Anti-realism about truth and facts

[Enai de a lukal]

Why do we need the term "qualia," when the term "thought" has sufficed for so long?

Well, "thought" would be amenable to physicalist analysis- "qualia" is supposed to capture the aspect of subjective first-person experience which physicalism cannot account for. However, as I noted, A. this is not obviously relevant to the topic of this thread and B. the existence of qualia, the nature of qualia, and the significance (i.e. metaphysical import) of qualia are extremely contentious to begin with. Not exactly the best starting point for a compelling argument, since so many people find the notion problematic.

 

[Willamena]

Well, "thought" would be amenable to physicalist analysis- "qualia" is supposed to capture the aspect of subjective first-person experience which physicalism cannot account for.

Regardless that A. this is not obviously relevant to the topic of the thread, and B. the existence of qualia are contentious to begin with, this is an education forum (of sorts) and I'm always willing to learn. I don't get why physicalists (or anyone) need something they cannot account for. "Qualia" is essentially a thought, as I see it.

I don't think I'll ever get qualia; doesn't fit with my schema.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

I don't get why physicalists (or anyone) need something they cannot account for.

Well, but according to the physicalist, they can account for qualia because the mental supervenes on the physical, or they don't need to, because there are no such things as qualia (depending on what flavor of physicalism they are endorsing; supervenience or eliminative).

 

[Willamena]

Well, but according to the physicalist, they can account for qualia because the mental supervenes on the physical, or they don't need to, because there are no such things as qualia (depending on what flavor of physicalism they are endorsing; supervenience or eliminative).

Denial is easy; but isn't it a problem for the physicalist to have something that interrupts their schema?

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Denial is easy; but isn't it a problem for the physicalist to have something that interrupts their schema?

"Denial" isn't quite right- it's not like they don't have arguments at their disposal for either of these conclusions; arguments which cannot be as easily dismissed as, e.g. rawthought (and quite a few others, in my experience), would like to think.

And the point is that for the physicalist, qualia is NOT something that "interrupts their schema"; either because they hold that their schema can account for it (supervenience), or because it is not a real something to begin with (eliminativism).

 

[raw_thought]

“This is a pretty strong indication you're not understanding his position then; dismissing a legitimate academic view as "deluded" and "neurotic" simply isn't credible. I don't agree with Searle or Nagel, but neither I nor Dennett or anyone else would call them deluded.”
enaidealukal
Please at least back up your accusations. Dennett believes that pain does not exist, only C-fibers firing exist. I call that deluded. As I said, I agree with Searle, who made the accusation that Dennett is deluded and for the reasons I gave.
Also, since Dennett does not believe in first person narratives and only 2nd and third narratives. Does it not follow that my joke (That Dennett woke up and asked his wife, “it was good for you. Was it good for me”? ) fit perfectly his position? Remember, Dennett cannot say, “It felt (qualia) good”. The only thing that exists for him is certain neurons firing, or his wife’s physical voice saying that it was good for him, there are no feelings.
Ironically, he must also say that he never hears his wife. The only thing that happens (according to Dennett) is that the sound waves she creates when speaking cause certain neurons in his brain to fire.
…………………….
“Nothing about physicalism precludes the existence of semantic meaning or of truth.”
enaidealukal
That is an extraordinary claim. Please back it up. So you are claiming that ink, if it has a particular pattern contains meaning? How do we know if that pattern is random or meaningful? Remember, that you must see that ink pattern as something without a signified. Or are you saying that a universal can actually have a physical existence? That is absurd!
What on earth is a signified for an eliminative materialist? A physical object cannot refer to anything. We can reason that an on light switch corresponds to an on light. But to say that the definition of an on light is a light switch where the symbol “on” is in the upright position is absurd.
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“because there are no such things as qualia (depending on what flavor of physicalism they are endorsing; supervenience or eliminative).”
enaidealukal
Actually, there is a difference between saying that qualia do not exist and that qualia supervene on matter. Perhaps, qualia do supervene on matter. However, to claim that we are unconscious and feel nothing is absurd.

 

[raw_thought]

"Denial" isn't quite right- it's not like they don't have arguments at their disposal for either of these conclusions; arguments which cannot be as easily dismissed as, e.g. rawthought (and quite a few others, in my experience), would like to think.

And the point is that for the physicalist, qualia is NOT something that "interrupts their schema"; either because they hold that their schema can account for it (supervenience), or because it is not a real something to begin with (eliminativism).

Are you talking about Quining Qualia ?
My seminar paper at university refuted the circular arguments in Dennett's position. I will be glad to debate the merits of Dennett's paper and the merits of my objections.* Let me say, that my arguments were well received by academic philosophers.
* perhaps, we can start a new thread?

 

[raw_thought]

Physicalists (such as Dennett) deny the existence of qualia. I hope to show that such a position requires them (if they are consistent) to assert something that they themselves will deny. Therefore, there position is untenable and perhaps absurd.
I believe that Dennett will not deny the obvious fact that a person can visualize a triangle. When one visualizes a triangle one sees a triangle. One does not see neurons firing or whatever.
Dennett has two options. 1. Deny that one sees a triangle. Saying that the triangle is an illusion is not a solution because Dennett (if consistent) must say that there is nothing “what it feels like” to see a triangle.
Or 2, There is an actual physical triangle in one’s brain. Both options are absurd. Therefore Dennett’s position is untenable.


The above is not from my paper*. Actually, that particular argument is only a small part of a larger argument.
* I tried to remember a short, easily explained segment of my paper. Perhaps, I did not remember it perfectly.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

“This is a pretty strong indication you're not understanding his position then; dismissing a legitimate academic view as "deluded" and "neurotic" simply isn't credible. I don't agree with Searle or Nagel, but neither I nor Dennett or anyone else would call them deluded.”
enaidealukal
Please at least back up your accusations.

My "accusation" stands as is. For a lay person to dismiss a serious academic position as "deluded" and "neurotic" (particularly after adducing a couple of strawmen of that view) only undermines their own credibility, and indicates they are not fully understanding the issue.

Dennett believes that pain does not exist, only C-fibers firing exist.

I don't believe Dennett denies that pain exists- that's certainly not any aspect of physicalism, eliminative or otherwise. Nor would he need to deny that consciousness exists. Now, I'm not entirely familiar with Dennett's views in particular, but in general, eliminative physicalism can be reduced to the conjunction of the following premises-

1. Everything that exists is physical
2. Nothing that exists is mental.

What Dennett claims is that folk psychology, including the view that there are such things as subjective mental states or first-person experiences that have certain properties- being ineffable, intrinsic, private, and directly apprehensible in consciousness- is fundamentally confused, superfluous, and should be dispensed with.

That is an extraordinary claim. Please back it up.

Not an especially extraordinary claim. In any case, there is nothing in linguistics or the study of our cognitive linguistic capacities which requires any non-physical entities- if you submit that there is, please specify, and substantiate that through the proper channels (preferably via academic publications). In fact, I would say that semantic meaning and linguistic ability is pretty much neutral on the matter- it is equally possible on a physicalist, idealist, neutral monist, or dualist account, it will simply be a matter of different terminology.

Actually, there is a difference between saying that qualia do not exist and that qualia supervene on matter.

I never said that there wasn't. However, this isn't entirely correct since, even if qualia do not exist, they could nevertheless be said to supervene on matter since there will never be qualia without matter (since there will never be qualia at all, if they do not exist). But yes, one can distinguish between eliminative and identity/supervenience physicalism, even though eliminative physicalism is still technically about supervenience as well.

However, to claim that we are unconscious and feel nothing is absurd.

Indeed. Good thing nobody is claiming that, and the fact that you mention it further illustrates that you are not accurately grasping the physicalist position.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Are you talking about Quining Qualia ?
My seminar paper at university refuted the circular arguments in Dennett's position. I will be glad to debate the merits of Dennett's paper and the merits of my objections.* Let me say, that my arguments were well received by academic philosophers.
* perhaps, we can start a new thread?

I love your modesty. You "refuted" one of the most prominent thinkers in the philosophy of mind. Surely this groundbreaking feat landed your paper in Mind or some other top-flight philosophical journal? No? The injustice!



Anyways, if you want to continue a discussion about qualia and the philosophy of mind outside the scope of the OP for this thread, I would suggest that you start a new thread, if only so that anyone interested in that topic could see the thread topic.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Ironically enough, eliminative physicalism is just like idealism in that, the vast majority of criticisms of it are merely strawmen, and based on a blatant misunderstanding/misrepresentation of that view: eliminative physicalism does not hold that pain, or consciousness, do not exist, any more than idealism claims that objects like cars and trees don't exist. Any view that was patently at odds with such obvious facts would not merit any discussion, much less the focus in the academic community that either of these views have prompted- they are both far more subtle than most of their opponents would have you believe.

 

[raw_thought]

“My "accusation" stands as is. For a lay person to dismiss a serious academic position as "deluded" and "neurotic" (particularly after adducing a couple of strawmen of that view) only undermines their own credibility, and indicates they are not fully understanding the issue.”
enaidealukal
OK, you have no back up and refuse to engage in an actual debate. Tell Searle http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Searle that. I got my point from him.
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“I don't believe Dennett denies that pain exists- that's certainly not any aspect of physicalism, eliminative or otherwise. Nor would he need to deny that consciousness exists. “
enaidealukal

Actually, you should read up on the topic.
The below is from Qualia (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
"Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale&#8217 to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia. Disagreement typically centers on which mental states have qualia, whether qualia are intrinsic qualities of their bearers, and how qualia relate to the physical world both inside and outside the head. The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness.”

In other words since Dennet would say that pain is not a quale ( singular of qualia) it is not a feeling or part of consciousness.
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“What Dennett claims is that folk psychology, including the view that there are such things as subjective mental states or first-person experiences that have certain properties- being ineffable, intrinsic, private, and directly apprehensible in consciousness- is fundamentally confused, superfluous, and should be dispensed with.”
enaidealukal

OBVIOUSLY, that is the nonsense he believes. Therefore, he thinks ( if he is consistent) that one cannot visualize a triangle, as that visualized triangle is private and inaccessible to others. It is amazing how anti-empirical he is! I can perform an experiment ( visualizing a triangle) and if I do, then there are qualia.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
“Not an especially extraordinary claim. In any case, there is nothing in linguistics or the study of our cognitive linguistic capacities which requires any non-physical entities- if you submit that there is, please specify, and substantiate that through the proper channels (preferably via academic publications). In fact, I would say that semantic meaning and linguistic ability is pretty much neutral on the matter- it is equally possible on a physicalist, idealist, neutral monist, or dualist account, it will simply be a matter of different terminology.”
enaidealukal

All you are doing is restating your position. Please actually engage the debate. So, you believe that the definition of an On light is a light switch in the on position?
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“even if qualia do not exist, they could nevertheless be said to supervene on matter “
enaidealukal
??????????? How can something that does not exist supervene on anything?
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
“Indeed. Good thing nobody is claiming that, and the fact that you mention it further illustrates that you are not accurately grasping the physicalist position.”
enaidealukal

Actually, you are confused, ( see the quote I gave at the top from the Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy that defines qualia.) Without qualia there is no consciousness, or pain etc.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
“I love your modesty. You "refuted" one of the most prominent thinkers in the philosophy of mind. Surely this groundbreaking feat landed your paper in Mind or some other top-flight philosophical journal? No? The injustice!”
enaidealukal

Please stop the ad hominums. AND PLEASE GIVE AN ACTUAL ARGUMENT!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ALL I GET ARE RESTATEMENTS OF YOUR POSITION! I did refute Dennett and it was acknowledged. However, it is not such a big deal as “Quining Qualia” is very easy to refute and has been destroyed by many philosophers.
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[raw_thought]

Ironically enough, eliminative physicalism is just like idealism in that, the vast majority of criticisms of it are merely strawmen, and based on a blatant misunderstanding/misrepresentation of that view: eliminative physicalism does not hold that pain, or consciousness, do not exist, any more than idealism claims that objects like cars and trees don't exist. Any view that was patently at odds with such obvious facts would not merit any discussion, much less the focus in the academic community that either of these views have prompted- they are both far more subtle than most of their opponents would have you believe.

Once again you never give an argument or address my points ( the triangle argument etc). All you ever do is 1. restate your position ( without any evidence) 2. Appeal to authority.How can I be so arrogant as to question the great Dennett? 3. Claim that I am ignorant. I guess it is because you have no argument.
Why do you even post? I have an idea, simple type that you believe that qualia is absurd, that Dennett is correct and that I am an idiot and simply copy and paste that over and over? It will save you time and effort.

 

[raw_thought]

Ironically enough, eliminative physicalism is just like idealism in that, the vast majority of criticisms of it are merely strawmen, and based on a blatant misunderstanding/misrepresentation of that view: eliminative physicalism does not hold that pain, or consciousness, do not exist, any more than idealism claims that objects like cars and trees don't exist. Any view that was patently at odds with such obvious facts would not merit any discussion, much less the focus in the academic community that either of these views have prompted- they are both far more subtle than most of their opponents would have you believe.

Eliminative materialism is no longer taken seriously by the majority of philosophers because it is so obviously absurd. Yes Dennett, Churchlands and a few others belong to that cult but they are insignificant compared to the consensus among philosophers.

 

[raw_thought]

” Now, I'm not entirely familiar with Dennett's views in particular, but in general, eliminative physicalism can be reduced to the conjunction of the following premises-

1. Everything that exists is physical
2. Nothing that exists is mental.”
enaidealukal
OK, anything mental does not exist for an eliminative materialist. Agreed. So consciousness , sensations , pain* etc do not exist, only brain states. A deluded position!
I would suggest that you do some thinking on your own and do not simply accept everything a philosopher says. I actually respect Dennett. However, his arguments against qualia are absurd.
You are a black and white thinker.
Either one is a hard core materialist ( and therefore qualia, sensations etc do not exist) or one is some kind of new age mystic. To bite the bullet and admit the obvious that how consciousness can supervene on matter is beyond us right now is not to advocate witchcraft or whatever.
* or are you claiming that consciousness, sensations etc are not mental states?

 

[raw_thought]

Perhaps, some are confused by the word “qualia”. It was invented because, take just one example “blue”, became only about its physical properties, its place on the spectrum etc. Materialists eventually even denied that there was something it was like to feel “blue”.
Qualia is about how something feels. What the wind in your face feels like. It is not about air particles brushing up against face cells. Qualia, is about how pain feels. What sadness feels like. To say that qualia do not exist is to say that pain does not feel like anything. To say that one feels nothing ( even thoughts)is to say one is unconscious. There can be no consciousness without qualia.
Qualia is actually something we are constantly and directly acquainted with. It is the empirical. Matter, etc is something implied. We experience color, sound etc. We then create the abstraction "matter".
Actually, this whole debate started with
Primary/secondary quality distinction - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Eliminative materialists would also deny the existence of secondary properties.

 

[Willamena]

Perhaps, some are confused by the word “qualia”. It was invented because, take just one example “blue”, became only about its physical properties, its place on the spectrum etc. Materialists eventually even denied that there was something it was like to feel “blue”.
Qualia is about how something feels. What the wind in your face feels like. It is not about air particles brushing up against face cells. Qualia, is about how pain feels. What sadness feels like. To say that qualia do not exist is to say that pain does not feel like anything. To say that one feels nothing ( even thoughts)is to say one is unconscious. There can be no consciousness without qualia.
Qualia is actually something we are constantly and directly acquainted with. It is the empirical. Matter, etc is something implied. We experience color, sound etc. We then create the abstraction "matter".
Actually, this whole debate started with
Primary/secondary quality distinction - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Eliminative materialists would also deny the existence of secondary properties.

It seems to me that it's more about how to describe some things.

What does qualia feel like?

 

[raw_thought]

Simply do this experiment, visualize a triangle.
That triangle does not show up in your brain ( physical) . There are no neurons firing in a triangular shape etc. If someone were to look into your brain they would find no triangle. Your experience of the triangle is PRIVATE!
If you can visualize a triangle, qualia are real. Simply, do the experiment and observe.
Perhaps, some will say that you did not visualize a triangle, but you will know that you did and therefore you will know that qualia are real.

 

[raw_thought]

It seems to me that it's more about how to describe some things.

What does qualia feel like?

Perhaps a good way to define qualia is "sensation" or "feeling". The taste of salt is different than the physical structure of salt. Or even the firing pattern of neurons created by tasting the salt.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

OK, you have no back up and refuse to engage in an actual debate.

There is no need to back up the claim in question- it's self-evident that lay folk with no credentials in the relevant field have to offer something far more substantial than accusations of being "neurotic" or "deluded", if they wish their criticisms of reputable, legitimate academic positions to be taken seriously. And there can be no "actual debate" regarding such a claim- you say Dennett is deluded and neurotic, how do we debate this? Access his psychiatric records? Why do we need "actual debate" regarding what amounts to nothing more than ad hominem (and it is the height of irony, given how prone YOU are to cry foul at the slightest hint of an ad-homimem, that you are now stamping your foot and demanding that I take your own ad hominems seriously)

Tell Searle John Searle - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia that. I got my point from him.

Ah, so not only were you trying to dismiss a substantive view on the basis of a (strawman version of it) being "neurotic" and "deluded", in doing so you were simply parroting someone else's comments. Awesome.

“I don't believe Dennett denies that pain exists- that's certainly not any aspect of physicalism, eliminative or otherwise. Nor would he need to deny that consciousness exists. “
enaidealukal

Actually, you should read up on the topic.
The below is from Qualia (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
"Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia. Disagreement typically centers on which mental states have qualia, whether qualia are intrinsic qualities of their bearers, and how qualia relate to the physical world both inside and outside the head. The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness.”

Exactly. Thank you for verifying my point.

OBVIOUSLY, that is the nonsense he believes.

And you're accusing others of failing to argue for their view? Clearly it is NOT obvious nonsense, otherwise there would be no serious academic debate over the matter. There is, because it isn't. Pretty simple.

??????????? How can something that does not exist supervene on anything?
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Look up "supervene". If there is no qualia without matter, because there is no qualia, then qualia supervenes on matter; there is no instance of Q without M, because there are no instances of Q, PERIOD.

Actually, you are confused, ( see the quote I gave at the top from the Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy that defines qualia.) Without qualia there is no consciousness, or pain etc.

Prove that, then, don't merely assert it. That is one of the fundamental points of contention in the entire debate regarding qualia.

I did refute Dennett and it was acknowledged.

So what academic journal was this achievement published in? If you refuted Dennett, that would most certainly warrant being published in SOME academic journal or another.

Of course, writing a paper on why Dennett is wrong is not the same thing as refuting his position, and clearly you're exaggerating here. A little bit of modesty would serve you well here.

However, it is not such a big deal as “Quining Qualia” is very easy to refute and has been destroyed by many philosophers.
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Yeah... Only not so much. Certainly not going to refute anybody while shadowboxing strawmen, as you're doing here.