Dunemeister manages to think that a belief in Christianity is basic by defining a basic belief as one that need not be either self-evident or necessarily true. Dunemeister is in effect saying that a belief can be basic by virtue of being true, and that in the absence of proof to the contrary, such a belief is rational. I think the flaws in that reasoning are obvious to you.
No, DM is saying that a belief is basic
if it receives warrant (that quantity enough of which elevates a true belief to knowledge) apart from argument. The vast majority of our beliefs have this character. Once again, consider a perceptual belief like "there is a computer there." That belief does not receive any warrant whatsoever by any argument. Rather, the belief receives warrant (and is therefore rational) by virtue of its being produced in a congenial cognitive environment by cognitive faculties functioning properly according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth.
I have further argued that, according to Christianity, belief in the gospel and other major Christian themes arise as a result of the operation of the
sensus divinitatus (sense of the divine) and the holy spirit (what I have referred to as the internal instigation of the holy spirit, or IIHS). This picture is certainly possible (in the broadly logical sense). If Christianity were true, it would receive warrant by IIHS or something very close to it.
IIHS, according to the theory, would be a cognitive process. Its function would be, together with revelation (the bible) and/or preaching, to form beliefs about God and what Jonathan Edwards calls "the great things of the gospel."
It would be a rational process inasmuch as it was a reliable belief-producing process; and since it would involve the activity of God himself, that would be presumed.
And please recall that I have also admitted that even if a belief is basic, it may still be defeasible. I see a sheep in that field about a hundred yards away. I form the belief "there's a sheep in that field" in the basic way. However, you own the field and tell me that there are no sheep in it. Nor are there any sheep in any fields for hundreds of miles. But there is a dog in that field that looks like a sheep. My first basic belief thus loses its warrant. I form a new belief (also in the basic way) based on your testimony: "there is a dog in that field."
The same would apply to beliefs formed by way of IIHS. By way of IIHS I believe that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself. This belief is basic, believed not on the basis of evidence but directly on the basis of the operation of the holy spirit. Subsequently, I come to believe that the whole Christian tradition, including the New Testament documents and their story about Jesus and IIHS, is based on a cleverly concealed (but now revealed) plot. It turns out the whole thing was a complete fabrication. (Perhaps we have uncovered authentic letters written by the apostles where they detail in all seriousness how the plot is to proceed and so forth.) If I believed the stuff about the plot, that would undermine my belief based on IIHS. It would be irrational for me to hold my original belief in the face of such damning information.
Of course, it's not so easy as that. The believer would have to be convinced of the truth of the plot. But if he were so convinced, the belief in the plot would indeed provide a defeater for his Christian belief, and he would no longer be able to rationally hold it (even if, after all, Christianity was in fact true).
So if our question is, "Is it rational to believe in Christianity," the answer must be "That depends." On what? Clearly, on whether it's true. If Christianity (including the story about IIHS) is true, it's rational to believe it, in the absence of defeaters, via IIHS. If it's false, it's probably not rational to believe it because the only way to rationally believe it would be through the use of publicly available information. IIHS would not be available, because since Christianity is false, so is IIHS. Thus one would have to appeal to various arguments (historical, cosmological, teleological, moral, ontological, whatever) to provide evidence for Christianity. Sadly, these arguments, even at their best, and when their collective weight is brought to bear, can't get us much past agnosticism. The objective probability that Christianity is true on these arguments, even if we are enormously generous, is about .5. That's hardly sufficient to make it rational to believe Christianity. The coin may come up heads or tails; it isn't rational for me to BELIEVE it will come up heads.
So the question of Christianity's rationality hinges on the question of its truth. The believer takes herself to have access to the truth of the gospel via IIHS. Clearly, the skeptic demurs. However, the skeptic must admit that it's broadly logically possibe that Christianity is true. So if the skeptic wants to say that the believer is irrational, she must show that Christianity is in fact false.
Skeptics have taken several lines in this respect. Freud, for example, said that Christian belief arises as the result of a cognitive faculty all right, wish fulfillment. But that faculty is not aimed at truth. Its function is to enable survival in the face of a cold, heartless world. Of course, he doesn't argue for this position, he merely assumes it. But if someone could pose a convincing argumen that (a) Christian belief arises by way of wish fulfillment, and (b) wish fulfillment is not aimed at getting true beliefs about God, we'd have ourselves a nifty little defeater for Christianity. So far as I am aware, no argument for this is available in the literature (although many people claim it).
So as you can see, the argument is not as cute (and niftily dismissed) as it is being represented.
