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Why Morality cannot come from God

blü 2

Veteran Member
Premium Member
You obviously want to include supernatural powers in your definition of god. I do not see why it is a necessity.
As I said, who'd want to worship a superscientist? Magic's a whole nother thing.
You said this chair has a real counterpart
No, I said 'this chair' (the inverted commas telling you I'm referring to the concept) has a real counterpart, whereas 'a chair' (the inverted commas again telling you I'm referring to the concept) has no real counterpart.
 

Curious George

Veteran Member
As I said, who'd want to worship a superscientist? Magic's a whole nother thing.
People choose to worship strange things. Is it only worship that makes a god?
No, I said 'this chair' (the inverted commas telling you I'm referring to the concept) has a real counterpart, whereas 'a chair' (the inverted commas again telling you I'm referring to the concept) has no real counterpart.
You said "'this chair,'" I said that chair. My "that" refers to your "'this.'" Now 'that' we have 'this' out of the way, can you field an answer?
 

blü 2

Veteran Member
Premium Member
People choose to worship strange things. Is it only worship that makes a god?

You said "'this chair,'" I said that chair. My "that" refers to your "'this.'" Now 'that' we have 'this' out of the way, can you field an answer?
The gods forbid that you should become tedious! It's all there. Just read it.
 

ArtieE

Well-Known Member
Give me an example of something objectively bad, as distinct from something bad relative to humans. For example, do you think any aspect of non-living nature gives a tart whether humans live on or die out? If dolphins thought that the greatest advantage they could bestow on their species was to wipe out the human race, would they be wrong?
Have you read this?
How Morality Has the Objectivity that Matters—Without God
Or this?
Evolution and Functionally Objective Morality - The Gemsbok
 
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shunyadragon

shunyadragon
Premium Member

Careful reading the whole sources as cited. From the Naturalist (science) perspective the concept of the nature of morality and ethics being possibly objective is addressed very differently and conditionally than the approach of Christian apologetics, who consider the foundation of 'objective morality' to be a brute fact ground in the necessity of God being the 'Source.'

From: Evolution and Functionally Objective Morality - The Gemsbok

It is objective, in the sense that it is universal, but it is also not objective, in the sense that it is not the immutable force described by moral realists. This also provides an account of human altruism. Whether an individual’s genes are selected in the communal sense detailed above, or via the individual’s reciprocal self-interest (‘If I scratch your back, you scratch mine’), the result is the same: more individuals inclined toward altruistic behavior.

Functionally objective morality would explain not only human moral inclinations, but also the feeling of moral obligation. Both are necessary aspects of the minds of a community if that community is to have any chance of continuing to exist.
 

blü 2

Veteran Member
Premium Member
My disagreement with that article may come down to terminology ─ I'm not sure.

Back in #83 I briefly set out my views on the origins of morality, noting that the basics are from evolution / genetics and most of the rest from culture. The parts from evolution are the moral tendencies found in all societies ─ the nurture and protection of children, the dislike of the one who harms, fairness and reciprocity, respect for authority, loyalty to the group and a sense of virtue or self-worth through self-denial. Some of these can be demonstrated even in children less than a year old. All but the first are to do with living gregariously.

The point is that evolution has no intention, no morality. Natural selection gave all mammals, including us, instinctive imperatives about eg the nurture and protection of offspring, not out of benevolence or desire that mammals flourish, but simply because those who took less care of offspring thereby passed their genes on at a lower rate than those who took more care.

If morality were objective then it would be morality independently of human opinion, and it would apply universally. Whereas morality is always relative to the species (and more).
 

ArtieE

Well-Known Member
The point is that evolution has no intention, no morality. Natural selection gave all mammals, including us, instinctive imperatives about eg the nurture and protection of offspring, not out of benevolence or desire that mammals flourish, but simply because those who took less care of offspring thereby passed their genes on at a lower rate than those who took more care.

If morality were objective then it would be morality independently of human opinion, and it would apply universally. Whereas morality is always relative to the species (and more).
Try reading those articles again. It appears you didn't understand them. You are using a definition of objective that simply isn't applicable to the subject matter.
 

blü 2

Veteran Member
Premium Member
Try reading those articles again. It appears you didn't understand them. You are using a definition of objective that simply isn't applicable to the subject matter.
I don't use their terminology.

It makes no sense to me that 'objective morality' means 'subjective morality'. Evolutionary morality is not moral of itself. That it's moral is an evolved human judgment.
 

ArtieE

Well-Known Member
I don't use their terminology.

It makes no sense to me that 'objective morality' means 'subjective morality'. Evolutionary morality is not moral of itself. That it's moral is an evolved human judgment.
I'm afraid that it's their terminology that makes sense not yours. The problem is with you, not them.
 

blü 2

Veteran Member
Premium Member
I'm afraid that it's their terminology that makes sense not yours. The problem is with you, not them.
If you think what I wrote in my previous post is wrong, please be specific about the error. This conversation is between you and me, not me and the authors of your link.
 

ArtieE

Well-Known Member
If you think what I wrote in my previous post is wrong, please be specific about the error. This conversation is between you and me, not me and the authors of your link.
The specific errors in post 168 is:

1. Objective morality doesn't mean subjective morality and those articles don't say so.
2. The sentence "Evolutionary morality is not moral of itself" is meaningless. "Moral of itself"? What's that supposed to mean?
3. "That it's moral is an evolved human judgment." What?
 

Ponder This

Well-Known Member
'To be objective' is a way for a human to consider a question, and has the qualities you mention. However, it's not possible for a moral rule, a maths rule, a physics rule, a rule for line-dancing, to possess such a quality. A human applying such a rule might proceed 'with objectivity' but the rule will remain a rule, that's to say a concept, not a thing with objective existence, not a thing existing in external ('objective') reality independently of the concept of it.
'

Is 'objective' a 'quality' or an 'abstraction' existing only in 'mentation'?
Are you using 'objective' a synonym for 'real'?
Because for me 'objective' is not synonymous with 'real'.
This is why straight lines are not 'real', but mathematics is 'objective'.

No he doesn't. Instead he arrives at a conclusion validly derived in accordance with the rules of the relevant branch of maths. The rules, and the processes, and the mathematical objects they apply to, are all conceptual, and the objects, exactly like our Euclidean straight line, have no counterpart in reality.

I don't have a problem with mathematics not being 'real' in the sense that 'straight lines' are not 'real'. But to say there is no 'counterpart in reality' is starting to play loose with the language, imo.

That said, how is 'validly derived in accordance with the rules of the relevant branch of maths' a matter of personal feeling or opinion? In mathematics, we have a name for personal opinions... we call them 'conjectures' or 'hypotheses'. A 'conjecture' is someone's hypothesis: a mathematical statement imagined to be true, but not having proof. And it is often the goal of future mathematicians to prove or disprove conjectures.

Then where I've said 'exist only in imagination', please read, 'exist only in mentation'.

Okay, I take this to mean that you regard things which exist 'only in mentation' to be things that we imagine but that do not have 'real counterparts'.

Not quite. The question is whether the concept refers to something with objective existence (eg 'this chair'), in which case it's about reality, or not (eg 'a chair'), in which case it's about, and only about, things in mentation.

So, in this sense, 'three' also may refer to something with real existence. If I say, 'these three chairs' referring to the three chairs I see gathered around my kitchen table, three has a 'real counterpart' in that the thing to which I refer is manifest (in fact, self-evident). Whereas, if I were to say 'some group of three chairs' where the chairs to which I am now referring lack substance, then they 'exist only in mentation'. And when I physically move 'this particular kitchen chair' taking it away and putting it in the living room, I have, in fact, done 'real mathematics' (that is to say 'real subtraction') as there are now two chairs in my kitchen, whereas if I take away one of the imaginary chairs, I have done something 'only in mentation'.

While your 'chair' may be 'real' to you, it exists 'only in mentation' to me. Is your 'chair' both 'objective' and 'subjective' at the same time? To wit: it is the mathematics of the chairs that is objective and the physical existence of the chairs that is subjective.

No, a complete definition of a 'brain-like thing' will depend on the conclusions we reach in the course of brain research, but these already show that the very great majority of brain activity is done by the nonconscious brain, . You may be aware of the experiments some years ago which showed that the brain had already made a particular decision up to ten seconds before the conscious brain was aware of the decision. Or more simply, ponder where the words you speak or type 'are', up to the millisecond before you say or type them ─ only very rarely in the conscious brain.

Indeed. It would seem that 'brain-like activity' is not completely understood yet.

First, morality is a quality that may be attributed to a roughly-defined set of animal, usually human, attitudes about the relationship of the individual to others, and the decisions and behaviors that result from them. These have their sources in genetic tendencies, such as child nurture and protection, dislike of the one who harms, fairness and reciprocity, respect for authority, loyalty to the group, and a sense of virtue or self-worth through self-denial, which are present in all societies. Or they may derive from particular customs, such as whether a wedding entails a dowry, a bride-price or neither, how to hold a knife and fork, whether and if so when you may spit or fart, and so on. And then each human has a conscience, the sense / conviction that certain rules of behavior have universal application, and aren't simply opinions (though the list of such rules will vary with the individual).
So morality ranges from largely fixed, like child nurture, to arbitrary (blackballed for wearing inappropriate socks, the moral judgment 'not a person we want to associate with').
(The Ten Commandments are an egregious example of arbitrary selection and crap draftsmanship. Don't get me started.)

hmmm, it sounds like you are well on your way to a morality of some sort.

If I had to do that, I'd start by offering a replacement definition of a circle, so that it fitted my maths and not Euclid's.

Hue, hue, hue.

As I said, I don't agree that 'objectivity' can be used here in the sense you propose. (And I continue to equate 'objective existence' with 'real existence', in contrast to 'existence solely in mentation'.)

I don't regard it as my aim to convince you otherwise. But I do find it burdensome to qualify morality as 'not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts' vs 'based on or influenced by personal feelings, tastes, or opinions'. Instead of calling it 'objective' vs 'subjective'.
 

blü 2

Veteran Member
Premium Member
1. Objective morality doesn't mean subjective morality and those articles don't say so.
Whether you follow the article or not, you can't arrive at what is moral except via your own judgment. No objective test will tell you whether any particular proposition is moral or not. Take a statement like,'We must exterminate the fire ant'. Good, bad, free of moral questions? The answers are the opinions of humans looking at human advantage against such concepts as respect for nature.
2. The sentence "Evolutionary morality is not moral of itself" is meaningless. "Moral of itself"? What's that supposed to mean?
Our morality arises by natural selection, an amoral process. That is, morality doesn't exist so that we can good. It exists because for gregarious critters it benefits survival and breeding. As I said before, if a dolphin concluded that the greatest benefit she could bestow on dolphinkind was to eliminate the human race, would she be wrong? Why? Because that doesn't suit human opinion? Or because morality is objective and wrong is wrong?
3. "That it's moral is an evolved human judgment." What?
As in my dolphin example.
 

blü 2

Veteran Member
Premium Member
Is 'objective' a 'quality' or an 'abstraction' existing only in 'mentation'?
Are you using 'objective' a synonym for 'real'?
For X to have objective existence is for X to exist independently of the concept of X in any brain. And yes, for me those things are real which have objective existence, and no other things. However it's not clear to me that everyone agrees.
Because for me 'objective' is not synonymous with 'real'.
This is why straight lines are not 'real', but mathematics is 'objective'.
It's true that arithmetic and its procedures arise out of human experience of reality, and have been constantly adjusted so as to conform with that. But this depends on human convenience and the way humans see the world. For there to be two sheep, you need a human to define the relevant physical region (let's call it the 'field') and the thing to be counted (let's call it the 'topic' and let's say 'sheep') and the test for relevance amongst the potential elements of the topic (eg 'all sheep I can see' or 'nearest sheep' or 'black sheep' or 'suitable for slaughter' &c). Same with pebbles, trees, parking police, and so on. And then from pebbles in a bag or notches on a stick on to abstractions like the numbers 1, 2, 3, and so on, concepts being derived from concepts, to build the edifice of maths.
I don't have a problem with mathematics not being 'real' in the sense that 'straight lines' are not 'real'. But to say there is no 'counterpart in reality' is starting to play loose with the language, imo.
We could argue that, I dare say. But there are no Euclidean points, lines, planes, no irrationals, infinities, outside of human thought. We have the concepts, defined with remarkable clarity, and the concepts have no real counterparts.
That said, how is 'validly derived in accordance with the rules of the relevant branch of maths' a matter of personal feeling or opinion?
It isn't. Applied maths is like turning a crank and getting a machine-made answer. Calculators could do useful arithmetic long before computers. Computers doing maths execute predetermined procedures analogous to the cranked machine or the Jacquard loom. What they do is done in reality.

The results remain conceptual though ─ 20,032.34 may be the week's takings, the number of Ruritanian vlads you can buy for $US100 today, the average number of rivets the factory uses in an hour, and so on ... in other words, the human has to provide the meaning of the calculated result. Otherwise it has no meaning.
In mathematics, we have a name for personal opinions... we call them 'conjectures' or 'hypotheses'. A 'conjecture' is someone's hypothesis: a mathematical statement imagined to be true, but not having proof. And it is often the goal of future mathematicians to prove or disprove conjectures.
True, but the Riemann hypothesis is about as abstract, as conceptual, as lacking a real counterpart, as you could wish for. And when it's replaced by ArtieE's Theorem (Fields Medal winner 2022) showing that the hypothesis holds for all values, it'll still be as abstract, as lacking a real counterpart, as ever.
Okay, I take this to mean that you regard things which exist 'only in mentation' to be things that we imagine but that do not have 'real counterparts'.
Just so.
So, in this sense, 'three' also may refer to something with real existence. If I say, 'these three chairs' referring to the three chairs I see gathered around my kitchen table, three has a 'real counterpart' in that the thing to which I refer is manifest (in fact, self-evident).
The three chairs are an instantiation of the concept 'three'. They aren't the concept three itself. That still is only found in brains. That's why, until a human comes along and takes notice of the chairs, ie chooses (makes relevant) the room as the field, chair as the topic, and remarks their quantity, there's no threeness there, any more than there's (say) tenness for the room's furniture or twoness for the room's carpets unless and until someone deems those relevant and notices their quantity.
Whereas, if I were to say 'some group of three chairs' where the chairs to which I am now referring lack substance, then they 'exist only in mentation'.
They lack real identity. Instead we're dealing with the abstraction 'something to sit on' or whatever.
And when I physically move 'this particular kitchen chair' taking it away and putting it in the living room, I have, in fact, done 'real mathematics' (that is to say 'real subtraction') as there are now two chairs in my kitchen
You've done mental mathematics on real things. That's the only way that anything mathematical can occur. As I said, without selection of relevant fields and topics, there can be no maths applied to reality, and only brains make those selections.
While your 'chair' may be 'real' to you, it exists 'only in mentation' to me. Is your 'chair' both 'objective' and 'subjective' at the same time? To wit: it is the mathematics of the chairs that is objective and the physical existence of the chairs that is subjective.
So for you I'm sitting on 'a chair' which is for me 'this chair', yes. But we both know that there are many chairs in the world, so it's a matter of particularity, not a matter of existence (at least in this case). It's the way the brain works by such abstractions that's interesting.
hmmm, it sounds like you are well on your way to a morality of some sort.
Why not? I'm genetically a social animal, with behavioral traits and attitudes built in.
I don't regard it as my aim to convince you otherwise. But I do find it burdensome to qualify morality as 'not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts' vs 'based on or influenced by personal feelings, tastes, or opinions'. Instead of calling it 'objective' vs 'subjective'.
What's an example of a moral rule not influenced by personal feelings? Isn't the whole basis of morality about how the individual relates to others? And from there by extension to how groups relate?
 
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Kelly of the Phoenix

Well-Known Member
Just as we need lawyers and judges for secular law, so we do also for the Laws of Judaism. G-d does not condone murder, whenever people are killed, it is for a defined set of facts and circumstances.
Ends up being a pretty big range of circumstances, from working on a Saturday to being gay to drawing some pictures.
 

Ponder This

Well-Known Member
For X to have objective existence is for X to exist independently of the concept of X in any brain. And yes, for me those things are real which have objective existence, and no other things. However it's not clear to me that everyone agrees.

Indeed, we do not agree on what 'objective' means, which is the crux of our disagreement here. And this is why I pointed out in my first post that you are asking for a 'real morality' (not merely an objective one).

It's true that arithmetic and its procedures arise out of human experience of reality, and have been constantly adjusted so as to conform with that. But this depends on human convenience and the way humans see the world. For there to be two sheep, you need a human to define the relevant physical region (let's call it the 'field') and the thing to be counted (let's call it the 'topic' and let's say 'sheep') and the test for relevance amongst the potential elements of the topic (eg 'all sheep I can see' or 'nearest sheep' or 'black sheep' or 'suitable for slaughter' &c). Same with pebbles, trees, parking police, and so on. And then from pebbles in a bag or notches on a stick on to abstractions like the numbers 1, 2, 3, and so on, concepts being derived from concepts, to build the edifice of maths.

The whole point is remove ambiguity and subjective interpretation.

We could argue that, I dare say. But there are no Euclidean points, lines, planes, no irrationals, infinities, outside of human thought. We have the concepts, defined with remarkable clarity, and the concepts have no real counterparts.

There is an assumption about the limits of our ability to verify, but I see no reason to argue about it.

It isn't. Applied maths is like turning a crank and getting a machine-made answer. Calculators could do useful arithmetic long before computers. Computers doing maths execute predetermined procedures analogous to the cranked machine or the Jacquard loom. What they do is done in reality.

The results remain conceptual though ─ 20,032.34 may be the week's takings, the number of Ruritanian vlads you can buy for $US100 today, the average number of rivets the factory uses in an hour, and so on ... in other words, the human has to provide the meaning of the calculated result. Otherwise it has no meaning.

It seems we agree on the nature of the processes, but not the nature of the results.

You are talking about objective ontological morality: which is asking if morals exist independently of people.
And I am talking about objective epistemic morality: which is asking if we can have objective knowledge of morals.

In Theistic Objective Morality God is an ontological basis for objective morality. And in the absence of God, it becomes difficult to find any ontological basis for objective morality.

True, but the Riemann hypothesis is about as abstract, as conceptual, as lacking a real counterpart, as you could wish for. And when it's replaced by ArtieE's Theorem (Fields Medal winner 2022) showing that the hypothesis holds for all values, it'll still be as abstract, as lacking a real counterpart, as ever.

This is all just confusion about ontological vs epistemic questions.
The questions in mathematics are epistemic - not ontological.

The three chairs are an instantiation of the concept 'three'. They aren't the concept three itself. That still is only found in brains. That's why, until a human comes along and takes notice of the chairs, ie chooses (makes relevant) the room as the field, chair as the topic, and remarks their quantity, there's no threeness there, any more than there's (say) tenness for the room's furniture or twoness for the room's carpets unless and until someone deems those relevant and notices their quantity.

The chairs are just instantiations of the concept of 'chair', they aren't the concept of chair itself. What of it?

They lack real identity. Instead we're dealing with the abstraction 'something to sit on' or whatever.

That's all a chair is anyways: an abstraction of 'something to sit on'. Real chairs are just instantiations of an abstract concept of a chair.

You've done mental mathematics on real things. That's the only way that anything mathematical can occur. As I said, without selection of relevant fields and topics, there can be no maths applied to reality, and only brains make those selections.

You've done imagination on real things. That's the only way you can describe something as a chair.

So for you I'm sitting on 'a chair' which is for me 'this chair', yes. But we both know that there are many chairs in the world, so it's a matter of particularity, not a matter of existence (at least in this case). It's the way the brain works by such abstractions that's interesting.

It's just that there are two senses: ontological and epistemic.
'Objective' and 'subjective' have ontological and epistemic meanings.

Why not? I'm genetically a social animal, with behavioral traits and attitudes built in.

I'm not sure if you are suggesting an objective morality or merely inventing another subjective one.

What's an example of a moral rule not influenced by personal feelings? Isn't the whole basis of morality about how the individual relates to others? And from there by extension to how groups relate?

That is the conundrum. Do you insist on an objective ontological morality (one that exists independently of the very people it is supposed to concern)? This is what you were asking people to produce for you.
 

blü 2

Veteran Member
Premium Member
Indeed, we do not agree on what 'objective' means, which is the crux of our disagreement here. And this is why I pointed out in my first post that you are asking for a 'real morality' (not merely an objective one).
And as you say, since I equate the two, no surprise.
The whole point is remove ambiguity and subjective interpretation.
Yes, but even within a common culture there are debates. For example, although there's a most-common answer to the Trolley problem, there are other answers as well. I recall reading an article a while back by an admired public health administrator in retirement, about how much a human life was indeed worth when you were in charge of finite money resources.
It seems we agree on the nature of the processes, but not the nature of the results.
I'm puzzled why you think the result of an e-calculation might be meaningful in the absence of a relevant human.
You are talking about objective ontological morality: which is asking if morals exist independently of people.
And as you know, my view is firmly that they don't.
And I am talking about objective epistemic morality: which is asking if we can have objective knowledge of morals.
There is no objective validation of a moral principle, no. (There may be an evolutionary explanation, but that's not the same thing, since nothing moral was involved in evolving it.) There's simply greater or lesser consensus, based on a mix of genes / evolution, culture and personal nature and experience.
In Theistic Objective Morality God is an ontological basis for objective morality. And in the absence of God, it becomes difficult to find any ontological basis for objective morality.
Amen. But even in the presence of God, no one can suggest an example of objective morality that will last more than ten seconds in sunlight.

It's an odd thing about quite a few believers that they seek to be reassured in terms of absolutes, not least about personal immortality ...
This is all just confusion about ontological vs epistemic questions.
The questions in mathematics are epistemic - not ontological.
Correct me if I misunderstand, but you seem to be saying that I've erred in pointing out that maths and its conclusions exist only conceptually, and don't run around in the wilds of nature. If that's right, what error? If I've misunderstood, what point were you making?
That's all a chair is anyways: an abstraction of 'something to sit on'. Real chairs are just instantiations of an abstract concept of a chair.
We get our concepts of 'chair' as infants turning to look where our mother is pointing and looking as she says 'chair'. The interesting thing is how the brain deals with categories by the resulting abstractions of 'chairness'.
I'm not sure if you are suggesting an objective morality or merely inventing another subjective one.
All morality comes from subjectivity. Conscience, duty, fairness, justice, are all in our respective brains, albeit our genes designed the module they run in. If we don't feel it, then very largely we don't do it, so (speaking as one who feels it) full marks to nature for a system effective in influencing behavior.
That is the conundrum. Do you insist on an objective ontological morality (one that exists independently of the very people it is supposed to concern)? This is what you were asking people to produce for you.
In asking people who support objective morality to put an example of an objectively moral proposition on the table where we can inspect it, my intention is to underline that there are no such propositions.
 

ArtieE

Well-Known Member
Whether you follow the article or not, you can't arrive at what is moral except via your own judgment. No objective test will tell you whether any particular proposition is moral or not. Take a statement like,'We must exterminate the fire ant'. Good, bad, free of moral questions? The answers are the opinions of humans looking at human advantage against such concepts as respect for nature.
Our morality arises by natural selection, an amoral process. That is, morality doesn't exist so that we can good. It exists because for gregarious critters it benefits survival and breeding. As I said before, if a dolphin concluded that the greatest benefit she could bestow on dolphinkind was to eliminate the human race, would she be wrong? Why? Because that doesn't suit human opinion? Or because morality is objective and wrong is wrong?
As in my dolphin example.
You and the authors of the articles I quoted and me we aren't on the same page blü 2. Not even in the same book. Not even in the same galaxy. Your questions have no meaning in our galaxy. So I can't answer.
 

Ponder This

Well-Known Member
I think that we've mostly covered this topic. So I'll sum up what I've gleaned from our discussion so far:

When talking about objective morality, it is important to distinguish between the ontological and epistemic.
When you asked someone to present an 'objective morality', what you really meant was an 'objective ontological morality' or 'real morality'. You did not mean an 'objective epistemic morality'. I think our disagreement has been 'solved' in that we now understand in what way we disagreed.

I'm puzzled why you think the result of an e-calculation might be meaningful in the absence of a relevant human.

The reason you are puzzled is because you haven't acknowledged that I have been referring to the epistemic nature of things. I understand why you don't see an objective ontological meaning.

And as you know, my view is firmly that they don't.

Indeed, that is your point of view.

There is no objective validation of a moral principle, no. (There may be an evolutionary explanation, but that's not the same thing, since nothing moral was involved in evolving it.) There's simply greater or lesser consensus, based on a mix of genes / evolution, culture and personal nature and experience.

I confirm that you mean that there is no objective ontological moral principle.

Amen. But even in the presence of God, no one can suggest an example of objective morality that will last more than ten seconds in sunlight.

It's an odd thing about quite a few believers that they seek to be reassured in terms of absolutes, not least about personal immortality ...

Hmm, well it seems the debate on this one has been ongoing. As I said the theistic objective morality argument in simple terms is an argument for the existence of God:

1. If God does not exist, then an objective ontological morality does not exist.
2. Objective ontological morality must exist.
Ergo: God must exist.​

This argument has been around and appears to hinge on whether or not there is an objective ontological morality. Moreover, it is also often claimed that:
3. If God exists, then an objective ontological morality exists.​

Correct me if I misunderstand, but you seem to be saying that I've erred in pointing out that maths and its conclusions exist only conceptually, and don't run around in the wilds of nature. If that's right, what error? If I've misunderstood, what point were you making?

To be clear, I don't think you've erred in pointing out the conceptual nature of math. You simply don't appear to regard epistemic questions as meaningful. You erred by bringing the epistemic nature of mathematics into an ontological discussion about morality. You cannot use the epistemic nature of mathematics to refute ontological morality.

All morality comes from subjectivity. Conscience, duty, fairness, justice, are all in our respective brains, albeit our genes designed the module they run in. If we don't feel it, then very largely we don't do it, so (speaking as one who feels it) full marks to nature for a system effective in influencing behavior.

In this case, you mean ontological subjectivity.

In asking people who support objective morality to put an example of an objectively moral proposition on the table where we can inspect it, my intention is to underline that there are no such propositions.

Since it was your intent to request an objective ontological morality, we can say you have successfully asked that question. However, if it was your intent to underline that there are no such 'propositions', then you failed to address the primary one from the OP: God.

Moreover, it was never your intent to ask about objective epistemic morality, which also makes use of the term 'objective' in discussing it's propositions. Can we regard the sources of our confusions as resolved? I am satisfied that I understand your terminology. I don't feel the need to convince you that there is an epistemic question as well as an ontological one, nor do I feel the need to convince you that God exists. It suffices for me if we disagree on these points.
 
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