Actually it does, it is only when you get in depth with the argument you find out that the attributes needed to create the universe can only come from an entity that itself was not part of the universe and had the POWER to create from nothing.
Well, not "
the argument", as in,
this argument; to establish this, a separate sub-argument needs to be adduced (because the argument is, as stands, invalid).
God is the only thing that comes close to meeting these criterias.
This is an argument from ignorance- we don't know that "God is the only thing" that could satisfy this criteria.
Philosophical arguments, such as the argument against an infinite past...
Except, and this is strictly for the record, such arguments have historically
failed- there has hitherto been no valid argument establishing that an infinite regress is self-contradictory (i.e. "illogical").
...implies that if these causal sequences DIDN'T originate within the same first term, the concept would be illogical because the sequences themselves cannot be extended to past eternity.
The premises of the causal argument imply that causal sequences cannot extend back indefinitely- thus there is AT LEAST ONE first cause. That's as far as the argument gets. Supposing there IS NO MORE THAN ONE is
non-sequitur.
Only an absolute "first cause" can avoid this absurdity.
No, ANY first cause can avoid to so-called "absurdity" of an infinite regress (which is no real absurdity anyways)- but it also creates an absurdity of its own, i.e. uncaused first cause.
This is not a fallacy of composition, because we have evidence that OUR universe, the one that we live in, had a beginning
No, we don't. This is a
misinterpretation of contemporary physics.
If you then believe that our universe originated from some naturalistic event, then you are right back to the infinity problem as mentioned above, and all you are doing is pushing the problem back one step further and the infinity problem is not dealt with.
No. The zero-energy universe- a hypothesis that the universe DID include a beginning (as opposed to competing hypothesis in physics right now which include NO beginning, such as the Hartle-Hawking universe) is naturalistic and does not admit of any "infinity problem".
Actually, I've come to like this one better than the Kalam
How unfortunate for you, then.
And the question is; is it possible for God to exist? I maintain that it is possible for God to exist because the concept is logically valid.
For one, whether it is possible that God exists is not relevant to the ontological argument, only the
modal ontological argument- and the standard ontological argument is invalid and only establishes the conditional, as I said before, that IF God exists THEN he exists necessarily. Second, you continue to betray your absolute unfamiliarity with logic- sort of a prerequisite for this subject-matter, unfortunately-
validity does not apply to concepts, but to
arguments- a "valid concept" makes no more sense than a "neurotic triangle". What you mean to say is that it is not self-contradictory- it is coherent. But even that is highly contentious, and likely depends on how one defines God in the first place.
It is logically valid, actually. I challenge you to point out why the argument is invalid and I also would like for you to point out what word is being equivocated.
I have already pointed this out to you a number of times, but I'm not sure you understood it since you apparently have very little understanding of modal logic- there are many modal logics, and these are distinguished by having slightly different axioms/rules of inference. And in all modal systems weaker than S4, "<>[]P->P"
is not included as an axiom, which renders the modal ontological argument formally invalid.
And Plantinga's version of the argument rests on a bait and switch between
logical possibility and
epistemic possibility (i.e. the equivocation is on the term "possibly").
Um, if Jesus rose from the DEAD, I would like to know what "possible other explanations" that can be given to explain this. It would have to be a naturalistic explanation, too. Please enlighten me.
No, it wouldn't have to be a naturalistic explanation- although naturalistic explanations would not be logically ruled out either. The point is that God's existence would not be
logically implied, even if it would undoubtedly become more
probable- nevertheless "Jesus rose from the dead and God does not exist" is NOT a logical falsehood, so the inference is
non-sequitur.