Atheism is not a default position

[leibowde84]

I wasn't clear. I meant that if atheism pits itself as opposed to a concept, then it's not pitting itself against theism, which is about a god.

Atheism doesn't pit itself against theism, it is merely the absence of theism. And, theism is the belief in the existence of God and gods, so the atheist simply must be absent of that belief.

 

[Willamena]

Atheism doesn't pit itself against theism, it is merely the absence of theism. And, theism is the belief in the existence of God and gods, so the atheist simply must be absent of that belief.

My bad. I though the elimination theism to be enough to qualify as pitting oneself against it.

 

[leibowde84]

My bad. I though the elimination theism to be enough to qualify as pitting oneself against it.

What?! Atheism, again, is a lack of belief. So there is no implicit intent to "eliminate theism", as you claim.

 

[Willamena]

What?! Atheism, again, is a lack of belief. So there is no implicit intent to "eliminate theism", as you claim.

Um... Okay. *backs away slowly*

 

[idav]

Time to lay this rhinoceros to rest. If you accept that atheism describes the person who has no interest in, no knowledge about, or no particular belief about god, then atheism cannot be described as a "default position" on a scale of beliefs.

Default: Amongst a mess of options, the default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing.

Thing about this: belief isn't an act. It's not something we do, and especially not something we choose to do. It's a description of the world, nothing more, nothing less.

Take the world.

The world is the case.

If we wish to examine truth or untruth, belief or doubt, certainty or uncertainty about the world, then we must hold the world distinct from those things we wish to examine. Hence, we will refer to it, and all its parts, as "the case."

The world is the case, and of the case things may be true or false, hence they may be believed or doubted, with degrees of certainty or uncertainty.

If I say, "I believe George went to the store," that lends it uncertainty. It says that because of insufficient knowledge there may some amount of doubt about George's activities, but still I have a degree of certainty about it. Similarly, to say, "I don't believe George went to the store," is to assert its uncertainty. Belief is the case described in such a way as to hold a degree of certainty.

If I say "George went to the store," then asserting the truth of that lends it a face that says there is no doubt, no uncertainty about George's journey. Truth is the case described as apart from me, apart from the certainty a consciousness might know.

That's because a consciousness is distinct from the world it knows.

The default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing. The world is the case.

Both asserting a degree of certainty to the world and describing it as apart from me, apart from any degrees of certainty, are things we do. They are dong something, not nothing. Where the default is the option that will obtain if the chooser does nothing, asserting belief and truth--and their counterparts disbelief and falsehood--about what is the case are doing something.

In discussion, we do not fail to do something about the world.

Not doing something in the case of belief is not making a choice of belief. While theism requires the choice atheism does not.

 

[Willamena]

Not doing something in the case of belief is not making a choice of belief. While theism requires the choice atheism does not.

But lending degrees of certainty to statements made about the world by asserting belief, or not, is "doing something."

 

[idav]

But lending degrees of certainty to statements made about the world by asserting belief, or not, is "doing something."

Sure but there are no degrees of certainty in a yes or no statement of belief or in lack of a choice made one way or another.

 

[idav]

Lets not convolute potential knowledge of God with a yes or no answer to a question.

 

[Willamena]

Sure but there are no degrees of certainty in a yes or no statement of belief or in lack of a choice made one way or another.

Can you give an example?

 

[Willamena]

Lets not convolute potential knowledge of God with a yes or no answer to a question.

I'm quite happy with leaving "potential" out of the conversation. That's a whole 'nother colour of horse.

 

[idav]

Can you give an example?

The choices aren't just guilty and not guilty,not making a decision, not able to, will result in a hung jury.

 

[leibowde84]

Um... Okay. *backs away slowly*

Why would you think otherwise? You are thinking about "anti-theism".

 

[Willamena]

The choices aren't just guilty and not guilty,not making a decision, not able to, will result in a hung jury.

So?

 

[idav]

I'm quite happy with leaving "potential" out of the conversation. That's a whole 'nother colour of horse.

Something being potentially true lends to degrees of certainty.

 

[Willamena]

Why would you think otherwise? You are thinking about "anti-theism".

I was talking about philosophical elimination, which stands in contrast to reduction. In reducing one thing to another, we describe the first thing in terms of the second. In eliminating a thing, though, we choose words to show how it's not there. Words like "lacking" or "absent" are good ones.

 

[idav]

So?

Guilty and not guilty can be the statements of belief despite the evidence or degree of certainty certainty. Not making the statement of belief ignores certainly levels.

 

[leibowde84]

I was talking about philosophical elimination, which stands in contrast to reduction. In reducing one thing to another, we describe the first thing in terms of the second. In eliminating a thing, though, we choose words to show how it's not there. Words like "lacking" or "absent" are good ones.

Philosophical elimination is what is used with distinguishing these terms. They refer to either holding or not holding a specific belief.

 

[Willamena]

Something being potentially true lends to degrees of certainty.

Not by my understanding. Certainty is its own relation to truth, potential is another. While I always hold the potential to throw up after drinking alcohol, I do not always hold the certainty that I will throw up.

 

[Willamena]

Philosophical elimination is what is used with distinguishing these terms. They refer to either holding or not holding a specific belief.

Indeed.

 

[Willamena]

Guilty and not guilty can be the statements of belief despite the evidence or degree of certainty certainty. Not making the statement of belief ignores certainly levels.

I see, judgement.

My beef is in conflating "not believe" with making no statement of belief--one is negation, the other elimination. In eliminating a statement about belief, we also fail to make a statement about that which is believed. In other words, if "atheism" doesn't make a statement about belief in god, then it isn't itself about belief in god, and so it isn't a-theism.

It's just a. Eh.