I just want to be as clear as possible so I can understand. Can you explain what you mean by a thought that is "willed" or "unwilled"? In my view, a thought is simply an act or result of thinking.
A willed thought would be one that is selected from an infinite number of sources and constructed from as likely many processes. The infinite number of processes I'm not so sure about. But we certainly have an infinite number of variables with which to work in "willing" some thoughts. I believe the creative product might be an example of this.
I have control over my output. I have control over selection of data and selection of processes, or so it seems. A thought is certainly an act or result of thinking. But don't you have some form of limited "willed" control over your thoughts, at least some of them?
And you believe learning and personal preference are not results of conditioning? I ask because you classify conditioned responses as "unwilled".
I don't believe all thoughts
HAVE to be the result of conditoning.
I commend you for that. I don't think any free will advocate has worked through it.
I certainly don't believe I have at this point. Again, I understand how difficult it is to disprove or even circumvent classical cause-and-effect determinism. It certainly appears every single event and act that occurs in our universe is the result of a cause that was pre-established by a preceding cause that was pre-established and was likewise preceded by a former cause and so on and so on.
However, I believe the human mind
might represent a break in classical determinism. It so keenly appears to me that freewill is a practical model on which to gage our behavior, and it also is an absolutely necessary model on which we base many of our human social systems, such as criminal law codes and democratic forms of government, it seems practical as well for me to try to validate it. At least that was my initial thought, which I believe I am free to reject or act on.
As an irrereverent agnostic jerk I am certainly not choosing sides yet. I have found no conclusive proof of Freewill, at least no proofs that have manifested in purlely academic debates and/or discussions like this one. However, like some other postulates which we assume are true because we've never observed them to be untrue, the very fact that freewill is a more practical model to assume than determinism gives me reason to attempt to reason it out.
I daresay nobody, not even the staunchest determinist, has met any relative success by acting under the assumed contraints of a purely determinist model. Nobody, in all practicality and everyday application, walks around thinking they have no influence over their actions and all choices result as predetermined effects beyond their control. That simply isn't a practical way to behave and live.
However, in this particular case, I was responding to allegations that no theists had ever made a reasonably coherent argument in favor of freewill. I certainly don't think I have proven freewill, by any stretch of the imagination, but I believe I can and have made some compelling points that are cogent and coherent based on a theist-style model, one that attempts to prove freewill without rejecting or challenging the proposition of the divine.
There are a few things that I find bothersome about classical determinism, and I have yet to compile enough material to author a book on the topic, but they go something like this:
1. We lack insufficient knowledge of how the brain ultimately works and whence comes all its products to verifiably say that there is no freethinking, freeacting Will influencing our outputs, at least I think so. But I'm no psychologist or expert on human brain activity. We are stuck with data the universe provides us and the processes that genetics and other natural causes have forced on us, but the human mind seems to be capable of learning, rejecting and selecting, and producing wholely unique thoughts. I find the uniqueness and originality of our products to be somewhat compelling evidence, though not conclusive proof, of freewill.
2. The practicality of assuming a freewill model. I know of no one who conducts themselves as if they have no control over their outputs and actions. This by itself seems to provide reason to better understand this area of espistemology.
3. Infinite variables. The fact that there are an infinite number of variables from which I can choose to construct and systhisize my thoughts seems to validate freewill. Again, this is not meant to be proof, in any way. I just find these particular elements to be bothersome and nagging.
4. The fact that some of my thoughts go through a seemingly controlled and willed process of synthesis rather than manifesting as reactions/responses. Boo!!! Suprise me, and yes, I will react with limited control. Ask me to write a poem ode to any number between one and infinity, and I will be able to assert control over my output.
Again, this is nothing conclusive, I realize that. However, I hope it is somewhat coherent with at least a few valid points.