invisible windmills. I can not present arguments against opinions. What i can do is present arguments over what opinions are based on.

There are indeed different kinds of ways to group choices, however the argument consider a characteristic valid to all kinds of choices. Therefore, it is useless to consider the separated groups.

Not every choice equals a "want." Again, the OPs argument is one of semantic restriction: define every choice in terms of want, ignoring coercision, desires, urges, etc., which under different conditions (some outside of the agents control) under the singular concept of want. By simply defining every choice as the outcome of a want, despite the fact that most individuals would argue they made choices they didn't want to make, the OP neatly side-steps an otherwise more complicated issue.

I am still waiting for a reply on:

Choose between A and B without wanting to.

More important, however, is the "looping" of choices. If the choice is a conscious one, then the choice to choose that choice is also a choice (and again, this loop may go on ad infinitum). Where is the "want" in an infinite loop?

I have already replied to this further above.

 

[wmjbyatt]

See Schopenhauer.

 

[Willamena]

If a free agent is condemned to travel any one path, then in what sense are they free?

In the sense that they own themselves--this is what libertarianism is about--and hence have the right to acquire ownership of other things, like thoughts, actions, and choices and call them "theirs," and then the consequences that arise of those things are also "theirs"--pride, honor, guilt, responsiblity, reward and punishment. Such an agent, at the mercy of a "force that predetermines or predestines events," is what I described as condemned to travel just one path. Your post #69 described just such a fated picture. So my question to you is what is the argument that supports both self-determination and predetermination in such a fatalistic picture.

 

[Willamena]

See Schopenhauer.

Word.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Even though you did expand on your previous post, this quote did not answer my question.

The issue is one of "fee will." The argument is that all choices result from wants which we are not responsible for, ergo our choices are inevitable. The point of differentiating "want" vs. "desire" and so forth is to point to the problem reducing all choices to wants. You can choose want you dont "want" in the normal sense of the word. This doesn't eradicate the argument that all choices are the result of wants, but it makes it rather trivial.

I don't have to go a step further.
I don't have to choose to choose to make a choice, and so on.
The 'want' to make choices , in general, is always active because either by action or inaction we are always making choices. So we always want to make choices.
This want is connected to the original wants. There isn't an infinite loop.

How so? If I'm offered a drug, I can choose whether or not I want to accept it. I can also be conscious of my deliberation (or choice) about this choice to accept or not accept. My deliberation is an action, and a choice (occuring simultaneously with my choice to accept or not).

If you argue that making a choice does not involve choosing to make a choice, then all choices are instinctive and lack any contemplation. I can't see how you can defend that. I can also choose NOT to think about a choice. Which means I can choose to think about making a choice. This is cognitive looping. Where does the "want" come in, and when? I decide to refuse the drugs, which means I decided to make a choice about whether or not to refuse the drugs, which means I decided to make a choice abouut making a choice whether or not to refuse the drugs, etc. The issue is that if all choices result from wants, what happens when the want is a choice? I want to choose to make a choice to make a choice and so on?

The OP treats choices and wants as seperate actions occuring at different (and linearly ordered) times). But in making a choice I am in that instant making the choice to make the choice by deciding to choose. Where is the want?

Second, one cannot choose A and ~A, but one can choose A and want both A and ~A in different degrees,

Actually the original example was choosing A but wanting ~A in the normal sense of the word. A mother who chooses which child a murder killers cannot be said to "want" the killer to do so other than in a highly abstract philosophical way. The argument some philosophers have made is that this "lumping" of different types of "wants" gives the appearance of less "free will" when in reality the ability of an individual to choose a "want" they don't "desire" is arguably very much free will.

Third, coercion restricts possible actions to the point that the action performed wouldn't be wanted in itself outside of the coercion.

That's almost never true. Point a gun at my head and order me to do something and I still have a choice. Moreover, ALL choices are restricted. Choices simply constitute a fuzzy set, in which the more constraints there are, the smaller the membership function.

Fourth, once again , in your opinion, it is an oversimplification of the nature of choice.

True. But I didn't come up with it. It's been a part of philosophical debate in various journals (and other publications) for some time. This doesn't make it right, but I think it is important to note that I'm not a lone voice here.

It is important to make clear what are strictly opinions. Otherwise i will fighting invisible windmills. I can not present arguments against opinions. What i can do is present arguments over what opinions are based on.

There are indeed different kinds of ways to group choices, however the argument consider a characteristic valid to all kinds of choices. Therefore, it is useless to consider the separated groups.

I am still waiting for a reply on:

Choose between A and B without wanting to.

Through the trivial answer of instinctive reaction, or through a realization that "want" is a more complex than the manner in which you use the word.

 

[Skwim]

In the sense that they own themselves--this is what libertarianism is about--and hence have the right to acquire ownership of other things, like thoughts, actions, and choices and call them "theirs," and then the consequences that arise of those things are also "theirs"--pride, honor, guilt, responsiblity, reward and punishment.

Yes, however this is not the sense in which free will is used in the framework of determinism/fatalism. You're shifting between concepts without making the relevant distinction.

Such an agent, at the mercy of a "force that predetermines or predestines events," is what I described as condemned to travel just one path. Your post #69 described just such a fated picture. So my question to you is what is the argument that supports both self-determination and predetermination in such a fatalistic picture.

From the way I read you, self-determination works with the "libertarianism" sense of free will: freedom of action; and predetermination works with the fatalism sense of free will: freedom to do otherwise. You're mixing two different concepts."

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

1. In order to make a choice, we must have a want that we believe to be relevant to that choice. To illustrate this, imagine a being who has no wants. If you present him with two options he has no want for either. He has no want to choose and no want to not choose, so the choice is irrelevant to him.

Now imagine a being who only has one want: to drink milk. He can now make only one choice: to drink milk. If he believes milk is in his mouth he will choose to drink it every time until he explodes or something else stops him, because it's his only want.

2. When we believe we have multiple wants related to a choice we will choose what we want more. To illustrate this imagine a being who has only two wants: to drink milk and to not drink milk. These wants contradict each other, so if they are of equal importance to the being they will cancel each other out and it will be as if the being has no wants at all.

On the other hand, if the want to drink milk is more important to the being than the want to not drink milk, he will drink milk just as if he didn't have the want to not drink.

3. In order to change the importance of a want, we must have a more important want that is relevant to doing so.This is a consequence of statements 1 and 2. For example imagine a being who has only three wants: to drink milk, to not drink milk, and to be comfortable. If the want to be comfortable is most important, it will change the importance of the other two. So if the being is uncomfortable because his stomach is empty, the want to be comfortable will make the want to drink milk more important than the want to not drink milk, until the stomach becomes uncomfortably full and so on.

4. All of our choices can be traced back to our original wants. This is a consequence of statements 1, 2, and 3, the result of wants leading to choices and changing the importance of other wants.

5. We did not choose to have our original wants. This is necessary because of statement 1 and is made obvious by the fact of birth.

We are not responsible for what led to all of our choices.This is given by statements 4 and 5.

Most of the literature on free will (or lack thereof) consists of arguments using natural language. However, there are many which use formalism to prooof (and by proof, I am referring to the use of techniques variously referred to as derivations, deductions, and proofs in mathematics and symbolic logic). The following is one such article which concerns Free Choice and utilizes modal logic (along with some novel adaptions by the authors) to resolve the paradox here. Free Choice and Contextually Permitted Actions.