That's probably my fault, worded it poorly. The negation of (zebra) is (no zebra), yes. It results in "nothing." But there's also the (idea of zebra) that we acquire when (zebra) has been realized. Much philosophical debate has gone into whether there is a negation of that, and if so what its nature might be. For instance, if we conceive of a possible world with no zebras, we have effectively placed a "blank" zebra into that world, a placemark where zebra might be. We can do that, because we still hold the idea of zebra. In the context of a possible world with no zebras, there's this big "nothing" where something should be roaming around; that "nothing" is not really nothing. It's useful.
The emptiness of form is not ¬x; in different contexts it negates different things, including the negation of "no zebras". Part of the learning referred to earlier as arational teaches one to switch between contexts to see multiple (myriad) "no zebras." Learning to switch contexts is often the more significant lesson.
I think I see what you mean. Consider a possible world where zebras never evolved: are you saying that by considering this possible world we've applied something to it (an absence of zebras)?
I'm comfortable with agreeing with this. If I were to explain it, I'd simply point out that the form still exists even in worlds where zebras aren't actualized.
Am I understanding you correctly?
Willamena said:I'm sure you can agree that my having justified knowledge of a capitol city isn't what makes it true that it's a capitol city. Truth is paramount. That's what I meant by knowledge is true despite justification: that we have justified belief doesn't generate truth.
Ok, I certainly agree with this. I think we find understanding below:
Willamena said:If it were so that truth requires justification, then justification could not be true. I believe that truth is paramount. If justification is to work, it must itself be justifiable by other things (that's not to say we need indulge an endless recursive --it stops at the point where we are convinced of a thing).
Perhaps it's important to distinguish between the proposition truth and propositions that are true. Truth is the mother of all propositions: it simply says, "true." While we use justification to guarantee propositions are true, it is the truth we find in justification that leads us to that guarantee.
I think we're saying the same thing in different ways. There are two "points of view" here: the omniscient ontological point of view (truth) and the epistemic "as far as we're capable of knowing" point of view (propositions).
Truth doesn't require justification to be true, but we require justification to be aware that we've stumbled on a true proposition (and therefore to recognize truth).
Willamena said:In my opinion, the phrase "knowledge is justified true belief" indicates that knowledge is unconditionally true, and it's also justified. That does not (for me) leave open the possiblity of knowledge skipping over justification, but truth is another matter.
Well, it can also be given in the context that knowledge is justified [true] belief -- where [true] means that it can either be absolutely true or true to the extent that it's possible for an epistemic thinker to know.
I have justified true belief that grass will appear green to me tomorrow, and this can comfortably be called knowledge of the lesser sort -- it isn't absolute since the truth is tentative; and tied to the shortcomings of the justification.
I have justified true belief that if something exists that it exists as what it is, and this would be the stronger knowledge -- this is because the truth is absolute and the justification infinite.
Either case, though, doesn't allow knowledge to be reached while skipping over justification. You can surely come to a true belief without justification, but that true belief wouldn't be knowledge; and furthermore, you would have no means of knowing that it's actually a true proposition.