Could you explain this further?
Immaterial things aren't necessarily conceptual if they exist externally to minds. For instance, if there were no minds but a universe, then there would still be a universe... it would still have X number of stars even if no one counted them, and those stars would still be what they are even if no one could describe the state of affairs of something being what it is.
Consider a configuration space, which is like a pocket universe with only a few things in it: let's talk about a 3-point configuration space as if it were real. This means only 3 Euclidean points exist in this thought experiment. If that were what existed and no minds were around to conceive it, it would still be true that there were "three" points (even without a word for it); it would still be true that there were 180 degrees total between the points (even without anyone to define what an "angle" is), and so on.
Minds don't create identity and maths, they just describe them using words and symbols. We do create the words and symbols, but that which we're describing is external to our minds and thus not conceptual. "Concepts" are limited to minds... an example of a true concept would be mathematical syntax (1 + 1 = 2... the symbols and arrangement of symbols, not the mathematical objects that we name "one" and "two") or the qualia (the experience of seeing red or smelling the scent of baked cookies).
Of course this would assume the existence of identity.
Not an assumption, a tautology.
Maybe I'm being contrarian, but it seems a little off to lable nothingness. By labeling it you turn it into a thing. Also, by labeling it notP(sorry, don't know that fancy symbol
), you are assuming P exists for nothingness to possibly be. In the absence of anything there is nothing to be.
I only label it because it's convenient. Ultimately the question comes down to whether nothingness can be somethingness.
If it can't -- notice that word,
can't -- then it has a limitation, which is identity.
If it can be somethingness, then it isn't nothingness at all, is it? Yet therein lies the contradiction.
If nothingness
can't be somethingness, then it has identity, which is something.
If nothingness can be somethingness, then it was never "nothingness" in the first place.
Therefore true "nothingness" is impossible since even then identity necessarily exists -- which makes sense, considering it's an incorrigible tautology.
See... I'm not sure I agree with that. How can the idea of two exist without multiple objects, or the concept of multiple objects, for which it to describe?
Here's how: suppose there is only a mind that exists. That mind can think about nothing. It can then think about thinking about nothing. It can then think about thinking about thinking about nothing.
With maths, I'm just describing essentially the ability of the null set, Ø, to give existence to all of mathematics.
As a quick primer, a set is just a category of mathematical objects... the set of all even numbers is {2,4,6,8,...} and the set of all even numbers between 4 and 10 is {4,6,8,10} and so on. There is an empty set, { } (also described with the symbol Ø) which is nothing. Thinking about nothing is Ø, and thinking about thinking about nothing is the set that contains the null set {Ø}. Thinking about thinking about thinking about nothing is the set that contains the set that contains the null set {{Ø}}.
Suddenly -- from nothing -- there are things to count which are wholly immaterial!
It can go on and on... you can also have the set of those sets in sequential order, which would look like {{Ø}, Ø} and the set after that {{{Ø}, Ø}, {Ø}, Ø} and so on... once you have things to count, all of mathematics follows -- from nothing! (Nothing material anyway)
I think you've strengthened my argument. You describe identity as a limitation in relation to the other. In the absence of the other, where does that leave identity? If there is nothing else to be, what coherence has a limitation on not being something else?
As described above, if you agree that "nothing"
can't be "something," then you must agree it has identity.
Identity is a relationship between things. Things are themselves, and cannot be other things. I think it could be fair to say God brought identity into existence with the creation of the other.
That would be putting the cart before the horse. If God created identity, how was God God in the first place to create it?
I don't think it is the same thing to say that maybe a rule can be broken and maybe a rule doesn't exist at all
That's true for things like natural laws, which are contingent -- but logic isn't contingent. It isn't possible to self-consistently assert that identity can
ever even possibly false.