Why don't Theist's admit that there's no evidence for God?

[Willamena]

In any case, what about Christian atheism? Sure, it may well be that theism, by definition, is committed to the existence of some god (so Christian atheism sort of paradoxically turns out to be a form of non-theism), but then again, Christian atheists and even sophisticated (or sophistry?) forms of protestantism are often formulated as commitment to a particular narrative (i.e. one in which this character, "God", figures prominently), without commiting one to any particular ontology or other...

That's an adequate example, but you need look no further than simple, ordinary theists to find an example, theists for whom the "decision" of whether there is a god doesn't enter into religion. It is entirely assumed. "Religion," then, is what proceeds from there.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Right, but that isn't an instance of religious belief without ontological commitment- as you say, "it is entirely assumed"... That is, the existence of God (i.e. an ontological commitment) is entirely assumed. (EDIT: what you're pointing out, I think, is that in many cases of theism, this ontological commitment is not the centerpiece or focal point of ones religious beliefs, as it appears to be for some- it is lurking in the background, as it were)

The only really obvious example of religion without ontological commitments I can come up with is Buddhism...

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Right, but that isn't an instance of religious belief without ontological commitment- as you say, "it is entirely assumed"... That is, the existence of God (i.e. an ontological commitment) is entirely assumed. (EDIT: what you're pointing out, I think, is that in many cases of theism, this ontological commitment is not the centerpiece or focal point of ones religious beliefs, as it appears to be for some- it is lurking in the background, as it were)

Right: it's the foundation, and like a literal foundation, while it might be disregarded or even completely hidden, if it fails, then the structure being supported by it collapses.

 

[McBell]

Children are sent to everything from prison to hell, because of what they do, and what society does to them. You tell me. I've sent no one to any hateful judgement.

Please answer the question.

 

[Sleeppy]

Please answer the question.

I'm for rehabilitation and redirection. What are you for?

 

[McBell]

I'm for rehabilitation and redirection. What are you for?

I am for a direct answer to a direct question.
Your avoidance speaks volumes.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

You know why I asked you to pay attention? Because the ontological statement you're attributing to me, was Riverwolf's. And I refuted it in logical manner as did Russell. Russell says obtaining knowledge requires knowledge, and so did I.

Talk about not paying attention. This was the ontological claim:

That's not possible, friend.

Russell said that the set which contains all sets that don't contain themselves was possible in Frege's system but is a logical paradox. When you make statements about the properties of knowledge itself (Riverwolf did not, but proffered an opinion on the knowledge and goals that you claimed wasn't possible), you use knowledge to do so. Which means you are using knowledge to claim something about what knowledge itself is, and therefore using something to define that something but doing so without acknowledging the inherent circularity or regress involved in this. Knowledge can be regarded in a number of ways, but set theory is one such way. We can define it as a set with certain properties (that it is obtained and this entails containment, for example). But instead of doing something like this, you implicitly define this set by appealing to it's properties. And now that I think of it, that may be more akin to Gödel's use of the Liar paradox than it is to Russell's use of the Barber's paradox. It really doesn't matter, though, as the logical flaw remains. You rely implicitly on the properties of knowledge in order to make a claim about its properties.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Show me. Show me the support to these claims. Rather, pick the ones you deem strongest and support them.

How? By referencing volumes/monographs/textbooks I have? What good will this do:

Unstable Singularities and Randomness: Their Importance in the Complexity of Physical, Biological and Social Sciences

Random Fields and Geometry

Random Walks in Biology

Algorithmic Randomness and Complexity

On the other hand, I could give you links to pre-prints to some of the studies I have (or, if you have access to databases like Academic Search Premier, ScienceDirect, Wiley Online, Springer's various online databases, etc., I can give you links to the studies themselves):

From knowledge, knowability and the search for objective randomness to a new vision of complexity

Synchronization of oscillators with random nonlocal connectivity

True Quantum Randomness

The Effects of Free Will on Randomness Expansion

Are There Quantum Effects Coming from Outside Space–Time? Nonlocality, Free Will and “No Many-Worlds”

Some remarks on an experiment suggesting quantum-like behavior of cognitive entities and formulation of an abstract quantum mechanical formalism to describe cognitive entity and its dynamics

and there are many more of both papers and volumes on all of the things I referenced. You just let me know how you want me to supply you with what I have in a way that is actually possible.

 

[Sleeppy]

Talk about not paying attention. This was the ontological claim:


Russell said that the set which contains all sets that don't contain themselves was possible in Frege's system but is a logical paradox. When you make statements about the properties of knowledge itself (Riverwolf did not, but proffered an opinion on the knowledge and goals that you claimed wasn't possible), you use knowledge to do so. Which means you are using knowledge to claim something about what knowledge itself is, and therefore using something to define that something but doing so without acknowledging the inherent circularity or regress involved in this. Knowledge can be regarded in a number of ways, but set theory is one such way. We can define it as a set with certain properties (that it is obtained and this entails containment, for example). But instead of doing something like this, you implicitly define this set by appealing to it's properties. And now that I think of it, that may be more akin to Gödel's use of the Liar paradox than it is to Russell's use of the Barber's paradox. It really doesn't matter, though, as the logical flaw remains. You rely implicitly on the properties of knowledge in order to make a claim about its properties.

I rely on it's properties to know its properties. Right.

Are you making all of this up as you go along? Wow. How long have you been studying with those scholars? Thanks. I'm done talking with them.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

I rely on it's properties to know its properties. Right.

Are you making all of this up as you go along? Wow. How long have you been studying with those scholars?

Which ones? My field is cognitive neuropsychology/neuroscience. As cognitive science and logic are intricately linked, it so happens that the development of formalism is important to understand for one in the cognitive sciences. For you I guess it isn't. Or were you referring to the clearly inadequate grasp of both randomness and everything else you asked me to substantiate only to completely ignore?

 

[Sleeppy]

Which ones? My field is cognitive neuropsychology/neuroscience. As cognitive science and logic are intricately linked, it so happens that the development of formalism is important to understand for one in the cognitive sciences. For you I guess it isn't. Or were you referring to the clearly inadequate grasp of both randomness and everything else you asked me to substantiate only to completely ignore?

I've ignored it because I have no use for it. When you study randomness, what are you studying?

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

I've ignored it because I have no use for it.

You asked for it.

When you study randomness, what are you studying?

That depends on whether I'm studying physics, in which randomness has particular definitions and characteristics, mathematics, in which randomness has a slew of definitions, or computability theory in which algorithmic randomness and complexity are linked and there are several but finite definitions of randomness which are regularly used.

 

[BruceDLimber]

Which is simply mistaken.

You are welcome to your opinion, as always.

Mine differs.


Bruce

 

[Willamena]

Right, but that isn't an instance of religious belief without ontological commitment-

As well it shouldn't be.

The only really obvious example of religion without ontological commitments I can come up with is Buddhism...

Buddhism has its fair share of ontological commitments.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

As well it shouldn't be.

Um... Except that that was precisely what it was purported to be. Oops, eh?

Buddhism has its fair share of ontological commitments.

Yeah, except not. The opposite of what you just said is the case.

Or, if you disagree, name some of Buddhism's ontological commitments. (outside of the existence of the Buddha)

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Right: it's the foundation, and like a literal foundation, while it might be disregarded or even completely hidden, if it fails, then the structure being supported by it collapses.

This is certainly correct (on a side note, this is precisely the point of Nietzsche's infamous madman parable, which proclaimed the Death of God- that without God, the entire structure of Judeo-Christian morality and value collapses).

 

[Enai de a lukal]

You are welcome to your opinion, as always.

Mine differs.


Bruce

Sure- but the difference between our two opinions is that I can justify mine with sound reasoning. A pretty crucial difference, that.

 

[Willamena]

Sure- but the difference between our two opinions is that I can justify mine with sound reasoning. A pretty crucial difference, that.

How do you know it's a difference at all?

 

[Willamena]

Um... Except that that was precisely what it was purported to be. Oops, eh?

Not by me.

Or, if you disagree, name some of Buddhism's ontological commitments. (outside of the existence of the Buddha)

Tao, dukkha, wu wei, Moksha, kaivalya...

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Not by me.

Looks like you need to rewind the thread for a refresher.

Tao, dukkha, wu wei, Moksha, kaivalya...

These are not ontological commitments. Once again, it appears you don't have a very firm grasp on what constitutes an ontology or ontological claim. An ontological commitment is a commitment to the existence of a particular object or entity. The claim "My grandfather plays the banjo" has ontological commitments to the existence of my grandfather and banjos. Christianity has ontological commitments to the existence of God, Jesus Christ, heaven, hell, etc.

Since a basic familiarity with a subject-matter is sort of a requisite to discussion, this may be a place to start- Ontological commitment - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Or here- Ontological commitment