Why Morality cannot come from God

[blü 2]

Are you now suggesting that thought exists independently of a brain?

Goodness! Please read again what I wrote. (I've varied the wording but not the substance slightly since I first posted it.)

You appear to be saying that I think unicorns are real because there can be drawings of them. I think nothing of the kind.

 

[Curious George]

Goodness! Please read again what I wrote. (I've varied the wording but not the substance slightly since I first posted it.)

You appear to be saying that I think unicorns are real because there can be drawings of them. I think nothing of the kind.

Ok you said:

The expression 'objective morality' indicates that at least some moral rules or statements exist independently of the concept of them in any brain.

Rules are concepts, not real objects, and concepts are only found in brains. Hence I can no more attach a coherent meaning to the expression than you can provide me with an example of a moral statement that has objective existence.

So: thoughts are concepts, not real objects, and thoughts are only found in brains. Hence, I can no more attach a coherent meaning to the expression than you can provide a thought that has objective existence.

Not at all. Thought, concepts, &c exist as physical brain states..

So independence or dependence of a brain has no importance to your position?

 

[blü 2]

Ok you said:

So: thoughts are concepts, not real objects, and thoughts are only found in brains. Hence, I can no more attach a coherent meaning to the expression than you can provide a thought that has objective existence.

So independence or dependence of a brain has no importance to your position?

Think of a concept as like a box. Think of the contents of concept box A as the idea of the real chair and the contents of concept box B as the idea of a unicorn.

The contents of concept box A, abbreviated to 'concept A', have a counterpart in reality.

The contents of concept box B, abbreviated to 'concept B', have no counterpart in reality.

Got it?

 

[Curious George]

Think of a concept as like a box. Think of the contents of concept box A as the idea of the real chair and the contents of concept box B as the idea of a unicorn.

The contents of concept box A, abbreviated to 'concept A', have a counterpart in reality.

The contents of concept box B, abbreviated to 'concept B', have no counterpart in reality.

Got it?

Sure and all we need to do to suggest an objective morality is suggest that concept A corresponds to some factors that are objectively real. In other words, god/gods, evolution, or pragmatism.

A mother should not be brutally killed only for helping her baby.

That ought lines up nicely with many different supposed objective phenomenon. Therefore the consistency between the thought I ought not... has an objective parallel namely contradicting divine purpose, evolutionary purpose, or pragmatic purpose.

 

[blü 2]

Sure

At last!

all we need to do to suggest an objective morality is suggest that concept A corresponds to some factors that are objectively real. In other words, god/gods, evolution, or pragmatism.

No, all you need to do to suggest an objective morality is to demonstrate the existence in reality of the counterpart to concept B, the unicorn, God, moral statement.

But all moral statements are conceptual. Concepts are only found in mentation. They don't have objective existence. That's why you don't find uninstantiated 2s running around, or scratch your car parking next to a moral statement.

A mother should not be brutally killed only for helping her baby.

But just because everyone agrees with it because that's how evolution has shaped mammalian nature, doesn't give the rule objective existence. It's simply a behavioral tendency whose origins lie in evolutionary natural selection.

Nor even in all human opinion is such a view absolute.

Consider a scenario in which the baby will eg grow up to be a Hitleresque monster, or carries a world-threatening infection, and must, in the overwhelming opinion of the onlookers, therefore die, even if it means killing anyone trying to help the baby survive.

Or where X demands that the mother not help the baby, credibly threatening that if she does, X will detonate an atomic explosion under a major city.

Would your suggested moral statement remain popular, do you think?

Or perhaps you saw the Torchwood series 'Children of Earth', in which the Harkness character can only rescue the earth by submitting a child to a psychic/auditory overload that must result in its death, and the only child available in time is the one he's just discovered is the only grandchild he'll ever have.

That ought lines up nicely with many different supposed objective phenomenon. Therefore the consistency between the thought I ought not... has an objective parallel namely contradicting divine purpose, evolutionary purpose, or pragmatic purpose.

For that to stick, you must first demonstrate the objective existence of any uninstantiated purpose (ie as distinct from conduct reflecting it). And for the first two you have the further problem of showing that a real god exists, and that evolution is capable of intention / purpose (presumably in that order).

 

[Curious George]

At last!

No, all you need to do to suggest an objective morality is to demonstrate the existence in reality of the counterpart to concept B, the unicorn, God, moral statement.

But all moral statements are conceptual. Concepts are only found in mentation. They don't have objective existence. That's why you don't find uninstantiated 2s running around, or scratch your car parking next to a moral statement.


But just because everyone agrees with it because that's how evolution has shaped mammalian nature, doesn't give the rule objective existence. It's simply a behavioral tendency whose origins lie in evolutionary natural selection.

Nor even in all human opinion is such a view absolute.

Consider a scenario in which the baby will eg grow up to be a Hitleresque monster, or carries a world-threatening infection, and must, in the overwhelming opinion of the onlookers, therefore die, even if it means killing anyone trying to help the baby survive.

Or where X demands that the mother not help the baby, credibly threatening that if she does, X will detonate an atomic explosion under a major city.

Would your suggested moral statement remain popular, do you think?

I think you have changed the scenario and are now suggesting that the mother be killed for something more than helping her child.

Or perhaps you saw the Torchwood series 'Children of Earth', in which the Harkness character can only rescue the earth by submitting a child to a psychic/auditory overload that must result in its death, and the only child available in time is the one he's just discovered is the only grandchild he'll ever have.

For that to stick, you must first demonstrate the objective existence of any uninstantiated purpose (ie as distinct from conduct reflecting it). And for the first two you have the further problem of showing that a real god exists, and that evolution is capable of intention / purpose (presumably in that order).

Here you are mistaken. Objective morality is being discussed. You have clearly acknowledged that if a god exists, then so too could objective morality exist based on that god. Hence, objective morality is a reasonable discussion as people do believe an objective god exists.

Next we move to evolution. I needn't show a specific purpose for evolution in order to base an objective morality on evolution. I need to show that evolution is a process and that process is hindered by certain actions.

 

[blü 2]

I think you have changed the scenario and are now suggesting that the mother be killed for something more than helping her child.

It fits your scene. She wants to help her child, and for that reason it's necessary hence good to kill her.

Here you are mistaken. Objective morality is being discussed. You have clearly acknowledged that if a god exists, then so too could objective morality exist based on that god.

That's not my view (though I've commented on that view in others). I have no idea what a real god might be, and I've never seen a proposed definition by which we could determine whether any real candidate were a god or not. It's not a trick question. If we want to talk about a real god or God, one that's not imaginary, one with objective existence, then we need that definition. Without it, we don't know what we're talking about.

I take it we're agreed here that imaginary gods don't count.

Hence, objective morality is a reasonable discussion as people do believe an objective god exists.

My objection is preliminary to any discussion. It's to the coherence of the proposed topic.

I needn't show a specific purpose for evolution in order to base an objective morality on evolution. I need to show that evolution is a process and that process is hindered by certain actions.

If evolution is not purposeful, not capable of intention ─ and it isn't ─ then evolution has no moral qualities. The genetic tendencies that are part of human morality arise out of evolution not because they're moral by any objective standard but because they're helpful to the survival of our gregarious species. I set my view out back in #83.

 

[Curious George]

It fits your scene. She wants to help her child, and for that reason it's necessary hence good to kill her.

Except I said "brutally kill for only helping her child," and you are severely neglecting the "only" with these additions. So no, it does not present a challenge.

That's not my view (though I've commented on that view in others). I have no idea what a real god might be, and I've never seen a proposed definition by which we could determine whether any real candidate were a god or not. It's not a trick question. If we want to talk about a real god or God, one that's not imaginary, one with objective existence, then we need that definition. Without it, we don't know what we're talking about.

That you have not seen one does not mean a definition does not exist. I have provided a definition my definition of a god in other topics, if you would like me to provide it here, I can. Though, it does seem quote tangential.

I take it we're agreed here that imaginary gods don't count.

No. We are not in agreement. I think all gods are imaginary. That does not mean one cannot accept as a premise the existence of any imaginary god and then discuss objective morality. In fact, your lack of versatility here surprises me.

My objection is preliminary to any discussion. It's to the coherence of the proposed topic.

You mean your objection is ancillary. While it is necessary at a macro level, your objection in no way prevents meaningful discussion of Objective morality. When someone who is familiar with the topic such as yourself presents overarching objections, then motive is suspect. I am guessing that you have and probably will continue to read papers and books on the topic with understanding. And, while you may question assumptions that are necessary for such arguments about an objective morality, you do understand and follow what is meant.

If evolution is not purposeful, not capable of intention ─ and it isn't ─ then evolution has no moral qualities.

evolution is capable of purpose in the same way any process is capable of purpose. Lacking intention does not necessarily mean to lack purpose. We are going to engage in semantics regarding purpose if we continue down this path. It is sufficient to say that evolution is a natural process. Then, impeding this process becomes the standard, objective mind you, that accounts for immoral behavior.

The genetic tendencies that are part of human morality arise out of evolution not because they're moral by any objective standard but because they're helpful to the survival of our gregarious species. I set my view out back in #83.

Yes, I read it. And it is a nice theory. That does not make alternative theories unreasonable. While we at the heart of the issue are going to disagree with what is objective vs. subjective (i.e. geometry), I do not think we will find much personal disagreement regarding morals in general. That said, the issue at hand is not whether your view is right or wrong, but whether other views are reasonable and capable of being discussed, and are meaningfully discussed.

 

[blü 2]

Except I said "brutally kill for only helping her child," and you are severely neglecting the "only" with these additions.

All she does is help her child, and she is killed for the good. That is, quite literally, she is killed for only helping her child.

That you have not seen one does not mean a definition does not exist.

Perhaps not, but you'll forgive me if I remain skeptical, as is my wont.

No. We are not in agreement. I think all gods are imaginary. That does not mean one cannot accept as a premise the existence of any imaginary god and then discuss objective morality.

Well, every imaginary god is different to every other imaginary god, because each is the creation of the individual imaginer. But if you care to outline the essential nature and powers of the particular imaginary god, we can discuss it as we could discuss, say, Gandalf, or Green Lantern. The question will be the significance of our deliberations, since they'll be more in the realm of literary criticism and fan-writing.

In fact, your lack of versatility here surprises me.

If it's my fault that I've failed your expectations then of course you have my apology.

You mean your objection is ancillary.

No. Just as I said, I mean it's preliminary (etymologically, before the doorstep). No point in entering the house / discussion if we don't know what we're intending to talk about.

When someone who is familiar with the topic such as yourself presents overarching objections, then motive is suspect.

I suppose I should thank you for your frankness, rather than contemn you for the gratuitous and self-serving insult.

while you may question assumptions that are necessary for such arguments about an objective morality, you do understand and follow what is meant.

I've already told you, but I'll tell you again: I understand the idea of an imaginary god effortlessly ─ it's whatever the imaginer wants it to be. I have no idea what real thing, what thing with objective existence, what non-imaginary thing, the word 'god' or 'God' is meant to denote.

And if you did, then you could give me the necessary definition of 'god' / 'God' such that if we found a real candidate, we could tell whether it was a god / God or not. It appears to me that you can't. If that's wrong, tell me the definition. If it's right, then explain why you can't, other than that you (like me) don't know.

evolution is capable of purpose in the same way any process is capable of purpose.

Namely none. Inanimate things and abstract concepts are alike in being devoid of intention, thus of purposes.

evolution is a natural process. Then, impeding this process becomes the standard, objective mind you, that accounts for immoral behavior.

Please restate that. I find your meaning unclear.

Yes, I read it. And it is a nice theory. That does not make alternative theories unreasonable.

That depends on the alternative theory.

While we at the heart of the issue are going to disagree with what is objective vs. subjective (i.e. geometry)

If Euclidean points, lines and planes, if abstractions such as 1, 2, 3, 4, √2, π, ∞, don't exist in reality, what else can they be but imaginary?

the issue at hand is not whether your view is right or wrong, but whether other views are reasonable and capable of being discussed, and are meaningfully discussed.

We're only up to the latter, where so far we're having trouble with our definitions, hence what might meaningfully be discussed'

 

[Curious George]

All she does is help her child, and she is killed for the good. That is, quite literally, she is killed for only helping her child.

Yet that is not the only reason for which she is killed. In your hypotheticals you have added additional facts which entail additional reasons for the killing.

Perhaps not, but you'll forgive me if I remain skeptical, as is my wont.
Well, every imaginary god is different to every other imaginary god, because each is the creation of the individual imaginer. But if you care to outline the essential nature and powers of the particular imaginary god, we can discuss it as we could discuss, say, Gandalf, or Green Lantern. The question will be the significance of our deliberations, since they'll be more in the realm of literary criticism and fan-writing.
If it's my fault that I've failed your expectations then of course you have my apology.

It is certainly not your fault, only mine for assuming you have understood the material which I assume you to have read.
So many assumptions on my part, I perhaps doomed myself to inevitable surprise.

No. Just as I said, I mean it's preliminary (etymologically, before the doorstep). No point in entering the house / discussion if we don't know what we're intending to talk about.

Is it though? I am not sure how.

I suppose I should thank you for your frankness, rather than contemn you for the gratuitous and self-serving insult.

I didn't think it gratuitous. I am merely stating that it brings to mind questions of motive. I cannot imagine you have not read at least an ethics textbook. So, when you come at the topic with a 'it befuddled me how anyone can call morals objective' approach, then I can only wonder what your driving points are.

I've already told you, but I'll tell you again: I understand the idea of an imaginary god effortlessly ─ it's whatever the imaginer wants it to be. I have no idea what real thing, what thing with objective existence, what non-imaginary thing, the word 'god' or 'God' is meant to denote.

And if you did, then you could give me the necessary definition of 'god' / 'God' such that if we found a real candidate, we could tell whether it was a god / God or not. It appears to me that you can't. If that's wrong, tell me the definition. If it's right, then explain why you can't, other than that you (like me) don't know.

Not sure how it helps but:
A god = an intelligent, immortal entity that has a degree of control over all things in the universe and more control over at least one specific aspect of the universe than any mortal thing.

Namely none. Inanimate things and abstract concepts are alike in being devoid of intention, thus of purposes.

Are you suggesting that a process must be an animated thing and cannot be abstract?

Please restate that. I find your meaning unclear.

Evolution is a natural process. This natural process is not subjective. Impediments to this natural process allow for a way to assert that something is objectively bad. This gives us a version of Objective morality.

If Euclidean points, lines and planes, if abstractions such as 1, 2, 3, 4, √2, π, ∞, don't exist in reality, what else can they be but imaginary?

Imaginary but not subject to any one mind. 2+2=4, regardless of the individual approaching the equation if the person approaching the equation has adequate understanding of the axioms at play. If your end game is to challenge the axioms as subjective then you are just preaching solipsism. It is like challenging logic itself as imaginary and subjective because the classical laws of logic are mind dependent.

We're only up to the latter, where so far we're having trouble with our definitions, hence what might meaningfully be discussed'

Yes, I am thinking more and more you are playing at solipsism.

 

[blü 2]

A god = an intelligent, immortal entity that has a degree of control over all things in the universe and more control over at least one specific aspect of the universe than any mortal thing.

No mention of supernatural powers, so you think God = superscientist. I have no trouble with the concept 'superscientist', but I don't equate it with 'god' and I suspect theology and I might agree on that. Why would anyone worship a superscientist?

Are you suggesting that a process must be an animated thing and cannot be abstract?

You can have a physical process, such as the courses of two moving bodies each with mass. You can have a mental process such as the solution to x^2 - 7x + 3 = 0 (all the elements of which are abstract / conceptual / imaginary).

Evolution is a natural process. This natural process is not subjective. Impediments to this natural process allow for a way to assert that something is objectively bad.

Give me an example of something objectively bad, as distinct from something bad relative to humans. For example, do you think any aspect of non-living nature gives a tart whether humans live on or die out? If dolphins thought that the greatest advantage they could bestow on their species was to wipe out the human race, would they be wrong?

Imaginary but not subject to any one mind. 2+2=4, regardless of the individual approaching the equation if the person approaching the equation has adequate understanding of the axioms at play.

But you contradict yourself when you have a 'person' approaching the equation. The abstraction '2' and the abstraction '4' and the abstraction 'addition' don't exist except as [the contents of] concepts in brains.

If your end game is to challenge the axioms as subjective then you are just preaching solipsism.

What axioms as subjective? And since axioms are supposed to be self-evident as distinct from deducible, hence wholly conceptual, how can anything but a brain declare any particular proposition to be an axiom? Nothing in nature is of itself axiomatic.

It is like challenging logic itself as imaginary and subjective because the classical laws of logic are mind dependent.

The classical laws of logic are indeed brain-dependent. In the absence of brains that hold their concepts, they have no existence.

Or are you a Platonist? Do you think there's a real place where axioms and abstractions and generalizations and Platonic forms gather and tingle together? If so, I'd be grateful for the coordinates to which I should point my telescope.

 

[Curious George]

No mention of supernatural powers, so you think God = superscientist. I have no trouble with the concept 'superscientist', but I don't equate it with 'god' and I suspect theology and I might agree on that. Why would anyone worship a superscientist?

I don't think I have met anot immortal superscientist yet. But I suppose if an immortal superscientist existed we could call her a goddess. Whether she was worshipped or not would have no bearing on whether or not she was a goddess.

You can have a physical process, such as the courses of two moving bodies each with mass. You can have a mental process such as the solution to x^2 - 7x + 3 = 0 (all the elements of which are abstract / conceptual / imaginary).
Give me an example of something objectively bad, as distinct from something bad relative to humans. For example, do you think any aspect of non-living nature gives a tart whether humans live on or die out? If dolphins thought that the greatest advantage they could bestow on their species was to wipe out the human race, would they be wrong?

Posing questions of what is right or wrong is secondary to any framework of morals. But, if you want to engage in such discussion the answer is "not necessarily, that I am aware."

But you contradict yourself when you have a 'person' approaching the equation. The abstraction '2' and the abstraction '4' and the abstraction 'addition' don't exist except as [the contents of] concepts in brains.

We have already been over this. That something is a concept does not mean that it is not or cannot be objective.

What axioms as subjective? And since axioms are supposed to be self-evident as distinct from deducible, hence wholly conceptual, how can anything but a brain declare any particular proposition to be an axiom? Nothing in nature is of itself axiomatic.
The classical laws of logic are indeed brain-dependent. In the absence of brains that hold their concepts, they have no existence.

So you want to argue that there is no objective anything. Cool.

Or are you a Platonist? Do you think there's a real place where axioms and abstractions and generalizations and Platonic forms gather and tingle together? If so, I'd be grateful for the coordinates to which I should point my telescope.

Lol. I just think your criteria for objectivity is mistaken. Solipsism is futile, imo.

 

[Paradox22]

Sounds like Blu 2 is following the road of Descartes but never went further than Cogito ergo sum

 

[blü 2]

I don't think I have met anot immortal superscientist yet. But I suppose if an immortal superscientist existed we could call her a goddess. Whether she was worshipped or not would have no bearing on whether or not she was a goddess.

The difference between a god and a superscientist is that the god has real magic, the power to alter reality independently of the rules of physics (by wishing, as a rule) while the superscientist has simply harnessed nature using better insights than we have.

I see no reason in principle why immortality, in the sense of an ever-renewing fit body, perhaps with external or add-on storage for memory, shouldn't be obtainable within science. Lobsters, I think I read somewhere, have no use-by date.

If you equate gods with superscientists then we have no argument. But theology attributes magic ('miracles' and 'omnipotence') to God, and that's what I'm talking about. Magic doesn't exist in reality, but like God it exists in imagination.

We have already been over this. That something is a concept does not mean that it is not or cannot be objective.

Yes it does, since concepts are found only in brains, not out in the wild. The question is therefore whether the concept has a counterpart in reality ('this chair') or not ('a chair'). Abstractions and generalizations only exist as concepts.

If you disagree, then perhaps you can post a photo of an uninstantiated 2, or a Euclidean point, or justice, or intention, or, given your fondness for it, solipsism. Not instances, just the concepts.

 

[Curious George]

The difference between a god and a superscientist is that the god has real magic, the power to alter reality independently of the rules of physics (by wishing, as a rule) while the superscientist has simply harnessed nature using better insights than we have.

I see no reason in principle why immortality, in the sense of an ever-renewing fit body, perhaps with external or add-on storage for memory, shouldn't be obtainable within science. Lobsters, I think I read somewhere, have no use-by date.

Yet we do not generally consider a lobster intelligent (nor a jellyfish). I see no reason not to consider this immortal superscientist a god. I still do not think she exists though.

If you equate gods with superscientists then we have no argument. But theology attributes magic ('miracles' and 'omnipotence') to God, and that's what I'm talking about. Magic doesn't exist in reality, but like God it exists in imagination.

immortal superscientists do not exist in reality.

Yes it does, since concepts are found only in brains, not out in the wild. The question is therefore whether the concept has a counterpart in reality ('this chair') or not ('a chair'). Abstractions and generalizations only exist as concepts.

If you disagree, then perhaps you can post a photo of an uninstantiated 2, or a Euclidean point, or justice, or intention, or, given your fondness for it, solipsism. Not instances, just the concepts.

How does that chair have any counterpart in reality?

 

[blü 2]

I see no reason not to consider this immortal superscientist a god. I still do not think she exists though.

Which implies you think it feasible that humans will become able to prolong useful life indefinitely (which will do for the concept of immortality).

But without supernatural powers, it's just sleight of hand.

How does that chair have any counterpart in reality?

The concept of this chair I'm sitting on is the concept of a real thing. That is, my concept has a counterpart in reality. The concept of 'a chair' refers to no specific chair, has no real counterpart, but is an abstraction, and nowhere in reality is there 'a chair', only 'this chair' and 'this chair' and ...

 

[Curious George]

Which implies you think it feasible that humans will become able to prolong useful life indefinitely (which will do for the concept of immortality).

But without supernatural powers, it's just sleight of hand.

Not really. I see no reason not to refer to such an entity as god. I do not think it is feasible that people will become immortal.

The concept of this chair I'm sitting on is the concept of a real thing. That is, my concept has a counterpart in reality. The concept of 'a chair' refers to no specific chair, has no real counterpart, but is an abstraction, and nowhere in reality is there 'a chair', only 'this chair' and 'this chair' and ...

I didn't say "a chair." So again, how does that chair have any counterpart in reality?

 

[blü 2]

Not really. I see no reason not to refer to such an entity as god. I do not think it is feasible that people will become immortal

As I said, if you exclude the supernatural we have no real point of disagreement except the title 'god'.

I didn't say "a chair." So again, how does that chair have any counterpart in reality?

It's not the chair that has a counterpart in reality, it's my concept of the chair. The real chair is the real counterpart to my concept of it. (Whereas my concept 'a chair' has no real counterpart.)

 

[blü 2]

Sounds like Blu 2 is following the road of Descartes but never went further than Cogito ergo sum

Sorry, I've only just noticed this.

I acknowledge one debt to Descartes ─ the realization that at the very roots of thought, some axioms, some assumptions, are necessary, for the reason that they can't be deduced unless you've already assumed they're correct. If memory serves, mine differ from his, but I owe him. My assumptions / axioms are that a world exists external to the self, that our senses are capable of informing us of this world, and that reason is a valid tool.

As for cogito ergo sum, my view is that the sense of self that each of us has is a datum, not an assumption.

(And as for dualism, pshaw! and phooey!)

 

[Curious George]

As I said, if you exclude the supernatural we have no real point of disagreement except the title 'god'.

Which is funny because that is all we are doing is discussing the title of god here. I am just trying to figure out how you think the title god doesn't apply. You obviously want to include supernatural powers in your definition of god. I do not see why it is a necessity.

It's not the chair that has a counterpart in reality, it's my concept of the chair. The real chair is the real counterpart to my concept of it. (Whereas my concept 'a chair' has no real counterpart.)

this is confusing. You said this chair has a real counterpart and I asked how that chair has a real counterpart. You have now moved on to how the chair has no real counterpart and just asserted that your concept of the chair has a real counterpart. You haven't answered the question at all.