*Quatermass puts on his scholarly hat, opens a series of books nad peers at you over half-moon spectacles, clearing his throat.*
In the book In the Shade of the Qu'ran by Sayyid Qut. Qutb describes Islam as politically and militarily expansionist from the very beginning, and in this he is right.
There's also paper from Princeton University called The Early Islamic Conquests which describes three large factors for the Islamic Crusades in the 7th Century. First, the ideological message of Islam itself triggered the Muslim ruling elite simply to follow Muhammad and his conquests; Islam had a divinely ordained mission to conquer in the name of Allah. The second factor is economic. The ruling elite "wanted to expand the political boundaries of the new state in order to secure even more fully than before the trans-Arab commerce they had plied for a century or more". The final factor is political control. The rulers wanted to maintain their top place in the new political hierarchy by having aggressive Arab tribes migrate into newly conquered territories.
So, was Islam ever spread by the sword?
Historical facts demonstrate that most of the conquered cities and regions accepted the last of the three options set forth in Sura 9:29 and enforced by the later Muslim Crusaders: fight and die, convert, or pay the jizya tax. They preferred to remain in their own religion and to pay the tax. However, people eventually converted. After all, Islamic lands are called such for a reason—or many reasons.
In Islam, Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition, David Dakake cites Sura 2:256, and defines compulsion very narrowly. Jihad has been misrepresented as forcing Jews, Christians, and other peoples of the Middle East, Asia and Africa to convert to Islam "on pain of death." Qutb, also citing Sura 2:256, is even more categorical: "Never in its history did Islam compel a single human being to change his faith" This is absurd on its face, and it only demonstrates the tendentiousness of Islamic scholarship, which must be challenged at every turn here in the West.
This all leads to some odd logic, however:
(1) The only forced conversions are ones that occur with swords hanging directly over necks.
(2) No "hanging sword" conversions occur during a military conquest (because the swords of the Muslim Crusaders glimmer outside the city wall, not directly over necks).
(3)Therefore, no forced conversions occurred during a military conquest.
But history does not follow abstract logic. Did the vast majority of conquered peoples make such fine distinctions, even if a general amnesty were granted to People of the Book? Maybe a few diehards did, but the majority? Most people at this time did not know how to read or could barely read, so when they saw a Muslim army outside their gates, why would they not convert, even if eventually? To Ruthven’s and Nanji’s credit, they come up with other reasons to convert besides the sword, such as people’s fatigue with church squabbles, a few doctrinal similarities, simplicity of the conversion process, a desire to enter the ranks of the new ruling elite, and so on. But using the Quran to interpret later facts paints the history of Islam into a corner of an unrealistically high standard.
Indeed, militant Christianity does not live up to it. Jesus said that "if anyone would come after me" ... (Matt. 16:24). The word "if" shows that Jesus did not force anyone, and this is the implied starting point in the following logic. Would a Muslim apologist believe this about the Medieval European Crusades?
(4) If anyone follows Jesus Christ closely, then the follower never forces conversions.
(5)The Medieval Crusaders followed Jesus Christ closely.
(6)Therefore, the Medieval Crusaders never forced conversions.
This is the same unsound logic that the four Muslim apologists use in their explanation of the Muslim Crusades. But this is completely inaccurate and wrong. Rather, everyone agrees that Medieval Crusaders did not always act exemplarily or that they sometimes forced conversions. Hence, this misguided connection between Scripture and later historical facts does not hold together. Revelations or ideals should not run roughshod over later historical facts, as if all followers obey their Scriptures perfectly. Actually, modus tollens (denying the consequent or "then" clause) works better here.
(7)If anyone follows Jesus Christ closely, then the follower never forces conversions.
(8)But the Medieval Crusaders forced conversions.
(9)Therefore, they did not follow Jesus Christ closely.
The historical fact in the eighth premise leads to a better conclusion. This must be repeated: The Medieval Crusaders did not follow Jesus Christ closely when they slashed and burned or forced conversions. The same cannot be said for the Muslim Crusaders, for they in fact closely followed their founder when they slashed and burned and forced conversions.
To his credit, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), late Medieval statesman, jurist, historian, and scholar, has enough integrity and candor to balance out these four Muslim apologists, writing a history that is still admired by historians today. He states the obvious: 'In the Muslim community, the holy war is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the Muslim mission and (the obligation to) convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force. ' In his book The Muqaddimah: an Introduction to History. He goes on to say: 'The first [Muslim] victory over them and the European Christians [in the Maghrib] was of no avail. They continued to rebel and apostatized time after time. The Muslims massacred many of them. After the Muslim religion had been established among them, they went on revolting and seceding, and they adopted dissident religious opinions many times. They remained disobedient and unmanageable .... Therefore, it has taken the Arabs a long time to establish their dynasty in the Maghrib.'
Using wisdom that is based on observation, the Medieval Muslim scholar acknowledges that slaughter occurred not only to establish a worldly dynasty, but also to force people to convert to the true religion by the sword, even though some of the inhabitants in the Maghrib were People of the Book, European Christians. If they did not convert, then 'the Muslims massacred many of them,' he says, matter-of-factly. This excerpt also shows that many did not want to become Muslims, or when they gave up and became Muslims, they 'apostatized [and] ... adopted dissident religious opinions ... and remained disobedient.' Therefore, freedom of religion was not the purpose of Islam, as it was not in Muhammad’s days, when he conquered Mecca and the Arabian Peninsula.
So in conclusion: Muslims who slashed and burned and forced conversions did not wander off from the origins of Islam, but followed it closely. It is a plain and unpleasant historical fact that in the ten years that Muhammad lived in Medina (622-632), he either sent out or went out on seventy-four raids, expeditions, or full-scale wars, which range from small assination hit squads to the Tabuk Crusade, described above. Sometimes the expeditions did not result in violence, but a Muslim army always lurked in the background. Muhammad could exact a terrible vengeance on an individual or tribe that double-crossed him. These ten years did not know long stretches of peace.