‘Another kind of Self’? (!) There is only one kind of self viz the following:
The metaphysical notion of a self is an identity that belongs to the thing, and nothing can be attributed to it, or be caused by it unless it first exists. And whatever else it is, and whatever it does, must be conditional upon its own prior existence and self-interest, thus it is self-contradictory to describe it as selfless or be ‘involved in an act of unconditional giving. The prior self is two-dimensional: metaphysical and evidential. The former comprises an internal truth, where the predicate cannot be separated from the subject without self-contradiction, although, as with all metaphysical notions, the subject and predicate can be rejected together. The latter is proved both logically and empirically true: there can be no logical necessity for a contingent self, but where such a thing is instantiated its priority is likewise demonstrated in the case of any action, positive or negative, which denial once again leads to a contradiction.
Pure consciousness simply means mind in a context distinct from the corporeal form, and by definition it is self-aware, which demonstrates the priority. And ‘giving’ implies a need, or the gifting of a benefit, but the needy recipients cannot exist if you say they are illusory. And since giving also requires a receiver we see once again the reliance on causation.
Nothing is ‘totally inconceivable’ to me; all things are possible unless it can be shown otherwise. The difference between us is that I must acknowledge that I may be proved wrong, while you make airy statements about discovering absolute reality while declaring it as a truth and yet never moving on from baseless assertions.