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Anti-realism about truth and facts

Enai de a lukal

Well-Known Member
OK, anything mental does not exist for an eliminative materialist. Agreed. So consciousness , sensations , pain* etc do not exist, only brain states. A deluded position!
"X is a deluded position". Nice argument.

I would suggest that you do some thinking on your own and do not simply accept everything a philosopher says.
You need to take your own advice- once again, the irony of you saying this, while merely parroting the views of Searle, is mind-blowing. And I'm not here defending Dennett- I don't find eliminative physicalism especially appealing, I tend to be more sympathetic towards identity physicalism or neutral monism. I do not, however, have a whole lot of patience for blowhards with delusions of grandeur taking whacks at a strawman of a reputable thinker, and am simply trying to correct some of the (many) misrepresentations you're throwing at us regarding Dennett and eliminative physicalism on this thread. And even though I don't endorse eliminative physicalism, its pretty uncontroversial to note that it is, at the very least, coherent, substantive, and plausible- it is internally consistent, it is not trivial, and it is consistent with the available evidence. Moreover, the types of objections based on common sense or intuition that you're advancing ("Dennett says there is no 'what it is like' to the experience of seeing red? How absurd!"), and probably make up the most comment objections to eliminativism, don't even really hold any water, given what eliminativism claims- it's long been granted that positional awareness can be mistaken. Eliminative physcalism suggests that it is just as possible for non-positional awareness to be fallible, at least in principle, as well. Just because our own representations are more 'immediate' to us, as we are representing one part of the brain to another instead of the external world to the brain, does not mean that the representing part is incapable of making a mistake. But once we grant that a thinking thing can radically misrepresent its own mode of representation to itself, all bets are off, and eliminativism can get its foot in the door—for now it seems at least possible that the an information-processing system could represent its own representations as subjective, when in fact they are in themselves blind, physical processes all the way down.

Either one is a hard core materialist ( and therefore qualia, sensations etc do not exist) or one is some kind of new age mystic.
Needless to say, these are not the only options.

* or are you claiming that consciousness, sensations etc are not mental states?
An eliminative physicalist would indeed claim that- consciousness and sensations are not mental entities, because there are no such things as "mental" entities; they are either physical, or they do not exist at all.
 

raw_thought

Well-Known Member
""X is a deluded position". Nice argument. "
enaidealukal
So you are saying that the belief that consciousness, sensations and pain do not exist is a reasonable position? That was the proposition I was referring to.
 

raw_thought

Well-Known Member
There is no need to back up the claim in question- it's self-evident that lay folk with no credentials in the relevant field have to offer something far more substantial than accusations of being "neurotic" or "deluded", if they wish their criticisms of reputable, legitimate academic positions to be taken seriously. And there can be no "actual debate" regarding such a claim- you say Dennett is deluded and neurotic, how do we debate this? Access his psychiatric records? Why do we need "actual debate" regarding what amounts to nothing more than ad hominem (and it is the height of irony, given how prone YOU are to cry foul at the slightest hint of an ad-homimem, that you are now stamping your foot and demanding that I take your own ad hominems seriously)


Ah, so not only were you trying to dismiss a substantive view on the basis of a (strawman version of it) being "neurotic" and "deluded", in doing so you were simply parroting someone else's comments. Awesome.


Exactly. Thank you for verifying my point.


:facepalm:
And you're accusing others of failing to argue for their view? Clearly it is NOT obvious nonsense, otherwise there would be no serious academic debate over the matter. There is, because it isn't. Pretty simple.


Look up "supervene". If there is no qualia without matter, because there is no qualia, then qualia supervenes on matter; there is no instance of Q without M, because there are no instances of Q, PERIOD.


Prove that, then, don't merely assert it. That is one of the fundamental points of contention in the entire debate regarding qualia.


So what academic journal was this achievement published in? If you refuted Dennett, that would most certainly warrant being published in SOME academic journal or another.

Of course, writing a paper on why Dennett is wrong is not the same thing as refuting his position, and clearly you're exaggerating here. A little bit of modesty would serve you well here.


Yeah... Only not so much. :facepalm: Certainly not going to refute anybody while shadowboxing strawmen, as you're doing here.
Umm , why didnt you take my advice and simply type," You are wrong. You have no credentials ( so why should anyone listen to you.) Eliminative materialists do not believe in qualia ( that was never debated).
Simply, answer a few questions. Or at least one. If you visualize a triangle, is it a private experience? If someone looked into your brain would anyone see a triangle? You have 2 options, if you wish to deny qualia
1. It is impossible to visualize a triangle
2. There is an actual physical triangle in your brain.
Both options are absurd. Therefore, it is obvious that you experienced a quale.
 

raw_thought

Well-Known Member
"An eliminative physicalist would indeed claim that- consciousness and sensations are not mental entities, because there are no such things as "mental" entities; they are either physical, or they do not exist at all."
enaidealukal
:facepalm:
Obviously. Once again you are merely stating your position. I am assuming that you believe that their position has merit.
 

Enai de a lukal

Well-Known Member
""X is a deluded position". Nice argument. "
enaidealukal
So you are saying that the belief that consciousness, sensations and pain do not exist is a reasonable position? That was the proposition I was referring to.
I'm saying, among other things, that eliminativism is coherent, substantive, and plausible, even if it isn't necessarily true.

Once again you are merely stating your position.
This is not my position. I don't subscribe to eliminativism. I'm merely defending a legitimate academic view from your quest to slay strawmen.
 

Enai de a lukal

Well-Known Member
Umm , why didnt you take my advice and simply type," You are wrong. You have no credentials ( so why should anyone listen to you.) Eliminative materialists do not believe in qualia ( that was never debated).
Simply, answer a few questions. Or at least one. If you visualize a triangle, is it a private experience? If someone looked into your brain would anyone see a triangle? You have 2 options, if you wish to deny qualia
1. It is impossible to visualize a triangle
2. There is an actual physical triangle in your brain.
Both options are absurd. Therefore, it is obvious that you experienced a quale.
Of course the options are absurd, because this is a strawman you've created. The eliminativist would choose the third (and intentionally unstated) option- that you can "visualize" a triangel, but that this a physical process of the brain which does not involve any "mental" functions or entities, and does not constitute a private, ineffable, intrinsic and immediately apprehensible to consciousness subjective "what it is like"- in other words, it is not an instance of qualia.

As I said, if eliminativism denied self-evident facts such as that pain or consciousness exists, or that we can visualize triangles, there would be no debate. It does not deny these things.
 

raw_thought

Well-Known Member
Of course the options are absurd, because this is a strawman you've created. The eliminativist would choose the third (and intentionally unstated) option- that you can "visualize" a triangel, but that this a physical process of the brain which does not involve any "mental" functions or entities, and does not constitute a private, ineffable, intrinsic and immediately apprehensible to consciousness subjective "what it is like"- in other words, it is not an instance of qualia.

As I said, if eliminativism denied self-evident facts such as that pain or consciousness exists, or that we can visualize triangles, there would be no debate. It does not deny these things.
OK, so there is a physical triangle in the guy's brain? If you claim that the triangle is represented without being in a triangular form, that is like saying that listening to a CD of Mozart = holding the CD in your hand.
What on earth is consciousness without feeling anything?
 

Enai de a lukal

Well-Known Member
OK, so there is a physical triangle in the guy's brain? If you claim that the triangle is represented without being in a triangular form, that is like saying that listening to a CD of Mozart = holding the CD in your hand.
What on earth is consciousness without feeling anything?
Lol ok... How is it like that?
 

raw_thought

Well-Known Member
I realize that you have a huge problem understanding analogies and metaphors. But I will try and help you. If you are claiming that there is a triangle in the person's brain, it is just not in a triangular form, that is similar to saying that the sound of Mozart's music= the physical CD. I hope it is obvious that holding the CD is different than hearing the music.
Anyway, I realize this thread was solely created so you could insult another member of religious forums. So I started another thread
http://www.religiousforums.com/forum/philosophy/157372-do-qualia-feelings-exist.html
 

raw_thought

Well-Known Member
“I'm merely defending a legitimate academic view from your quest to slay strawmen.”
Enaidealukal
I suppose you are claiming that my strawman is that eliminative materialists deny the existence of sensations, feelings and consciousness.
I have addressed your question over and over and shown why an eliminative materialist does not believe in feelings etc. But you choose not to engage my arguments. Makes me wonder why. Anyway, see ya at the other thread!
 

Enai de a lukal

Well-Known Member
I realize that you have a huge problem understanding analogies and metaphors.
Ad-hominem. You sure are averse to practicing what you preach, aren't you?

If you are claiming that there is a triangle in the person's brain
Who claimed that? I seem to recall pointing out that the eliminativist would likely reject BOTH of your options, but you seem to want to pretend that they would choose one of your absurd pseudo-options.

Anyway, I realize this thread was solely created so you could insult another member of religious forums.
Apparently you haven't been reading any of this thread then. Another member requested/suggested that I create this thread for them to defend their view that there is no such thing as truth- a view that I most definitely have taken some shots at, especially since said member completely begged off his invitation to defend his view and essentially tricked me into wasting my time creating this thread.
 

Enai de a lukal

Well-Known Member
But you choose not to engage my arguments.
You haven't offered any arguments. Ad-hominems and strawmen are not legitimate arguments. You've called eliminativism "deluded" and "neurotic", then mocked some claims that have nothing to do with eliminativism. Not sure what you expect me to do with any of this besides what I have done- pointing out the ludicrous nature of these types of "arguments".
 

raw_thought

Well-Known Member
“Who claimed that? I seem to recall pointing out that the eliminativist would likely reject BOTH of your options, but you seem to want to pretend that they would choose one of your absurd pseudo-options. “
enaidealukal
Here I will help you understand.
There are two options for an eliminative materialist
1. There is a triangle in the person’s brain. Because for an eliminative materialist only the physical exists that triangle must be physical.
2. There is no triangle in the person’s brain and so therefore, it is impossible to visualize a triangle.
Number 1 is absurd because it is obvious that there is no physical triangle in the person’s brain. And.
Number 2 is absurd because it is obvious that we can visualize triangles.
Therefore, the eliminative materialist’s position is untenable.
What third option are you talking about? The triangle exists or it does not exist. What is your third option?:facepalm:
 

raw_thought

Well-Known Member
You haven't offered any arguments. Ad-hominems and strawmen are not legitimate arguments. You've called eliminativism "deluded" and "neurotic", then mocked some claims that have nothing to do with eliminativism. Not sure what you expect me to do with any of this besides what I have done- pointing out the ludicrous nature of these types of "arguments".

Good grief! Take a philosophy course or basic logic.
True you may disagree and say that my syllogisms are invalid. But to claim that I have not made any arguments is absurd.
As for the "strawman", what are you talking about? My contention that eliminative materialists do not believe in consciousness, feelings and pain. I have presented my evidence. All you do is say, " you are wrong'..etc. Show me how my argument is invalid. That is what is called a debate.
 
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Enai de a lukal

Well-Known Member
Already addressed this-

Of course the options are absurd, because this is a strawman you've created. The eliminativist would choose the third (and intentionally unstated) option- that you can "visualize" a triangel, but that this a physical process of the brain which does not involve any "mental" functions or entities, and does not constitute a private, ineffable, intrinsic and immediately apprehensible to consciousness subjective "what it is like"- in other words, it is not an instance of qualia.

As I said, if eliminativism denied self-evident facts such as that pain or consciousness exists, or that we can visualize triangles, there would be no debate. It does not deny these things.
 

raw_thought

Well-Known Member
We agree that eliminative materialists do not believe in qualia. My contention is that qualia = feelings. Please address my arguments.
So what is your third option to " a triangle exists" and " a triangle does not exist"?
 

raw_thought

Well-Known Member
I am just stating the truth. You are smart but have a hard time understanding metaphors and analogies. For example, you could not see the obvious metaphor of the CD of Mozart's music.
 

Enai de a lukal

Well-Known Member
My contention is that qualia = feelings. Please address my arguments.
This got addressed in one of my first responses to you on this thread- that the terms "qualia", "subjective", "sensation", "consciousness" and so on do not mean precisely the same thing. And you have now linked to the stanford article several times, which explains what qualia is; which should also explain how they differ from "feelings", ordinarily understood. Feelings could by physical. Qualia, by definition, cannot. If you are identifying feelings with qualia, you're either using words in a weird and novel fashion, or you're simply begging the question.

So what is your third option to " a triangle exists" and " a triangle does not exist"?
Read my post.
 

raw_thought

Well-Known Member
simply answer the question. Anyway, restating your position that consciousness can exist without qualia does not offer any substance to the question," does consciousness require qualia."
 
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