This post continues considering Smoke's objection to my argument that Christianity could be warranted by the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit:
Smoke said:
Christianity is false. I know this by the internal instigation of Eris (IIE). IIE is the means by which one may have true beliefs about God, if Discordianism is true. If you wish to object to the evidence provided by IIE, you have to show that Discordianism is not true.
Argument for warrant via IIHS generalizable?
Here the objection might be that if theistic belief is properly basic, then so can any other belief be, no matter how bizarre. If theistic belief is basic, you might as well make the same claim for atheism, voodoo, astrology, whatever.
This objection is plainly false. To recognize that
some kinds of beliefs are properly basic doesn't mean
all other kinds of beliefs are. Even if the IIHS model I've described is correct, it doesn't follow that these others are properly basic.
Perhaps the objection is that my view is radically relativistic. Voodoo followers (the objection runs) would be able to claim that insofar as their beliefs are basic in the voodoo community they are rational and that Christianity is irrational in this community. Indeed, any community whatsoever can argue their particular beliefs are properly basic. According to this objection, someone who took any proposition
p in the basic way could legitimately claim that
p was properly basic; it can therefore be rationally accepted in the basic way. This is the Generalizability Argument:
(1) If Christian epistemologists can legitimately claim that belief in God is rationally acceptable in the basic way, then for any other belief accepted in some community, the epistemologists of that community could legitimately claim that it was properly basic, no matter how bizarre the belief.
But
(2) The consequent of this conditional is false.
So
(3) The Christian apologist cannot legitimately claim that belief in God is rationally acceptable in the basic way.
Problems with the second premise
There are problems here with (2). What kind of rationality are we dealing with here? Are we talking about whether the voodooists could be justified? That is, are we asking whether they could be within their intellectual rights, flout no epistemic duty, do their intellectual best while believing as they do? That's too easy. Of course they could; hence they could be justified. So presumably the voodooists could legitimately claim they were justified. So premise (2), if we're thinking about justification, is clearly false.
Are we talking internal rationality, rationality "downstream from experience"? Given their experience, is it compatible with proper function that they accept voodooism? That could be so. The voodooists have always been taught their voodoo beliefs are true; all alleged contrary evidence is cleverly explained away by the priests; or perhaps they are all subject to cognitive malfunction "upstream from experience" that skews their doxastic experience. Such voodooists could certainly claim that their beliefs are internally rational. So here premise (2) fails again.
Problems with the first premise
The only option left is warrant. What does it mean to make a legitimate claim to warrant? There are three possibilities: claim truthfully; claim justifiably, and claim warrantedly. Truthfully won't work. If belief in God is truthfully warrant basic, voodoo beliefs might not be. It's possible for theistic belief to be true and voodoo false. What about justifiably? Perhaps if belief in God can be justifiably said to be warrant basic, so can voodoo belief. Again, too easy. Obviously, the voodooists might be justified in thinking voodoo belief is warrant basic. It might just seem obvious to them. So taken, premise (2) fails.
So what about the claim that if belief in God is warrant basic, so is voodoo? If this is the claim, the argument is (1) if the claim that
belief in God is properly basic with respect to warrant has warrant, then for any proposition
p, no matter how bizarre, accepted by some community, if the members of that community were to claim that
p is properly basic with respect to warrant, their claim would itself have warrant; (2) the consequent of (1) is false; therefore the Christian apologist's claim isn't warranted. A problem with this argument is that I don't claim that belief in God and the deliverances of IIHS
do have warrant because in all likelihood they have warrant only if they are true, and I am not arguing that they are in fact true (only that they are possible). I'm prepared to
claim they're true even though I'm not prepared to mount an argument. So let's suppose I'm claiming that belief in God (etc) enjoys warrant. Let's further assume that my claim is legitimate -- that is, the claim indeed has warrant. Would it follow that for any proposition
p, if there were a community of people who endorsed
p, these people would be warranted in believing that
[p is properly basic with respect to warrant for those in their community?
No, it wouldn't. Suppose the IIHS model I've described is true (not just possible). Then (a) Christianity is in fact true, (b) there really are such cognitive processes as the sense of the divine and IIHS, and (c) their deliverances meet the conditions for warrant. Suppose (1) a Christian believes the gospel on the basis of IIHS (etc); (2) he notes further that his belief and that of many others is accepted in the basic way (testimony). (3) He further comes to believe that God intends his children to know him and the gospel, but also that it isn't possible for enough of us to know about him by way of inference from other beliefs; (4) he correctly concludes that God has instituted cognitive processes by which we humans can form these true beliefs in the basic way. (5) He concludes that these cognitive processes are functioning properly when they deliver those beliefs, and are also functioning in a congenial cognitive environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth: that is, his belief, taken in the basic way, has warrant. He thus concludes that these beliefs are properly basic with respect to warrant, drawing this conclusion from beliefs that themselves have warrant; but forming a belief in that way itself meets the conditions for warrant; hence, his belief that theistic belief is properly basic with respect to warrant is itself warranted.
It doesn't follow that the voodooist is also warranted in claiming that voodoo belief is properly basic with respect to warrant. For suppose (1) that voodoo belief is in fact false and (2) that it arose initially in some kind of mistake or confusion, or out of a fearful reaction to natural phenomena. If so, the original voodoo beliefs do not enjoy warrant. Suppose (3) these voodoo beliefs were passed down by way of testimony. Now if a testifier testifies to something that has no warrant for her, then it has no warrant for anyone believing it on just the basis of her testimony.
So consider the voodooist and suppose he accepts voodooism on the basis of testimony and reasons from their truth together with other premises to the conclusion that they are properly basic with respect to warrant. Then his conclusion that voodoo beliefs are warrant-basic will not itself be warranted because it is accepted on the basis of an argument at least one premise of which has no warrant for him. That is because inference is warrant-dependent in the same way as testimony. I believe
p and
q; these logically yield
r;
r will have warrant for me if
p and
q do; but if either
p or
q lacks warrant for me, the same will go for
r. The voodooist is mistaken in holding their voodoo beliefs; therefore his claim that voodoo views are properly basic with respect to warrant is both false and unwarranted.
So it could happen that the views of the Christian are legitimate (warranted) but those of the voodooist, who arrives at his views in a structurally similar way to the Christian, are not. That could be if the central claims of Christianity are in fact true and voodooism false. So it's not true that if the claim that basic belief in God is properly basic with respect to warrant is itself warranted, then any parallel claim is warranted.