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Do you believe in the mystical?

Do you believe in the mystical?


  • Total voters
    31

Gambit

Well-Known Member
And now some scientists are telling us that what they are calling The Unified Field is none other than Pure Consciousness; Brahman; 'Sat Chit-Ananda', etc, and can be accessed directly via the meditative process:

ॐ = mc^2

:cool:
 

godnotgod

Thou art That
Or perhaps of realizing that there is such a thing as believing in too much for one's own good?

True, but awakening to one's own divine nature is not belief-based. Of course, in the case of the atheist, he wouldn't know that until he does awaken.
 

lovemuffin

τὸν ἄρτον τοῦ ἔρωτος
I read that as being a reference to the unknown, the things we can not see. Hence the other derivative of the term; Mystery. I do not see it as in conflict with atheism.

I would say typically it's more correct to hear mystical as referring to the unknowable, rather than just the unknown. Still, given the usual definition of atheism, there still isn't a conflict. Disbelief in gods does not entail disbelief in the unknowable. Mysticism is incompatible in practice with a philosophical outlook in which the whole of reality is taken to be intelligible and logically describable. A rationalism, of sorts.
 
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Gambit

Well-Known Member
True, but awakening to one's own divine nature is not belief-based. Of course, in the case of the atheist, he wouldn't know that until he does awaken.

Belief plays a critical part in having a lucid dream (which is a form of awakening to one's own dream).
 

godnotgod

Thou art That
Belief plays a critical part in having a lucid dream (which is a form of awakening to one's own dream).

Faith, maybe, but not belief, as belief is about doctrine, and doctrine is never about spiritual awakening. Faith is not about anything in particular, but rather an attitude.

Belief clings;
Faith lets go.
 

godnotgod

Thou art That
I would say typically it's more correct to hear mystical as referring to the unknowable, rather than just the unknown. Still, given the usual definition of atheism, there still isn't a conflict. Disbelief in gods does not entail disbelief in the unknowable. Mysticism is incompatible in practice with a philosophical outlook in which the whole of reality is taken to be intelligible and logically describable. A rationalism, of sorts.

The other side of 'the unknowable', is the 'don't know mind', in which the mind is not trying to grasp or define what it knows. In this respect, the atheist is not truly in this state of mind, as he has already taken up a position, whereas the 'don't know mind' neither believes, nor not-believes. Choosing neither, one then is free to see, rather than believe, what is. This condition of 'just seeing', without thought, is the beginning of the merging of subject/object of internal divine union, which is, in essence, the mystical experience; the atman 'becoming' Brahman; the surrender of the 'I' of limited individual consciousness to unlimited, universal consciousness.

You are correct: the mystical experience is not philosophy.
 

Bunyip

pro scapegoat
I would say typically it's more correct to hear mystical as referring to the unknowable, rather than just the unknown. Still, given the usual definition of atheism, there still isn't a conflict. Disbelief in gods does not entail disbelief in the unknowable. Mysticism is incompatible in practice with a philosophical outlook in which the whole of reality is taken to be intelligible and logically describable. A rationalism, of sorts.
Sure, but we can not distinguish between the unknown and the unknowable, but I do understand your argument. Thanks.
 

lovemuffin

τὸν ἄρτον τοῦ ἔρωτος
Sure, but we can not distinguish between the unknown and the unknowable, but I do understand your argument. Thanks.

Maybe not always, but certainly in some cases. No one knows exactly what's going on at some particular location in the Marianas trench right now, I presume, but we know that whatever it is, it's knowable.
 

Bunyip

pro scapegoat
Maybe not always, but certainly in some cases. No one knows exactly what's going on at some particular location in the Marianas trench right now, I presume, but we know that whatever it is, it's knowable.
How would you know that?
 

lovemuffin

τὸν ἄρτον τοῦ ἔρωτος
How would you know that?

induction from the fact that the floor of the trench has been explored (in part) before? Maybe I need to clarify what I mean by "know what's going on there". I don't mean necessarily know literally every physical detail, I just mean like in the way I'd look into your room and see what you were doing in there...
 

Bunyip

pro scapegoat
induction from the fact that the floor of the trench has been explored (in part) before? Maybe I need to clarify what I mean by "know what's going on there". I don't mean necessarily know literally every physical detail, I just mean like in the way I'd look into your room and see what you were doing in there...
Well sure, it is an induction - which is different from a known.
We seem to be sharing a fair bit of common ground here, I understand what you are saying and am not trying to obscure your point.
 

lovemuffin

τὸν ἄρτον τοῦ ἔρωτος
It seems to me that if your epistemology excludes from "knowledge" that which is reached by way of induction that there is very little which could be said to be known. I wouldn't know that if I knock my phone off my desk it will fall to the ground. I'm aware that in epistemology there is not some universal agreement about what constitutes "knowledge", and there are issues like the Gettier cases, but I'm fairly comfortable saying that conclusions drawn from reasonably established inductive arguments are "known".
 

Bunyip

pro scapegoat
It seems to me that if your epistemology excludes from "knowledge" that which is reached by way of induction that there is very little which could be said to be known. I wouldn't know that if I knock my phone off my desk it will fall to the ground. I'm aware that in epistemology there is not some universal agreement about what constitutes "knowledge", and there are issues like the Gettier cases, but I'm fairly comfortable saying that conclusions drawn from reasonably established inductive arguments are "known".
Yes, I exclude induction from knowledge.
 

NulliuSINverba

Active Member
The mystical experience is not that of the personal finite self; it's not my experience as only 'I' see it; it is impersonal, and being impersonal, it is the experience of the universal.


Unsubstantiated twaddle.

As the Hindus say:
'the saltiness of the sea is the same everywhere'.


Unfortunately, that "deepity" is demonstrably untrue. Salinity levels in seawater vary. Sorry.

Just as there is no such 'it' that rains

Again, a demonstrably false assertion.

See: "Storm."

Example:

Q. - What is it that is raining?
A. - It is a storm that is raining.

See? Easy peasy.


there is no experiencer of the experience; there is only the experience itself.

You're suggesting that experiences can occur without anyone to experience them? Isn't that akin to claiming that reading can take place without a reader?
 

NulliuSINverba

Active Member
The point is that the belief is not the same thing as the experience.

So you're saying that belief cannot be experienced? That belief isn't experienced?

The distinction becomes important to the understanding of mystical experience (and especially to inter-religious dialogue) because the interpretation of an experience is not "absolute" or unmediated in the way the experience is in itself.

The assertion that anything "mystical" exists is unsubstantiated.
 

lovemuffin

τὸν ἄρτον τοῦ ἔρωτος
So you're saying that belief cannot be experienced? That belief isn't experienced?

No, but the experience of belief is not the experience of that experience which is prior to the belief about it.

The assertion that anything "mystical" exists is unsubstantiated.

Yes and no, in my opinion. Yes in that it's not rationally or empirically (scientifically) demonstrated. It wouldn't exactly be the experience of the ineffable and unknowable in that case. No in that there is widespread testimony as to the fact that people have experiences which they describe in "mystical" terms, and that fact shouldn't be entirely ignored, even if it doesn't demonstrate an objective and rationally justifiable "existence" to which those experiences point.
 

NulliuSINverba

Active Member
No, but the experience of belief is not the experience of that experience which is prior to the belief about it.

But you wouldn't deny that belief itself can be (and in fact must be) experienced ... that the act of believing must be experienced to be meaningful?

Yes and no, in my opinion. Yes in that it's not rationally or empirically (scientifically) demonstrated. It wouldn't exactly be the experience of the ineffable and unknowable in that case.

So empty claims regarding allegedly spooky stuff will always be just claims, correct? Because the very minute that any of these claims were substantiated, they'd also cease to be mystical, no?

No in that there is widespread testimony as to the fact that people have experiences which they describe in "mystical" terms, and that fact shouldn't be entirely ignored, even if it doesn't demonstrate an objective and rationally justifiable "existence" to which those experiences point.

There are also plenty of people who're ready to offer equally sincere (and equally unsubstantiated) testimony that they've been abducted by aliens or that they've been reincarnated. So what?
 
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