Australia is intersubjectively verifiable.
So are visions of God. That's the whole point. Visions of God are intersubjectively verifiable (a million alive today is a generous, generous underestimate). Mermaids are not verifiable in this way.
On the one hand, you persistently fail to offer any means whatsoever to distinguish between vision and delusion.
lol, I don't see anything in this post I disagree with. I think we are finally coming around to the same point of view.
All I would add is that there is no means to distinguish whether or not the chair I'm sitting on, or the screen I'm looking at is a delusion, or if they are based in reality.
More on "innately suspect" in a minute (FYI I agree with you). Let's clear up some business first.
"""Please resist the urge to accuse me of saying I know what this vision of God is. I do not.[/quote]Please make sure you do not give in to temptation on this point."""
I don't know if you already have or you ever did - I just want that point to be clear.
Another point: I have used the word vision with a rather subtle shade, with needs some explanation.
If you consult the dictionary definition of vision, one of its potential definitions is "hallucination." Another of its potential definitions is "seeing something real."
So you see, I don't distinguish between vision and delusion because there is no difference, they
can potentially mean the exact same thing. I will deal with what makes this "vision of God" epistemically interesting below.
For now, let's be clear that I really and truly don't know if there's anything behind this vision of God. That's why I choose to refer to them as visions of God, because it is a way of talking about what we perceive that everyone can agree on. The atheists use the word vision to mean "delusion" and the theists use the word to mean "something really perceived."
I don't know for certain who is right, and neither does anyone else.
Everyone can agree that *a lot of people* see whatever this thing is, delusion or real.
The point is, every time you say "vision of God could be a delusion," I say, "I just said that."
Every time you say "a vision of God IS a delusion" I say, "I don't know and neither do you."
On the other, there is abundant evidence that humans are susceptible to delusion.
I just said that.
So, for example, ...
Experiments conducted by Barbara Tversky and Elizabeth Marsh corroborate the vulnerability of human memory to bias.7 In one group of studies, participants were given the "Roommate Story," a description of incidents involving his or her two fictitious roommates. The incidents were categorized as annoying, neutral, or socially "cool." Later, participants were asked to neutrally recount the incidents with one roommate, to write a letter of recommendation for one roommate’s application to a fraternity or sorority, or to write a letter to the office of student housing requesting the removal of one of the roommates. When later asked to recount the original story, participants who had written biased letters recalled more of the annoying or "cool" incidents associated with their letters. They also included more elaborations consistent with their bias. These participants made judgements based upon the annoying or social events they discussed in their letters. Neutral participants made few elaborations, and they also made fewer errors in their retelling, such as attributing events to the wrong roommate. The study also showed that participants writing biased letters recalled more biased information for the character they wrote about, whereas the other roommate was viewed neutrally.
Memory is affected by retelling, and we rarely tell a story in a neutral fashion. By tailoring our stories to our listeners, our bias distorts the very formation of memory—even without the introduction of misinformation by a third party. The protections of the judicial system against prosecutors and police "assisting" a witness’ memory may not sufficiently ensure the accuracy of those memories. Even though prosecutors refrain from "refreshing" witness A’s memory by showing her witness B’s testimony, the mere act of telling prosecutors what happened may bias and distort the witness’s memory. Eyewitness testimony, then, is innately suspect. [
source]
I am familiar with this research. It's pretty cool (and scary) isn't it?
Is this proof that no one has ever had a vision of God? Absolutely not.
Please note the subtle use of my words "vision of God." I estimate that millions of people have had a "vision of God", but the thing that is lacking is any proof that these visions have any real substance.
Please distinguish in your mind between the question of whether or not one perceives something and the question of whether or not that perception is real.
I have a vision of a Paris mug right now. Nobody disputes that perception. What people could dispute is its basis in reality.
There is no reason we should disagree on this point. If we disagree, I believe it is a problem of wording, not ideas.
But there is, indeed, abundant evidence that these vision should be held "innately suspect" -- which, by the way, is precisely why you so readily discount past visions of Faeries and Mermaids.
I've got a surprise for you. Are you ready for it?
I agree completely!!
I just believe that visions of mugs should be innately suspect as well. But I believe a vision of God is more suspect. But then a vision of a mermaid is way, way, way more suspect than a vision of God. The reason is simple: reproducibility.
But, it is quite evident that a perception of God is very different from a perception of my Paris mug. For instance, we can both see my Paris mug in the same way at the exact same time. It is not immediately evident why with God we cannot.
On the other hand, the reason that many many people have more or less the same vision is not immediately evident either. There are not nearly so many reports of any other type of immaterial perception: ghosts, aliens, mermaids, fairies, Loch Ness... God is number one by a very, very, very large margin.
The atheists say that one sees what one expects or wants to see. But on the other hand, most theists have reasons for believing that atheists don't know.
In short, this is why my post refers to the "problem of God." Because epistemologically, this question is unique.
I believe the only way to "investigate" is for a lot of people to realize that we must all expand our perception. It is not immediately apparent why one would choose to do so, because from all perspectives, the "content of the room" is self-evident, and not in need of investigation. I am asking people have a slightly skeptical attitude toward what they themselves perceive (or don't perceive), which is asking a lot, I agree.
CV