The battle of evolution vs creationism

[cottage]

In order for you to hold the objection of omnibenevolence, you yourself would have to be omniscient. I mean, assuming that God had a divine purpose, and his divine purpose must be carried out for the greater good, certain things has to happen to ensure this; a certain criteria has to be met in order for this to occur. So if the suffering that God allows happens for a greater good, a good that you cannot even BEGIN to understand or see with your finite knowledge and presence, then you can't logically say that suffering is incompatible with an ominibenevolent being.

(N.B. I'll be dealing with each objection separately. This is the first rebuttal: The Problem of Evil. I also have other objections to Plantinga's MOA, and I will be introducing them after this current crop.)

No, I’m sorry but I don’t agree with any of that. If you attest to the truth of propositions such as 2 + 2 = 4, or ‘a circle is not a square’, then you must accept that if God the Creator is all goodness then there can be no badness (P or not-P). And if you don’t need to be omniscient in order to find a proposition intelligible then why can’t the same privilege be extended to me? The greater good argument re-states and confirms the contradiction: which is where you require suffering to overcome or alleviate suffering. Makes no sense! And again, my finitude or lack of greatness doesn’t prevent me from identifying contradictions, since even God is subject to the laws of thought.

For example, suppose a 7 year old girl was sexually molested by her father. Now suppose God knew that the only way the girl was going to love and accept him was if she got molested, so God allowed the girl to get molested. Now of course, God will discipline her father at whatever time he sees fit, but it is the salvation of the girl that is more important/the greater good that God is looking for. Christians believe that the joys and pleasures of heaven will filled with so much euphoria that all of the pain and suffering that we've suffered on earth, we will be willing to undergo these things 10x over if we knew what awaited us in heaven.

So take any "suffering" X; How do you know that God doesn't have morally sufficient reasons for allowing this act? I really would like you to answer this question. I mean, take any suffering of X, it can be personal or otherwise...how do you know that God doesn't have morally sufficient reasons to allow it to happen? Take any patient that is suffering from terminal cancer. How do you know that this person didn't murder person 30 years ago, and no one knew about the murder but God...no one knew this person committed this crime but God...and God choose to give this person cancer as an act of judgement. But all you see is the suffering that the man is in...you don't know the reason behind it.

With respect the case being made for a ‘morally sufficient reason’ is a hopeless one that leads into the realms of contradictory nonsense. In fact this argument is the only one that has ever has Prof Craig (whom I respect) on the ropes and with nowhere to go and finally having to resort to an argument from ignorance. To say God had a morally sufficient reason for causing/allowing evil and suffering makes as much sense as saying God had a logically sufficient reason for enabling married men to be bachelors. Also I see you are appealing to a principle restuitive justice. There are a number of things to be said about that. First, by definition that can only take place after the fact. Second, what is done cannot be undone, and so the suffering that took place proves the contradiction and blots God’s copy book for ever. Third, there is no suffering in heaven, demonstrating that an existence without suffering is logically possible. Fourth, you actually give an example of vengeance, which in my book is the opposite of forgiveness and contrary to a God of mercy; so once more proving the contradiction.

I mean, on a personal and emotional note, to be quite honest, I've been a bit of a hypochondriac these past few years. I keep thinking that I am destined for pancreatic cancer, one of the worse (if the the worse) cancers you can possibly have.

Now suppose my faith is very very strong with the Lord, and I am diagnosed with pancreatic cancer. Now suppose I touch a lot of people with the story of my illness AND my faith. Now suppose my story and faith allows 10 people in Montana to be converted and saved. Now suppose God used ME as a token to get those people saved.

Now suppose this scenario is actually true, and the reasons I was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer is so that 10 people would be saved, and God used me in a way to ensure this...if this was to happen, I would BE HONORED. I would be freakin honored, because the ALMIGHTY GOD used ME (notice the emphasis on "me").

You can't make an omelet without breaking a few eggs; if God was to appear to me in divine revelation or in the afterlife and say to me "I used you for the conversion of 10 newly converted apostles in Montana. I knew that you would remain faithful to me despite your ailment....". That would make things all the worthwhile, in my opinion.

I think the problem of evil fails because those that use it just doesn't have the knowledge and foresight to make judgments on the actions (or lack thereof) of an Almighty God. As long as morally sufficient reasons are even POSSIBLE, then the argument fails

I can even grant you God having a reason for inflicting evil and suffering, but that does not, I’m afraid, overturn the contradiction. For whatever the reason, the fact remains that people have suffered and are suffering. Any defence you make on God’s behalf must either weaken him, for example by saying X circumstances compelled him to cause/allow suffering, or you simply demonstrate his causal complicity, which confirms the inconsistency in either case, demonstrating his inability or his unwillingness to prevent suffering.

 

[Ouroboros]

Reptiles to birds? That is something new. Something that no one has ever seen. I would say that is quite new.

Yes and no.

It was an hypothesis already in the 19th centruy, but was recently confirmed through genetics.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

No, I’m sorry but I don’t agree with any of that. If you attest to the truth of propositions such as 2 + 2 = 4, or ‘a circle is not a square’, then you must accept that if God the Creator is all goodness then there can be no badness (P or not-P).

So basically you are saying that either God should of created a world at which human beings are programmed to do only what is good, or he should not have created human beings at all. Is that the argument? The badness only stems from free creatures utilizing their own free will. God cannot "make" someone freely "choose" to do anything. I think granting creatures free will is in fact the right moral thing to do. I would want my children to love and obey me because they love and respect me, not because I "programmed" them too. Unless we have different views in that regard I will expect you to agree with that.

And if you don’t need to be omniscient in order to find a proposition intelligible then why can’t the same privilege be extended to me? The greater good argument re-states and confirms the contradiction: which is where you require suffering to overcome or alleviate suffering. Makes no sense! And again, my finitude or lack of greatness doesn’t prevent me from identifying contradictions, since even God is subject to the laws of thought.

Then it goes back to objective morally. If you are saying that God cannot be omni-benevolent because of the pain and suffering in the world, then you are presupposing a standard of goodness and holding God to that very standard. You are saying "God doesn't quite measure up to my standard of goodness, because if God is omnibenevolent he would prevent X,Y, and Z." But that is neither here nor there. Where do you get your moral code from? You are just simply in no position to hold God to your standard when you have so little knowledge of what the reasons God may have for allowing such acts to occur.

And you are certainly not in a position to tell God "there could of been a better way", because if there was a better way, God would know, and he would execute based on that way.

With respect the case being made for a ‘morally sufficient reason’ is a hopeless one that leads into the realms of contradictory nonsense. In fact this argument is the only one that has ever has Prof Craig (whom I respect) on the ropes and with nowhere to go and finally having to resort to an argument from ignorance. To say God had a morally sufficient reason for causing/allowing evil and suffering makes as much sense as saying God had a logically sufficient reason for enabling married men to be bachelors. Also I see you are appealing to a principle restuitive justice. There are a number of things to be said about that. First, by definition that can only take place after the fact. Second, what is done cannot be undone, and so the suffering that took place proves the contradiction and blots God’s copy book for ever. Third, there is no suffering in heaven, demonstrating that an existence without suffering is logically possible. Fourth, you actually give an example of vengeance, which in my book is the opposite of forgiveness and contrary to a God of mercy; so once more proving the contradiction.

So this goes back to my question above...are you saying that God should of either created human beings without free will and programmed them to commit only good acts, or not created them at all? Once again, evil comes from free will. Now, if God allowed unrepentant evil to go unpunished, then that would not be the act of a morally perfect God, in my opinion. There are just so many scenarios that can be given as to why evil and suffering could be used for the greater good. I mean heck, the plan was for Jesus to come on earth and die for the sins of mankind. It was all part of the plan. The evil act of getting betrayed and unjustly sentenced to death brought out the greater good of dying for the sins of mankind. God looks at the "big picture" of things...he sees the world from beginning to end in his omniscience, and here you are with your finite knowledge, you can barely see the world from your own two eyes, so how can you possibly know the justification as to why the Almighty allows certain acts to transpire.

I can even grant you God having a reason for inflicting evil and suffering, but that does not, I’m afraid, overturn the contradiction. For whatever the reason, the fact remains that people have suffered and are suffering.

That is part of life, cot. We all suffer. We are not guaranteed 100% happiness and bliss in our lives, especially being sinful beings. Jesus called John the Baptist the greatest man that ever lived, and guess what; John the Baptist was beheaded. Jesus is God incarnate, yet he himself suffered while on earth. So if he was not immune to it, then we are certainly not.

 

[Falvlun]

When dealing with necessary truths, X does exist if it is possible for X to exist. That is the case with necessary truths. Now it is true that when dealing with contingent propositions, then you are correct, X doesn't exist if it is possible for X to exist. But we are not TALKING ABOUT CONTINGENT TRUTHS. We are talking about NECESSARY TRUTHS.

What is the proof that God is a necessary truth?

 

[cottage]

Ummm cot, the argument just makes the case; all possible necessary truths must exist in reality, and this is true even if there was no argument to make the case. The truth value of a proposition is true or false independent of what is known. Second, if the argument is true, then OMINIPOTENCE does exist, as more than just a concept.

2/3 Reality, Kalam etc

All possible necessary truths do not demonstrate existence in reality! ‘Pegasus is a winged horse’ is a necessary truth. Now see if you can demonstrate the existence of such a creature for me? And omnipotence, an attribute, can only exist if it belongs to some object. In what way can you demonstrate that any omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, omnibenevolent object exists in reality, which is to say outside the proposition? I say it can’t be done. Prove me wrong?

Oh but I believe that it is, cot. It is demonstrable outside of the proposition. I was going to make an entire thread about it, actually. The fact of the matter is, the kalam cosmological argument (KCA) corroborates the modal ontological argument (MOA).

And to give a brief sketch...the KCA makes a case for an metaphysically necessary being, one that transcends (transcended) all space, time, matter, and natural energy. This being would have to be omniscience, and one with unimaginable power (being able to create from nothing).

Well that doesn’t demonstrate that a Maximally Great Being exists outside of any logical or metaphysical argument. Neither an inferential argument such as the Kalam, nor non-inferential (MOA) argument can demonstrate a thing actually existing in reality.

The MOA makes the case that a MGB exists, and at least three of those attributes that the KCA claims MUST be necessary based on a finite universe are covered in the MOA (necessary, omniscient, omnipotent). One argument supports the other, and I think both can be demonstrated on a philosophical level with corroboration from empirical evidence as well.

Now for the Kalam Cosmological Argument; and I’ll paraphrase Professor Craig’s exposition, as judging by the terms and phrases used that is the model you have in mind. Craig argues that the world began to exist (no disagreement there). In one of his papers he said every kind of explanation is either a logico-mathematical explanation (such as the number 7), but which being abstract it is incapable of explaining the fact that something comes into existence. And he says a scientific explanation can explain events occurring within the universe but not how the universe itself came to be. He concludes that the cause of the universe requires a personal being, immaterial, eternal, timeless, changeless, yadda, yadda, yadda. Now I know you’re entirely familiar with all of this stuff so I’ll cut to the chase. A personal being, he says, involving an agent doing something for a reason, provides the only explanation for the universe coming into being.

Professor Craig thinks that wraps the argument up nicely. In my view it opens a can of worms.

Leibniz’ version of the cosmological argument (also known as the Argument from Contingency) says that even if the world has always existed there must be a sufficient reason to explain its contingent existence. And this sufficient reason he said will be God, an intelligent being that freely chose to bring the world into existence. And according to this principle of sufficient reason nothing happens by chance and a thing that doesn’t have to exist but does exist needs a reason for its existence. It is immediately evident that to say an intelligent, personal being freely chose to bring the world into existence is to assign a purpose to the act of creation. And that poses a question for which there can only be two answers: either God created the world for himself or for the benefit of others. Both possibilities appear incoherent. For it seems obvious that an omnipotent Supreme Being, who is sufficient in all things, cannot have needs, unfulfilled wishes or desires. He has everything and is everything by definition. And nor can it be said that he created the world for the benefits of others, since it is nonsensical to imply that creatures that didn’t formerly exist can profit or gain from anything. Now it may be argued that neither God nor the world existing from eternity need a reason for being, since there will be nothing external to them, but if the world is created then according to Leibniz there must be a reason and a purpose for its being brought into being. So I think we are entitled to ask the reason for bringing the world into existence. And given that there are only, at most, the two possibilities mentioned above, both of which contradict the concept of a self-sufficient Supreme Being, a personal explanation fails to deify the basic first cause concept.

Leibniz said "No fact can be real or existing and no statement true unless it has a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise". The existence of the world isn’t a necessary aspect of God, and while God’s eternal existence doesn’t demand an explanation, the finite world of creatures does require an explanation or a reason for its creation. And according to Christian theism, God the creator wants a personal relationship with his creation, and as I’ve explained there is logically only one agent that can profit or gain from this arrangement – and it isn’t the formerly non-existent creatures! And this is seemingly confirmed for us when Prof Craig in his debate with Peter Millican spoke of “God bringing people into a relationship with himself, forever.” I think it is clear from that statement that an eternally existent God requires something he does not already have, which is an immediate contradiction even before we consider the implied emotional content, for by no amount of sophistry can it be argued that the greatest conceivable being is at the same time, or at anytime, not wholly entire or in some way incomplete. And it is utterly absurd even to think of created beings gratifying the needs or emotional requirements of the Supreme Creator.
So the contradiction becomes evident because there is a supposed Supreme Being, who, by very definition of the term, is a complete entity that wants for nothing and yet intentionally brought the world of creatures into being. But since nothing existed prior to the act of creation there was nothing that could profit, gain, or benefit from the act other than God himself. Therefore if God intentionally created the world with a purpose, that could only be for his own sake or advantage (as described above). But as the Supreme Being is a concept already augmented without limit an act of creation is purposeless, which is absurd. And on that account there is no Supreme Being.

We can summarise the above argument like this:

P1: If God is the Supreme Being then he wants for nothing
P2: God wanted a relationship with his creation
Conclusion: God is not the Supreme Being

 

[cottage]

So basically you are saying that either God should of created a world at which human beings are programmed to do only what is good, or he should not have created human beings at all. Is that the argument? The badness only stems from free creatures utilizing their own free will. God cannot "make" someone freely "choose" to do anything. I think granting creatures free will is in fact the right moral thing to do. I would want my children to love and obey me because they love and respect me, not because I "programmed" them too. Unless we have different views in that regard I will expect you to agree with that.

No, I’m not saying (absurdly) what God should do! I’m saying there was no logical impediment in God creating a logically possible world without suffering. And in regard to free will that programmed robot analogy is nothing but a red herring. There is no logical impossibility in God creating a world without evil and suffering, as an all good world with all good inhabitants, where their goodness exists at a basic level and they can still aspire to and achieve an even greater level of goodness.

Then it goes back to objective morally. If you are saying that God cannot be omni-benevolent because of the pain and suffering in the world, then you are presupposing a standard of goodness and holding God to that very standard. You are saying "God doesn't quite measure up to my standard of goodness, because if God is omnibenevolent he would prevent X,Y, and Z." But that is neither here nor there. Where do you get your moral code from? You are just simply in no position to hold God to your standard when you have so little knowledge of what the reasons God may have for allowing such acts to occur.

No, I’m saying nothing of the sort! All I’m doing is identifying a logical contradiction.

And you are certainly not in a position to tell God "there could of been a better way", because if there was a better way, God would know, and he would execute based on that way.

I’m not claiming to know a better way.I’m simply observing that if everything God created was good, then nothing created by God was evil. So if every existent thing is good, then no existent thing is evil. Yet there is evil! Therefore, as some existent things are evil then not every existent thing created by God was good.

So this goes back to my question above...are you saying that God should of either created human beings without free will and programmed them to commit only good acts, or not created them at all? Once again, evil comes from free will. Now, if God allowed unrepentant evil to go unpunished, then that would not be the act of a morally perfect God, in my opinion. There are just so many scenarios that can be given as to why evil and suffering could be used for the greater good. I mean heck, the plan was for Jesus to come on earth and die for the sins of mankind. It was all part of the plan. The evil act of getting betrayed and unjustly sentenced to death brought out the greater good of dying for the sins of mankind. God looks at the "big picture" of things...he sees the world from beginning to end in his omniscience, and here you are with your finite knowledge, you can barely see the world from your own two eyes, so how can you possibly know the justification as to why the Almighty allows certain acts to transpire.

Programming them only to good acts is begging the question somewhat. You speak about evil going unpunished but evil and suffering exist only because God causes those things to exist. A world without evil and suffering doesn’t reduce to a world of robots. And again I don’t need to justify or apologize for identifying a logical contradiction. I’m not pontificating on the moral aspect.

That is part of life, cot. We all suffer. We are not guaranteed 100% happiness and bliss in our lives, especially being sinful beings. Jesus called John the Baptist the greatest man that ever lived, and guess what; John the Baptist was beheaded. Jesus is God incarnate, yet he himself suffered while on earth. So if he was not immune to it, then we are certainly not.

Yes indeed suffering is part of life. But I’ll leave it there as the above is a matter of theology and belief.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

What is the proof that God is a necessary truth?

No proof, that God exists necessarily if he exists at all is simply stipulated.

 

[cottage]

I remember when you first raised this objection, and I will admit, I was stumped at first (which doesn't happen to often on here). But I think I've figured it out.

You are saying if God is necessary, like the #1, then you shouldn't be able to think of a possible world at which God doesn't exist, like the #1. But you can, so God cannot be said to be necessary, because you can think of a possible world at which God couldn't exist.

My response to this is simple; if you can think of a world at which God doesn't exist, then you are not thinking of the same God as defined as a MGB. Take for example the attribute of omniscience. To be omniscience is to know all true propositions (all knowing), right. Now, if it is a FACT that being X has the necessary attribute of omniscience, then I can't think of a possible world at which being X doesn't know a given proposition. If I can think of a possible world at which being X doesn't know a given proposition, then I am not really thinking of being X in the first place.

3/3 No necessary existence?
What makes a proposition true is not omniscience but self-evidence or truth by definition. Regardless of any Maximally Great Being a triangle will always have three sides and my Mother will never be my Father.

So if you can think of a possible world at which a MGB doesn't exist, then you are not really thinking of a MGB, you are thinking of a being other than a MGB, because a MGB cannot fail to exist, just like numbers and other abstract objects. Or take any other attribute...omnipresence. I can't think of a world at which an omnipresent God doesn't exist. If I think of a world where an omnipresent God doesn't exist, then I am not thinking of an omnipresent God. I am thinking of more of a contingent God, but certainly not an omnipresent God.

Well, if I’m thinking of a Maximally Great Being, then I’m thinking of a Maximally Great Being, and a Maximally Great Being, as defined, cannot be contingent! So if I can conceive of a possible world minus a Maximally Great Being, while understanding what is meant by the term Maximally Great Being, the it follows that there is no Maximally Great being in that possible world. But take note that I’m not really saying we have to enter into some deep meditative enquiry that enables us to search possible worlds for an illusive God.

I’m saying if an Almighty, omnipotent and necessary being exists in all possible worlds and we cannot think what cannot be thought, supposedly that there is no such possibility of the thing not existing, then it follows that such a being must be present to our minds as a clear and distinct truth in the same way that we cannot think of 2 + 2 = 4 as being anything other than what it is. Now it seems to me that a necessarily existing, Maximally Great Being, one that is omnipotent and omniscient, can only be such if the truth of its existence is necessarily and universally ever-present and assuredly more certain to us than we are even of our own existence. But that is evidently not the case, not even for the most devout believer, and certainly not conforming to the veracity that is endued with the 2 + 2 = 4 example. And nor is there any necessarily existent entity, a Maximally Great Being, that imposes itself upon my mind. And further more since this concept can only exist in the mind when it’s thought of, there is therefore no Maximally Great Being that can be thought as remaining always in existence, and in which case there is no necessarily existent Maximally Great Being.

 

[Contemplative Cat]

Q: why would evolution automatically debunk creationism.

Hypothetically God could start creation and thus evolution.
We have already observed small adaptions like height increase.
I apologize if this has already been gone over.

 

[Ouroboros]

Q: why would evolution automatically debunk creationism.

Depends on what kind of creationist you're thinking of.

I tend to be sloppy and call it creationism when it's really should be more specific, like "special creation." Special creation is the idea that all animals, plants, biological life, etc was created as is, in place, one time, like God waving his wand and *poof* there it is. It's not a progression at all.

However, if you think of creationism just as a term of a divine being creating the universe and life with whatever method, even including evolution, then yes, there's no real conflict.

I've been trying to get CotW to accept this for a while that evolution doesn't negate God. Evolution only contradicts a certain kind of God, the kind that has to carve out each and every mountain, build animals from clay, sculpt elephants and mice alike, and so on. That kind of God is very hands-on, but that's not necessarily how a God would create the world or life. Evolution would be a very smart way of doing it. Genetic/Evolutionary algorithms are used more and more in games to create planets, landscape, trees, enemies, buildings, ... If you have Unity3D you can buy a couple of these for less than $100! Heck, there's a building paintbrush in Adobe Flash, and a vine paintbrush as well. If we can do smart things like that, why wouldn't God be as smart?

Hypothetically God could start creation and thus evolution.

Exactly.

 

[Runewolf1973]

Hypothetically speaking, a God could have started creation and thus evolution, but more realistically speaking and in accordance with nature, a God wasn't needed to start anything.

 

[Ouroboros]

Hypothetically speaking, a God could have started creation and thus evolution, but more realistically speaking and in accordance with nature, a God wasn't needed to start anything.

Which means nature is the creator of life, i.e. the actor (personal or not) of producing the world.

Then if someone wants, he/she can call the world/life producing Nature "God".

 

[Runewolf1973]

Which means nature is the creator of life, i.e. the actor (personal or not) of producing the world.

Then if someone wants, he/she can call the world/life producing Nature "God".

Sure can, and in fact I do sometimes call that nature presence "God" or "Spirit" depending on who I am talking to. I prefer to call those underlying fundamental forces of nature The Animating Factor. No man-like or supernatural deities involved though, only natural forces.


---

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

3/3 No necessary existence?
What makes a proposition true is not omniscience but self-evidence or truth by definition. Regardless of any Maximally Great Being a triangle will always have three sides and my Mother will never be my Father.

Relevance?

Well, if I’m thinking of a Maximally Great Being, then I’m thinking of a Maximally Great Being, and a Maximally Great Being, as defined, cannot be contingent!

So if I can conceive of a possible world minus a Maximally Great Being, while understanding what is meant by the term Maximally Great Being, the it follows that there is no Maximally Great being in that possible world.

No, what you are conceiving of is a contingent, watered down version of a MGB (if that makes sense). If a being is omniscient, and you can think of a possible world at which this being is less knowledgable, then you've taken this being and watered it down to some other kind of being, because it can't be the same being.

And second, the only way you can successfully refute the argument is for you to find an internal contradiction based on the concept. If there is no MGB in every possible world based solely on the fact that you can conceive of it NOT existing, then quite the contrary, a MGB must exist based on solely on the fact that I CAN conceive of such a being actually existing.

Both cannot be true, and neither can be based primarily on what one can conceive, which is why St. Anslems version failed.

I’m saying if an Almighty, omnipotent and necessary being exists in all possible worlds and we cannot think what cannot be thought

Right, we cannot think of what cannot be thought...and I can't think of a possible world at which an omnipresent being cannot exist. Just like we cannot think of a possible world at which a bachelor is married, we cannot think of a possible world at which a omnipresent being does not exist. If you can think of a possible world at which being X doesn't exist, then being X is not a omnipresent being.

Now it seems to me that a necessarily existing, Maximally Great Being, one that is omnipotent and omniscient, can only be such if the truth of its existence is necessarily and universally ever-present and assuredly more certain to us than we are even of our own existence.

That is subjective. It is quite certain to those that believe it to be certain.

But that is evidently not the case, not even for the most devout believer, and certainly not conforming to the veracity that is endued with the 2 + 2 = 4 example.

The 2+2 = 4 example is easy, because we know it to be true. But even if we didn't know, let say...if the #7 can be divided evenly into 10293988389281283838828181282838485488383282234374747732767122828303222838383...we dont know if #7 can be divided evenly into that number...but if it is POSSIBLE for that to be the case, then it is necessarily true, in the same way that if it is possible for God to exist as defined in the argument, then God exists necessarily, and all necessary truths must exist in reality.

 

[SkepticThinker]

Hypothetically speaking, a God could have started creation and thus evolution, but more realistically speaking and in accordance with nature, a God wasn't needed to start anything.

Agreed.

 

[Call_of_the_Wild]

2/3 Reality, Kalam etc

All possible necessary truths do not demonstrate existence in reality! ‘Pegasus is a winged horse’ is a necessary truth.

Hold up now: Please answer the following question; Can a proposition be possibly necessarily true? Yes or no.

Now see if you can demonstrate the existence of such a creature for me? And omnipotence, an attribute, can only exist if it belongs to some object. In what way can you demonstrate that any omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, omnibenevolent object exists in reality, which is to say outside the proposition? I say it can’t be done. Prove me wrong?

I can demonstrate that it is POSSIBLE for such a being to exist. The concept is internally logical and coherent. If something is logical and coherent, then it could happen, which is basically what the argument states; "For all we know"....For all we know, God (MGB) could exist.

Well that doesn’t demonstrate that a Maximally Great Being exists outside of any logical or metaphysical argument. Neither an inferential argument such as the Kalam, nor non-inferential (MOA) argument can demonstrate a thing actually existing in reality.

That is why the question at the very top is important, because I am trying to drive home the point that all possible necessary truths must be actually true.

Leibniz’ version of the cosmological argument (also known as the Argument from Contingency) says that even if the world has always existed there must be a sufficient reason to explain its contingent existence. And this sufficient reason he said will be God, an intelligent being that freely chose to bring the world into existence. And according to this principle of sufficient reason nothing happens by chance and a thing that doesn’t have to exist but does exist needs a reason for its existence. It is immediately evident that to say an intelligent, personal being freely chose to bring the world into existence is to assign a purpose to the act of creation. And that poses a question for which there can only be two answers: either God created the world for himself or for the benefit of others. Both possibilities appear incoherent. For it seems obvious that an omnipotent Supreme Being, who is sufficient in all things, cannot have needs, unfulfilled wishes or desires. He has everything and is everything by definition. And nor can it be said that he created the world for the benefits of others, since it is nonsensical to imply that creatures that didn’t formerly exist can profit or gain from anything. Now it may be argued that neither God nor the world existing from eternity need a reason for being, since there will be nothing external to them, but if the world is created then according to Leibniz there must be a reason and a purpose for its being brought into being. So I think we are entitled to ask the reason for bringing the world into existence. And given that there are only, at most, the two possibilities mentioned above, both of which contradict the concept of a self-sufficient Supreme Being, a personal explanation fails to deify the basic first cause concept.

I happen to agree with you on that one. Despite my commitment to the Christian faith, there are some tough (in my opinion) questions. I have at least three. One is the very thing you mentioned; about about how a perfectly content being would need/want to create anything. The second is the doctrine of predestination. The third is a problem with the problem of contingency. I've yet to dive in to these issues as of yet, but I am sure each one can be reconciled.

We can summarise the above argument like this:

P1: If God is the Supreme Being then he wants for nothing
P2: God wanted a relationship with his creation
Conclusion: God is not the Supreme Being

Will get back to you on that one.

 

[idav]

And second, the only way you can successfully refute the argument is for you to find an internal contradiction based on the concept. If there is no MGB in every possible world based solely on the fact that you can conceive of it NOT existing, then quite the contrary, a MGB must exist based on solely on the fact that I CAN conceive of such a being actually existing.

We can conceive it but it is a contradiction therefore not necessary. A maximal being is inherently contradictory, like existing in multiple realities at the same time as you allude to, that's self refuting.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

...the only way you can successfully refute the argument is for you to find an internal contradiction based on the concept.

OR note that the concept/definition is itself arbitrary OR note that the argument is invalid in most modal systems OR note that the argument is question begging OR note that the argument relies on a fallacious equivocation (a "bait and switch") OR note that the argument, if granted, leads to contradictory conclusions (the less than maximally great necessary beings). There probably other ways the MOA fails as well, but this is just off the top of my head.

 

[cottage]

No, what you are conceiving of is a contingent, watered down version of a MGB (if that makes sense). If a being is omniscient, and you can think of a possible world at which this being is less knowledgable, then you've taken this being and watered it down to some other kind of being, because it can't be the same being.

And second, the only way you can successfully refute the argument is for you to find an internal contradiction based on the concept. If there is no MGB in every possible world based solely on the fact that you can conceive of it NOT existing, then quite the contrary, a MGB must exist based on solely on the fact that I CAN conceive of such a being actually existing.

Both cannot be true, and neither can be based primarily on what one can conceive, which is why St. Anslems version failed.

No, no, that’s not the way it works. I too can conceive of a Maximally Great Being! But whatever we formerly conceived of as existent can also be conceived to be non-existent, but it takes only a single negative instance to prove the contradiction; and whereas Anselm spoke of conceiving a necessary being, I’m saying no such necessity can be conceived without contradiction. Further more, my objection to both Anselm’s and Plantinger’s argument is the fallacy that necessary existence can be demonstrated in reality through merely non-inferential propositions. See my argument on this at the bottom of the page.

Right, we cannot think of what cannot be thought...and I can't think of a possible world at which an omnipresent being cannot exist. Just like we cannot think of a possible world at which a bachelor is married, we cannot think of a possible world at which a omnipresent being does not exist. If you can think of a possible world at which being X doesn't exist, then being X is not a omnipresent being.

Indeed, I can think of a world where an omnipresent being doesn’t live up to its name. An omnipresent being can be such if, and only if, it is always in existence, and in which case it would have to be necessarily existent – but that's the very point I’m disputing.

That is subjective. It is quite certain to those that believe it to be certain.

Clearly it is subjective and in which case it cannot be necessary.

The 2+2 = 4 example is easy, because we know it to be true. But even if we didn't know, let say...if the #7 can be divided evenly into 10293988389281283838828181282838485488383282234374747732767122828303222838383...we dont know if #7 can be divided evenly into that number...but if it is POSSIBLE for that to be the case, then it is necessarily true, in the same way that if it is possible for God to exist as defined in the argument, then God exists necessarily, and all necessary truths must exist in reality.

But all necessary truths do not exist in reality, otherwise one-eyed Cyclops, winged horses such as Pegasus, and half-fish, half-human mermaids would be in evidence. And in the case of the 2 + 2 = 4 example, you are in the habit of excising parts of my post so that the context and meaning is lost. Here is the reinstated passage:

I’m saying if an Almighty, omnipotent and necessary being exists in all possible worlds and we cannot think what cannot be thought, supposedly that there is no such possibility of the thing not existing, then it follows that such a being must be present to our minds as a clear and distinct truth in the same way that we cannot think of 2 + 2 = 4 as being anything other than what it is. Now it seems to me that a necessarily existing, Maximally Great Being, one that is omnipotent and omniscient, can only be such if the truth of its existence is necessarily and universally ever-present and assuredly more certain to us than we are even of our own existence. But that is evidently not the case, not even for the most devout believer, and certainly not conforming to the veracity that is endued with the 2 + 2 = 4 example. And nor is there any necessarily existent entity, a Maximally Great Being, that imposes itself upon my mind. And further more since this concept can only exist in the mind when it’s thought of, there is therefore no Maximally Great Being that can be thought as remaining always in existence, and in which case there is no necessarily existent Maximally Great Being.

The conclusion here is that your illusive Maximally Great Being isn’t all that great, and certainly isn’t necessarily existent, since we can conceive the concept of a greater being, one that is always in existence and ever-present, a being that would in that case be impossible to deny.


Now on the matter of reality, let’s just consider a few things. In experience there is no necessity, a thing is possible or it is actual and a thing that is actual is also possible. It is raining at the moment but it is possible for it to be not raining. But the fact that it is raining also makes it possible for it to be raining. But in the case of our 2 + 2 = 4 proposition it isn’t possible that 2 + 2 = 4 can ever be false; in other words the question of possibility doesn’t arise. But if it is raining the event will not be necessary for we can conceive the possibility of it not raining without involving a contradiction or some other absurdity.

Therefore possible existence belongs to experience and necessary existence to pure concepts alone, and I will argue that there is no way to bring the two things together. But wouldn’t a Maximally Great Being necessarily be a special case? One would certainly think so!

So on that understanding if it is asserted that there is a Maximally Great Being that necessarily exists, then it must be demonstrable outside of the proposition, which is to say existent in reality, and experience is part of reality, if not its totality.

P1. An entity that exists necessarily in experience as well as being logically demonstrable is maximally greater than an entity that exists only as a logical demonstration.

P2. It is impossible to demonstrate necessity in experience

P3. There is no necessary Maximally Great Being in experience

Conclusion: There is no Maximally Great Being

Premise 1 is self-evident and so the argument hinges on premise 2. But there is no necessary existence as general sense experience in the external world, and nor is there any innate or necessary imposition present in our minds.

I believe the argument to be conclusive as the only objection is to confine necessary existence within narrow bounds, which is to weaken the concept and expose the supposed Being to a comparison with a conceptual being that does logically meet the criteria. And since there cannot logically be two Maximally Great Beings, the latter concept makes the former impossible.

 

[cottage]

Hold up now: Please answer the following question; Can a proposition be possibly necessarily true? Yes or no.

If a thing is necessarily true then it follows that it is also possible. ‘Pegasus is a winged horse’ is both necessarily and possibly true. But what about this: ‘Pegasus necessarily exists’ is possibly necessary true. Therefore Pegasus is a necessarily existing being. Or: ‘Pegasus, the winged horse, is the omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, omnibenevolent, Maximally Great Being’. If is possible necessary that Pegasus is the MGB, then…well you know the rest.

I can demonstrate that it is POSSIBLE for such a being to exist. The concept is internally logical and coherent. If something is logical and coherent, then it could happen, which is basically what the argument states; "For all we know"....For all we know, God (MGB) could exist.

I have demonstrated conclusively that an omnibenevolent being is contradictory and therefore it is impossible - never mind possibly necessary.

That is why the question at the very top is important, because I am trying to drive home the point that all possible necessary truths must be actually true.

Yes, but only as tautologies, from which only further tautologies follow. I invite you to identify any existent thing that is universally known to be true in reality and was only discovered by means of a self-evident proposition – never mind a necessary existence!

I happen to agree with you on that one. Despite my commitment to the Christian faith, there are some tough (in my opinion) questions. I have at least three. One is the very thing you mentioned; about about how a perfectly content being would need/want to create anything. The second is the doctrine of predestination. The third is a problem with the problem of contingency. I've yet to dive in to these issues as of yet, but I am sure each one can be reconciled.

Now I'm confused. What's with this conciliatory and thoughtful Call of the Wild? Now come on, what have you done with the rather cocksure and utterly certain contributor who generally goes by that name?