A Formal Proof that if Evil Exists then the Theists' God Does Not

[Matthew78]

Not all theists have the same concept of deity. So the presumption fails.

I agree to a point. This argument is devastating against the classical theism of Christians like William Lane Craig and Alvin Platinga. Liberal theists have different ways around it. Whether this argument can be generalized to all types of theism is another matter.

Evil is a concept not all agree even exists. Another fail.

I have to agree. I think it's also important to distinguish between moral values, value judgments, and acts of evil. Bradley took this for granted. I excuse his error because I suspect that he was trying to meet classical theists on their own grounds. However, I can agree with Bradley as far as classical theism goes. Folks like William Lane Craig argue that objective moral values exist and evil is real. Bradley's argument, in my opinion, comes back and kicks Christians like Craig in the behind.

It is not the responsibility of anyone to prevent anything as even if they have the power to prevent something it doesn't mean that there would not be repercussions to preventing it that may be worse than the supposed "evil" in the first place. If someone were to have foreknowledge to know that something bad was going to happen they may also have the foreknowledge to know that it has to happen in the long run or else things could be worse.

I think denying the validity of the Principle of Command Responsibility creates an ethical dilemma. If you deny the validity of this principle, then how could the greatest of evil people be held responsible for crimes against humanity? As Bradley notes:

The Principle of Command Responsibility, as recognized in international law, deals expressly with the kind of scenario that Plantinga has developed in God's defense, one in which he argues that sole responsibility for both moral and natural evils should be laid at the feet of God's subordinate creatures (human and Satanic) and none at the feet of the Commander in Chief who planned and brought about the situation in which they find themselves.

By way of contrast, the Generalized Principle of Command Responsibility spells out sufficient conditions (as expressed in (3) below) for holding any person morally culpable, and criminally responsible, for the occurrence of evils, whether those evils have been brought about by that person himself or by that person's subordinates or by any other agency, and whether or not any of that person's subordinates brought about those evils of their own free will. It not only allows for the Plantinga scenario in which natural evils such as disease and disaster are attributable to the agency of nonhuman subordinates such as Satan, but also allows for the biblical scenario in which natural evils are attributable to God himself, i.e., are, as we so aptly describe them, "acts of God."

The Generalized Principle of Command Responsibility, namely (3), I would argue, is an unassailable moral truth any exception to which, either in this world or in any other possible world, would be morally unconscionable and would undermine morality itself. Hence, if any moral truths are candidates for the status of necessary truth, this is one of them.

I agree with Bradley's statements here. Any exception would be morally unconscionable and would undermine morality. Now for the dilemma. Bradley says:

They wondered at the moral myopia of someone who would advance a defense which, if accepted, would absolve Hitler of all his crimes on the grounds that he himself never fired a shot in anger or pulled the levers that released gas into the chambers of Auschwitz. The free will of Hitler's subordinates, they noted, wasn't "buck-stopping"; it did nothing to absolve Hitler as the person who planned and initiated all operations with full knowledge of their outcome. Would defense counsel, they asked, mount the same argument on behalf of other moral monsters of human history, men who have brought about suffering on an incalculable scale: men like Genghis Khan, Stalin, and Pol Pot, or others like George W. Bush and the mythical Moses, both of whom claimed God's own sanction for their crimes? Was he suggesting they, the judges, adopt double standards, holding God Almighty and All-Knowing to lower standards than his weaker, benighted subordinates?

They reminded defense counsel that the accused was being judged according to the moral principles concerning Command Responsibility as recognized by Ping Fa around 500 B.C.E., principles that were eventually enshrined in the Hague Conventions of 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1948, and the Nuremberg Charter of 1950 (Principles III and VI of which explicitly assign responsibility to Heads of State who have "planned" and "initiated" crimes against humanity). And, quoting from Article 7 (3) of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, they pointed out that the fact that a subordinate committed crimes.

The dilemma is that to deny the Principle of Command Responsibility would absolve monsters like Hitler, Khan, Stalin, and Pol Pot of their crimes against humanity. Folks like Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot and other moral monsters planned their evils and initiated the operations of their evils, knowing full well what would the result might be. Deny the Principle and these evil men can be absolved of the criminal responsibility of their crimes. Affirm it and Yahweh joins the list of intelligent and conscious beings who become morally responsible for crimes against humanity.

I do believe that the argument is sound against classical theism but it needs to be worded better to show that it's sound.

 

[Matthew78]

Unsupported assertion and attempt at creating a strawman.

So you expect critics of Christian theism to go through theological dictionaries and support what is commonly believed about the Abrahamic god? That he is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good?

How is it an attempt at creating a straw man? Who is creating such a straw man? Bradley or the author of the OP?

Asserted without evidence.

Before requesting any kind of evidence, we need definitions. Do you believe that there is any such thing as "evil'"? If so, how do you define it? If not, why not?

Need to provide evidence of 1 and 2 before beginning to state 3.

Why do you need evidence of 1 and 2?

More importantly, do you agree with the Generalized Principle of Command Responsibility?

This is the weakest "Argument from evil" that I've seen in a while. Come back when you have some substance.

No need to be rude. If you're not impressed, then you can simply state so and specify what more is needed to make the argument better.

 

[Matthew78]

True, I've seen weaker, but for something this flimsy to be posted as "proof"? That's nothing less than a horrid example of the quality of the education system that produced the one who considers those 10 statements, alone, to be proof of anything other than the ignorance of someone who takes it as proof. I know the debate is still ongoing, and, to be honest, i typically don't post these arguments due to their inherent flaws.

Okay, so you consider yourself better educated than the poor sods like me and the author of the OP who consider the argument to be a good one if worded properly. You know that Raymond Bradley has a doctorate in philosophy, right? Do you have a doctorate in philosophy, religious studies, or any other academic subject or do you consider all of that simply beneath you?

 

[Matthew78]

I expect it to be understood for what it is, and hardly consider your post or those of the others to be any kind of attack. If you don't understand formal logic so be it.

I understand it and I agree with it. I do think it can be worded better. While I appreciate the criticisms of the argument (I think one participant can be a bit less rude and not sound snobbish). However, Yosi may understand formal logic and just may not be impressed with the argument. But I think it might be seen as rude to criticize him for not understanding formal logic. Maybe I'm wrong but he might take it as a rude snipe against him.

 

[Matthew78]

Yeah, whatever, yet you seemed so upset that we responded against it. Get over yourself.

Maybe I'm interpreting the tone of your posts wrong but this seems a bit rude. Is there a reason for it?

 

[Matthew78]

I saw the "IF", however, it said "IF God exists HE IS omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good." It made a statement about "the theist's god" and IF that god exists then he IS so on and so forth. It is a blanket statement about theists believing in one particular concept of god. That, and the arbitrary concept of "evil", is the main hinging premise of the entire argument. If it wanted to deal with one particular concept of deity then that should have been explained, but one cannot argue deity in general with that argument.

I agree. This is Bradley's fault. He should have made it clear that he was attacking classical theism of the type that conservative Christians, some Jews, and Muslims adhere to. Maybe he just wasn't thinking of more liberal types of theism or maybe he just got sloppy and overgeneralized. I think this can be rectified. As for "evil" being the main hinging premise of the entire argument, I'm not sure I agree with you; I think the main hinging premise of the argument is the "Generalized Principle of Command Responsibility".

 

[Matthew78]

Here's something i don't get. The above is an assertion that this proof "triumphs" over Plantiga's. But it doesn't address Platinga's argument. If god exists, is omnipotent (which I've always believed implies omniscience), and wholly good, then he could ensure no evil occurs. However, in order for free agents to exist, god has to allow grant them to act against his wishes (e.g., by doing evil). The proof doesn't address whether agency at all.

Bradley's argument came near the end of his paper. The bulk of his paper was devoted to showing flaws in Platinga's defense. The proof itself doesn't refute Plantinga's defense but the preceding analysis attempts to.

 

[Skwim]

I think the argument can be worded in ways that make it stronger and I suspect that a sound logical argument can be produced.

The problem with the way it's worded is that the second premise, "Evil occurs" is ambiguous. The problem is that Bradley has taken for granted that everyone agrees on what evil is and that it does occur. He didn't bother to define evil.

That's why you have seen some quibbles in this thread. Bradley left himself open to criticism for this and now, it's up to folks like me, to try to polish the argument by wording it in such a way as to eliminate ambiguity and formulate a sound wording of it.

As has been mentioned before, the premises of a formal proof are to be taken as true. They are a given. In determining the validity of a formal argument it isn't necessary that one agree to the truth of its premises. If one doesn't agree that evil occurs or that god is omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good, that's fine. The only consequence of this disagreement is that such a person could not consider the argument to be sound---valid as it may be. And this is why Bradley has, in fact, not left himself open to criticism for his premises. As for all the quibbles, they've simply been a result of not understanding the nature of a formal argument.

Bradley has only sought to establish a valid formal argument that the Christian god does not exist by looking at evil in the context of its affirmation by Christians, their concept of god as omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good; and the notion of the "generalized principle of command responsibility."

 

[Matthew78]

Subjectivity is perceiving things and assigning them a relative worth based on how they relate specifically to us and our circumstances.

I agree to a point. But despite our own subjectivity, there are objective facts that all of us can more or less agree on. For instance, mathematical formulas like the Pythagorean Theorem work for us when we use them in mathematics. Other facts can be contingent like, "The Chrysler Building is in New York State". Moral values and moral judgments can be subjective but if there is a all-good deity who is morally perfect, then even what that deity believes is morally wrong becomes an objective statement of fact. I'm sure that you probably agree with this.

If God sees all, knows all, etc., He's immune to subjectivity. His perspective by virtue of being all inclusive would have to be objective. Unless we want to assign specific emotions and intentions to him, as most religions do, and talk about reality in relation to those emotions and intentions, in which case His perspective would have to be subjective too (they would be subject to his emotions). But this isn't a universally theist view of God, it's a religious one.

I agree to a point. The problem, as I see it, is that classical theists like Craig and Plantinga argue that objective moral values exist, that moral value judgments are objective too, and that there are some acts of evil that are universally agreed upon as being evil like 1st degree murder, physically torturing children for fun, raping a woman for fun, and other acts of cruelty. If evil is subjective, we have to ask: if any deity exists, is that deity all-good? We have to ask: what does it mean for that deity to be good and what that deity considers to be good?

My problem is that I honestly don't know how we can define evil in such a way that we can all judge certain acts to be objectively evil despite our subjectivity.

 

[Matthew78]

yes, humans have free will... it's really not that hard of a concept to grasp...

So which part of Bradley's critique of Plantinga's free will defense do you disagree with?

 

[Matthew78]

evil exists because:

a) God does not take away our free will and we choose to kill one another etc.etc.

b) theory of relativity - opposites define one another - good cannot be appreciated without evil. Good and evil are relative terms, they each cease to exist without one another.

The point of Bradley's critque of the free will is that a consequence of the Generalized Principle of Command Responsibility is that God is morally culpable for the fact that we abuse our free will in committing evils. God knew that we would do it and God gave us free will anyways.

As for the theory of relativity- are you referring to Einstein's theories? As for the contrast, there are other ways of introducing a contrast that do not involve moral evils that some human beings commit against others.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Bradley's argument came near the end of his paper. The bulk of his paper was devoted to showing flaws in Platinga's defense. The proof itself doesn't refute Plantinga's defense but the preceding analysis attempts to.

I don't quite see how one can "refute" Plantinga's defense by 1) ignoring most of his work since the publication of The Nature of Necessity 2) misrepresenting Plantinga's argument and 3) ignoring what other's have done with the argument since (even Walls' and Adams' critiquess and Plantinga's response).

How does deliberately distorting even one of Plantinga's proofs by taking out most of the proof, selecting a line, and inserting it in another vastly simplified proof just to make it appear ridiculous constitute an analysis? Bradley simply distorts just about everything. It's true that Leibniz was the one we get "possible worlds" theory from but Plantinga's formal proof uses much more modern logics (e.g., Lewis'), not Leibniz. There was no formal modal logic until Lewis. Bradley claims to present Plantina's "formal presentation" only first he takes out most of it and then he talks about what a first year logic student would say without bothering to mention that modal logics have quite different rules from propositional and predicate calculi.

If Bradley wished to present a formal proof and analysis against Plantinga, he'd have to deal with the logical systems in question. He doesn't. His formal proof uses classical logic without stating anything formally, his analysis simply selects a few lines from Plantinga and replaces puts them were he wished. He relegates to an endnote the following "For the sake of simplicity, I have changed the numerical designations of most of the propositions that appear in Planting's presentation. Thus his original "(31)" becomes "(3)"; his "(32)" becomes "(4)"; and so on"). One need not have read Plantinga at all to see the blatant dishonesty in this, as it is apparent in this alone that Plantinga presented at least 32 "propositions" yet Bradley's presentation doesn't just reorder them, he takes most of them out.

 

[HiddenDjinn]

Maybe I'm interpreting the tone of your posts wrong but this seems a bit rude. Is there a reason for it?

There is, but I must refrain from responding as to keep in obedience with the rules. One of your earlier posts drew the conclusion that I was not impressed with the argument as presented. That was correct. The argument may be correct in form, but when one starts engaging the particular assertions of said argument, it doesn't hold. The question of strawman applies to Bradley, but not necessarily Skwim, unless he presents this argument as his proof against the existence of a deity. I see the assertions as unsupported. They can't stand a posteriori, nor can they be taken as an a priori argument, considering that they rely heavily on observation.

EDIT:
Almost all formal arguments are correct in form. The point of contention comes when one tries to apply that formal argument as a proof of anything outside the argument itself. Formally-correct arguments are not necessarily valid arguments.

 

[HiddenDjinn]

Also, correct me if I'm wrong(philosophy studies were years ago), but isn't an argument required not only to be "valid" but also to be "sound" before considering it a proof?

 

[Matthew78]

I don't quite see how one can "refute" Plantinga's defense by 1) ignoring most of his work since the publication of The Nature of Necessity 2) misrepresenting Plantinga's argument and 3) ignoring what other's have done with the argument since (even Walls' and Adams' critiquess and Plantinga's response).

Just for the sake of clarification, I started chiming into this thread by saying that I like Bradley's logical argument for evil. If worded differently, I agree with it. I agree with the gist of Bradley's argument as he formulated it although I think it can be made much stronger.

However, I am in the process of going through Bradley's argument just to make sure he has thoroughly presented Plantinga's argument correctly. In fact, I've ordered Plantinga's books The Nature of Necessity and God and Other Minds. Just today, I received a copy of Bradley's book Possible Worlds.

How does deliberately distorting even one of Plantinga's proofs by taking out most of the proof, selecting a line, and inserting it in another vastly simplified proof just to make it appear ridiculous constitute an analysis? Bradley simply distorts just about everything. It's true that Leibniz was the one we get "possible worlds" theory from but Plantinga's formal proof uses much more modern logics (e.g., Lewis'), not Leibniz. There was no formal modal logic until Lewis. Bradley claims to present Plantina's "formal presentation" only first he takes out most of it and then he talks about what a first year logic student would say without bothering to mention that modal logics have quite different rules from propositional and predicate calculi.

I'm not convinced that Bradley was deliberately distorting Platinga's proof. He quoted from a page, pg 167 where, if I recall correctly, Plantinga summarized his proof and Bradley was recalling Plantinga's summarization of his own proof. I have requested a copy of Plantinga's books so I can study Bradley's argument and Plantinga's argument more carefully.

If Bradley wished to present a formal proof and analysis against Plantinga, he'd have to deal with the logical systems in question. He doesn't. His formal proof uses classical logic without stating anything formally, his analysis simply selects a few lines from Plantinga and replaces puts them were he wished.

I'm not sure what you mean "without stating anything formally" and I'm not sure what you mean by his analysis selecting a few lines from Plantinga.

He relegates to an endnote the following "For the sake of simplicity, I have changed the numerical designations of most of the propositions that appear in Planting's presentation. Thus his original "(31)" becomes "(3)"; his "(32)" becomes "(4)"; and so on"). One need not have read Plantinga at all to see the blatant dishonesty in this, as it is apparent in this alone that Plantinga presented at least 32 "propositions" yet Bradley's presentation doesn't just reorder them, he takes most of them out.

When I read the relevant parts of Plantinga's book (that was a year ago, I admit), the page that Bradley quoted from, IIRC, contained a summary of Plantinga's consistency proof and I thought Bradley was quoting from that and changed numerical designations to make it much simpler to discuss. I agree that in his full consistency proof, Plantinga presented at least 32 propositions but summarized them on one page and Bradley quoted the summary and started listing other propositions from elsewhere in the book. I could be wrong about this and my memory somewhat faulty. This is why I have ordered books from both of them.

 

[Matthew78]

Also, correct me if I'm wrong(philosophy studies were years ago), but isn't an argument required not only to be "valid" but also to be "sound" before considering it a proof?

Of course.

 

[HiddenDjinn]

Of course.

Ok, in that sense, the argument isn't a proof, despite what you call it. The argument is not sound.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

However, I am in the process of going through Bradley's argument just to make sure he has thoroughly presented Plantinga's argument correctly. In fact, I've ordered Plantinga's books The Nature of Necessity and God and Other Minds. Just today, I received a copy of Bradley's book Possible Worlds.

I'll provide a preview. I've uploaded a paper Plantinga published in The Journal of Philosophy (1973) which provides an early version of the basic argument found in The Nature of Necessity: "Which Worlds Could God Have Created?"

I'm not sure what you mean "without stating anything formally"

The whole point of formalism (in mathematics and logic) is to symbolic representations of things like propositions. Formal logic involves symbols like the following: Possible World Semantics

and I'm not sure what you mean by his analysis selecting a few lines from Plantinga.

In his second section, Bradley presents, supposedly, Plantinga's "formal" argument. He lays out the argument in four steps. However, proposition 3 in Bradley's presentation is, according to the endnote, actually proposition 31 in Plantingas. So what's missing?

 

[Skwim]

Also, correct me if I'm wrong(philosophy studies were years ago), but isn't an argument required not only to be "valid" but also to be "sound" before considering it a proof?

Not really. Logic proofs concern themselves with the form of an argument. For instance, take the argument (P&Q) → R,(P&Q) : R: It's proof would be

1. (P&Q)→ R  premise
2. (P&Q)   premise
3. R    1,2 Modus Ponens
​

And therefore isn't concerned with being sound, but being valid.

Validity has to do with the form of the argument.
Proof has to do with establishing that validity.
Soundness has to do with the truth of its premises.

 

[HiddenDjinn]

Not really. Logic proofs concern themselves with the form of an argument. For instance, take the argument (P&Q) → R,(P&Q) : R: It's proof would be

1. (P&Q)→ R  premise
2. (P&Q)   premise
3. R    1,2 Modus Ponens
​

And therefore isn't concerned with being sound, but being valid.

Validity has to do with the form of the argument.
Proof has to do with establishing that validity.
Soundness has to do with the truth of its premises.

In the classes I took on formal logic, that wasn't called proof. It was called deduction. I need your source(and NOT wikipedia).

EDIT:
Hint: Both ibiblio and gutenberg are teeming with humanities texts.