Things you don't like about Materialism

[Nous]

We'll get back to that when you've answered my questions:

You want me to answer your question regarding Berkeley's 'immaterialism'.

How did Berkeley define 'immaterial'?​

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Exactly like you didn't define "determine," Berkeley didn't define "immaterial". It isn't necessary for him to have defined "immaterial" given that he spelled out a metaphysical thesis. I asked you how to "mix" it with materialism, because claim that you fuzzy idea of determinism is a "mix" of the thesis of determinism with random events thrown in. The purpose of my question is to illustrate what nonsense you are proposing. You have well demonstrated your nonsense by your inability to answer such simple questions such as how did you determine which are "random events" and which are determined events.

Apparently your fuzzy idea of determinism depends on the denial of reductionism. I.e., apparently your fuzzy idea depends on causes not being reducible to quantum events.

 

[blü 2]

Berkeley didn't define "immaterial".

But since it's your question, if you're using any other meaning of 'immaterial' than the religious one, please say so; and if not, you already have my answer.

Apparently your fuzzy idea of determinism depends on the denial of reductionism. I.e., apparently your fuzzy idea depends on causes not being reducible to quantum events.

Quantum events can be causes. The Casimir effect is the result of random quantum events, for example. Radioactive poisoning is also such a result.

The last time I looked (about three years ago) at reductionism and the quantum world, the question was being debated but no clear answer was presented. As I said, I can't think of any alternative to reductionism (and I take it from your silence in answer to my previous question that you can't either) but I acknowledge it has problems.

 

[Nous]

But since it's your question, if you're using any other meaning of 'immaterial' than the religious one, please say so; and if not, you already have my answer.

Use whatever meaning of "immaterial" you wish, and explain how to "mix" Berkeley's metaphysical thesis with materialism.

Quantum events can be causes. The Casimir effect is the result of random quantum events, for example. Radioactive poisoning is also such a result.

The last time I looked (about three years ago) at reductionism and the quantum world, the question was being debated but no clear answer was presented. As I said, I can't think of any alternative to reductionism (and I take it from your silence in answer to my previous question that you can't either) but I acknowledge it has problems.

You said above that there are "chains of causation". Apparently that is a denial of reductionism; i.e., a denial that causes emanate from and are reducible to some lowest level of reality.

You also haven't answered my questions as to which "chains of causation" are not "interrupted by quantum events," and how is what you have described different from a world of random events?

 

[blü 2]

Use whatever meaning of "immaterial" you wish, and explain how to "mix" Berkeley's metaphysical thesis with materialism

Take one beaker of nonsense, one beaker of Berkeley, and one cup of tinsel confetti. Mix thoroughly. Leave to stand for seven days, then throw away.

You said above that there are "chains of causation". Apparently that is a denial of reductionism; i.e., a denial that causes emanate from and are reducible to some lowest level of reality.

I'd say that on the exact contrary it's an affirmation of reductionism, that up from the most basic levels flow effects that become causes, leaving (in strict determinism) nothing uncaused.

We've agreed to use your definition of (strict) determinism here. Do you suggest that definition says or implies anything different?

You also haven't answered my questions as to which "chains of causation" are not "interrupted by quantum events," and how is what you have described different from a world of random events?

You apparently didn't read #341:
Nous

How did you determine that an event is not "relevantly interrupted by quantum events"?​

Blü 2

By elaborate tests in an expensive and specialized laboratory.​

how is what you have described different from a world of random events?

As I said in 336:

According to strict determinism,

A causes B, B causes C, C causes D ... X causes Y, Y causes Z. Therefore if A then Z ─ the future is in principle perfectly predictable (though in practical terms very rarely so).

In fuzzy determinism this isn't strictly so. To keep with our example, "A causes B" becomes "A causes B unless a random quantum event occurs which prevents A causing B". And so on for all the other steps in the chain to Z. Thus the future is in principle not predictable (though still derived only from sequences of physical events ─ which is what it has in common with strict determinism).​