That's not quite correct.
In emergentism, you have matter creating minds, and yet it is not reductionism.
That's why I have asked you before about how you use your terms.
Yes but with emergence the mind is immaterial to an even greater extent.
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That's not quite correct.
In emergentism, you have matter creating minds, and yet it is not reductionism.
That's why I have asked you before about how you use your terms.
There is definitely nothing difficult to understand about Stoljar's article: "physicalism" is a metaphysical thesis in which its fundamental posit can only be given a circular definition. Therefore it is a vacuous thesis.
You still can't articulate any defense of either materialism or physicalism as a true metaphysical thesis, can you?
Yes but with emergence the mind is immaterial to an even greater extent.
I don't know what you're asking here. Stoljar's article didn't say anything about a vacuum.Do you mean you were unable to understand what was meant by 'physical theory' and 'physical body' as anything more than a vacuum ?
So emergent dualism? Then the mind is still something immaterial that arose from matter (in an unknown way), thus making materialism false.
I don't know what you're asking here. Stoljar's article didn't say anything about a vacuum.
If you believe I have misunderstood something about physicalism, then quote whatever I said and demonstrate its error.
I'll ask this question again: You still can't articulate any defense of either materialism or physicalism as a true metaphysical thesis, can you?
Yes, I noted that Stoljar's article makes clear that "'physicalism' is a metaphysical thesis in which its fundamental posit can only be given a circular definition. Therefore it is a vacuous thesis."You have said that Physicalism 'is a vacuous thesis.'.
That's correct. I do not "get anything meaningful" about a metaphysical thesis in which its fundamental posit can only be defined in a circular way. That is contrary to the scientific method.Did you mean you were unable to get anything meaningful from the definitions provided ?
I didn't see those links. What were the definitions for "physical" in the Wikipedia?Were you able to comprehend what was meant by physical theory and physical objects ? I have provided links to both terms in the wikipedia.
Thoughts and memories are immaterial. Thoughts and memories exist, regardless of which ontological model one may subscribe.Try reading it again. If anything material was shown to exist, then materialism would be shown to be false.
Yes, I noted that Stoljar's article makes clear that "'physicalism' is a metaphysical thesis in which its fundamental posit can only be given a circular definition. Therefore it is a vacuous thesis."
That's correct. I do not "get anything meaningful" about a metaphysical thesis in which its fundamental posit can only be defined in a circular way. That is contrary to the scientific method.
I didn't see those links. What were the definitions for "physical" in the Wikipedia?
What are the criteria by which to distinguish something that is "physical" from something that is not? (And why doesn't Stoljar know about these criteria?)
No. Define "physical" so that we can distinguish something that is "physical" from something that is not, and provide your defense that the thesis of physicalism is true.Can you understand what was meant by 'Physicalism' now ?
You have expressed dualism when you suggest that the mind, which is a result of the brain, is not the brain it is a result of. Dual=two.As for dualism(of the mind body sort), that's also not a necessity. You can categorize anything as a dualism. apples/non apples=dualism. Mind isnt a singular thing, there are many emergent properties that are totally seperate, yet affect our experience. Emotion(many types), self awareness(ego, I), internal vocalization(thinking), body awareness, subconscious mind, etc etc, and the physical experience can be similarly broken down. There is only dualism if you create one in your own mind.
No. Define "physical" so that we can distinguish something that is "physical" from something that is not, and provide your defense that the thesis of physicalism is true.
Not according to the definition of materialism that you have provided. perhaps you should have examined it a little closer?
Materialism makes no claim(within that definition) that the mind can be reduced from the brain(as I have already pointed out), only that mind is a result of brain. You are a result of your parents, you are not your parents. You can not be reduced to your parents. That mind itself is not material, but arises from material processes, is completely consistent with the definition that, again, you provided.
You aren't actually arguing against materialism, you are arguing against a very specific proposition(the mind can be reduced to the brain) that nobody actually made; not any definition, nor any proponent of materialism, nor anyone in this thread. You are effectively arguing against yourself.
As for dualism(of the mind body sort), that's also not a necessity. You can categorize anything as a dualism. apples/non apples=dualism. Mind isnt a singular thing, there are many emergent properties that are totally seperate, yet affect our experience. Emotion(many types), self awareness(ego, I), internal vocalization(thinking), body awareness, subconscious mind, etc etc, and the physical experience can be similarly broken down. There is only dualism if you create one in your own mind.
"Physical" means "not mental"? You're saying there are only two possible kinds of things--either "mental" or "not mental"? Define mental.I think the most simple way to do just that is to define it as 'That which is not mental'.
"Physical" means "not mental"? You're saying there are only two possible kinds of things--either "mental" or "not mental"? Define mental.
And "physicalism" is the thesis that everything that exists is "not mental"--i.e., that nothing is "mental"?
What have you done here but proven that "physicalism" is vacuous, is not premised on any coherent idea? Obviously you haven't been able to articulate any argument that concludes that the thesis of physicalism is true (that nothing is real but that which is "physical" or, as you now claim, "not mental"). Right?
Sigh.Incorrect. If matter is all that exists (materialism) then everything has to be reduced to matter. Thoughts can't exist as immaterial things and thus are seen as "dependent on the brain", despite 14 pages clearly showing this has no defense. But even if a mind emerged from matter, we still get dualism, because we are drawing a distinction between substance A and B.
So your use of the adjective "mental" to define "physical" is also vacuous, undefinable?No. It is rather that everything is either physical or supervenes on the physical ( such as that which is 'mental' ).
The words 'physical' and 'mental' are being used in layman terms here.
I obviously do know what the definition of "physicalism" is. I quoted it above from Stoljar's article: "Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical."I find no point in trying to posit an argument in favour of 'Physicalism' if, after all this time, you can't even understand what 'Physicalism' is.
This is a different question. But wherever a person draws their line for "the material", if they say that nothing exists beyond that line, a single thing beyond that line would prove them wrong.
Obviously no one on this thread has been able to show that "all the data can be made to fit" the thesis of materialism or physicalism.All the data can be made to fit whatever ontological philosophy one subscribes to.
Obviously no one on this thread has been able to show that "all the data can be made to fit" the thesis of materialism or physicalism.