Unity of Self and Memory

[Polymath257]

Because "what it is like to be an electron" remains a coherent question even after we know every property of the electron as they pertain to the electron's interactions with the rest of the universe. How X relates to every thing else is determinable, but how X relates to X itself is indeterminable as any investigation you do reveals only something about that entity X interacting with something other than itself.

Hmmm...I'm not so sure it *is* a coherent question. What sort of answer could it possibly have?

So, we can determine what it is like to be another person by studying our own brains and how we feel internally and then noting when someone else's brain has the same internal states, etc. We can collect evidence of how they report their internal states in various situations and compare what they report to what is happening in brain scans. We don't even have to believe their reports are accurate: just that they are reports and can be correlated with brain scans is enough to make progress.

This can be extended, at least to some extent with many other types of brains (finding the types of information they process, etc).

But I'm not sure it is a coherent question to ask what it is like to be an electron: it simply doesn't have the structure required to have an internal state described by a 'what is it like?' answer. From everything I can see, consciousness is a particular type of information processing. Anything without that information processing would then not have consciousness and no 'internal state' in the sense of a 'what is it like to be that'. In some ways, I see it as similar to asking what the temperature of a single electron is. The question simply doesn't make sense in that context.

 

[Polymath257]

Yes yes. . Its not a limitation of science per se, but of any observation. All observations are necessarily of one entity interacting with its surroundings, and hence illuminates the properties of that entity in relation to things other than itself. Properties of an entity that manifests in relation to interactions with its own self are always hidden. Thus the only hope there is to investigate how you relate to your own self through introspection/meditation etc. and then infer, based on your own self investigation, how other entities relate to their own selves.

I disagree that internal states are always hidden. At least not any more than the state of an atom we don't observe is hidden. We can already observe enough about brain functioning to read minds in some limited ways. I don't see any reason to think that ability won't grow as we learn more. As we get more and more correlates between brain states and reported internal states, we will be able to say *exactly* what someone is thinking and feeling based on what we can observe.

So I don't think the matter is as hopeless as you make it out to be. It isn't simply a matter of introspection of our own internal states, but the correlation of what others report to be their internals states band other aspects that we can observe. That allows for a tremendous amount of information about internal states to be built up that is objectively observable. I see no reason to think we won't be able to tell not just if someone is lying, but what they actually think to be the truth internally.

 

[Polymath257]

I will like to refer this to @Polymath257 and @sealchan for their comments. I hope that is not breaking some rule.

No rule that I can think of. See my answer above.

I don't see how its logically possible for Y to experience the experience X has of itself. The only way it could be possible is if X and Y share the same self at the deepest core level.... hmm

Well, if we can learn how to transfer brain states in some way, it may well become possible. I'm not sure that is something that is out of the realm of possibility. Sort of like a virtual machine.

 

[sayak83]

No rule that I can think of. See my answer above.



Well, if we can learn how to transfer brain states in some way, it may well become possible. I'm not sure that is something that is out of the realm of possibility. Sort of like a virtual machine.

What guarantees that identical brain states in two different persons will generate identical experience ?

 

[sayak83]

I disagree that internal states are always hidden. At least not any more than the state of an atom we don't observe is hidden. We can already observe enough about brain functioning to read minds in some limited ways. I don't see any reason to think that ability won't grow as we learn more. As we get more and more correlates between brain states and reported internal states, we will be able to say *exactly* what someone is thinking and feeling based on what we can observe.

So I don't think the matter is as hopeless as you make it out to be. It isn't simply a matter of introspection of our own internal states, but the correlation of what others report to be their internals states band other aspects that we can observe. That allows for a tremendous amount of information about internal states to be built up that is objectively observable. I see no reason to think we won't be able to tell not just if someone is lying, but what they actually think to be the truth internally.

No. I am talking about whether my experience of green is same as your experience of green.

 

[atanu]

I disagree that internal states are always hidden. At least not any more than the state of an atom we don't observe is hidden. We can already observe enough about brain functioning to read minds in some limited ways. I don't see any reason to think that ability won't grow as we learn more. As we get more and more correlates between brain states and reported internal states, we will be able to say *exactly* what someone is thinking and feeling based on what we can observe.

So I don't think the matter is as hopeless as you make it out to be. It isn't simply a matter of introspection of our own internal states, but the correlation of what others report to be their internals states band other aspects that we can observe. That allows for a tremendous amount of information about internal states to be built up that is objectively observable. I see no reason to think we won't be able to tell not just if someone is lying, but what they actually think to be the truth internally.

Well, if we can learn how to transfer brain states in some way, it may well become possible. I'm not sure that is something that is out of the realm of possibility. Sort of like a virtual machine.

Let me use my own invented example.

Suppose there is a brilliant scientist who has mastered all correlations between orgasm and its brain state/verbal reports but is unable to experience orgasm due to a defect. Will all knowledge of verbal reports/brain states ever give him/her the subjective experience of an orgasm?
...

You know, this forum used to be 'Science versus Religion'. Fortunately it was changed to 'Science and Religion' at this one's suggestion.

My point is that this is not a versus thing that some make it. Science is about objects -- physical and/or mental. Religion/spirituality is about the subject itself. Spirituality is about gaining mastery over the fake master, the ego-mind. So, imo, the science and religion occupy non overlapping domains and true happiness can come from accepting both the domains.

 

[sayak83]

Hmmm...I'm not so sure it *is* a coherent question. What sort of answer could it possibly have?

So, we can determine what it is like to be another person by studying our own brains and how we feel internally and then noting when someone else's brain has the same internal states, etc. We can collect evidence of how they report their internal states in various situations and compare what they report to what is happening in brain scans. We don't even have to believe their reports are accurate: just that they are reports and can be correlated with brain scans is enough to make progress.

This can be extended, at least to some extent with many other types of brains (finding the types of information they process, etc).

But I'm not sure it is a coherent question to ask what it is like to be an electron: it simply doesn't have the structure required to have an internal state described by a 'what is it like?' answer. From everything I can see, consciousness is a particular type of information processing. Anything without that information processing would then not have consciousness and no 'internal state' in the sense of a 'what is it like to be that'. In some ways, I see it as similar to asking what the temperature of a single electron is. The question simply doesn't make sense in that context.

Any quantum event can also be represented as a form of information processing, even if we do not go to the extreme as Tegmark does. Thus information processing does not appear to be a good criteria between those entities that can have subjective experiences and those that do not.

 

[Polymath257]

Let me use my own invented example.

Suppose there is a brilliant scientist who has mastered all correlations between orgasm and its brain state/verbal reports but is unable to experience orgasm due to a defect. Will all knowledge of verbal reports/brain states ever give him/her the subjective experience of an orgasm?

Not until his own brain is in those states. The difference is that between knowing that an asteroid is going to his a planet and it actually doing so.

You know, this forum used to be 'Science versus Religion'. Fortunately it was changed to 'Science and Religion' at this one's suggestion.

My point is that this is not a versus thing that some make it. Science is about objects -- physical and/or mental. Religion/spirituality is about the subject itself. Spirituality is about gaining mastery over the fake master, the ego-mind. So, imo, the science and religion occupy non overlapping domains and true happiness can come from accepting both the domains.

And in my view, there is only the material: mind is one aspect of the universe, but an aspect that happens in sufficiently complex informational networks.

 

[Polymath257]

What guarantees that identical brain states in two different persons will generate identical experience ?

Because the experience *is* that brain state? I really don't see how it could be otherwise.

 

[Polymath257]

No. I am talking about whether my experience of green is same as your experience of green.

And we know that it isn't. For example, our eyes will respond slightly differently. The specifics of the brain pathways will be different. But they are similar enough to be considered the same up to some isomorphism.

 

[Polymath257]

Any quantum event can also be represented as a form of information processing, even if we do not go to the extreme as Tegmark does. Thus information processing does not appear to be a good criteria between those entities that can have subjective experiences and those that do not.

I think it is a matter of degree and complexity of the internal interactions. Is there information collected about the internal state and encoded in a way that affects future states?

 

[atanu]

Not until his own brain is in those states. The difference is that between knowing that an asteroid is going to his a planet and it actually doing so.

IMO, that is an assumption. On what factors a particular brain state is dependent on is simply not known

And in my view, there is only the material: mind is one aspect of the universe, but an aspect that happens in sufficiently complex informational networks.

Okay. But what is 'material'?

 

[sayak83]

I think it is a matter of degree and complexity of the internal interactions. Is there information collected about the internal state and encoded in a way that affects future states?

That won't be needed if the entity is a passive patient rather than an agent with will. But clearly to a limited extent, every entity's future behavior is affected by its past states..otherwise predictive physics is not possible.

I am making a simple point. We are all entities in this world. We know that we ourselves have an internal experiential state that exist in conjunction with our external interactive states. We need a justification to say that this basic two-nature of existence is not something that is common to all entities. I do not see any such justification being made other than the presupposition that it does not, which is based originally on the Christian notion that only we have a soul and nothing else in this world have it.

 

[Polymath257]

That won't be needed if the entity is a passive patient rather than an agent with will. But clearly to a limited extent, every entity's future behavior is affected by its past states..otherwise predictive physics is not possible.

I am making a simple point. We are all entities in this world. We know that we ourselves have an internal experiential state that exist in conjunction with our external interactive states. We need a justification to say that this basic two-nature of existence is not something that is common to all entities. I do not see any such justification being made other than the presupposition that it does not, which is based originally on the Christian notion that only we have a soul and nothing else in this world have it.

Well, the future of most things is determined by only a few forces and thereby the location with respect to those forces. I saw a recent article discussing whether bacteria have enough information processing capability to be called conscious in some way. I think it an interesting question and I found that article intriguing. But the crucial aspect is information processing ability as well as actually having a homeostasis to some degree (an internal physical state).

My point is that I don't see it as a two-nature system, but simply as an expressing of one aspect of our total state: the information processing aspect of it.

 

[Polymath257]

IMO, that is an assumption. On what factors a particular brain state is dependent on is simply not known

We know a fair amount. And it is something subject to further research. To the extent it is an assumption, it is one based on extensive evidence.

Okay. But what is 'material'?

The first approximation is anything described by physics. As far as I can see, once you know the physical situation, you know everything about a situation. Once I know the physical state of the brain (which neural circuits are activated, which neurotransmitters are where, etc) we will be able to determine such things as mental states.

 

[`mud]

Unity of Self and Memory
Self, that entity within one self's brain that could be called a functional conscious controlling action.
And triggering a supportive other entity to hold, almost indefinitely, the action that was initiated.
It has to contact the body's physical responses to react to the established memory synapses, doesn't it ?
So, I think memory occurs before action, doesn't it ?
So the unity has to be a function of the entire bodily operation coupled with the operation of the brain to connect all those functions together.
So...I don't get the problem represented here.
Where does the `soul` that was mentioned come in ?
And...where is the spirit held, are `soul` and `spirit` the same ?
What separates the `spirit/soul` from the consciousness that activates the cognizant awareness of one's self.
I guess the `memory` is the most important entity within the body,
isn't it, when `memory` is lost in death, everything is lost except for `spirit/soul
but...maybe...not even that !
Maybe we are all just Stuff, the remains of the Cosmos !
And I think you all know the rest of the story.

 

[atanu]

We know a fair amount. And it is something subject to further research. To the extent it is an assumption, it is one based on extensive evidence.

We know fair amount from third party perspective. And we do not know what we do not know.

And we (science) know nothing about the subject from subjective point of view. It assumes that knowledge of objects = knowledge of the subject. "I" awareness is not same as "I am this body" thought. Objects and their knowledge veil the pure "I" awareness.

The first approximation is anything described by physics. As far as I can see, once you know the physical situation, you know everything about a situation. Once I know the physical state of the brain (which neural circuits are activated, which neurotransmitters are where, etc) we will be able to determine such things as mental states.

Again that is assumption. We do not know what dark matter is. We think we know all that is to know of objects. And as noted above, we know nothing of consciousness from subject's POV no matter how much we pose to know, because subject is not the objects that science can study.

 

[Polymath257]

We know fair amount from third party perspective. And we do not know what we do not know.

And we (science) know nothing about the subject from subjective point of view. It assumes that knowledge of objects = knowledge of the subject. "I" awareness is not same as "I am this body" thought. Objects and their knowledge veil the pure "I" awareness.

Again that is assumption. We do not know what dark matter is. We think we know all that is to know of objects. And as noted above, we know nothing of consciousness from subject's POV no matter how much we pose to know, because subject is not the objects that science can study.

Of course we know things from the subject's point of view because some subjects can *tell* us about their point of view. That means we *can* know some things about the subjective point of view. Now, do we have *perfect* knowledge of such? No. But I don't see that to be required to say we have some knowledge and that this is enough to do science correlating subjective points of view with objective brain processes. And this is true even if, occasionally, the subject is mistaken or lying.

No, we do not know what dark matter is, but it is certainly subject to study by physics. We can, and do, study its properties, its distribution in the cosmos, etc. We also have several good candidates of what it might be composed of in terms of subatomic particles. To call it anything but matter and physical seems strange to me.

 

[Nakosis]

Memory loss does not mean effacement of unity of self.

I was only answering the question of who owns the memories IMO.

The red and blue above contradict. We do come back from sleep with unity of self intact.

If you are talking about the feeling of unity, I suspect there is a lot involved in that. I was referring to the separation of the conscious and subconscious mind. While during some parts of the sleep cycle self conscious may be involved, during deep sleep cycles, self consciousness in non-existent. While we may feel a unity of self, there is a definite separation between the conscious and subconscious brain.

That is better.

Ok, though I did not see a problem with any of my statements.

 

[atanu]

Of course we know things from the subject's point of view because some subjects can *tell* us about their point of view. That means we *can* know some things about the subjective point of view. Now, do we have *perfect* knowledge of such? No. But I don't see that to be required to say we have some knowledge and that this is enough to do science correlating subjective points of view with objective brain processes. And this is true even if, occasionally, the subject is mistaken or lying.

Okay. A verbal report may be "I never thought I could do it." Where do you see the I in the objective brain processes?

No, we do not know what dark matter is, but it is certainly subject to study by physics. We can, and do, study its properties, its distribution in the cosmos, etc. We also have several good candidates of what it might be composed of in terms of subatomic particles. To call it anything but matter and physical seems strange to me.

The point is that there will never be a time when the objective world will be fully known and the fact is that the subject, the knower of the objects will ever remain unknown. You cannot ever say "I know this" for the subject, since the subject "I" knows "this".