"The brain is just how the soul expresses itself"

[Febble]

In 200 years you won't be able to tell if your best friend is conscience or not. He can tell you he is, but you won't be able to verify it.

I disagree.

 

[Nick Soapdish]

I disagree.

It's one thing to think we will have flying cars, or ships that go to Pluto someday, because there are logical plausibilities for such things. But how on earth are you going to verify the consciousness of another creature? How can you tell if a computer is conscious, or a newt, or heck, the entire human super-organism?

Science is based on quantification. Ultimately, everything can be reduced down to ideas that are rooted in formulas. Conscious experience is incompatible with numbers. There is a quality to it that can't be quantified (often referred to as qualia). The feeling of hot, the view of the stars, the sensation of smelling a rose. We can describe these things poetically, but we can't transfer our conscious experience to someone using any form of information we can conceive. Even if you have the technology to transfer the neuron firings of one brain to another, you will never know if the source brain is actually generating a consciousness, or whether it is simply a zombie, a stimulus-response machine, that doesn't really experience anything in a qualitative way. In the experiment, you might just experience what their consciousness would be like, if they were conscious.

 

[Nick Soapdish]

Let me pursue your analogy.

Imagine that we have some cars and some unobservable drivers. How could we tell that these unobservable drivers exist?

1. Observe something in the car that violates established laws of physics (e.g. the gas pedal lowers on its own)
2. Observe that two physically identical cars behave differently (e.g. both cars start out in park, one drives off obeying traffic laws, while the other drives aimlessly into things, or just sits there in park; perhaps one driver is more skilled than the other)
3. Observe that the 'intentions' of the car cannot be altered by physically changing the car (e.g. no matter how you play with the engine or brakes, the driver will still do his best to avoid running into a crowd of people)

Any of these observations would falsify the hypothesis that the behavior of cars is exclusively the result of physical causes. The same argument could be made for any physical system, including brains, both animal and human.

We could add a fourth observation in the case of a brain or machine capable of communicating its experience or at least exhibiting signs of unique experiences:

4. Observe that the experiences indicated by the behavior of the machine (e.g. it says 'I see the color blue', or its feelings/experiences are evident by its behavior) do not correspond to anything physical about the machine.
​

Despite a wealth of research, none of these observations have been made with respect to any physical system that I know of, even human brains. Clearly, human brains, chimpanzee brains, and cell phones are not inhabited by these sorts of supernatural 'drivers'.

Now, you could postulate some things about the human 'soul' that makes it different from the supernatural 'drivers' above:

1. Maybe we just haven't found the part of the brain where a non-physical action occurs; or, maybe the soul is actually a passive 'receiver' who doesn't interact with the brain but who experiences what it's like to be sitting in it nonetheless.
2. Maybe souls are too similar to be distinguished by the different ways in which they control brains; also, maybe brains with certain physical characteristics are always inhabited by a soul.

....and so on. I have no doubt that, if we try hard enough, we can make all sorts of ad-hoc hypotheses about the human soul in order to make it immune to empirical falsification.

However, I am equally certain that we could postulate an unfalsifiable soul for the chimpanzee brain, cell phones, or any physical system. So why should we take the existence of an unfalsifiable human soul more seriously than the existence of an unfalsifiable cell phone soul?

You have not 'solved' anything simply by observing that we don't understand something and declaring the existence of a supernatural soul. To call this a 'solution' is a pretty big stretch, unless you can use it to predict something (e.g. you could predict the four observations I outlined above).

I believe you are missing my assertion that conscious experience cannot be observed or measured. The car analogy is inaccurate for that. It simply illustrates that there is something else besides the engine if the engine can't account for the entire driving event.

Consciousness is non-quantifiable, which means it can't be measured. Sounds like something outside of the domain of science--something supernatural.

 

[Nick Soapdish]

I think you may have this backward.

If our experience is wholly dependent upon the physical, then it is not surprising that one person who has physically seen an Arizona sunset can recall that experience and use it as a tool for communication with others who have been exposed to similar physical influences.

On the other hand, if a person who had been living underground his/her entire life understood exactly what you meant about the Arizona sunset, that would be good evidence against physically-caused experience.

I don't follow you. Any understanding of the sunset would be based on similar experiences that can be related to. But you will never truly know that experience. We have no means of communication for that.

The fact that we can't completely quantify our experience is not a problem. We can't quantify the experience of many animals whose behavior shows that they experience things as much as any human (perhaps many things that a human cannot experience). The conclusion is that science is an objective method for investigating the world whereas our experience comes from a mammalian brain that has evolved to survive, not to worry about x-rays or warped spacetime or all the other things that we cannot conceive with our minds, though we can understand them through science.

How do you know a mouse is conscious? To say "it just seems conscious" seems like bad science. What do you measure? How do you verify?

 

[Nick Soapdish]

Who knows? We have not encoded vision so our brain can decipher it, but we can encode vision. It will be possible for a blind person to experience color provided enough advances in technology are made as the brain can quickly adapt to new additions to it.
For instance, a monkey learned to control third arm with some neural implants fairly quickly. I am unaware if somethig similar has been tried on humans. I think there were some experiments done with mouse pointers.

Well, the difference between a person who can see colors and a person who can't is physical.....so if you can discover that physical difference and correct it, anyone should be able to experience colors. I don't see how this example serves to do anything but confirm that physical causes are at the root of our experience.

I am not arguing that physical causes are not at the root of our experience. They are to a very large degree. And sure, it may be possible to repair the brain so that a color-blind person can experience colors. But how do you know they are really experiencing anything? Because they tell you? Is that good science? How do you know their blue doesn't feel like your red? Is there a way to verify that?

There was an incident that a man lost his color vision because of brain trauma. Not only could he not see colors, he could not imagine them. His neurons would fire when he imagined a green pasture, but it would just feel gray to him. This validates your assertion that the physical brain dictates our conscious experience. I agree with that. But how could you verify he was not lying? (not that I am claiming this poor fellow was dishonest). But from a hypothetical stance, how does the scientific method verify his claim?

 

[yossarian22]

I am not arguing that physical causes are not at the root of our experience. They are to a very large degree. And sure, it may be possible to repair the brain so that a color-blind person can experience colors. But how do you know they are really experiencing anything? Because they tell you? Is that good science?

Yes it is. How do you think a census works? A census is scientific, as are polls if conducted properly. How do you think we find out how effective a pain killer is? We ask. The majority of people will tell the truth. Those who don't are very rare and will deviate from the pattern.

How do you know their blue doesn't feel like your red? Is there a way to verify that?

Because the wavelength of light we associate with "red" will cause a distinct set of information to come from the retina. What this looks like we have no idea yet (or we might, I am not up to date with this area of science), but we will eventually find out. That way we know what color they are experiencing.

There was an incident that a man lost his color vision because of brain trauma. Not only could he not see colors, he could not imagine them. His neurons would fire when he imagined a green pasture, but it would just feel gray to him. This validates your assertion that the physical brain dictates our conscious experience. I agree with that. But how could you verify he was not lying? (not that I am claiming this poor fellow was dishonest). But from a hypothetical stance, how does the scientific method verify his claim?

We need a comparison. Individual data does not show us much. If a majority of people with similar conditions could still imagine green, then there is either something wrong with the man or he is lying. In an hypothetical and unethical situation, we could take thousands of people, give them an identical injury, and then collect data. But, needless to say, that is not an option

 

[Febble]

It's one thing to think we will have flying cars, or ships that go to Pluto someday, because there are logical plausibilities for such things. But how on earth are you going to verify the consciousness of another creature? How can you tell if a computer is conscious, or a newt, or heck, the entire human super-organism?

The same way that I can tell that you are conscious - by interacting with you, or observing your interactions with others.

Science is based on quantification. Ultimately, everything can be reduced down to ideas that are rooted in formulas. Conscious experience is incompatible with numbers. There is a quality to it that can't be quantified (often referred to as qualia). The feeling of hot, the view of the stars, the sensation of smelling a rose. We can describe these things poetically, but we can't transfer our conscious experience to someone using any form of information we can conceive. Even if you have the technology to transfer the neuron firings of one brain to another, you will never know if the source brain is actually generating a consciousness, or whether it is simply a zombie, a stimulus-response machine, that doesn't really experience anything in a qualitative way. In the experiment, you might just experience what their consciousness would be like, if they were conscious.

Well, I know that that is the argument, but I don't think it holds water. Sure, we can't quantify the smell of a rose, but there is no reason why we should. If we knew the sequence of events that lead to the percept of the smell of a rose (and we know a fair bit), and we observe that sequence of events in another organism, we can infer that that percept has occurred.

I don't say that it's possible in practice, merely in principle. I think (reluctantly) that the idea of qualia is a misleading one, as it suggests that it might be possible to function exactly like a conscious organism but not be conscious - it implies the theoretical possibility of philosophical zombies - organisms exactly like our selves, down to the last neuron, but who somehow don't experience anything.

I see no reason to think that such a thing is possible, even theoretically.

 

[rocketman]

The same way that I can tell that you are conscious - by interacting with you, or observing your interactions with others.

Lizzie, doesn't this conflict with what Dennet taught you about unconscious zombies being indistinguishable from conscious people? Correct me if I'm wrong.

I think (reluctantly) that the idea of qualia is a misleading one, as it suggests that it might be possible to function exactly like a conscious organism but not be conscious - it implies the theoretical possibility of philosophical zombies - organisms exactly like our selves, down to the last neuron, but who somehow don't experience anything.

Why your reluctance? Is it the irony of your own consciousness being involved in a decision not to accept your own consciousness as anything special?

I think it is incorrect to say that the existence of qualia allows for zombies. Here is an interesting piece against this Dennet/zombie line of thought:

COULD DANIEL DENNETT BE A ZOMBIE?

Cheers.

 

[Febble]

Lizzie, doesn't this conflict with what Dennet taught you about unconscious zombies being indistinguishable from conscious people? Correct me if I'm wrong.

First, it's Dennett, not Dennet, secondly, I'm not sure that "taught" is the right word - I read some of his work - and thirdly, Dennett, AFAICT, would dispute the notion that "unconscious zombies" are possible, so could not hold the position that they are "indistinguishable from conscious people". He would, I believe, argue that if they are "indistinguishable from conscious people" they must be conscious. That would be my position, anyway.

Why your reluctance? Is it the irony of your own consciousness being involved in a decision not to accept your own consciousness as anything special?

It was relatively recently that the irrelevance of the notion of qualia dawned on me, and it was something of an upset to my worldview, as I had, hitherto, accepted Chalmers' position that there was something ineffable about subjective experience, and that that made some kind of dualism a rational stance. I abandoned dualism with a certain initial reluctance, not knowing quite how bleak, or otherwise, the world might look without it. However, the good news is that it looks not only fine, but better, because my world-model no longer rests on what I regard as a kludge.

But I do not consider (nor did I, I don't think) that my consciousness is involved in decisions. I don't think, as I've said, that consciousness is a thing. I think it's a state, and some decisions are made in a state of consciousness and some are not.

I think it is incorrect to say that the existence of qualia allows for zombies.

I'm not sure what would allow for zombies. Nothing, AFAICT. I'm not saying that qualia don't exist, just that they are simply what we are conscious of. So a conscious entity will have qualia, i.e. noting that we have qualia simply brings us back to the question - it doesn't tell us, in itself, that consciousness is something especially Hard, it merely tells us that consciousness consists of being conscious of something.

Here is an interesting piece against this Dennet/zombie line of thought:

COULD DANIEL DENNETT BE A ZOMBIE?

Cheers.

Except that the views apparently attributed to Dennett in this piece seem to me bear no resemblance to the views expressed in either of the three books of his that I have read (Kinds of Minds; Consciousness Explained; Freedom Evolves). If he once held those views, he seems to have changed; if he doesn't, it is an critique of a straw man.

 

[Zeno]

The problem you are running into here:

Consciousness is non-quantifiable, which means it can't be measured. Sounds like something outside of the domain of science--something supernatural.

and here:

I don't follow you. Any understanding of the sunset would be based on similar experiences that can be related to. But you will never truly know that experience. We have no means of communication for that.

is not a problem of non-quantifiable-ness or unverifiable-ness. It is a problem of definition. The reason we have the problem you describe is not due to some supposed inherent nature of consciousness. It is due to our lack of agreement on the definition of consciousness.

For example, if I arbitrarily decide that the definition of consciousness is the ability to use a set of symbols or sounds to communicate ideas, then consciousness is most certainly quantifiable. Various tests assessing whether the ideas communicated are abstract or concrete could be completed. Vocabulary tests would also be useful. People with various forms of aphasia would be considered "less conscious" than others. Additionally, gorillas unable to learn sign language would be quantifiably "less conscious" than gorillas who could.

I am certain we both agree that a 'distance' is a quantifiable concept. Why is that? It is because we both accept that distance is the amount of space between two points. If I arbitrarily define distance as the exact space between the fourth dimension and the fifth dimension, then the concept of distance becomes non-quantifiable rather easily.

How do you know a mouse is conscious? To say "it just seems conscious" seems like bad science. What do you measure? How do you verify?

How do you know that you are conscious? How do you know that anything is conscious? The point being that when something is arbitrarily defined, it can attain quantifiable and non-quantifiable characteristics on a whim.

You may feel that your arbitrary definition of consciousness is closer to the "truth," than mine (both are arbitrary), however, there exist a multitude of examples showing that our perceptions or feelings can, have, and will deceive us.

 

[rocketman]

Except that the views apparently attributed to Dennett in this piece seem to me bear no resemblance to the views expressed in either of the three books of his that I have read (Kinds of Minds; Consciousness Explained; Freedom Evolves).

Wow. You certainly have interpreted him differently than I have.

The piece was mostly refering to his 2005 work "Sweet Dreams".

 

[Febble]

I haven't read "Sweet Dreams". But your comment was:

Lizzie, doesn't this conflict with what Dennet taught you about unconscious zombies being indistinguishable from conscious people? Correct me if I'm wrong.

I note that in Susan Blackmore's review of Sweet Dreams, she says:

He describes his task as being to explain away qualia-based intuitive objections to materialism, and this he does using some of his favourite examples. One is the ever-popular philosopher’s zombie; an imaginary creature who looks, acts and speaks like a normal person but has no subjective experiences – or qualia. It’s easy to imagine a zombie – or at least to think you are imagining one – says Dennett, and he calls this “falling for the Zombic Hunch”, which traps people into believing that consciousness is separate from brain function. Dennett has tried to murder the zombie before, explaining how people fail to follow the rules when they think they are imagining one, but now with the concept of the Zombic Hunch he explores the damage done by this false intuition. But don’t worry, he says, if you are patient and open minded it will pass, or mutate into a less virulent form. Just as we still feel as though the Earth stands still, in the future people may still feel the Zombic Hunch but they won’t believe it. They will know that mechanistic theories of consciousness do the whole job, and we don’t need the concept of qualia.

which would fit with what I have read of his, but is NOT a claim of "unconscious zombies being indistinguishable from conscious people", but that the very notion that a zombie imaginable is false. Or, to put it differently, that if someone was indistinguisable from a conscious person it would be incoherent to regard them as unconscious. If they behaved as though they were conscious of things, then to say that they were not conscious would be an absurdity - like postulating that a soft surface only felt soft, but was really hard (my analogy - don't blame Dennett).

 

[sandandfoam]

I. If they behaved as though they were conscious of things, then to say that they were not conscious would be an absurdity - like postulating that a soft surface only felt soft, but was really hard (my analogy - don't blame Dennett).

What about blindsight?

 

[Febble]

What about blindsight?

Well, what about blindsight?

 

[sandandfoam]

Well, what about blindsight?

Blindsight patients can access visual information without conscious awareness, e.g. the capacity to make colour discriminations may be preserved in blindsight. This would seem at odds with your statement "If someone...behaved as though they were conscious of things, then to say that they were not conscious would be an absurdity"

 

[Febble]

Blindsight patients can access visual information without conscious awareness, e.g. the capacity to make colour discriminations may be preserved in blindsight. This would seem at odds with your statement "If someone...behaved as though they were conscious of things, then to say that they were not conscious would be an absurdity"

OK, so how do you know that they lack conscious awareness of that information?

 

[sandandfoam]

OK, so how do you know that they lack conscious awareness of that information?

Weiskrantz et al. (1974) is a good place to start. Also Weiskrantz (1986), and Stoerig and Conway (1989) amongst others.

 

[Febble]

Weiskrantz et al. (1974) is a good place to start. Also Weiskrantz (1986), and Stoerig and Conway (1989) amongst others.

No, my question is for you. I know a fair bit about patients with blindsight - I've even tested one in the lab.

I want you to think through what you are saying: how would you know that they lack conscious awareness of visual information?

ETA: in cases it isn't clear: I'm not saying that they do have conscious awareness of visual information - I simply want to know how you would ascertain that they didn't.

 

[sandandfoam]

No, my question is for you. I know a fair bit about patients with blindsight - I've even tested one in the lab.

I want you to think through what you are saying: how would you know that they lack conscious awareness of visual information?

I don't, but I accept the academic literature that states that they do. I have unfortunately never met anyone with blindsight.

 

[sandandfoam]

ETA: in cases it isn't clear: I'm not saying that they do have conscious awareness of visual information - I simply want to know how you would ascertain that they didn't.

Sorry I missed this bit.
Come back. My question was in response to :- "If someone...behaved as though they were conscious of things, then to say that they were not conscious would be an absurdity"
I asked what about blindsight? I don't have the answer to my question of you.