The argument wants to quickly pass over premise 1 in order to require us to accept the conclusion (6), via premises 2 -5, which are valid it must be said.
This one objection alone refutes the first premise, which halts any progression to the conclusion. Of course this particular objection only refutes the God of Classical Theism, but there are still other ontological difficulties to be overcome even if the attribute of omnibenevolence is dropped (which would be an anathema to most Christian Theists).[/FONT][/COLOR]
In order for you to hold the objection of omnibenevolence, you yourself would have to be omniscient. I mean, assuming that God had a divine purpose, and his divine purpose must be carried out for the greater good, certain things has to happen to ensure this; a certain criteria has to be met in order for this to occur. So if the suffering that God allows happens for a greater good, a good that you cannot even BEGIN to understand or see with your finite knowledge and presence, then you can't logically say that suffering is incompatible with an ominibenevolent being.
For example, suppose a 7 year old girl was sexually molested by her father. Now suppose God knew that the only way the girl was going to love and accept him was if she got molested, so God allowed the girl to get molested. Now of course, God will discipline her father at whatever time he sees fit, but it is the salvation of the girl that is more important/the greater good that God is looking for. Christians believe that the joys and pleasures of heaven will filled with so much euphoria that all of the pain and suffering that we've suffered on earth, we will be willing to undergo these things 10x over if we knew what awaited us in heaven.
So take any "suffering" X; How do you know that God doesn't have morally sufficient reasons for allowing this act? I really would like you to answer this question. I mean, take any suffering of X, it can be personal or otherwise...how do you know that God doesn't have morally sufficient reasons to allow it to happen? Take any patient that is suffering from terminal cancer. How do you know that this person didn't murder person 30 years ago, and no one knew about the murder but God...no one knew this person committed this crime but God...and God choose to give this person cancer as an act of judgement. But all you see is the suffering that the man is in...you don't know the reason behind it.
I mean, on a personal and emotional note, to be quite honest, I've been a bit of a hypochondriac these past few years. I keep thinking that I am destined for pancreatic cancer, one of the worse (if the the worse) cancers you can possibly have.
Now suppose my faith is very very strong with the Lord, and I am diagnosed with pancreatic cancer. Now suppose I touch a lot of people with the story of my illness AND my faith. Now suppose my story and faith allows 10 people in Montana to be converted and saved. Now suppose God used ME as a token to get those people saved.
Now suppose this scenario is actually true, and the reasons I was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer is so that 10 people would be saved, and God used me in a way to ensure this...if this was to happen, I would BE HONORED. I would be freakin honored, because the ALMIGHTY GOD used ME (notice the emphasis on "me").
You can't make an omelet without breaking a few eggs; if God was to appear to me in divine revelation or in the afterlife and say to me "I used you for the conversion of 10 newly converted apostles in Montana. I knew that you would remain faithful to me despite your ailment....". That would make things all the worthwhile, in my opinion.
I think the problem of evil fails because those that use it just doesn't have the knowledge and foresight to make judgments on the actions (or lack thereof) of an Almighty God. As long as morally sufficient reasons are even POSSIBLE, then the argument fails
The second thing to be said is that no existential demonstration follows from modal propositions alone. Existence implies that a thing is or obtains outside of any logical demonstration in some aspect, feature, form, or place etc. It cannot exist merely as a concept or a set of characteristics, such as omnipotence for example; for we wouldnt say omnipotence exists!
Ummm cot, the argument just makes the case; all possible necessary truths must exist in reality, and this is true even if there was no argument to make the case. The truth value of a proposition is true or false independent of what is known. Second, if the argument is true, then OMINIPOTENCE does exist, as more than just a concept.
There has to be some object in which the characteristics inhere or are manifested. And so if it is asserted that there is a Maximally Great Being that necessarily exists, then it must be demonstrable outside of the proposition, which is to say in reality, which is what the term existence refers to. For an entity that exists in actual reality as well as being logically demonstrable is maximally greater than an entity that exists only as a logical demonstration. I don't think there can be any disagreement over that conclusion.
Oh but I believe that it is, cot. It is demonstrable outside of the proposition. I was going to make an entire thread about it, actually. The fact of the matter is, the kalam cosmological argument (KCA) corroborates the modal ontological argument (MOA).
And to give a brief sketch...the KCA makes a case for an metaphysically necessary being, one that transcends (transcended) all space, time, matter, and natural energy. This being would have to be omniscience, and one with unimaginable power (being able to create from nothing).
The MOA makes the case that a MGB exists, and at least three of those attributes that the KCA claims MUST be necessary based on a finite universe are covered in the MOA (necessary, omniscient, omnipotent). One argument supports the other, and I think both can be demonstrated on a philosophical level with corroboration from empirical evidence as well.
Further more, if God can be conceived to be non-existent in this the actual (and therefore possible) world, without involving a contradiction or some other absurdity, then it follows that there is no Maximally Great Being in every world, which means that no Maximally Great Being exists of necessity. For as Hume said: it will always be possible for us at any time to conceive the non-existence of what we formally conceived to exist. He also said:
nor can the mind lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain in always in being in the same manner that we lie under the necessity of always conceiving twice two to be four. In sum, there is no entailment from God has necessary existence to Necessarily God exists. So, if it is possible to conceive the non-existence of any object, then its non-existence is possible and therefore it cannot be necessary. If a thing is necessary and an absolute truth then it cannot be thought as false, as with the 2 + 2 = 4 example that Hume mentioned. And yet, regardless of any definition, concept, or proposition we can conceive of there being no God, which would be impossible if Gods existence is necessary, certain and true.
I remember when you first raised this objection, and I will admit, I was stumped at first (which doesn't happen to often on here). But I think I've figured it out.
You are saying if God is necessary, like the #1, then you shouldn't be able to think of a possible world at which God doesn't exist, like the #1. But you can, so God cannot be said to be necessary, because you can think of a possible world at which God couldn't exist.
My response to this is simple; if you can think of a world at which God doesn't exist, then you are not thinking of the same God as defined as a MGB. Take for example the attribute of omniscience. To be omniscience is to know all true propositions (all knowing), right. Now, if it is a FACT that being X has the necessary attribute of omniscience, then I can't think of a possible world at which being X doesn't know a given proposition. If I can think of a possible world at which being X doesn't know a given proposition, then I am not really thinking of being X in the first place.
So if you can think of a possible world at which a MGB doesn't exist, then you are not really thinking of a MGB, you are thinking of a being other than a MGB, because a MGB cannot fail to exist, just like numbers and other abstract objects. Or take any other attribute...omnipresence. I can't think of a world at which an omnipresent God doesn't exist. If I think of a world where an omnipresent God doesn't exist, then I am not thinking of an omnipresent God. I am thinking of more of a contingent God, but certainly not an omnipresent God.
And if Im right in what Ive said above then it can be objected that it is possible that there is no Maximally Great Being, and from which the conclusion must follow necessarily that a Maximally Great Being is an impossible concept.
Oh, you should know that it is never that easy, cot.