I would say, in defense of libertarian freewill, allergies, culture preference and social pressure unless being directly applied from some other individual are internal factors. Even physical factors are your personal physiology which is fair game for a person to take into consideration in libertarian freewill.
In my view, physique, mental condition, desire, internalized cultural pressure, morality, anything that is internalized/part of the physical body, that is part of the decision fits with the definition, per post #16, of libertarian freewill.
Of course as someone who accepts determinism you could have a different definition of freewill but then it is the definition that is the problem and not the person who believes in libertarian freewill.
None of the above offered any defense of libertarian free will since all you mentioned and many other factors imped potential libertarian free will. There is absolutely no evidence for unimeeded libertarian free will.
Do we have free will? Free will is one of the central topics in philosophy, both historically and in the present. The basic puzzles of this topic are easily felt. For instance, it’s easy to wonder whether factors beyond our control -- our genetic constitution, the environment in which we were...
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Free will, libertarianism, and luck
Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates
Do we have free will? Free will is one of the central topics in philosophy, both historically and in the present. The basic puzzles of this topic are easily felt. For instance, it’s easy to wonder whether factors beyond our control — our genetic constitution, the environment in which we were brought up, and so on — might be among the causes of our behavior. In the light of this, we might wonder whether it’s really possible for us to act freely or, instead, whether everything we do is ultimately shaped by these factors in such a way that undermines our free will.
In contemporary philosophical discussions, this concern is crystallized as a concern about the relationship between free will and causal determinism. Causal determinism is the view that for any given time, a complete statement of the facts at that time, together with a complete statement of the laws of nature, entails every truth as to what happens after that time. On this issue, the basic divide among philosophers is between compatibilism and incompatibilism. Compatibilists believe that free will is compatible with determinism, whereas incompatibilists argue that free will is incompatible with determinism. According to incompatibilists, if our actions are causally determined, then we can’t act freely.
One view about free will that has recently received a lot of scholarly attention is the
libertarian view of free will. Libertarianism about free will, which is completely distinct from libertarianism as a political doctrine, is the view that people
do have free will, but that this freedom is
incompatible with determinism. Thus, libertarians are incompatibilists who think that free will exists. (You could, of course, be an incompatibilist who thinks that free will
doesn’t exist — a so-called “free will skeptic.”) In short, if libertarianism is true, then people sometimes act without being causally determined to do so.
In many ways, libertarianism is a natural view to hold about free will. After all, it seems obvious to most of us that we have free will, and many people believe that there’s a clear incompatibility between free will and determinism. But despite this appeal, many philosophers are skeptical of libertarianism. They think that there are powerful reasons to think that this view is false.
One especially prominent objection to libertarianism is the “luck objection.” According to this objection, if our actions aren’t causally determined, then our actions or crucial facts about our actions become matters of luck or chance in a way that undermines our free will. To illustrate, suppose that you have a choice between telling the truth or lying, and you decide to tell the truth. In order for your decision to be a free action, then, according to libertarians, it can’t be causally determined by past events. However, what follows from it not being causally determined is that it was open, up until the time you decided as you did, that you
wouldn’t decide that way — that is, it was open, keeping everything else fixed up until that moment, that you would decide to lie instead.
Headline Image Credit: Jubilee Maze, Symonds Yat. CC-BY-SA 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons.
David Palmer is Assistant Professor at the University of Tennessee. He specializes in ethics, metaphysics, and philosophy of action. He edited the volume,
Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates (OUP, 2014).