Transcendental Argument for Nonexistence of God

[Meow Mix]

First, let me be clear by what is meant by a "transcendental argument for the nonexistence of God." This isn't an argument that defeats the existence of all possible gods, it's only aimed at a certain conception of God. If someone believes in a god that doesn't possess the qualities that this argument attacks, then it obviously doesn't apply.

Many conceptions of God suppose that God is the creator of all things external to God, that God has control over everything external to God, and furthermore that God isn't contingent on any higher transcendental "truths" than God. My argument (which amplifies the first published transcendental argument for the non-existence of God by Michael Martin) aims to show that God is not the creator of all things external to God, that God does not have control over everything external to God, and that God is contingent on higher transcendental "truths" than God, so that therefore any God attributed with those characteristics can't exist.

1) "God is the creator of all things external to God"

The Law of Identity describes a state of affairs in which something is itself, formulated symbolically as A = A. This state of affairs is both self-evident and incorrigible, which is what epistemologists would call "properly basic," meaning that it's necessarily true because even its negation assumes its efficacy.

For example, if I were to even hypothetically say, "The Law of Identity is false," to what am I referring? The Law of Identity. Is the Law of Identity the Law of Identity? Yes! To even attempt to doubt it, I have to assume its truth -- which is ultimately self-refuting. There are volumes on this subject, but let us just keep in mind for now that identity is incorrigibly true.

Is identity part of God? Well, it's true that God = God (identity), and that God must be either God or not-God (excluded middle), and that God can't be both God and not-God at the same time and in the same respect (noncontradiction), so clearly God exemplifies identity. This doesn't mean identity is part of God though, since every last one of us exemplifies identity.

For example, my name is Erin and I exemplify identity. Erin = Erin, but identity is external to me. Why would I say this? Because if I never existed, things would still be what they are (and they wouldn't be what they aren't). So identity isn't a part of me, it's just an attribute I possess.

If God didn't exist, would identity continue to exist? Yes. Let's say that the proposition "God exists" is represented by the character X.

Is ¬X = ¬X true? Yes, we must agree that it is. Clearly, identity would still function just fine in the absence of God just as it functions in the absence of Erin.

Thus, identity is external to God. This is important because it brings us to the next question: can God create identity?

Consider for a second the absurdity of God trying to create identity. How could God be God in the first place to create identity if identity weren't already inherently true?

If identity is external to God, and God can't create identity, then God didn't create all things external to God. This suggests there is a higher transcendental "truth" than God, and therefore God can't be the highest transcendental reality. (Out the window, all you old and dusty ontological arguments for God!)

2. "God has control over everything external to God"

Does God have control over identity? Even some of the most die-hard theologians would argue that God doesn't. Let's ignore for a second the bizarre cart-before-the-horse ramifications of God controling a higher transcendental "truth" than God and ask:

Can God create a square that is a circle at the same time and in the same respect?
Can God exist and not-exist at the same time and in the same respect?
Can God be absolutely benevolent and absolutely malevolent at the same time and in the same respect?

I think we would have some intersting thinkers on our hands, indeed, if they answered yes to either of these questions.

Furthermore, many theists argue that it's "against God's nature" to be malevolent. For these folks in particular: do you see how saying that God is unable to do something "because of his nature" suggests that God conforms to higher transcendental truths which are outside of the control of God?

Since God is unable to change God's own nature, or to actualize logical contradictions, God is not able to controll all things external to God.

3) "God isn't contingent on any higher transcendental truths"

As I've argued from (1) and (2), this must clearly be the case. God is contingent on higher transcendental states of affairs.

Now this really raises some tough ramifications. For one, any kind of ontological argument for the existence of God that relies on God being "that which nothing greater can be conceived" fail immediately and inherently. This is the most serious consequence of this line of argument, and where I rest my case against such arguments.

Secondly, the three statements that I tackled can't be said to be true of any god. This is far less serious, since any rational theist can go right on believing in a god that's contingent on higher transcendental truths.

However, this really raises the most hair-raising question: if God wasn't necessary to cause identity, then we have at least one non-God thing that exists independently of God's creation that even theists must logically admit given the argument is sound. There goes theistic arguments that God is necessary to explain any non-God existence at all! While it doesn't follow from the argument, it does set the stage for the question: why should we assume the existence of the material universe must be explained as "created" or "beginning" in the first place?

You decide.

------------------------
EDIT: Oh yeah, PS. I forgot to mention that this argument also undercuts the basis for the Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God. Whoops! Tiny oversight.

 

[sandandfoam]

Does your identity exist or is it merely a social construction?
I see human beings as embodying identities, multiple and contradictory. I suggest identity is a phantom rather than a reality

 

[Mister Emu]

From Argument 1

Consider for a second the absurdity of God trying to create identity. How could God be God in the first place to create identity if identity weren't already inherently true?

This arguement raises a couple of questions right in my mind...

In what sense does a concept actually exist as a thing in and of itself? Would identity exist without a something to identify? Or is identity an aspect of things that exist.

And secondly, how coherent is the concept of identity if there is only one "thing" in existence. What meaning has the statement God = God if there is no "not God" to compare God to; if the only thing to put after, or before for the matter, the = is God. Could not it be said that by creating the other that God brought identity into existence?

From Argument 2

Since God is unable to change God's own nature, or to actualize logical contradictions

We should not assume that when it is said that God is unable to do because of His nature that it is the result of an external constraint instead of an internal one. Even if we assume that God cannot change His nature, we need not assume this inability results from something outside of God, for God could have limited His own ability, and thus the statement that God is able to control all things external to God remains intact.

Secondly, perhaps it is possible that God could create something that is both A and not-A, a logical contradiction... that we(humans) cannot conceptualize that which is inconceivable to the human mind, besides being somewhat of a tautology, could merely be an argument for our limitations and not God's.

 

[Mr Cheese]

“Most people think that God is infinite. But that is incorrect. The infinite is that which goes on and on in space. However, God created space and is therefore not bound to the laws and limitation of space. If we describe God as infinite, what we really mean is that God is spaceless. Infinite is the opposite of finite, while spaceless means ‘free from the limitations of space.’ The One who is spaceless is free to be both beyond space and within space simultaneously. Therefore, God is beyond this finite world and yet God completely inheres every inch of the earth.


Most people think that God is eternal. But that is incorrect. Eternity would be that which goes on and on in time. But God created time and is therefore not confined to the limitations of time. If we describe God as eternal, what we really mean is that God is timeless. The eternal is the opposite of the temporal, while timeless means ‘free of the limitations of time.’ The One who is timeless is free to be both beyond time and within time at the same time. Therefore, God is both beyond time and yet within every moment, completely lifting it with His entire presence.


And when we say that God is One, we really mean that God is nondual. One is limited; it is the opposite of many. But nonduality is free of the confines of one or many. Nonduality is free to be beyond the many and within the many. Therefore, God is beyond you, me, and everyone else in this world, and yet also within us.
How can the unlimited be expressed within the limited? How can the unlimited God be expressed within time, space, and finite beings?


If the unlimited could not be expressed within the limited, then that would be a limitation. Ultimate freedom must include the freedom to choose to be restricted. Otherwise freedom wouldn’t be free, it would imply a limitation of choices—you could not choose to be restricted and limited.


This is the meaning of the kabbalistic principle called the tzimtzum—the divine self-restriction. Kabbalah says that God withdrew His Endless Light in order to create a place for time, space, and finite beings. God then filled time, space, and the diversity of beings with a restricted light so as not to overwhelm His creation and obliterate its existence.


Therefore, according to Kabbalah, God is free to be both beyond time and within each moment, beyond space and within every inch, beond multiplicity and within billions of finite human beings. God is free to be manifest as one hundred percent transcendent and yet also one hundred percent immanent.”

—David Aaron (The Secret Life of God: Discovering the Divine within You )

 

[Meow Mix]

Does your identity exist or is it merely a social construction?
I see human beings as embodying identities, multiple and contradictory. I suggest identity is a phantom rather than a reality

That's equivocating two different contexts of the word "identity," an unfortunate side effect of English re-using words for different contexts.

In my post I'm using "identity" in the logical sense, the state of affairs that things are what they are; not in the sense of a social identity.

 

[Meow Mix]

From Argument 1

This arguement raises a couple of questions right in my mind...

In what sense does a concept actually exist as a thing in and of itself? Would identity exist without a something to identify? Or is identity an aspect of things that exist.

That's a fair question that I forgot to address.

For one thing, identity isn't necessarily conceptual. To be immaterial doesn't necessarily equate to being a concept. Next, identity has itself to identify even in the absense of anything else.

Let's say that P is "the existence of everything."

What happens with the proposition ¬P? It actually refutes itself, since ¬P = ¬P (otherwise it could become the existence of everything rather than the nonexistence of everything). If ¬P = ¬P then even the absence of everything shows the efficacy of identity, which contradicts our original notion of ¬P.

In plain english, let's suppose for a moment that nothing exists. Is nothing able to be nothing and something at the same time and in the same respect (noncontradiction)? Must there be either nothing, or something (excluded middle)? Even without anything to describe identity is efficacious. Why would this be?

Well, for one thing identity is self-evident and incorrigible, so it must exist as a state of affairs -- so in fact posing "nothing exists" is a nonsensical statement considering that even the absence of anything exemplifies identity. A more proper statement would be "the absence of anything besides identity exemplifies identity," so that we don't have a self-contradiction. There's no way around identity "existing" even if material objects or immaterial "objects" (like God or the number two) don't exist. As a side note, I don't think it's possible for certain immaterial "objects" like the number two not to exist either. Call me a neo-Platonist like Gödel.

And secondly, how coherent is the concept of identity if there is only one "thing" in existence. What meaning has the statement God = God if there is no "not God" to compare God to; if the only thing to put after, or before for the matter, the = is God. Could not it be said that by creating the other that God brought identity into existence?

Even if God is the only thing in existence, God has certain limitations. Identity is essentially another word for limitations. God is limited from being wholly a pink unicorn, since God is God. God is limited from being a square-circle. Pink unicorns and square-circles don't have to exist in actuality for God to be limited from being them, so yes, identity is efficacious even if one thing exists.

From Argument 2

We should not assume that when it is said that God is unable to do because of His nature that it is the result of an external constraint instead of an internal one. Even if we assume that God cannot change His nature, we need not assume this inability results from something outside of God, for God could have limited His own ability, and thus the statement that God is able to control all things external to God remains intact.

Secondly, perhaps it is possible that God could create something that is both A and not-A, a logical contradiction... that we(humans) cannot conceptualize that which is inconceivable to the human mind, besides being somewhat of a tautology, could merely be an argument for our limitations and not God's.

However, you've just contradicted yourself so what was said doesn't actually mean anything. I mean that in a polite way of course!

Saying "Maybe God can violate identity" is equivalent to saying "Maybe identity is false," which as I pointed out in my argument is inherently self-refuting. No human being can even make that suggestion because it has a necessarily false antecedent.

"If the number two were odd, then it would be a horse," Alvin Plantinga told me in one of our correspondences.

 

[Baydwin]

That was an interesting read, although formal logic and semantics have never been my strong point so I had to read it several times.

I guess my only objection to the argument is that it is inherently limited (and it could be no other way) because of the nature of human beings and the physical universe in which we exist. Trying to form arguments of this type about god, whilst fun, can only really serve to demonstrate the limitations of our reasoning.

I'd liken it to a fish living in a pond. The fish only has access to a specific environment containing certain elements, it can speculate on the world above the surface, but it can only do so using what it knows and all it knows is the pond.

To bring it back to your OP, you speak of god being limited by logical contradictions, like the square-circle. But what the argument fails to take into account is that this logic holds true only for our universe. Add an extra dimension of time and a couple of extra spatial dimensions and you've got your object that is both a square and a circle. Place the object in our universe which lacks the physical laws to express such an entity and we'd no doubt see it as alternating between the two states, one moment a square, the next a circle. It's not a limit of god or the object, but a limit of our universe and thus of our ability to observe and perceive.

On the other hand I agree with some of the arguments. If I believed in an interventionist god then I would agree that she'd be limited on what she could do in our universe, due to the nature of that universe.

As for the identity argument, from my point of view I would say that god is the only "thing" that lacks an inherent identity. I can give her one, I can create an image in my mind, call it god and thus form an entity that has identity. But without going through that process, I wouldn't say god exists in a sense that one could ever pin down and say "that is god". I say this principally because I believe in a god that is less an extant entity as she is chaotic potentiality, and thus is without an intrinsic substance that we would recognise.

Perhaps this god concept isn't one that you would deem the argument applicable too, nevertheless I'd say that I agree with the three statements, which is why I've replied.

 

[no-body]

Does your identity exist or is it merely a social construction?
I see human beings as embodying identities, multiple and contradictory. I suggest identity is a phantom rather than a reality

Exactly. Our idea of what we are and what we really are, are two separate things. As social creatures we come to think as the most popular images as "truth"

You can say this about God or a Tree. It is interesting to talk about and try to define it on a mental level, but that is not where you will see God. It must be felt and experienced firsthand.

Whether these experiences are Yahweh, Allah, Krishna, Delusion, Mental illness, Nirvana, etc don't really mater. When you try to categorize it you leave the spiritual.

 

[Meow Mix]

That was an interesting read, although formal logic and semantics have never been my strong point so I had to read it several times.

I guess my only objection to the argument is that it is inherently limited (and it could be no other way) because of the nature of human beings and the physical universe in which we exist. Trying to form arguments of this type about god, whilst fun, can only really serve to demonstrate the limitations of our reasoning.

I'd liken it to a fish living in a pond. The fish only has access to a specific environment containing certain elements, it can speculate on the world above the surface, but it can only do so using what it knows and all it knows is the pond.

To bring it back to your OP, you speak of god being limited by logical contradictions, like the square-circle. But what the argument fails to take into account is that this logic holds true only for our universe. Add an extra dimension of time and a couple of extra spatial dimensions and you've got your object that is both a square and a circle. Place the object in our universe which lacks the physical laws to express such an entity and we'd no doubt see it as alternating between the two states, one moment a square, the next a circle. It's not a limit of god or the object, but a limit of our universe and thus of our ability to observe and perceive.

Hello! I understand the point you're trying to make here, but the example you gave wouldn't be an example of a square-circle because it isn't a square and a circle at the same time and in the same respect. That's why I made very sure to type those two qualifications in my argument: it's not possible in any world for X to be ¬X at the same time and in the same respect.

For instance, let's say that I stick a straw in water. It would appear to be disjointed where the waterline is, so my visual senses would tell me "the straw is separated." If I touched it though, I would feel that the straw was indeed straight even though it looked disjointed.

Is this a contradiction? Not truly -- it may be (to my senses) disjointed and straight at the same time, but not in the same respect. Your example is similar to the straw example in which something appears to be two contradictory things at the same time, but not in the same respect.

It isn't just that our experience is limited or that our universe doesn't contain all possibilities (which are both true). It's that it really is impossible for X to be ¬X at the same time and in the same respect in any universe. This is what's meant by "logically possible universes."

It's logically possible for there to be a universe where my keyboard is pink or even where my keyboard floats in the air, but it's not logically possible (read: not possible at all) for there to be a universe where my keyboard is a horse and a keyboard at the same time and in the same respect.

On the other hand I agree with some of the arguments. If I believed in an interventionist god then I would agree that she'd be limited on what she could do in our universe, due to the nature of that universe.

As for the identity argument, from my point of view I would say that god is the only "thing" that lacks an inherent identity. I can give her one, I can create an image in my mind, call it god and thus form an entity that has identity. But without going through that process, I wouldn't say god exists in a sense that one could ever pin down and say "that is god". I say this principally because I believe in a god that is less an extant entity as she is chaotic potentiality, and thus is without an intrinsic substance that we would recognise.

However, this is again equivocation between two contexts of the word "identity." There is an "identity" that we associate with things to label them, but logical identity is the idea that something is what it is and not something else.

Whatever God is, God must be God and not something else (or else it clearly wouldn't be God). We don't have to know what God is in order to assert, absolutely, that God is itself and not something else. This is what logical identity is.

Perhaps this god concept isn't one that you would deem the argument applicable too, nevertheless I'd say that I agree with the three statements, which is why I've replied.

I appreciate the reply, and look forward to seeing you around!

 

[Meow Mix]

Exactly. Our idea of what we are and what we really are, are two separate things. As social creatures we come to think as the most popular images as "truth"

You can say this about God or a Tree. It is interesting to talk about and try to define it on a mental level, but that is not where you will see God. It must be felt and experienced firsthand.

Whether these experiences are Yahweh, Allah, Krishna, Delusion, Mental illness, Nirvana, etc don't really mater. When you try to categorize it you leave the spiritual.

What is meant by "the spiritual" though? This post is a logical examination, not a mystical one. Is that necessarily negative, in your view?

 

[YmirGF]

Sadly, your argument wouldn't make the slightest bit of difference to a believer in said god(s). The downside of logic is that is ignores the emotional side of the human animal which is not especially logical.

 

[Baydwin]

Hello! I understand the point you're trying to make here, but the example you gave wouldn't be an example of a square-circle because it isn't a square and a circle at the same time and in the same respect. That's why I made very sure to type those two qualifications in my argument: it's not possible in any world for X to be ¬X at the same time and in the same respect.

For instance, let's say that I stick a straw in water. It would appear to be disjointed where the waterline is, so my visual senses would tell me "the straw is separated." If I touched it though, I would feel that the straw was indeed straight even though it looked disjointed.

Is this a contradiction? Not truly -- it may be (to my senses) disjointed and straight at the same time, but not in the same respect. Your example is similar to the straw example in which something appears to be two contradictory things at the same time, but not in the same respect.

It isn't just that our experience is limited or that our universe doesn't contain all possibilities (which are both true). It's that it really is impossible for X to be ¬X at the same time and in the same respect in any universe. This is what's meant by "logically possible universes."

It's logically possible for there to be a universe where my keyboard is pink or even where my keyboard floats in the air, but it's not logically possible (read: not possible at all) for there to be a universe where my keyboard is a horse and a keyboard at the same time and in the same respect.

This makes my brain hurt a little . I think get what your saying, but I'd still like to give another go at explaining my idea, because I'm not too sure I fully get what you mean by "the same respect".

Going back to my multi-dimensional object, I would agree with you that when placed in our universe, it couldn't be both a square and a circle at the same time, it would need to alternate from one form to another. But, what about this;

If we imagine a universe like ours with three dimensions of space and a dimension of time moving forward, the arrow of time. If we then imagine that this universe also has a dimension of time that instead of being horizontal, like the arrow, is vertical. Imagine temporal layers stacked one on top of another (in time, but not in space). In that universe an object could be a circle in one temporal layer, and a square on the layer above it. It would occupy a single point in three-dimensional space and a single moment on the arrow of time, but because of the extra dimension of time it would at that point exist both as a circle and a square, it wouldn't be more circle than square or vice versa, it would just be a single object. Like, and I'm not sure of my analogy here, a square is still a square even if it's one face of a cube, but the cube and the square are one object, not two. You can't remove the square without destroying the cube.

However, this is again equivocation between two contexts of the word "identity." There is an "identity" that we associate with things to label them, but logical identity is the idea that something is what it is and not something else.

Whatever God is, God must be God and not something else (or else it clearly wouldn't be God). We don't have to know what God is in order to assert, absolutely, that God is itself and not something else. This is what logical identity is.

I thought you might say that . But what if god isn't god?

What I was trying to say, although perhaps not that well, is that perhaps our images of god have their own inherent identity, but that if they exist only in our subjective minds they might only have identity in those subjective forms, but not necessarily beyond those forms. So, Allah is Allah and can't be anything else, same with Jesus and Krishna etc, but that may be the limit of their identity. So when we think of god, it could be that only the thought has identity, not the subject of the thought.

Put another way, if the objective reality upon which we affix our image of god isn't actually a fixed object and lacks inherent form or existence, can it be said to have identity?
For example, I have a tree in my back garden that has the potential to fall down at any point (although I'm hoping it won't). The idea in my mind could be said to possess identity, it's the concept of a falling tree. But can the potential itself actually possess identity? It isn't something that has nor necessarily will happen, it's a possibility, a scenario, that in the real world has no objective existence of it's own. Or am I still not grasping the distinction between the two uses of the word?

I appreciate the reply, and look forward to seeing you around!

And I you, even if your threads give me brainache.

 

[no-body]

What is meant by "the spiritual" though? This post is a logical examination, not a mystical one. Is that necessarily negative, in your view?

It is neither positive nor negative. I was only pointing out that a logical examination of God is impossible because it is based on first hand experience like all mystical experiences.

 

[Meow Mix]

This makes my brain hurt a little . I think get what your saying, but I'd still like to give another go at explaining my idea, because I'm not too sure I fully get what you mean by "the same respect".

Going back to my multi-dimensional object, I would agree with you that when placed in our universe, it couldn't be both a square and a circle at the same time, it would need to alternate from one form to another. But, what about this;

If we imagine a universe like ours with three dimensions of space and a dimension of time moving forward, the arrow of time. If we then imagine that this universe also has a dimension of time that instead of being horizontal, like the arrow, is vertical. Imagine temporal layers stacked one on top of another (in time, but not in space). In that universe an object could be a circle in one temporal layer, and a square on the layer above it. It would occupy a single point in three-dimensional space and a single moment on the arrow of time, but because of the extra dimension of time it would at that point exist both as a circle and a square, it wouldn't be more circle than square or vice versa, it would just be a single object. Like, and I'm not sure of my analogy here, a square is still a square even if it's one face of a cube, but the cube and the square are one object, not two. You can't remove the square without destroying the cube.

I love your analogy, you're obviously well read and a deep thinker. I probably couldn't count on both hands how many people I know who have any kind of understanding of multiple temporal dimensions. However, this would still not be an example of being X and ¬X in the same respect.

The reason why is because in this scenario we have five dimensions to describe an object's location: <x, y, z, t1, t2>

If we have a square at <0, 0, 0, 1, 0> (arbitrary units)
and a circle at <0, 0, 0, 0, 1>

Then we don't have an instance of something being itself yet something else in the same respect (though an observer in the spatial planes would see two objects at the same time); what we actually have is two distinct objects with different spacetime coordinates.

Interestingly, I had the pleasure of reading a paper by a grad student who didn't realize that by using a certain transform from gauge theory that his results were in six dimensions -- <x, y, z, t1, t2, t3>. Whoops!

I thought you might say that . But what if god isn't god?

What I was trying to say, although perhaps not that well, is that perhaps our images of god have their own inherent identity, but that if they exist only in our subjective minds they might only have identity in those subjective forms, but not necessarily beyond those forms. So, Allah is Allah and can't be anything else, same with Jesus and Krishna etc, but that may be the limit of their identity. So when we think of god, it could be that only the thought has identity, not the subject of the thought.

Well certainly our conceptions of God have identities, but it must also be the case that God = God even if our conceptions of the deity (or deities) is inaccurate. For instance, if I see a mirage and mistakenly believe that I see an oasis (oasis = oasis in my mind), but it's in reality just the refraction of light in the air, then it's still the case that "the refraction of light in the air = the refraction of light in the air" regardless of whether or not I'm aware of what it actually is.

To exist is to exist as something, to exist as something is to be that thing and not something else, and to be that thing is that thing's identity.

If God isn't God, then there is no God. So, if God exists, then God exists as itself and not something else.

Put another way, if the objective reality upon which we affix our image of god isn't actually a fixed object and lacks inherent form or existence, can it be said to have identity?

It can't be said to exist if it lacks identity, so we'd be talking about nothing, not a god.

For example, I have a tree in my back garden that has the potential to fall down at any point (although I'm hoping it won't). The idea in my mind could be said to possess identity, it's the concept of a falling tree. But can the potential itself actually possess identity? It isn't something that has nor necessarily will happen, it's a possibility, a scenario, that in the real world has no objective existence of it's own. Or am I still not grasping the distinction between the two uses of the word?


And I you, even if your threads give me brainache.

Yes, it can be said that a potential has an identity. "The capacity for the tree to fall" is still "the capacity for the tree to fall," and is distinct from the capacity for the tree to explode, or to be home to squirrels, or to shoot off into the sky like a rocket. Each capacity is limited to what it is, and can't be what it isn't.

 

[Baydwin]

I love your analogy, you're obviously well read and a deep thinker. I probably couldn't count on both hands how many people I know who have any kind of understanding of multiple temporal dimensions. However, this would still not be an example of being X and ¬X in the same respect.

The reason why is because in this scenario we have five dimensions to describe an object's location: <x, y, z, t1, t2>

If we have a square at <0, 0, 0, 1, 0> (arbitrary units)
and a circle at <0, 0, 0, 0, 1>

Then we don't have an instance of something being itself yet something else in the same respect (though an observer in the spatial planes would see two objects at the same time); what we actually have is two distinct objects with different spacetime coordinates.

Interestingly, I had the pleasure of reading a paper by a grad student who didn't realize that by using a certain transform from gauge theory that his results were in six dimensions -- <x, y, z, t1, t2, t3>. Whoops!

Heh, ok. I think I'm going to have to yield to you on this one, things are just zipping straight over my head now.

Well certainly our conceptions of God have identities, but it must also be the case that God = God even if our conceptions of the deity (or deities) is inaccurate. For instance, if I see a mirage and mistakenly believe that I see an oasis (oasis = oasis in my mind), but it's in reality just the refraction of light in the air, then it's still the case that "the refraction of light in the air = the refraction of light in the air" regardless of whether or not I'm aware of what it actually is.

To exist is to exist as something, to exist as something is to be that thing and not something else, and to be that thing is that thing's identity.

If God isn't God, then there is no God. So, if God exists, then God exists as itself and not something else.

You know, I see the truth in this, it's obviously true.
However, there is something that's bugging me, and please be patient if this is patently stupid, I'm out of my comfort zone.

Ok, so God = God which means that it's true to say that Baydwin = Baydwin.

Now, if I'm in the kitchen doing the dishes and 10 minutes later go into the garden, we have one object moving from one location to another and so it's logical identity appears intact.
However, step outside of time for a moment and we see two Baydwins, we have Kitchen Baydwin and Garden Baydwin.

Applying logical identity to this situation we have two distinct objects, Kitchen Baydwin = Kitchen Baydwin and the same is true for Garden Baydwin. Kitchen Baydwin can't leave the kitchen and remain Kitchen Baydwin, yet along the arrow of time it must do for Garden Baydwin to exist.
The distinction becomes more pronounced the further we move the two points apart along the arrow, four year old Baydwin is the same human being as 27 year old Baydwin, but the two Baydwins exist in different times, places, and are composed of different atoms.

Therefore, to say that Baydwin = Baydwin is an abstract concept without an inherent existence of it's own. For a Baydwin to possess logical identity it needs to be pinned down to specific coordinates in time and space, like with my square-circle. The abstract concept of "Baydwin" is actually composed of billions(?) of distinct objects each with their own spacetime coordinates.

So, if I haven't made some silly error in my thinking, Baydwin = Baydwin is essentially a meaningless statement with no real-world application.
Thus, god, who most religions believe occupies a region outside of spacetime, cannot be pinned down and so cannot have an inherent logical identity.

(I can already here the sound of ripping and tearing )

It can't be said to exist if it lacks identity, so we'd be talking about nothing, not a god.

I'd say "nothing" in the sense that we understand the distinction between nothing and something, but that leads us into realms of belief rather than meaningful reasoning.

 

[Troublemane]

Without getting into the whole argument whether God exists or not, just wanted to point out that in Non-Euclidean space a square can become indistinguishable from a circle. Thats all, carry on, ill keep watching. Fun thread! :trampo:

 

[cottage]

First, let me be clear by what is meant by a "transcendental argument for the nonexistence of God." This isn't an argument that defeats the existence of all possible gods, it's only aimed at a certain conception of God. If someone believes in a god that doesn't possess the qualities that this argument attacks, then it obviously doesn't apply.

Many conceptions of God suppose that God is the creator of all things external to God, that God has control over everything external to God, and furthermore that God isn't contingent on any higher transcendental "truths" than God. My argument (which amplifies the first published transcendental argument for the non-existence of God by Michael Martin) aims to show that God is not the creator of all things external to God, that God does not have control over everything external to God, and that God is contingent on higher transcendental "truths" than God, so that therefore any God attributed with those characteristics can't exist.

1) "God is the creator of all things external to God"

The Law of Identity describes a state of affairs in which something is itself, formulated symbolically as A = A. This state of affairs is both self-evident and incorrigible, which is what epistemologists would call "properly basic," meaning that it's necessarily true because even its negation assumes its efficacy.

For example, if I were to even hypothetically say, "The Law of Identity is false," to what am I referring? The Law of Identity. Is the Law of Identity the Law of Identity? Yes! To even attempt to doubt it, I have to assume its truth -- which is ultimately self-refuting. There are volumes on this subject, but let us just keep in mind for now that identity is incorrigibly true.

Is identity part of God? Well, it's true that God = God (identity), and that God must be either God or not-God (excluded middle), and that God can't be both God and not-God at the same time and in the same respect (noncontradiction), so clearly God exemplifies identity. This doesn't mean identity is part of God though, since every last one of us exemplifies identity.

For example, my name is Erin and I exemplify identity. Erin = Erin, but identity is external to me. Why would I say this? Because if I never existed, things would still be what they are (and they wouldn't be what they aren't). So identity isn't a part of me, it's just an attribute I possess.

If God didn't exist, would identity continue to exist? Yes. Let's say that the proposition "God exists" is represented by the character X.

Is ¬X = ¬X true? Yes, we must agree that it is. Clearly, identity would still function just fine in the absence of God just as it functions in the absence of Erin.

Thus, identity is external to God. This is important because it brings us to the next question: can God create identity?

Consider for a second the absurdity of God trying to create identity. How could God be God in the first place to create identity if identity weren't already inherently true?

If identity is external to God, and God can't create identity, then God didn't create all things external to God. This suggests there is a higher transcendental "truth" than God, and therefore God can't be the highest transcendental reality. (Out the window, all you old and dusty ontological arguments for God!)

2. "God has control over everything external to God"

Does God have control over identity? Even some of the most die-hard theologians would argue that God doesn't. Let's ignore for a second the bizarre cart-before-the-horse ramifications of God controling a higher transcendental "truth" than God and ask:

Can God create a square that is a circle at the same time and in the same respect?
Can God exist and not-exist at the same time and in the same respect?
Can God be absolutely benevolent and absolutely malevolent at the same time and in the same respect?

I think we would have some intersting thinkers on our hands, indeed, if they answered yes to either of these questions.

Furthermore, many theists argue that it's "against God's nature" to be malevolent. For these folks in particular: do you see how saying that God is unable to do something "because of his nature" suggests that God conforms to higher transcendental truths which are outside of the control of God?

Since God is unable to change God's own nature, or to actualize logical contradictions, God is not able to controll all things external to God.

3) "God isn't contingent on any higher transcendental truths"

As I've argued from (1) and (2), this must clearly be the case. God is contingent on higher transcendental states of affairs.

Now this really raises some tough ramifications. For one, any kind of ontological argument for the existence of God that relies on God being "that which nothing greater can be conceived" fail immediately and inherently. This is the most serious consequence of this line of argument, and where I rest my case against such arguments.

Secondly, the three statements that I tackled can't be said to be true of any god. This is far less serious, since any rational theist can go right on believing in a god that's contingent on higher transcendental truths.

However, this really raises the most hair-raising question: if God wasn't necessary to cause identity, then we have at least one non-God thing that exists independently of God's creation that even theists must logically admit given the argument is sound. There goes theistic arguments that God is necessary to explain any non-God existence at all! While it doesn't follow from the argument, it does set the stage for the question: why should we assume the existence of the material universe must be explained as "created" or "beginning" in the first place?

You decide.

The argument (in a highly compressed form) appears to be that if the laws of thought are external to God then God is contingent upon them, which is a contradiction. I must agree, of course. But then you refer to the principle of identity (p = p) and argue that this is not exclusive to God, but merely an attribute, which may be applied to the rest of us. But God’s identity is necessary. God = God is not the same as Erin = Erin. Erin is contingent, and might or might not exist, but God is necessary. We can annihilate Erin and Cottage in thought, and with no contradiction, but we cannot conceive of a necessarily existent object not existing. I contend that God is the laws of thought, that we have such because of God, not in spite of him. Everything must follow from God’s necessary existence (the ens realissimum). In other words, if there is no Absolutely Necessary Being then there can be nothing existent. Laws of thought cannot exist independent of the mind that articulates them, and minds are contingent. I propose, therefore, that such principles are necessarily part of God’s identity, and not external to it.

(I should explain that when I speak of ‘God’ I’m not speaking about a specific, worshipful deity. I’m identifying the concept of Supreme Being, which may be applied to any self-existent entity, the universe not excepted.)

 

[Meow Mix]

Now, if I'm in the kitchen doing the dishes and 10 minutes later go into the garden, we have one object moving from one location to another and so it's logical identity appears intact.
However, step outside of time for a moment and we see two Baydwins, we have Kitchen Baydwin and Garden Baydwin.

Applying logical identity to this situation we have two distinct objects, Kitchen Baydwin = Kitchen Baydwin and the same is true for Garden Baydwin. Kitchen Baydwin can't leave the kitchen and remain Kitchen Baydwin, yet along the arrow of time it must do for Garden Baydwin to exist.
The distinction becomes more pronounced the further we move the two points apart along the arrow, four year old Baydwin is the same human being as 27 year old Baydwin, but the two Baydwins exist in different times, places, and are composed of different atoms.

Therefore, to say that Baydwin = Baydwin is an abstract concept without an inherent existence of it's own. For a Baydwin to possess logical identity it needs to be pinned down to specific coordinates in time and space, like with my square-circle. The abstract concept of "Baydwin" is actually composed of billions(?) of distinct objects each with their own spacetime coordinates.

So, if I haven't made some silly error in my thinking, Baydwin = Baydwin is essentially a meaningless statement with no real-world application.
Thus, god, who most religions believe occupies a region outside of spacetime, cannot be pinned down and so cannot have an inherent logical identity.

(I can already here the sound of ripping and tearing )


I'd say "nothing" in the sense that we understand the distinction between nothing and something, but that leads us into realms of belief rather than meaningful reasoning.

I know this response is moooooonths later, I just sort of fell away from the website. I'm terribly unemployed at the moment, though, so I guess I'm back!

Now, to address your point. You don't give yourself enough credit; even if you're not familiar with the subject matter you've raised objections and points that philosophy students struggle with -- and in this case you imagined them on your own, which is impressive. If analytical philosophy isn't your field you should consider it at least as a hobby.

It's true that Garden Baydwin =/= Kitchen Baydwin. This is actually the equivalent of an old paradox: Archimedes' Ship. Suppose that Archimedes has a brand new ship anchored at a port next to his buddy... uh... Billy's ship. (lol). Billy is a terrible sailor, so he keeps damaging his ship; but he can't afford to make repairs.

Archimedes, being the nice gentleman that he is, and since he has access to new components, offers parts of his own ship to Billy to use on his ship. So, Archimedes takes off a few boards from his ship and transfers them to Billy's ship and orders some new boards. (I think you can see where this is going, so I'll skip the theatrics). Over time, and because Billy is really an awful sailor, eventually every single component of Billy's ship has been replaced by Archimedes' ship's parts.

Now the question is: is Billy's ship actually Archimedes' ship now, parked in Billy's port rather than in Archimedes'? Is the identity of the ship defined by the parts it's made out of, by socially agreed ownership, or something else?

It's somewhat related to another greek paradox: if you put a grain of sand on a table you have a grain of sand; if you put two then you have a pair; but at what point is it a "heap" of sand? Whence comes its identity as a "heap?"

The problems ignore a few basic components of idendity: one, that identity is instantaneous (not temporal, though we do assign temporal identities those are more social conventions than logical ones). Even Kitchen Baydwin is not exactly the same at t = 2 as opposed to t = 1 due to losing skin flakes, quantum state fluctuations, etc. So, we can't say that "Baydwin at t1 = Baydwin at t2." But notice that it doesn't look like the symbolism for identity anymore: identity is A = A, not A1 = A2. Identity is that at any given timesomething is what it is. And that is enough for it to be a transcendental "rule" that even the gods must follow, lest they stop being themselves!

 

[Tathagata]

Does your identity exist or is it merely a social construction?
I see human beings as embodying identities, multiple and contradictory. I suggest identity is a phantom rather than a reality

Are you serious?? She was clearly referring to identity in the logical sense, not the social sense of the word.

She stated: "The Law of Identity describes a state of affairs in which something is itself, formulated symbolically as A = A. This state of affairs is both self-evident and incorrigible, which is what epistemologists would call "properly basic," meaning that it's necessarily true because even its negation assumes its efficacy."


.

 

[Meow Mix]

The argument (in a highly compressed form) appears to be that if the laws of thought are external to God then God is contingent upon them, which is a contradiction. I must agree, of course. But then you refer to the principle of identity (p = p) and argue that this is not exclusive to God, but merely an attribute, which may be applied to the rest of us. But God’s identity is necessary. God = God is not the same as Erin = Erin. Erin is contingent, and might or might not exist, but God is necessary. We can annihilate Erin and Cottage in thought, and with no contradiction, but we cannot conceive of a necessarily existent object not existing. I contend that God is the laws of thought, that we have such because of God, not in spite of him. Everything must follow from God’s necessary existence (the ens realissimum). In other words, if there is no Absolutely Necessary Being then there can be nothing existent. Laws of thought cannot exist independent of the mind that articulates them, and minds are contingent. I propose, therefore, that such principles are necessarily part of God’s identity, and not external to it.

(I should explain that when I speak of ‘God’ I’m not speaking about a specific, worshipful deity. I’m identifying the concept of Supreme Being, which may be applied to any self-existent entity, the universe not excepted.)

If you assert that God is ontologically necessary you'd need to establish that, though -- and my argument will make that more difficult. It doesn't much make sense to me to say that God "is" identity since nothing about identity implies a creator being.

As for your assertion that laws of thought can't exist independent of the mind that articulates them, I disagree. To quote Einstein, "Do you really believe the moon isn't there if you're not looking at it?" Even in the absence of any minds whatsoever, things would still be what they are (and not what they aren't) even if no one was around to write down that state of affairs as "A = A."

Again, I know what you mean when you're saying that God could just be any ontologically necessary thing (which identity is, by the way)... but I've never understood the concept of calling something which is not a creator being a "god." It just doesn't make sense to me. Might as well call a lamp or a sock "God."