I want to add there are points of agreement that I have with Dennett concerning that our social behavior and the nature of choice is evolved behavior for the survival of the human species,
But, his belief his belief in Compatibilism does not reflect my view as in the following:
en.wikipedia.org
Dennett's stance on
free will is
compatibilism with an evolutionary twist – the view that, although in the strict physical sense our actions might be determined, we can still be free in all the ways that matter, because of the abilities we evolved. Free will, seen this way, is about
freedom to make decisions without duress (and so is a version of Kantian positive practical free will, i.e., Kantian autonomy), as opposed to an impossible and unnecessary freedom from causality itself.
To clarify this distinction, he uses the term 'evitability' (the opposite of 'inevitability'), defining it as the ability of an agent to anticipate likely consequences and act to avoid undesirable ones. Evitability is entirely compatible with, and actually requires, human action being deterministic. Dennett moves on to
altruism, denying that it requires acting to the benefit of others without gaining any benefit yourself. He argues that it should be understood in terms of helping yourself by helping others, expanding the self to be more inclusive as opposed to being selfless. To show this blend, he calls such actions 'benselfish', and finds the roots of our capacity for this in the
evolutionary pressures that produced
kin selection. In his treatment of both free will and altruism, he starts by showing why we should not accept the traditional definitions of either term.
The above clearly indicates that Dennett's view of Compatibilism fits the definition I previde. He may describe human actions as evitable they are ultimately deterministic.