Originally, I didn't intend to make a response to the last post as it was completely focused on refuting the idea that God knows future free actions, which I take to be a red herring and replying would put me in an ungrateful position of having to offer an apology for not answering an opponent's question. Seeing how many people have decided to jump on this issue, however, I feel like explaining myself since I think the last few exchanges perfectly illustrate why the issue is (while certainly fascinating and worth talking about) irrelevant here.
The reason I say this can already be seen partly in my previous post in which I said the problem of evil presupposes God's knowledge of future evils (if God did not know what evils will occur then the problem of evil cannot get off the ground since then God is not in fact responsible for these evils occuring as he simply didn't see them coming). Koldo, ofcourse, responds to this but in a completely unsatisfactorily way:
Actually, if one has to drop omniscience to maintain the other two attributes then the problem of evil has been successful.
The problem of evil itself is silent on regards to free will. But the thing is: There is no contradiction in being omniscient and not knowing what can not be known ( such as what free agents will choose to do ). My contention ( at least the only one you are trying to address ) has to do with your particular answer to the problem of evil that involves the free will defense and God being able to achieve the utmost balance of good and evil.
The first paragraph obviously misses the point. What I'm talking about is not the theist rejecting God's omniscience (or knowledge of future events) in order to escape the problem of evil, rather it is that the theist (or an atheist) who already believes that God's knowledge is limited with respect to evils that will occur will not be in any way affected by the problem of evil as all the proponents of the problem know that very well, hence why they themselves presuppose that God's knowledge is not limited in this way which means that He is responsible for not preventing these evils. Instead of being successful, the problem of evil is just irrelevant in this situation.
The other paragraph (atleast the part which doesn't propose a view of omniscience that is irrelevant to the problem of evil, which is actually just the first sentence) says that the problem of evil is silent on free will. I'll grant you that but while a general discussion of the problem of evil does not require any mention of free will (calvinists also disagree with the problem of evil yet their doctrines don't allow them to believe in free will), the one who presupposes free will is the OP himself. This thread wasn't stated as a general discussion of the problem of evil but was a complaint that a very specific answer (using free will), even when granted that free will is true, still fails to satisfactorily explain away the problem for (so it is said) it does not deal with the first and the third step of freedom when it comes to evil.
Therefore, in the context of this thread (and my posts so far) both free will and God's knowing of future evils (which, granted free will, occur because of that free will) are presupposed and all I aimed to show was that there was no objection offered by the OP which managed to show that this particular answer fails to satisfy. At the very least, this is how I take the thread and under which framework I constructed my replies and the idea at which these replies were directed . Even if the OP meant it some other way (in which case he'd be advised to word his threads more clearly) I feel disinclined to suddenly drop the way I answered so far and shift to (supposedly out of some sense of duty) a topic which I wasn't particularly interested in discussing (indeed, one which is completely independent of the problem of evil and which deserves to be approached on it's own merit).