Unity of Self and Memory

[osgart]

I think much of these posts are what people infer must be without any actuality, or evidence whatsoever.

Sciency language, no substance.

Observation and correlation have severe limitations. They can only tell you about object, and matter, and energy.

The subjective experience of self tells a lot more then any experiment ever will.

Science's explanatory power is way overrated. Science manipulates reality mostly. There is no intrinsic knowledge of what consciousness and unity of self is.

Seems that most people have faith in science one day having all the answers in the context of the material.

Its all useless jargon from science when it comes to consciousness, and the unity of self.

 

[Polymath257]

Okay. A verbal report may be "I never thought I could do it." Where do you see the I in the objective brain processes?

Once again, the statement is an objectively observable thing. The brain processes are also. The correlation between the two is also. That is how we can identify brain processes with internal states.

The point is that there will never be a time when the objective world will be fully known and the fact is that the subject, the knower of the objects will ever remain unknown. You cannot ever say "I know this" for the subject, since the subject "I" knows "this".

Instead of looking for a noun (a knower), maybe you should look for a verb (the process of knowing). Again, we can get correlates between reports made by 'subjects'. These reports are observable (whether or not the subject is reporting accurately). We can correlate these reports to brain states. I really fail to see what that isn't evidence that the brain states *are* the internal state of the subject.

 

[atanu]

Once again, the statement is an objectively observable thing. The brain processes are also. The correlation between the two is also. That is how we can identify brain processes with internal states.

Instead of looking for a noun (a knower), maybe you should look for a verb (the process of knowing). Again, we can get correlates between reports made by 'subjects'. These reports are observable (whether or not the subject is reporting accurately). We can correlate these reports to brain states. I really fail to see what that isn't evidence that the brain states *are* the internal state of the subject.

Simple. As has been pointed out several times earlier, the reports and correlations thereof are objective and do not repress the subject and subjective experience. There is no taste of mango no experience of orgasm, no thrill of first kiss, no disappointment, no fear .......

Why is it difficult to accept this? Because, then you have to accept possibility of a consciousness at the root of all phenomena?

 

[Polymath257]

Simple. As has been pointed out several times earlier, the reports and correlations thereof are objective and do not repress the subject and subjective experience. There is no taste of mango no experience of orgasm, no thrill of first kiss, no disappointment, no fear .......

So what? We still have the correlation between the reported experiences and the brain states. If that correlation is good enough, how is that NOT a proof that consciousness is a result of brain states? If I had the same brain state as someone who was experiencing eating a mango, I would also be experiencing eating a mango. Why is that so hard to accept?

The reports don't 'repress' the experience because they don't 'repress' the brain state: they report it. I don't see why 'repressing' is relevant here at all.

Why is it difficult to accept this? Because, then you have to accept possibility of a consciousness at the root of all phenomena?

Because I simply don't think it is true. From everything I can see, consciousness is a brain phenomenon. At the extreme, it is a phenomenon of information processing, which is why I think AI is a possibility. Consciousness, from everything we know, is a product of matter, not the other way around.

 

[JoshuaTree]

So what? We still have the correlation between the reported experiences and the brain states. If that correlation is good enough, how is that NOT a proof that consciousness is a result of brain states? If I had the same brain state as someone who was experiencing eating a mango, I would also be experiencing eating a mango. Why is that so hard to accept?

The reports don't 'repress' the experience because they don't 'repress' the brain state: they report it. I don't see why 'repressing' is relevant here at all.



Because I simply don't think it is true. From everything I can see, consciousness is a brain phenomenon. At the extreme, it is a phenomenon of information processing, which is why I think AI is a possibility. Consciousness, from everything we know, is a product of matter, not the other way around.

Do you consider the world wide web to be an evolving artificial intelligence?

 

[Polymath257]

Do you consider the world wide web to be an evolving artificial intelligence?

I'd not use the term 'evolving', which has a technical meaning. Maybe 'developing'.

At this point, I don't know. It may have something like a bacterial level of cognition at this point. Past that, I cannot predict.

 

[sayak83]

So what? We still have the correlation between the reported experiences and the brain states. If that correlation is good enough, how is that NOT a proof that consciousness is a result of brain states? If I had the same brain state as someone who was experiencing eating a mango, I would also be experiencing eating a mango. Why is that so hard to accept?

The reports don't 'repress' the experience because they don't 'repress' the brain state: they report it. I don't see why 'repressing' is relevant here at all.



Because I simply don't think it is true. From everything I can see, consciousness is a brain phenomenon. At the extreme, it is a phenomenon of information processing, which is why I think AI is a possibility. Consciousness, from everything we know, is a product of matter, not the other way around.

The problem is that without the prior knowledge of subjective experience, one would never have inferred from brain activity alone the existence of such experiences in humans.

 

[Polymath257]

The problem is that without the prior knowledge of subjective experience, one would never have inferred from brain activity alone the existence of such experiences in humans.

I'm not at all convinced of that. We see the information processing activity in the brain, including the complexity and the self-referential aspects of it. The latter, in particular, would lead me to say there is an internal state that is 'consciously' held.

At the very least, that would be an interesting phenomenon and separated off as an area of study. Again, I fail to see why this *isn't* an explanation for consciousness and internal 'states of mind'.

/E: One of the difficulties is imagining a being with enough processing power to be curious while not having enough to be conscious. I doubt that is possible. In other words, any being that could ask the question would have an internal state because it would have to be complex enough to have such.

 

[JoshuaTree]

I'm not at all convinced of that. We see the information processing activity in the brain, including the complexity and the self-referential aspects of it. The latter, in particular, would lead me to say there is an internal state that is 'consciously' held.

At the very least, that would be an interesting phenomenon and separated off as an area of study. Again, I fail to see why this *isn't* an explanation for consciousness and internal 'states of mind'.

/E: One of the difficulties is imagining a being with enough processing power to be curious while not having enough to be conscious. I doubt that is possible. In other words, any being that could ask the question would have an internal state because it would have to be complex enough to have such.

If brain states define both our conscious and unconscious thoughts, why aren't all thoughts conscious?

 

[JoshuaTree]

I'm not at all convinced of that. We see the information processing activity in the brain, including the complexity and the self-referential aspects of it. The latter, in particular, would lead me to say there is an internal state that is 'consciously' held.

At the very least, that would be an interesting phenomenon and separated off as an area of study. Again, I fail to see why this *isn't* an explanation for consciousness and internal 'states of mind'.

/E: One of the difficulties is imagining a being with enough processing power to be curious while not having enough to be conscious. I doubt that is possible. In other words, any being that could ask the question would have an internal state because it would have to be complex enough to have such.

Could a being be curious at a subconscious level without being conscious?

 

[JoshuaTree]

I'm not at all convinced of that. We see the information processing activity in the brain, including the complexity and the self-referential aspects of it. The latter, in particular, would lead me to say there is an internal state that is 'consciously' held.

At the very least, that would be an interesting phenomenon and separated off as an area of study. Again, I fail to see why this *isn't* an explanation for consciousness and internal 'states of mind'.

/E: One of the difficulties is imagining a being with enough processing power to be curious while not having enough to be conscious. I doubt that is possible. In other words, any being that could ask the question would have an internal state because it would have to be complex enough to have such.

Would we be conscious if we only have subconscious thoughts?

 

[JoshuaTree]

As far as consciousness goes I think we are more than simply the sum of our parts...

 

[JoshuaTree]

Two entangled particles provide more information than the same two particles not entangled but an observer is required to make sense of it... maybe the subconscious operates off entanglement?

 

[Polymath257]

If brain states define both our conscious and unconscious thoughts, why aren't all thoughts conscious?

My guess is division of labor in the processing. The frontal cortex, which is where planning occurs, is a relatively late development in evolution. Much of our processing happens well before the frontal cortex gets involved. I'm guessing that a similar thing is true for the circuitry producing consciousness: it is where the 'system' coordinates information across the brain as opposed to being localized in one region.

Could a being be curious at a subconscious level without being conscious?

I'd be skeptical of this being possible.

Would we be conscious if we only have subconscious thoughts?

Well, that seems to be directly contradictory. But I think that once you get to a certain level of complexity, the coordination between different regions of processing will *be* conscious.

As far as consciousness goes I think we are more than simply the sum of our parts...

Well, I'd say that also. In the sense that interactions between different regions produces more than the sum of each region separately.

 

[JoshuaTree]

* sigh *

 

[Polymath257]

Two entangled particles provide more information than the same two particles not entangled but an observer is required to make sense of it... maybe the subconscious operates off entanglement?

Very doubtful. Entanglement is a very sensitive thing that is easily destroyed by any interaction with the environment. That alone makes anything like quantum effects unlikely to be relevant for consciousness.

 

[JoshuaTree]

Very doubtful. Entanglement is a very sensitive thing that is easily destroyed by any interaction with the environment. That alone makes anything like quantum effects unlikely to be relevant for consciousness.

I once saw a documentary called "quantum robin" that explained how robins (subconsciously) migrate through quantum entanglement. Although I can't fully appreciate the physiology of the information it was interesting.

 

[Polymath257]

I once saw a documentary called "quantum robin" that explained how robins (subconsciously) migrate through quantum entanglement. Although I can't fully appreciate the physiology of the information it was interesting.

Well, entanglement happens in photosynthesis at certain stages. And the detector for magnetic fields in birds relies on a quantum mechanism. But detection of a photon (light) is also a quantum event in the eye. But the preservation of entangled states is different than the existence of entangled states in our sensory mechanisms.

 

[JoshuaTree]

Well, entanglement happens in photosynthesis at certain stages. And the detector for magnetic fields in birds relies on a quantum mechanism. But detection of a photon (light) is also a quantum event in the eye. But the preservation of entangled states is different than the existence of entangled states in our sensory mechanisms.

Well I am not nearly smart enough to speak to that lol... but I am going to think more about it. Thanks!

 

[JoshuaTree]

Well, entanglement happens in photosynthesis at certain stages. And the detector for magnetic fields in birds relies on a quantum mechanism. But detection of a photon (light) is also a quantum event in the eye. But the preservation of entangled states is different than the existence of entangled states in our sensory mechanisms.

Ok, beginning research into the quantum brain lol...

A New Spin on the Quantum Brain | Quanta Magazine

As recently as 10 years ago, Fisher’s hypothesis would have been dismissed by many as nonsense. Physicists have been burned by this sort of thing before, most notably in 1989, when Roger Penrose proposed that mysterious protein structures called “microtubules” played a role in human consciousness by exploiting quantum effects. Few researchers believe such a hypothesis plausible. Patricia Churchland, a neurophilosopher at the University of California, San Diego, memorably opined that one might as well invoke “pixie dust in the synapses” to explain human cognition.

..."pixie dust" in the synapses!!!