Any Defenses of Materialism?

[1137]

The only defense is that they are trying to provoke the argument for better physical explanations.
For instance, vitamin B certainly improves concentration, and alcohol inhibits the mind.
But, of course, it is the mind that decides to consume one or the other.

Essentially it seems impossible to escape dualism, but the problem still persists in:
to what extent the material effects the mind.

To often, people lazily slip into ignoring the physical aspects of consciousness
and dualism often degenerates into solipsistic non-materialism.

Actually the physical still effects consciousness to a far greater extent than any of us can realize.
So the defense is actually methodological:

By assuming a rigid materialist ontology, we stop the mind from degenerating into solipsism.

Shouldn't we just not ignore the physical aspects instead of assuming an unsound position just to make it easier?

 

[1137]

What we call material is not material.

What is it made of?

 

[Willamena]

No it is not.

Ha ha. It was sarcasm.
...

It is evidence.

Evidence doesn't assign the truth value.

 

[Koldo]

How do you reconcile that with the claim made in post 281 that physicalism makes no claim about all things being physical?

There is a misunderstanding here. It is not that Physicalism makes no claim about all things being physical. It is that it makes no claims about all things being physical objects.

 

[1137]

It is evidence.

Evidence doesn't assign the truth value.

Correlation is not evidence of causation.

 

[Willamena]

Correlation is not evidence of causation.

It is. It is causation's principle evidence, and the primary reason that we have the modern scientific method.

 

[1137]

It is. It is causation's principle evidence, and the primary reason that we have the modern scientific method.

 

[atanu]

It is evidence.
Evidence doesn't assign the truth value.

Yes. Truth value is assigned by the thinker.

 

[Willamena]

I believe the saying you are looking for is: "Correlation is not causation." And that's correct; but nothing I can think of eliminates it from being evidence of causation.

 

[Willamena]

There is a misunderstanding here. It is not that Physicalism makes no claim about all things being physical. It is that it makes no claims about all things being physical objects.

Philosophically, "things" are synonymous with "objects."

quote: Tugendhat then proceeds to ask:Now what is meant by the word ‘object’? This word too, in the comprehensive sense in which it is used in philosophy, is a term of art. In ordinary language we are inclined to call only material objects… objects, and not e.g. events or numbers… What is meant by ‘objects’ in philosophy has its basis in … what we mean by the word ‘something’… There is a class of linguistic expressions which are used to stand for an object; and here we can only say: to stand for something. These are the expressions which can function as the sentence-subject in so-called singular predicative statements and which in logic have also been called singular terms…

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/object/ /quote

 

[atanu]

I believe the saying you are looking for is: "Correlation is not causation." And that's correct; but nothing I can think of eliminates it from being evidence of causation.

Yes. Correlation is a strong evidence of causation but evidence can be spurious or there can be a third factor controlling the two correlating factors.

So, until a valid mechanism explains how brain states give rise to cognition, the proposition of causation is a hypothesis.

 

[Koldo]

A lot worse than "literally not one defense"? I highly doubt it. At the very least at least we can directly know the mind, giving immaterial monism a slight edge.

A defense against what ?
What is the nature of the criticism ?

Being unable to explain how the mind arises from the brain ? A gap in knowledge ?
Is that its fault ?

By default I mean that dualism is the stance that accounts for all the evidence, makes the least assumptions, and is easily defended. I mean the most unbiased, intellectually honest stance is dualism.

How do you explain the mechanic behind both substances interacting ?

 

[Nous]

LOL... I don't think that's necessary. You have to do the think work for yourself with these philosophical questions. I can see how all the data can be made to fit materialism, in spite of not agreeing with that ontological philosophy. Don't need people to show me that, but I also spent way too much time thinking about stuff like this as a kid.

I also used to be much more interested in metaphysics than I am now. I think I now basically consider all efforts to formulate a monist metaphysics futile.

How can one conclude that the thesis of materialism is true in light of the fact that matter is not even one of the fundamental conserved quantities in modern physics?

 

[Nous]

If you don't understand what is meant by 'physical' in the definition of 'Physicalism' then you don't understand 'Physicalism' at all.
And I am afraid I can't explain it any better than I have done so far.

Are you saying that the circular definition of "physical" that Stoljar gave is coherent and makes for a coherent metaphysical thesis?

If so, I assume you also agree my defense of pantheism above is a coherent metaphysical thesis.

Physicalism doesn't state that the only things that exist are physical objects.

This is what Stoljar said in the SEP article that you provided: "Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical." I haven't misrepresented what the definition of physicalism, have I?

BTW: in the Wikipedia article on "physical body" that you linked to, which contains no citations, the term "physical body" just means "matter". Right?

 

[Koldo]

Philosophically, "things" are synonymous with "objects."

quote: Tugendhat then proceeds to ask:Now what is meant by the word ‘object’? This word too, in the comprehensive sense in which it is used in philosophy, is a term of art. In ordinary language we are inclined to call only material objects… objects, and not e.g. events or numbers… What is meant by ‘objects’ in philosophy has its basis in … what we mean by the word ‘something’… There is a class of linguistic expressions which are used to stand for an object; and here we can only say: to stand for something. These are the expressions which can function as the sentence-subject in so-called singular predicative statements and which in logic have also been called singular terms…

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/object/ /quote

I don't see any issue as long as you understand the term 'physical object' is not being used in the same sense in that sentence.
It is being used in a fairly more restrictive manner.

 

[Koldo]

Are you saying that the circular definition of "physical" that Stoljar gave is coherent and makes for a coherent metaphysical thesis?

If so, I assume you also agree my defense of pantheism above is a coherent metaphysical thesis.

Could you please do as requested in post #197 and exemplify a 'deific theory' and a 'deific object' ?
I can't agree on what I don't understand.

This is what Stoljar said in the SEP article that you provided: "Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical." I haven't misrepresented what the definition of physicalism, have I?

BTW: in the Wikipedia article on "physical body" that you linked to, which contains no citations, the term "physical body" just means "matter". Right?

Explain how exactly the existence of 'energy' refutes Physicalism. Regardless of your reasons, the fact you have presented 'energy' as being able to do so makes it apparent that you have either misrepresented or misunderstood Physicalism.

Regarding the 'physical body', yes. That's correct.

 

[Willamena]

I don't see any issue as long as you understand the term 'physical object' is not being used in the same sense in that sentence.
It is being used in a fairly more restrictive manner.

Restrictive in what way? What do you mean? Which sentence is more restrictive, and how do the uses of 'physical object' differ in sense?

 

[Koldo]

Restrictive in what way? What do you mean? Which sentence is more restrictive, and how do the uses of 'physical object' differ in sense?

Consider abstract objects. Consciousness, emotions, numbers.
Those wouldn't be regarded as 'physical objects' in Physicalism, even though Physicalism does state everything is physical.

 

[Willamena]

Consider abstract objects. Consciousness, emotions, numbers.
Those wouldn't be regarded as 'physical objects' in Physicalism, even though Physicalism does state everything is physical.

So, coming full circle, how do you reconcile objects (collections of properties) that are not physical in Physicalism?

 

[Koldo]

So, coming full circle, how do you reconcile objects (collections of properties) that are not physical in Physicalism?

Supervenience.