So "thought-collective's" are just categories of those who share the same belief regardless of how they arrived at that belief. So if two individuals arrive at a belief wholly independently in time and space, neither aware of the other and their beliefs, and no other person with whom these individuals interacted shared such a belief, it can be said that these two individuals are both within the same "thought-collective"? . . . If so, I see no value in even coining the term. I'm failing to see the point.
I would say one point would be examining what occurs when members of a particular thought-collective encounter members of a different thought-collective. Or else when the ingrained predispositions of a thought-collective come under the microscope for examination and come up wanting, after which, the nature of the thought-collective's blind-spot can cause members to deny their own lyin eyes. In the foreword to Fleck's book, Thomas Kuhn says:
Put briefly, a thought collective seems to function as an individual mind writ large because many people possess it (or are possessed by it). To explain its apparent legislative authority, Fleck therefore repeatedly resorts to terms borrowed from discourse about individuals. Sometimes he writes of the “tenacity of closed systems of opinion” (chap. 2, sec. 3; italics mine). Elsewhere he accounts for this tenacity in terms, for example, of “trust in the initiated, their dependence upon public opinion, intellectual solidarity” (chap. 4, sec. 3). Responding to these forces, the members of a successful thought collective come to participate in what Fleck sometimes describes as “a kind of harmony of illusions” (chap. 2, sec. 3).
Fleck, Ludwik. Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. Kindle Edition.
It's the inability of members of a thought-collective to appreciate the subjective nature of their belief that they have the Truth that's kind of the point; wondering, or trying to discover, if it's possible to discard with predispositions that are based on belief in a worldview despite the fact that objective facts often seem to obliterate many of the sacred cows of a given worldview or thought-collective. Fleck says:
What we are faced with here is not so much simple passivity or mistrust of new ideas as an active approach which can be divided into several stages. (1) A contradiction to the system appears unthinkable. (2) What does not fit into the system remains unseen; (3) alternatively, if it is noticed, either it is kept secret, or (4) laborious efforts are made to explain an exception in terms that do not contradict the system. (5) Despite the legitimate claims of contradictory views, one tends to see, describe, or even illustrate those circumstances which corroborate current views and thereby give them substance.
Fleck, Ludwik. Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (p. 27). Kindle Edition.
It's not merely simpletons bamboozled by the mystical powers of the thought-collective they're part of. A nearly perfect example of the force of a thought-collective on even a genius-caliber brain is found in the quotation from Sir Karl Popper below:
I share with the materialists or physicalists not only the emphasis on material objects as the paradigms of reality, but also the evolutionary hypothesis. But our ways seem to part when evolution produces minds, and human language. And they part even more widely when human minds produce stories, explanatory myths, tools and works of art and of science. All this, so it seems, has evolved without any violation of the laws of physics. But with life, even with low forms of life, problem-solving enters the universe; and with the higher form, purposes and aims, consciously pursued. We can only wonder that matter can thus transcend itself, by producing mind, purpose, and a world of the products of the human mind.
Karl Popper, The Self and Its Brain, p. 11.
Popper is fully aware (see his 3 world's argument) that that the human mind transcends the laws of physics such that it can't be subsumed within the worldview of a NeoDarwinian, or scientific-materialist's thought-collective. Nevertheless, although Popper knows better than most, and proves more effectively than most, that the human mind can't be placed within the constraints of the materialist's thought-collective, still, since Popper is part of that thought-collective, he must use Fleck's 5th point in order to try to find those facts that corroborate the legitimacy of the thought-collective he's a part of even though he knows that that thought-collective is patently wrong concerning the most important aspect of its foundation.
Another perfect example is the great Jewish scholar Ibn Ezra. He initially claimed he wouldn't allow Jewish traditional understandings of the Hebrew text of the Tanakh (the Jewish thought-collective) to influence his exegesis and interpretation of the sacred text but would rely solely on the science of exegesis and the guidance of God alone to find the literal meaning of the text.
But then he came upon Christian exegesis that took passages like Psalms 2:6 and showed that if exegeted literally, using only the science of exegesis, without bias or the predisposition of a Jewish thought-collective's imposition, this verse (like many others) justified Christian theology and caused serious problems for the Jewish thought-collective. Faced with this reality, Ibn Ezra, like Popper after him, fell back on Fleck's 5th point of a thought-collective such that he decided later in life that the traditional Jewish interpretation must be what guides an exegete and not science or God.
John