Koldo
Outstanding Member
So your use of the adjective "mental" to define "physical" is also vacuous, undefinable?
I obviously do know what the definition of "physicalism" is. I quoted it above from Stoljar's article: "Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical."
It is a non-vacuous definition of the adjective "physical" that you haven't been able to provide or cite.
If you don't understand what is meant by 'physical' in the definition of 'Physicalism' then you don't understand 'Physicalism' at all.
And I am afraid I can't explain it any better than I have done so far.
BTW, did you notice that the Wikipedia article "physical body" that you linked to does not contain a single citation whatsoever? I don't recall ever seeing another Wikipedia article that had no source whatsoever for its assertions.
Did you also notice that according to the defintion of "physical body" given in the first sentence of the article, the current theories and findings of physics demonstrate that the thesis of "physicalism" isn't true:
In physics, a physical body or physical object (sometimes simply called a body or object; also: concrete object) [citation needed] is an identifiable collection of matter, which may be more or less constrained by an identifiable boundary, [citation needed] to move together by translation or rotation, in 3-dimensional space.[citation needed]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_body
Obviously "energy" is but one example of a phenomenon that isn't a "collection" of objects that have mass and volume (i.e., matter).
It isn't my fault that you are unable to defend the thesis of materialism or physicalism. It's because the thesis has been proven empirically false (in the first case) or is vacuous (in the second case).
Physicalism doesn't state that the only things that exist are physical objects.
Read this part again:
"The theory-based conception:
A property is physical iff it either is the sort of property that physical theory tells us about or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property that physical theory tells us about."
"The object-based conception:
A property is physical iff: it either is the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents."