Any Defenses of Materialism?

[Willamena]

Supervenience.

According to Physicalism, as given, a property that supervenes on the physical is also physical.

"A property is physical iff it ...is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property that physical theory tells us about."

 

[Koldo]

According to Physicalism, as given, a property that supervenes on the physical is also physical.

"A property is physical iff it ...is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property that physical theory tells us about."

Let me put it this way: When I say 'physical object', I am talking about concrete objects.

 

[1137]

Let me put it this way: When I say 'physical object', I am talking about concrete objects.

So a chair is physical but the subatomic nonsense creating it is not?

 

[Koldo]

So a chair is physical but the subatomic nonsense creating it is not?

How did you reach this conclusion ?
Kindly explain the logical steps you took to reach it.

 

[Willamena]

Let me put it this way: When I say 'physical object', I am talking about concrete objects.

But Physicalism isn't. Physicalism addresses literally everything, and it is correct to say that there is nothing that is not physical in this context. The abstract object, for instance, does not exist apart from the physical object it is about: there is no thing called "two" without two things for it to be about.

The definitions of Physicalism given in 281 are in terms of properties, no doubt for this reason. It is inclusive of the abstract object as physical.*

*Or, entirely exclusive and eliminative of it.

 

[1137]

How did you reach this conclusion ?
Kindly explain the logical steps you took to reach it.

Um, I was asking you a question based on your claim that what is physical must be concrete.

 

[Koldo]

But Physicalism isn't. Physicalism addresses literally everything, and it is correct to say that there is nothing that is not physical in this context. The abstract object, for instance, does not exist apart from the physical object it is about: there is no thing called "two" without two things for it to be about.

The definitions of Physicalism given in 281 are in terms of properties, no doubt for this reason. It is inclusive of the abstract object as physical.*

*Or, entirely exclusive and eliminative of it.

I think the fatal flaw here is approaching the definitions with the conclusion that 'everything is physical' already in your mind.
As I see it, their intent is to explain what a physical property is by pointing to the ordinary applications of the word 'physical'.

 

[Koldo]

Um, I was asking you a question based on your claim that what is physical must be concrete.

I haven't claimed that what is physical must be concrete.

 

[1137]

I haven't claimed that what is physical must be concrete.

Let me put it this way: When I say 'physical object', I am talking about concrete

Wut?

 

[Willamena]

I think the fatal flaw here is approaching the definitions with the conclusion that 'everything is physical' already in your mind.
As I see it, their intent is to explain what a physical property is by pointing to the ordinary applications of the word 'physical'.

Actually, the intent is to explain what it means for something to be "physical."
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#UndPhyInt

The definitions are approached objectively, and the discussion would seem to play out objectively.

 

[Nous]

Could you please do as requested in post #197 and exemplify a 'deific theory' and a 'deific object' ?

Why? My purpose in transferring Stoljar's "defense" of physicalism to pantheism was to show how ridiculous Stoljar's "defense" of physicalism.

Obviously nothing that I can say about "deific theory" or "deific objects" is going to help you provide a coherent (non-circular) definition of "physical" or argue for the thesis of physicalism.

This is what Stoljar said in the SEP article that you provided: "Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical." I haven't misrepresented what the definition of physicalism, have I?

BTW: in the Wikipedia article on "physical body" that you linked to, which contains no citations, the term "physical body" just means "matter". Right?

Explain how exactly the existence of 'energy' refutes Physicalism.

Perhaps you are referring to my comment in #277:

Did you also notice that according to the defintion of "physical body" given in the first sentence of the article, the current theories and findings of physics demonstrate that the thesis of "physicalism" isn't true:

In physics, a physical body or physical object (sometimes simply called a body or object; also: concrete object) [citation needed] is an identifiable collection of matter, which may be more or less constrained by an identifiable boundary, [citation needed] to move together by translation or rotation, in 3-dimensional space.[citation needed]​

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_body

Obviously "energy" is but one example of a phenomenon that isn't a "collection" of objects that have mass and volume (i.e., matter).​

Perhaps I should have clarified that according to the definition of "physical body" given in the first sentence of the Wikipedia article, the current theories and findings of physics demonstrate that the thesis of physicalism isn't true if "physicalism" means that everything consists of or supervenes on "physical bodies".

Obviously the thesis of "physicalism" can't be falsified until we get a non-circular definition of "physical". The Wikipedia article provides a non-circular definition of "physical body". I was using that term to define what "physicalism" means.

 

[Koldo]

Wut?

Something can be physical and yet not a 'physical object' in the sense I was using the term.

 

[Nous]

Something can be physical and yet not a 'physical object' in the sense I was using the term.

What is the nature of this "something" that is supposedly "physical" but isn't an object (a "collection of matter" according to the article you linked to)? How did you determine that this "something" is in fact "physical"?

 

[Koldo]

Actually, the intent is to explain what it means for something to be "physical."
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#UndPhyInt

The definitions are approached objectively, and the discussion would seem to play out objectively.

Consider the following definitions:

"The object-based conception:
A property is physical iff: it either is the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents."

And

"The object-based conception:
A property is physical iff: it either is the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic objects and their constituents or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic objects and their constituents."

I have removed the word 'physical' twice from the first definition when typing the second definition. If everything is physical, then attaching 'physical' as an adjective to anything that exists is absolutely redundant in the context of this definition. Yet, this word was included in the first case. That's because there is something meaningful that can be understood from its use. What is it ?

 

[Koldo]

Why? My purpose in transferring Stoljar's "defense" of physicalism to pantheism was to show how ridiculous Stoljar's "defense" of physicalism.

Obviously nothing that I can say about "deific theory" or "deific objects" is going to help you provide a coherent (non-circular) definition of "physical" or argue for the thesis of physicalism.

I can understand what is meant by 'physical theory' and 'physical object', regardless of whether you do.
But I don't understand what is a 'deific object' and a 'deific theory'. Can you exemplify ?

Perhaps you are referring to my comment in #277:

Did you also notice that according to the defintion of "physical body" given in the first sentence of the article, the current theories and findings of physics demonstrate that the thesis of "physicalism" isn't true:

In physics, a physical body or physical object (sometimes simply called a body or object; also: concrete object) [citation needed] is an identifiable collection of matter, which may be more or less constrained by an identifiable boundary, [citation needed] to move together by translation or rotation, in 3-dimensional space.[citation needed]​

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_body

Obviously "energy" is but one example of a phenomenon that isn't a "collection" of objects that have mass and volume (i.e., matter).​

Perhaps I should have clarified that according to the definition of "physical body" given in the first sentence of the Wikipedia article, the current theories and findings of physics demonstrate that the thesis of physicalism isn't true if "physicalism" means that everything consists of or supervenes on "physical bodies".

Obviously the thesis of "physicalism" can't be falsified until we get a non-circular definition of "physical". The Wikipedia article provides a non-circular definition of "physical body". I was using that term to define what "physicalism" means.

I will repeat both definitions, and I want you to explain how 'energy' contradicts Physicalism.

"The theory-based conception:
A property is physical iff it either is the sort of property that physical theory tells us about or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property that physical theory tells us about."

"The object-based conception:
A property is physical iff: it either is the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents."

 

[Koldo]

What is the nature of this "something" that is supposedly "physical" but isn't an object (a "collection of matter" according to the article you linked to)? How did you determine that this "something" is in fact "physical"?

Is it 'something' that any physical theory tell us about ? Is it 'something' required for a complete account of the intrinsic nature of a physical object and their constituents ?
Does this 'something' supervene on anything that a physical theory tell us about ? Does this 'something' supervene on anything that is required for a complete account of the intrinsic nature of a physical object and their constituents?

If your answer is 'yes' to any of those questions, it is physical.

 

[Willamena]

I have removed the word 'physical' twice from the first definition when typing the second definition. If everything is physical, then attaching 'physical' as an adjective to anything that exists is absolutely redundant in the context of this definition. Yet, this word was included in the first case. That's because there is something meaningful that can be understood from its use. What is it ?

Its meaning is that those references apply to physical objects. But to look at only that ignores the first half of what is said.

"A property..." (which is an abstract object) "...is physical if and only if..." (conditions ensue).

As everything has properties, and as things are the sum of their properties, it is inclusive of everything as physical.

 

[Nous]

I can understand what is meant by 'physical theory' and 'physical object', regardless of whether you do.

Evidently you haven't understood that it merely begs the question to try to defend the thesis of "physicalism" by using a circular definition of the adjective "physical".

I will repeat both definitions, and I want you to explain how 'energy' contradicts Physicalism.

"The theory-based conception:
A property is physical iff it either is the sort of property that physical theory tells us about or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property that physical theory tells us about."

"The object-based conception:
A property is physical iff: it either is the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents."

(1) I already pointed out the impossibility of falsifying the thesis of "physicalism" as long as it is premised upon a circular definition of "physical".

(2) I clearly pointed out that I was referring to the definition of "physical object" that you linked to in the Wikipedia article when I noted that energy is not a collection of physical objects.

 

[Nous]

Is it 'something' that any physical theory tell us about ? Is it 'something' required for a complete account of the intrinsic nature of a physical object and their constituents ?
Does this 'something' supervene on anything that a physical theory tell us about ? Does this 'something' supervene on anything that is required for a complete account of the intrinsic nature of a physical object and their constituents?

If your answer is 'yes' to any of those questions, it is physical.

So evidently free will or volition (the ability to choose between available options) is not one of the physical somethings. I guess that's the end of physicalism.

BTW, how do physical objects produce something that is "additional or extraneous" (http://www.dictionary.com/browse/supervene?s=t ) to physical objects?

 

[Koldo]

Evidently you haven't understood that it merely begs the question to try to defend the thesis of "physicalism" by using a circular definition of the adjective "physical".

Still waiting for your examples.

(1) I already pointed out the impossibility of falsifying the thesis of "physicalism" as long as it is premised upon a circular definition of "physical".

If you were to treat it as scientific hypothesis ?
You would have to show objects with identical physical properties but with different mental properties ( or that the physical differences between similar objects don't account for the divergence in mental properties ).

(2) I clearly pointed out that I was referring to the definition of "physical object" that you linked to in the Wikipedia article when I noted that energy is not a collection of physical objects.

And ? What if 'energy' is not a collection of physical objects ? In what way does that contradict 'Physicalism' ?